HIDDEN
ALLY By Arthur L. Funk
This is a disk version of Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the
Landings in
Chapter 1 Introduction
Although the landings in southern France have never received the same
attention as that given to OVERLORD, the Normandy assault, it should not be
forgotten that in the mind of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of
the Allied forces, two thrusts into France were considered as integral parts of
the overall Allied Grand Strategy.
Eisenhower's concept of a broad front, reaching from
Eisenhower and the American chief of staff,
Gen. George Marshall, firmly believed in this strategy, but Prime Minister
Winston Churchill and many others, mostly British, vigorously opposed Operation
ANVIL, the southern landings. The prime
minister used every argument known<197>and Churchill knew them
all<197>to persuade President Roosevelt, General Marshall, the
Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Eisenhower to abandon the
project. The British argued that pulling
divisions from the Italian Theater would doom an advance into the Po Valley,
and with that failure would evaporate all prospects of exploring the
At the Quebec Conference, in August 1943,
neither Churchill nor the British chief of staff, Gen. Sir Alan Brooke,
registered strong opposition to a southern
After the Teheran Conference, in December
1943, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that Eisenhower should leave
Shortly after taking up his new
responsibilities, Devers learned that the U.S. IV Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen.
Alexander M. Patch, Jr., had been assigned to the Mediterranean Theater. Devers had long known and admired Patch, a
dependable and experienced officer who had acquired some knowledge of Free
French intransigence in New Caledonia, and who had built up a reputation as
commander in Guadalcanal. Devers
strongly recommended to
It was no wonder that Frenchmen who had been
working with the Allies were somewhat bewildered. While the announcement that Patch had been
appointed to command the Seventh Army seemed to confirm the fact that ANVIL would
take place, there had not yet been any definite decisions concerning the exact
role that the French were to play.
Allied planning assumed that French divisions would land in
@HEAD1 = THE FRENCH STAKE IN ANVIL
Since June 1943, Gen. Charles de Gaulle,
leader of the Free French, and Gen. Henri Giraud, Commander in Chief of the
non-Gaullist French troops in
Out of the turmoil, with that inherent and
undeniable flair for the right move in a political impasse, de Gaulle emerged
with new prestige. When American staff
officers outlined the ANVIL plan to him on
De Gaulle possessed a comprehensive view of
Allied strategy and keenly appreciated his own need to work with the great
powers at the same time that he made sure he would be accepted as leader within
@HEAD1 = THE RESISTANCE
The French Resistance had come into being in
1940<197>virtually as soon as the Armistice with
On the nonmilitary side, many French citizens
who were simple civilians began to band together secretly in order to resist
the Nazi occupiers. In the South, an
energetic journalist of leftist leanings, Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie,
united some groups under the title Libá,áration. Another important group,
Combat, was headed by the dynamic Henri Frenay, whose energy was largely
responsible for the formation of a Gaullist military wing, the Secret Army, or
AS (Armá,áe Secrá_áte). When Combat,
Libá,áration, and another group, Franc-Tireur, came together in early 1943 as
the MUR (<MI>Mouvements Unis de la Rá,ásistance<D>), they
recognized de Gaulle's leadership and accepted, at least in theory, that the
military arm would help to impose de Gaulle's FCNL as the provisional
government on the French people. In
general, the professed policy of the Secret Army was to organize itself so that
it could mobilize in force when the Allied invasion occurred but meanwhile was
not to engage in premature uprisings that could provoke German reprisals. Under the MUR were listed many <MI>Groupes
Francs<D>, originally oriented toward sabotage but in any case filled
with young enthusiasts who wanted action as soon as
possible.<P8MJ239>5<P255DJ0>
Unification was complicated by those
companies organized as FTP (<MI>Francs-Tireurs et
Partisans<D>). With its leadership
largely Communist-oriented, the FTP strode along its own political and military
path. Since many of its chiefs detested
both the decadence of the
From the very early days, many Resistance
leaders kept in touch with de Gaulle's Free French in
However, the French, almost entirely
dependent on British subsidies, had to rely on British planes, weapons, and
radio in order to keep in touch with their occupied country. This clandestine support, a unique phenomenon
of World War II, came from a unique organization, SOE (Special Operations
Executive), with which sections of its American counterpart,
@HEAD1-NP = THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE
SOE was a secret organization formed after
France fell in 1940.<P8MJ239>8<P255DJ0> It had the mission of holding together,
aiding, and providing leadership for those stalwart individuals in Europe who
could not accept Nazi domination and who wished to fight on with whatever
meager resources they had. Attached to
Lord Selborne's Ministry of Economic Warfare, headed after 1943 by Maj. Gen.
Colin Gubbins, SOE from its London headquarters in Baker Street, enlarged
itself octopus-like so that its tentacles touched ultimately on multitudinous
problems: ferrying and parachuting agents into the European mainland, providing
machine guns and explosives, and developing elaborate codes and radio
communications, all with the purpose of hampering and interfering with the
German occupiers. In 1942, for example,
SOE's stated mission was to build up and equip paramilitary organizations,
which would disrupt enemy transport, communications, and equipment by various
methods, but with "particular care to avoid premature large-scale rising
of patriots." In general, SOE never
believed that widespread, universal risings would be effective: With their superior weapons and trained
soldiers, the Germans would inflict unnecessary losses and undoubtedly wreak
vicious reprisals against civilians.
Many British plans were developed with the
Gaullist BCRA, and SOE maintained a separate section, RF, to provide services
for the Gaullists. Using British planes,
weapons, and radio equipment, the Free French were gradually able to send in
agents and supplies to those who would form the nucleus of the Gaullist
military organ, the AS. By August 1943,
these BCRA enterprises had led to the formation in France of the BOA
(<MI>Bureau d'Opá,árations Aeriennes<D>) and in the South, previously unoccupied, SAP
(<MI>Section d'Atterrissage et de Parachutage<D>, or
Landings and Parachute Section), responsible for selecting places for drops and
for organizing the reception, storing, and distribution of weapons and
explosives. Set up along a regional and
departmental structure, SAP controlled hundreds of localities where agents and
supplies could be landed or dropped.
SOE ran its own French operation, in F
section, with French and British agents who built networks, arranged for air
drops, and cooperated with Gaullist and non-Gaullist elements of the French
Resistance. Headed by Maj. Maurice
Buckmaster, this section was the largest unit within SOE concerned with
The job of such agents as Cammaerts was to
identify local Resistance leaders, and to enable them to receive the containers
of arms and explosives, parachuted on moonlit nights at prearranged spots. Just as SAP made plans for Gaullist drops, so
the F section agents made sure that supplies for their own people would reach
the proper destination. The agents could
do little without the cooperation of the French underground.
Nor could SOE "set
After the Teheran Conference, where operation
ANVIL had been once more affirmed, Churchill had fallen ill with
pneumonia. Then shortly after Christmas
1943, he had taken himself to
Churchill was as good as his word. When he returned to
On January 31, Lord Selborne produced for the
prime minister a not-too-optimistic summary of the situation in southeastern
@HEAD1 = EISENHOWER AND THE FRENCH
Churchill's new policy, conceived and
executed unilaterally, raised serious questions regarding Eisenhower's control
over issues related to the land the Supreme Allied Commander was charged to
invade. When the prime minister convoked
his special committee, he had not invited any Americans even though some agents
from SO, the Special Operations section of Maj. Gen. William "Wild
Bill" Donovan's OSS, had already joined SOE units in London and were
rapidly learning about the French Resistance.
In fact, the group that was advising the Supreme Commander had the
official designation SOE/SO, although the OSS people never numbered as much as
a third of the total personnel. When
Eisenhower released to the French, on March 17, a statement about his plans for
the Resistance, he was simply reflecting the standard policies of SOE, that
guerrillas could best be used in sabotage, in blocking roads and
communications, together with hit-and-run attacks over a widespread area. He also saw the need to bring SOE/SO closer
to his own planning staffs and a week later absorbed the unit, not serving on
the headquarters staff but "consulting, as if attached." Later these SOE/SO components especially
involved in OVERLORD were given a new name, SFHQ (Special Force Headquarters),
with joint Anglo-American direction: Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, head of SOE's
Northern Europe section, for the British, and Col. Joseph F. Haskell, in charge
of SO's London branch, for the Americans.
SHAEF decided that overall control of the French Resistance should be
exercised from London, which meant abolishing the line of demarcation in France
that had given SHAEF the northern side and Gen. Maitland Wilson's AFHQ in
Algiers the southern part.<P8MJ239>10<P255DJ0>
Eisenhower's vague statement about the use of
the Resistance did not in any way satisfy de Gaulle, who saw nothing different
from what had been the relationship between BCRA and SOE's RF section. What he hoped for was inclusion in
Eisenhower's planning, with concrete tasks for the French in cooperation with
the Anglo-American allies. Disappointed
with the progress made by his representatives in
On his side, Eisenhower faced an almost
insuperable problem because he himself had never received clear-cut
instructions delineating exactly the line he should follow with the FCNL, even
though a draft directive had been sent by
It was clear to Koenig that, if he were to
exercise command over the French Forces of the Interior, he would have to
control not only the Gaullist BCRA, but also SFHQ. The French general established a
After the beachhead had been established,
SFHQ personnel hammered out a working agreement that evolved into a rather
awkward administrative structure: Koenig
would have two deputies, Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell, with a tripartite
Franco-Anglo-American staff (EMFFI, or <MI>Etat Major des Forces
Franá‡áaises de l'Intá,árieur<D>) that would consist of Colonel
Ziegler for the French, Maj. Maurice Buckmaster (head of SOE's F section) for
the British, and Lt. Col. Paul van der Stricht (head of SO's French section)
for the Americans. Significantly, the
new organization did not become officially established until June 23, even
though an enormous number of crucial decisions were being made on an
<MI>ad hoc<D> basis. Only
gradually, well into August, did Koenig obtain real authority, by which time
ANVIL had already been launched and
Chapter 2 Resistance in
The French Resistance, because of its many confusing and contradicting aspects, almost
defies analysis. Some resisters
concentrated on politics, some on propaganda, others on helping Allied fliers
to escape, and considerable groups devoted their energies to sabotage and
fighting. They spanned political and
social categories -- from Communists to members of the old aristocracy: professors, lawyers, and physicians, as well
as peasants. Beginning with small
intimate groups of school or business associates, they ended up with literally
hundreds of organizations, which far-sighted leaders tried to unify for more
effective action. The hierarchy of
command, with a duality of political and military leadership, was further
complicated because organizations outside of France--ultimately de Gaulle and
the FCNL--attempted to control those inside the Metropole. The FCNL had counterparts in local
Departmental Committees of Liberation, while the military delegate, General
Koenig, theoretically would command all those ragged poorly armed guerrillas
who, after the Normandy D Day, comprised the FFI, the Forces Françaises de
l'Intérieur.
In
popular usage, all of the guerrillas, the insurgents, the terrorists (as the
Germans called them), the Resistance fighters, the FFI, came to be known as the
Maquis. Since the end of the war, there
has developed a great body of writing about the Maquis. Virtually every department
has one or more histories about what happened there during the occupation, and
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Liberation, professional
historians undertook to clarify innumeerable questions about La Résistance et les Français.a As a result of their
collaboration, a series of colloquia were organized: Toulouse (Histoire et mémoire, 1993),
Rennes (Enjeux stratégiques et environnement social,
1994), Bruxelles (Résistance et les Européens du Nord,
1994), Besançon (Lutte armée, 1995), Paris (Villes, centres et logiques de décision, 1995) and they
focussed scholarly attention on many characteristics of the Resistance not
previously scrutinized. No one with
serious concern about the Maquis and their role can ignore these studies, but the brief Histoire de la Résistance,
by the distinguished historian Henri Michel (to whom this volume is dedicated),
still provides a succinct and authoritative introduction. Michel writes.
For the most part, a Maquis contained local people, and many Maquis were
identified simply by the town from which the maquisards came. Others,
particularly if the leader
were
popular, might recruit from a wider area. Take as an example, the 142 members of the
6th company, commanded by Captain Brentrup, in the central part of the Drôme
Department. About two-thirds came from
Crest and other towns in the area, with about 25 from neighboring departments,
such as Ain and Vaucluse, but included in the roster were three North Africans,
one Pole, one Spaniard, two Germans, two Belgians, one Italian, one Russian,
and one American--Pierre Bettager, from
How many Maquis were there? How
well prepared were they? This was
exactly what the Anglo-Americans, before the
THE DROME
From a geographic point of view, the central
Drôme enjoys considerable variety. Along the banks of the Rhône east of
Valence, spreads a rolling plain, dotted with farms and clusters of woods,
about eighteen kilometers wide, then rising gradually 500 meters to a
plateau. From ledges along the plateau,
one can see the plain spread out for miles, and once started downhill, an
automobile can coast the ten miles from Léoncel to Chabeuil, where the German occupiers
guarded the area's most important airport.
Behind the plateau, another fifteen km to the east, rise the formidable
cliffs of the Vercors, a plateau so high, so well protected, and so
inaccessible that the Resistance commander for the southeast maintained in this
remote locality his regional headquarters.
The great Vercors Plateau's southern escarpment descends to the
South of the
In early 1944, the military Resistance groups
of the region, which by this time had all accepted de Gaulle's leadership, came
under the orders of Commandant L'HERMINE, the Drá“áme departmental
military chief. L'HERMINE, whose real
name was Drouot, had been mobilized as a sergeant in 1939, and soon thereafter
became a cadet at the French air academy.
After the French defeat, he continued to serve as an officer under
After February 1944, L'HERMINE received as
deputy commander a young graduate of St.-Cyr (the French West Point),
Commandant LEGRAND, the <MI>nom-de-guerre<D> for Jean-Pierre de
Lassus Saint-Geniá_ás, who since his escape from a German prison camp in 1941
had served with the Secret Army in the departments of Ain and Savoie.
At that time, there were fewer than 500
<MI>maquisards<D> in the department. De Lassus estimated that about 150 supported
the Gaullist Secret Army, while the rest served with the pro-Communist FTP. However, there were others who, like the
Minute Men of Colonial Massachusetts, could be called upon to leave their
homes, get what weapons were available, and serve with already organized
groups. These were the
<MI>sá,ádentaires<D> (sedentary reserve), of whom there were
perhaps 1,500 in the department. The
extent to which they could be called up, and their reliability, depended more
or less on the arms they might receive.
The gathering of these parachuted arms continually preoccupied the
Resistance leaders.<M^>5<D>
To describe the situation at any one moment
is difficult because of fluid conditions prevailing before the
Although difficult to maintain in occupied
No account of Resistance organization is
complete without a commentary on a principal concern: sabotage.
In his memoirs, General de Gaulle singled out the Drá“áme Department,
pointing out that the Maquis took action against the railroads in
particular: "In December [1943], a
train of German soldiers on leave was blown up at Portes-les-Valence; the
wagons stopped or overturned were machine-gunned by our men, who killed or
wounded two hundred soldiers."<M^>6<D>
Individual acts like this occurred hundreds
of times, all over
@INDENTED-NUM = 17 major
railway bridges destroyed, Oct. '43<196>Aug. '44.
@INDENTED-NUM = 248 attacks and
sabotage of railway lines, locomotives, cars, and railway
@INDENTED-NUM = equipment, Feb.'43<196>Aug. '44.
@INDENTED-NUM = 25 road bridges
destroyed, June<196>Aug. '44.
@INDENTED-NUM = 1 hydroelectric plant sabotaged, July
'44.
@INDENTED-NUM = 25 high-tension
lines and towers destroyed,
@INDENTED-NUM = 15 ruptures of
long-distance telephone cables, from June to the end
@INDENTED-NUM = of Aug. `44
@INDENTED-NUM = 2 large-scale attacks against trains of
German soldiers on leave,
@INDENTED-NUM = Dec. '43, Feb. '44.
@LINE = ____
@INDENTED-NUM = 333 Total actions
of the Drá“áme Resistance.<M^>7<D>
While the work of sabotage never prevented
the German occupiers from controlling the country, it produced delays,
inconveniences, a need for constant patrols, and an increasing apprehension
about the role they played. As General
Eisenhower put it, the resistance forces had "by their ceaseless harassing
activities, surrounded the Germans with a terrible atmosphere of danger and
hatred which ate into the confidence of the leaders and the courage of the
soldiers."<M^>8<D>
@HEAD1 =
INTER-ALLIED MISSIONS
Although missions like
@HEAD1-NP =
CIRCUIT JOCKEY
Francis Cammaerts was known to Resistance
leaders throughout the southeast as Major ROGER, or sometimes more familiarly
as <MI>grands pieds<D> (big feet), a reference to the means of
locomotion appropriate to a large-framed six-footer.<M^>10<D> By June 1944, Cammaerts had spent a total of
twelve months in France, eight in 1943 and the remainder in 1944, covering by
car, foot, and motorcycle an area almost as large as South Carolina. Within this region, he had organized over 100
"minuteman" teams averaging around fifteen men, each with codes,
communications, and drop zones, prepared for sabotage, harassment, and
hit-and-run tactics.
To be sure, JOCKEY was only one of about forty
SOE F-section circuits operating in
Because his mother was British and his father
Belgian, Cammaerts knew both English and French from childhood. Nevertheless, Cammaerts' education had been
essentially British, and after
Not until March 1943, however, was Cammaerts
dispatched to the field with the mission of reconstructing infiltrated circuits
and of building new ones. Cammaerts soon
concluded that efforts to resuscitate the older circuits might prove
self-defeating, and he consequently moved south to the Mediterranean coast,
where he made contact with a small resistance group at
Cammaerts was able to maintain excellent
contacts with SOE's
Cammaerts was joined, in June 1943, by
another F-section agent, known in the field as ALAIN, but whose real name was
Pierre J. L. Raynaud. A native
Frenchman, he had helped the Allies, in November 1942, land in
@INDENTED =
@INDENTED = We were contacted by an agent of
the Intelligence Service [<MI>sic<D>]. This officer, "Alain," was one of
those rare Frenchmen officially affiliated with a very important Allied
service. . . .
@INDENTED2 = Next day, after a long
conversation, I conducted him on a tour of the areas I had checked as possibly
suitable for parachute drops. These
satisfied him, and back at the house, we arranged for a future drop and the
code messages to precede it. I was
really happy: finally I was going to get
what we wanted most: arms, ammunition,
explosives.
@INDENTED =
@FIRSTPARA = The foregoing scenario was
repeated all over the JOCKEY area, with anywhere from two to ten groups
recruited in each department.<M^>12<D>
In October 1943, SOE ordered Cammaerts to
report back in
After one false start, Cammaerts flew back to
He was especially successful in the
Hautes-Alpes (Upper Alps), the department whose pleasant rounded hills in the
west become more rugged and convoluted as the terrain rises toward the Italian
frontier at Brianá‡áon, where 300 years earlier Vauban and his successors
erected impregnable fortresses for Louis XIV.
People in this area are mountaineers from childhood, and such was Paul
Há,áraud, a chair-maker in the Hautes-Alpes' principal town of
Known simply as Paul, or in the Maquis as
Commandant DUMONT, Há,áraud had served in the 1939 French army as a sergeant of
engineers, and after the Armistice had become involved in the <MI>Groupes
Francs<D>, the activist arm of Combat, along with his good friend and
deputy, Etienne Moreaud. With the
welding of various groups into the
When Cammaerts finally met Há,áraud, they
immediately struck up a firm friendship that lasted until Há,áraud's untimely
death at German hands just before the ANVIL landings. Cammaerts has written:
@INDENTED =
@INDENTED = From my first meeting with Paul,
I knew that I was dealing with the greatest Resistance leader I had ever met in
@INDENTED =
The four months between Cammaert's return in
February until the
@BODY3 = 1944 Operations Containers Packages
@BODY3 =
@BODY3 =
@BODY3 =
@BODY3 =
@BODY3 =
@FIRSTPARA = Even so, Cammaerts was sometimes
irritated at sloppy packing in
What Cammaerts and SOE were doing must always
be viewed against the backdrop of other happenings in
@INDENTED = for coordinating sabotage and
other subversive activities including the organization of Resistance Groups,
and for providing advice and liaison on all matters in connection with Patriot
Forces up to the time of their embodiment into the regular forces. . . . Sabotage of communications and other targets,
must be carefully regulated and integrated with our operational plans.
@FIRSTPARA = Clearly he was to mold and
direct the units he armed so that they would give maximum aid to the Allied
invasion; nothing in his instructions suggested, at least until June 1944, that
he should support purely French internal objectives.<M^>17<D>
@HEAD1 = THE FRENCH IN
Meanwhile, the French in
The month of March 1944, however, had brought
frustration on all issues to the French.
It was learned that
Thwarted by the Allies' lack of cooperation,
de Gaulle took unilateral steps. He
eliminated Gen. Henri Giraud, the French Commander-in-Chief, by assigning him
to a meaningless inspectorship; he took firm control of the military hierarchy,
placing both regular forces and Resistance forces (with Koenig as military
delegate outside France) under the FCNL; he invited cooperation with leftists
by accepting two Communists into the National Committee, which he now began openly
to refer to as the provisional government.
Within
Although de Gaulle imposed his plans all over
De Gaulle also sent "military
delegates" into
Bourgá_ás-Maunoury and other high-level
Resistance leaders, assuming the Allies would land along the
Long before the Allies landed, Zeller had
organized a clandestine chain of command that established hierarchies of
officers: regional, subregional, and
departmental. Southeastern France had
two administrative regions: R-1, with
its seat at Lyon, included eight departments:
Ardá_áche, Drá“áme, Isá_áre, Savoie, Haute-Savoie, Ain,
Rhá“áne, Loire, and parts of two others; R-2, headquartered at Marseille,
was composed of seven: Gard,
Bouches-du-Rhá“áne, Var, Alpes-Maritimes, Vaucluse, Hautes-Alpes, and
Basses-Alpes (later renamed Alpes de Haute-Provence). Under Bourgá_ás-Maunoury, there were regional
military delegates, and under Zeller, regional, subregional, and departmental
military commanders (referred to after the French Forces of the Interior were
established, as <MI>chefs<D>, <MI>FFI<D>).
Not the least of Zeller's concern was
coordination with SOE and BCRA, the source of supplies and orders from the
Allies. Technically speaking, by the
time of the Normandy invasion, the French sections of SFHQ should have been
consolidated under General Koenig's FFI headquarters in London, and in the
field, all separate military groups theoretically should have lost their
separate identities. However, Regions 1
and 2, which comprised Zeller's command, lay much closer to
The French also had to coordinate the
policies and actions of the Gaullists outside France<197>in Algiers and
London<197>with those of the Resistance leaders inside France, many of
whom did not consider, with some justification, that the exterior French, who
acted as legislators, really understood what conditions in France were
like. Many insurgents believed that the
clandestine CNR (<MI>Conseil National de la Rá,ásistance<D>),
created by Jean Moulin with de Gaulle's approval, better represented the true
aspirations of the French underground, not only of the major Resistance groups,
but of the labor unions and political parties.<M^>21<D>
Aware of the CNR's rival claim to authority,
the
In southeastern
An engineer educated at M.I.T. and Harvard,
30-year-old Aubrac had been arrested in
Farge, on the other hand, was already
residing in
At the departmental level, de Gaulle named
Resistance prefects, some of whom had already participated in local underground
activity. Altogether, there were a great
many political and military chiefs, some self-appointed, some designated by
Algiers, others approved by the CNR, who would serve as hidden allies when
Patch's Seventh Army came ashore in August 1944.
Chapter 3 Special Operations in
Shortly after the successful Allied landing
in
Eisenhower said the
Since SOE had already been operating out of
In
For
Throughout 1943, SOE and
To establish exactly what this agency would
be posed a considerable problem for the French because two separate services,
one Giraudist and one Gaullist, made rival claims. When de Gaulle eliminated Giraud from active
duty in March 1944, he opened the way for integration of the two agencies. The difficult task of consolidation fell to
Jacques Soustelle, a brilliant young anthropologist who from the early days had
thrown in his lot with de Gaulle. Soustelle's
DGSS (Direction Générale des Services Spéciaux)
became the Algerian counterpart of the London BCRA and, with de Gaulle once
established in
Under DGSS, there existed an implementing
body, the <MI>Direction Technique<D>,
that supervised a small group, the "Action" Service, concerned
especially with operations (as opposed to Intelligence) within France. When Commandant Clipet, the Giraudist officer
who headed this service, was relieved, Soustelle concluded that an officer
close to General de Lattre (who would be commanding the French forces destined
for ANVIL) would provide a satisfactory liaison. De Lattre concurred and released his aide,
Lt. Col. Jean Constans, for this position.
Constans, a tall, heavy-set officer (code
named SAINT SAUVEUR), had since 1941 served as chef de
cabinet to de Lattre, who having been imprisoned in France, had
escaped to London, and finally reached Algiers in December 1943. Constans, coming to
"Willy" Widmer, a French
Protestant, outdoorsman, and good horseman, was well accepted by the British
officers at MASSINGHAM's Club des Pins, where in fact he was already
living. Trained in law and banking, the
36-year-old Widmer, a cousin of André Gide, had worked for the Banque
d'Indochine in
ESTABLISHMENT OF SPOC (SPECIAL
In the spring of 1944, with training for the cross-channel invasion in
process, there developed imperative needs for MASSINGHAM (to say nothing of
Once the decision was made in May, the awesome technical capacities of
the armed forces in Algiers quickly permitted construction of a new facility,
made up of nine Quonset (British:
Nissen) huts, over twenty-five tents, and a wooden mess hall, built
across from the Villa Magnol (one of the OSS-North Africa installations), which
was given the name Special Project Operations Center, or, as it was generally
called, SPOC. The Center opened
officially on
The
staffing of SPOC continued the inter-allied procedure of British and American
officers sharing responsibilities. The
command went jointly to the British Lt.
Col. John Anstey, commanding officer of MASSINGHAM, and to the American Lt.
Col. William P. Davis, SO director in
The French section was headed by the British
Lt. Cdr. Brooks Richards, who carried on with the same general responsibilities
he had shouldered at MASSINGHAM, maintaining contact with all the agents and
missions in southern France. Francis
Brooks Richards (he did not use his first name), a yachting enthusiast and
yacht designer, had begun his studies at
Richard's American opposite number was Capt.
Gerard (Gerry) de Piolenc, an engaging and enthusiastic young
With the
MISSIONS INTO
SPOC had responsibility for sending and supplying all the special
missions in southern
1.
British SOE circuits, such as JOCKEY.
2.
Inter-allied Maquis missions consisting generally of British, American,
and French agents.
3.
American
4.
Inter-allied Jedburgh teams.
5.
Groupes de contre-sabotage de la Marine française.
It must be emphasized that SOE and SO of OSS, together with Service
Action of DGSS, concentrated not on intelligence but on sabotage and military enterprises--what the Resistance
termed "la lutte armée."
There were a great many intelligence networks in France, some run by the
BCRA of Colonel PASSY (André Dewavrin) in cooperation with the RF section of
SOE; some run by the British SIS (or MI6); some by the Poles; some by OSS. For
example, the SI (Intelligence Section) of
Important as intellience networks may be, the study and analysis of them
lies outside the scope of this volume, although they may be referred to when
they interact or relate to special operations. Let us, then, describe briefly
the missions that fell under SPOC's control.
In order to direct and to supply its
missions, SPOC kept up a steady volume of communications with the field. One hut was devoted to writing and receiving
field messages, at first handled almost entirely by SOE. Another hut, using the MASSINGHAM ciphers,
encoded and decoded the messages that, via a teletype system, were relayed to
and from the MASSINGHAM wireless transmitting and receiving station west of
When SPOC began operations in late May,
control of the Resistance, as far as the Allies were concerned, remained vested
with SHAEF, so that actions within
Coordinated with overall control and with the
French country section stood the operations hut, with its maps detailing all of the agents in
the field together with the many drop zones.
Operations had to keep track of the equipment being packed in containers,
loaded on planes, and ready for parachuting into southern
The number of planes available to SPOC had
increased from twenty at the beginning of 1944 to over thirty. The basic contingent of eighteen
While SPOC controlled the planes assigned to
it, the overall command of aircraft remained vested in General Eaker's
Mediterranean Air Force, which could alter the allocation or supplement it
according to overall strategic requirements.
With northwestern
At SPOC, several huts were devoted to air
operations, of which one housed the personnel responsible for those unique
types of operations: the inter-allied
Jedburghs and the American OSS Operational Groups. The Jeds and the OGs posed additional
problems for SPOC, which already administered or had to keep track of SOE
circuits, French missions, and inter-allied missions, to say nothing of
coordinating all these operations with the needs of General Patch's Seventh
Army. How to use the Jedburghs most
effectively raised problems among Operations, the Country section, and the Jedburgh
section, headed by the British Major Champion.
Coordination proved difficult but was eased when Maj. Neil Marten
replaced Champion in early August. A
Jedburgh himself, Marten had parachuted into the Drá“áme as a member of
team VEGANINE but had returned to
At the height of its operations in August,
SPOC personnel numbered about 150, but if one counts all the people--agents,
Jedburghs, OGs--operating in the field, one must add another 400 or 500 to the
list. Before examining what SPOC did
specifically in preparing the way for Operation ANVIL, one must take at least a
glance at the ways in which it coordinated its activities with de Gaulle's
Committee of National Liberation and with General Patch's Seventh Army.
THE
FRENCH AND SPOC
Up to June 6, the date of the
This French representative was to be Lt. Colonel Jean Constans (SAINT
SAUVEUR), a tall, heavy-set officer, who
had served as General de Lattre's chef de cabinet since 1941. At the insistence of Jacques Soustelle, head
of de Gaulle's Direction Générale des Services Spéciaux (DGSS),
de Lattre released Constans to Soustelle, who appointed him chef, Service
Action. One of Constans' major tasks,
to develop good relations with the Anglo-Americans, was facilitated by the fact
that Captain Guillaume Widmer, already on the Action staff, became
automatically a member of Constans' team.
"Willy" Widmer was in fact living at the Club des Pins, the
SOE headquarters and training center west of
The choice of Constans, a military officer, as a special service
agent, signified a shift in Gaullist
policies, echoing a realization that the Allies, unwilling to extend political
recognition to de Gaulle, nevertheless appreciated the value of French soldiers
in the forthcoming campaign. In keeping with his past experience and lack of
information about the Resistance,
Constans conceived of his new job at SPOC essentially in military
terms. In a diary entry of 22 May he
wrote: "Vu Richards ŕ qui j'explique comment je conçois le rôle qui m'est
dévolu--Nous sommes en guerre, nous aurons un plan d'opération ŕ éxécuter, sous des ordres et un commandement-- Celŕ
seul compte et est en rapport avec le réel."
There remained, however, the need for a clarification as to where
exactly Constans stood in the hierarchy of command. Part of the problem lay in the fact that,
when General Giraud was ousted from his command of French forces in
Apparemment rattaché ŕ la section G.B., mais en réalité autonome du fait
de sa qualité d'officier de liaîson, le Lt de Vaisseau (puis Cne de Corvette)
Brooks Richards assurait au sein du SPOC le rôle de représentant du
Commandement allié auquel l'organisme était subordonné. Ce commandement ne
manifestait jamais sa présence directe, ce qui valorisait d'autant l'influence
et le rôle de B. Richards."
Constans recalled the excellent and cordial relations within SPOC's
tripartite structure, but he could not avoid a sense of frustration, any more
than de Gaulle could, at his enforced second-class citizenship. The SPOC commanders, Anstey and Davis, with
their overall responsibilities, were not inclined to take Constans into their
circle, while they nevertheless expected the French country officer, Richards,
to maintain daily contact with DGSS's "Action" representative. With Richards a grade lower than Constans,
this interchange devolved essentially on Widmer, whose congeniality and
broad-based attitudes were suited admirably to the task. Brooks Richards was not officially a
"liaison officer," nor was he autonomous, but, responsible for
operations long before Constans arrived on the scene, he could not readily
alter the complex business of running agents into
SPOC,
In due course, a Strategic Services Section
(SSS), under Lt. Col. Edward W. Gamble, became attached to Patch's G-2 and
participated in ANVIL planning. Gamble
was prepared to send a contingent of about 30 persons, with seven vehicles and
drivers, over the beaches alongside the landing troops. This unit would be attached to Seventh Army
headquarters.
The relationship of SPOC to Seventh Army was
somewhat different because, for one thing, SPOC was an international body,
operating under Gen. Maitland Wilson's AFHQ.
So long as Force 163, the Planning Group for the Seventh Army, remained
in
This was 4-SFU, Special Forces Unit No. 4,
commanded by American Lt. Col. William G. Bartlett, with British Lt. Col. E. S.
N. Head as deputy, assigned by AFHQ to the Seventh Army on June 29 and later
moved to
Because the officers of 4-SFU were all
French-speaking, they were in a position to assist the commanders, especially
at the lower levels, in getting help not only from the FFI, but from French
civilians. The Seventh Army had not made
any special effort to ensure that interpreters would accompany all its
units. As a consequence, once the
invasion began, interrogators, translators, SSS, and 4-SFU personnel found
themselves providing interpretation services, which did not lie within their
principal missions. Possibly, because so
many GIs of Italian background enabled the VI Corps to get along in
Chapter 4 Impact of the
The invasion of
Eisenhower had already received from General
Wilson a summary of SOE,
Eisenhower had in mind using Resistance forces essentially to keep
German troops stationed in the south from reinforcing the
The French Resistance, however, had its own ideas as to what should be
done in case an Allied landing paved the way for liberation. Granted that the Maquis along the strategic
routes did their best to hinder German movements, there existed no overall plan
to integrate Resistance forces into OVERLORD.
As a consequence, many French insurrectional plans had been formulated
that, while possibly known to the Gaullist military delegates, had not been
analyzed or approved by British or American commanders. These Maquis uprisings, and the German
reprisals, affected the entire area for which ANVIL was planned.
Together with the inter-allied missions, there were also enterprises in
southern France of essentially French origin, not part of Allied strategy or
planning, but to some extent supported by SOE and OSS.
For example, French plans had been drawn up
to gain control of the great Vercors Plateau southwest of
Another plan, to hold the Larche pass approaches, had been developed
over a period of several months before June 6.
Barcelonnette, The
principal problem related to overall regional military command: whether the dominant officer should be Robert
Rossi (LEVALLOIS), pro-Communist regional chief of the
Lécuyer, stationed in
The political aspects of Resistance rivalry found emphasis with the
arrival of the MICHEL mission. Helped by MICHEL mission members Lancesseur and
Captain Hay, and inspired by Hay's contention that the Allies would soon be
disembarking in
On the eve of the
To Commandant Michel Bureau, the ORA officer commanding the Maquis of
the Ubaye valley, the message definitely meant:
"Put the plan into effect"
and he ordered his men to capture the German garrison at
Barcelonnette. On this day, the
higher-ranking FFI officers were not in the Ubaye area. Colonel Henri Zeller, FFI commander for
southeastern
The date has interest because at this time the FFI command sent messages to the Maquis--"la
pause-Koenig,"--to restrain their offensive actions and revert back to the
regular tasks of harassment and sabotage.
This order of June 10 reached Barcelonnette at a crucial juncture of the
operations: a formidable enemy task force was reported to be coming down from
Guillestre to the north. German elements threatened Barcelonnette in the early
afternoon of June 11 and soon reached a roadblock only seven miles from
Barcelonnette. After a desperate
defense, in which Captain Hay was killed, the FFI command ordered a withdrawal
at nightfall. During the next few days,
the maquisards scattered into the hills, some into
Meanwhile information about the MICHEL mission had been treacherously
revealed to Gestapo headquarters in Marseille. Chanay and Lancesseur were
arrested in July, along with the American d'Errecalde and the sea-lift agent
Pelletier.
THE VERCORS
While the Maquis effort in the Ubaye
was heroic, it was a small affair compared to the Resistance uprising in the
Vercors. Ultimately some 4,000 guerrilla
fighters, many untrained and unarmed, rallied to the great plateau southwest of
Grenoble, where the leaders proclaimed the area of woods and rolling
farmland an independent republic. Upon receiving word that the Vercors
population had begun their insurrection, Zeller, with nothing more to be
accomplished at Barcelonnette, hurried to the plateau. With him went Cammaerts, now understanding
that his JOCKEY network had been absorbed into the FFI and that he was to serve
essentially as a liaison officer for Zeller.
The Vercors maintained radio contact with both
By June 15, elements of the Grenoble-based 157th Reserve Division, under
Generalleutnant Karl Pflaum, had wrested St.-Nizier from the Maquis. Resting on the northeast road into the
Vercors from
Lt. Col. François Huet, code named HERVIEUX, had held the overall
Vercors command since May. He
coordinated the defense under Zeller and Colonel Marcel Descour (BAYARD), commanding
the eastern part of R1. He also
consulted with the FFI heads of the Drôme and Isčre departments because the
approaches to the plateau lay in these two departments. An important aspect of the defense was a
determination of which Maquis would be on the heights and which around the
perimeter. Not all the discussions went
smoothly, however, because of personality differences and the basic logistical
problems in clandestine warfare.
In the midst of these essentially French command hierarchies stood Francis Cammaerts, now involved in FFI
affairs as a consequence of his designation as Zeller's liaison officer. Although Cammaerts had two radio operators
with him in the Vercors, he was hampered for lack of staff, nor was he entirely
clear as to his position in the chain of command or what was his role related
to missions sent in by SPOC.
While SPOC could only authorize actions under
its specific control (and the Vercors
uprising was not one of them), it did send the embattled maquisards from time to time encouragement,
which gave the Resistance leaders reason to believe they had not been completely
abandoned. On the plateau, the leaders
recorded innumerable hopeful messages coming in from
A
spectacular drop of 420 containers in daylight reached the plateau on June 25,
a Sunday, as if heaven had bestowed a blessing while Colonel Huet officiated at
a memorial service. The present of some
70 Bren submachine guns, over 1,000 Stens, 648 .30-cal. rifles, and
most-prized, 34 Bazookas came, interestingly enough, from the Americans.
Certainly the drop of arms gave some comfort to the Maquis on the
Vercors, who, with recruits coming in every day, had good reason to believe
that the Germans, constantly probing the Vercors defenses, would not leave the
defiant gesture of the French unchallenged.
There was always hope that paratroopers would materialize, and this hope
had been nourished before the end of June by SPOC's dispatch of special forces
to the area: an American OG, JUSTINE; an
inter-allied mission, EUCALYPTUS; and two Jedburgh teams, VEGANINE and
CHLOROFORM.
MISSIONS TO THE VERCORS
JUSTINE, made up of fifteen men, commanded by two officers, 1st Lt.
Vernon G. Hoppers and 1st Lt. Chester L. Myers, landed at Drop Zone
"Taille Crayon" near Vassieux in the small hours of June 29. They reported to Colonel Huet and at once
began to work with the maquisards, especially to train them how to use the
American and British weapons they were receiving.
Landing at the same time, the inter-allied mission (EUCALYPTUS)
consisted of two British officers, Maj. Desmond Longe and Capt. John
Houseman. With them were two radio operators,
one of them an American, Lt. André Pecquet (PARAY), who, being bilingual,
served also as an interpreter. To the
Vercors inhabitants, these commandos in full uniform had to be precursors of an
army of paratroopers, and they were greeted with enthusiasm by an ecstatic
populace.
The first Jedburgh team to come into the ANVIL area from
The team had been given the unusual mission of looking into the command
relationships that appeared to keep the southern Drôme department from being
well integrated under the FFI commander, Commandant Jean Drouot, better known
as L'HERMINE. Fine athlete, impressive personality, L'HERMINE was one of the
more colorful figures spawned by the Resistance, but his actions antagonized
some influential people in the department.
SPOC also had reports intimating that Pierre Raynaud (ALAIN), Cammaert's
assistant, was having difficulty in cooperating with the FTP, which was
especially strong in the southern Drôme.
FTP leaders appeared to have joined forces with members of the
Departmental Committee of Liberation in
demanding L'HERMINE's removal.
Colonel Zeller, FFI commander for southeastern
L'HERMINE was in the process of moving to his new headquarters northeast
of Gap, in the Hautes-Alpes Department, when the CHLOROFORM Jeds arrived on the
scene. They were impressed by
L'HERMINE's leadership qualities, and when he asked them to go with him, they
enthusiastically agreed. They believed
that, with other Allied missions in the Drôme area, they would be more useful
in some locality where the Allied presence had been less apparent. Although SPOC did not oppose the
transfer, Cammaerts felt that CHLOROFORM
would be more useful in the Drôme.
The apThe appearance of so many military personnel in the JUSTINE,
EUCALYPTUS, CHLOROFORM, and VEGANINE missions foreshadowed a significant change
in Resistance and Allied relations. Such
agents as Cammaerts had indeed been in touch with some professional soldiers,
generally officers of the ORA, but he, like many in SOE, believed that a firmer
and longer-ranged base would emerge from relations with the civilian Resistance
and with those who would be the future prefects or parliamentary
representatives. SOE believed
furthermore that sabotage, together with hit-and-run harassment, served as the
most effective use of force, not a head-on confrontation of the Wehrmacht.
Cammaerts found himself in a trying situation. He had been informed that he was officially
senior Allied liaison officer, deputy to Colonel Zeller, but he had no clear instructions
as to where he stood in the overall hierarchy of command.
Cammaerts gave vent to his feelings in a long message carried to Algiers
on July 11 by Major Marten, the VEGANINE Jedburgh whose colleague NOIR remained
in the Drôme. He pointed out that he had
organized small groups of saboteurs that could harass German lines of
communication until such time as he knew definitely that an invasion was
imminent. He commented on the premature
risings right after the Normandy D-Day, emphasizing that FFI leaders assumed
that, when they embarked on open warfare, no more than two or three weeks would
elapse before Allied reinforcements would pour in. He complained that his appointment as
Zeller's liaison officer came much too late:
"The result was chaos."
Cammaerts concluded his letter by mentioning that R-1 was better
organized than R-2, but "R-2 can be rallied. Coupled with the Italians, they may be able
to hold the frontier Alp valleys." "In
spite of everything," he added, "I believe there will be a great and
general uprising when a serious attack is made in the southeast."
In the field, such officers as Cammaerts, together with hundreds of
guerrilla leaders, could scarcely imagine the political and logistical
complexities at high levels outside
CAMMAERTS AND THE JOCKEY AREA
Although plans for ANVIL were now moving ahead with increased intensity,
no definite word could be sent to the field so far in advance. Cammaerts and the Resistance leaders could
assume that the main highways from the beaches northward would become invasion
arteries, but they could only continue to prepare for the landings by ambushes,
road-blocks, sabotage, and bridge-blowing along possible German supply routes. Cammaerts needed to check on contacts
throughout his JOCKEY area and not restrict his liaison duties to the Vercors,
which, while looming up as a great sacrificial symbol of French defiance, did
not coincide with the SOE guerrilla warfare principles he believed it was his
mission to implement. Cammaerts
therefore continued to travel around the southeast, returning regularly to his
center of operations headquarters, Seyne, in the Basses-Alpes between Digne and
Gap.
The department of Basses-Alpes had been hard hit by German reprisal
actions after the uprisings on June 6.
Not only had the Germans attacked the Ubaye area, but they had carried
out raids throughout the department with investigations, arrests, massacres,
and executions. Furthermore, echoes of
the Lécuyer--Rossi dispute reverberated at the departmental level, with ORA
officers accused of noncooperation by the local Liberation Committee. This meant that no one held undisputed
command, and there was danger that the FTP, the Secret Army, and the ORA would
go their separate ways.
Cammaerts also kept in touch with leaders of
the Hautes-Alpes department. No
comparable command problem existed there, because Paul Héraud, the wiry
carpenter and mountaineer whom Cammaerts held in the highest respect.
Cammaerts had other
responsabilities than defense of the Vercors, but after travelling around the
JOCKEY circuit he soon returned to the plateau. He learned that in his absence,
SPOC had sent in a French mission which
arrived in the Vercors on 7 July. This was
Mission PAQUEBOT, the leader of which, Captain Tournissa, an engineer,
had been sent to the Vercors to supervise construction of an airstrip near
Vassieux. With him came Christine
Granville (code name PAULINE), a petite
attractive Polish woman, then 29 years old, whose real name was Krystina
Skarbek. Of an aristocratic Polish
family, she had been recruited as an
agent for SOE and had come to
COLLAPSE OF THE VERCORS
Bastille Day, 1944, ushered in a short, exuberant period where those in
the Vercors Resistance, rejoicing in the summer sunshine, celebrated their
defiance of the Nazi occupiers. Although
ominous storm clouds may have loomed on the horizon, they must have felt that
indeed
However, in spite of token demonstrations of Allied concern, the Vercors
defenders received no further meaningful support. The German bombings of July 14 simply gave
warning that General Pflaum, commanding the 157th Reserve Division, would soon
unleash his troops, some 14,000 in number, against the ragged companies,
perhaps 4,000 in all, which now defended the heights.
On July 19/20, the German forces on the east, west, and south of the
plateau began sending reconnaissance patrols along the approaches, and on July
21, they landed a force of over 200
commandos by glider on the meadows near Vassieux. Valiantly the maquisards tried to break up
this airborne invasion, but with inferior weapons, they could not dislodge the
attackers. The American commandos of OG
JUSTINE could provide only an infinitesimal fraction of the total fire power
required. The group had also lost
Lieutenant Myers, invalided after an emergency appendectomy, leaving Lieutenant
Hoppers in sole command of the thirteen team members. The situation on the plateau was now
hopeless. Germans were everywhere,
destroying the towns, and shooting both maquisards and civilians, inflicting
atrocities on helpless women, invalids, and wounded.
There was no alternative to dispersal, reluctantly ordered by Colonel
Huet, who tried to develop some sporadic counterattacks. The OG team JUSTINE, like the Maquis,
underwent a trying ordeal. Lieutenant
Myers, recovering from his appendix operation, saw the wounded maquisards
around him killed without mercy. He
became a prisoner, finally ending the war in
The fate of Hopper's group was duplicated by many of the defenders. The British EUCALYPTUS team, Longe and
Houseman, escaped to
The German occupation forces, struck by the realization that
Since June, there had been such continual sabotage and ambushing that
the Germans were hard pressed to maintain their supply routes. They had to keep the main roads and railways
intact, but on some lines they would find forty and fifty exploded rails a day,
to say nothing of destroyed locomotives and broken telephone and telegraph
cables. On July 28, General Blaskowitz
noted: "The activity of bands in
the rear of the Army Task Force has been allowed gradually to reach the point
that control over a greater part of the area can no longer be assumed."
In July, the Germans began a series of operations designed to make sure
that they controlled the principal links between major cities and also to
diminish the number of strongholds from which guerrillas (or
"terrorists," as the Germans preferred to call them) could launch
attacks on their convoys. The Germans,
with many divisions spread across the French Mediterranean coast from Spain to
Italy, were not simply sitting in the countryside waiting for the Allies to come. They were in fact skirmishing constantly with
the FFI who, working with Allied agents, kept the German commanders off
balance, unable to coordinate their defenses with any degree of efficiency or
reliability.
Chapter
5 Preparations
for ANVIL/DRAGOON
Although a final decision on ANVIL had to
wait until after the Allies had successfully obtained a foothold in Normandy,
General Alexander Patch, whose Seventh Army was responsible for the landings in
southern France, continued to plan. In
Algiers and in Naples, where Seventh Army transferred its headquarters in July,
American officers worked on details with the staff of General de Lattre de Tassigny. who had been
confirmed by de Gaulle as commander of Army B, the French troops allocated to
ANVIL.
The seven weeks prior to D Day, finally fixed definitely for August 15,
saw intensive training and perfecting of plans. Renamed Operation DRAGOON, the
plans called for a beachhead to be established on forty kilometers of the Côte
d'Azur between Cavalaire and St.-Raphael, with rapid expansion to a "blue
line" about twenty-five kilometers inland.
The first wave would comprise three infantry divisions of Major General Lucien Truscott's VI Corps: Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel's 3rd, Maj. Gen.
John E. Dahlquist's 36th, and Maj. Gen. William W. Eagle's 45th. Just beyond the landing beaches, the First
Airborne Task Force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick, would bring
in troops by parachute and glider to seize airfields in the vicinity of Le Muy
and Draguignan. The small river Argens
provides a valley of easy access from St.-Raphael to Draguignan, a short
distance to the northwest. Once in
possession of that corridor, troops would control a major railroad junction and
would find relatively level highways west to the ports of Toulon and Marseille,
the first objectives, and northwest to the Rhône Valley. While responsibility for establishing the
beachhead would be Truscott's, de Lattre's Army B, consisting of five
divisions, would land later to thrust along the coast westward to Toulon. The ultimate objective was Lyon and Vichy,
600 kilometers away.
That Patch and de Lattre maintained headquarters in Naples made for good
coordination between them, but it made communications with Algiers
difficult. Algiers remained the
headquarters of General Maitland Wilson, who commanded the Mediterranean
Theater, and it was also the seat of de Gaulle's provisional government, as
well as the headquarters of General
Gabriel Cochet, Délégué Militaire, Opérations Sud (DMOS).
Cochet faced an unusual problem, as it was not clear to him whether
Koenig in London superseded him in his relations with the FFI in the south.
With the Normandy battle continuing, Eisenhower controlled all activities in
France and it could be assumed that Koenig therefore commanded all the
FFI. No commanders in the Mediterranean
were supposed to initiate operations, but only to support Operation
OVERLORD. Officially, London even made
policy regarding the Vercors.
This sitThis
situation made it difficult for General Cochet to exercise any real authority
over the FFI in the south. In the
latter part of June, Cochet, assuming he was authorized by de Gaulle to act on
behalf of the FFI, addressed himself to General Wilson with the intention of
coordinating Resistance actions and Allied operations. He argued that, just as Koenig had an integrated
staff of British, Americans, and French, he should operate in a comparable
fashion--that is, in control of SPOC.
On Jul Wilson issued a preliminary directive, on 7 July, regarding
Cochet's spheres of action. It stated
that Cochet would command (a) the FFI in southern France; (b) SPOC, but not
technical control of communications, supplies, and aircraft; (c) OSS/SOE groups
with the Seventh Army. The directive
pointed out that Cochet would have to provide his own staff, although SPOC's
staff would be maintained.
When Wilson gave orders to Cochet as
"Commanding General, FFI, Southern Zone," many of the higher-ranking
Allied officers simply assumed that Cochet could give orders to the French
Resistance just as de Lattre could give orders to the French First Army. General Patch, for example, appreciating the
convenience of having de Lattre's headquarters adjacent to his own, assumed
that Cochet would also come to Naples.
Just Just returned from his visit with Roosevelt, de Gaulle tried to
clarify the distinction between "Commanding General" and
"Délégué Militaire" when he saw Wilson on July 20. Following the conversation, Wilson modified
the basic orders to Cochet on July 29:
His "operational control" was defined as "issuing orders
and executing orders from Allied Force Headquarters," and his mission was
defined as giving "the maximum possible assistance to ANVIL." Such assistance could be no more than what
SPOC was doing: working on directives
from the Seventh Army planners, with whom Cochet had no direct contact except
by liaison. When Cochet's chief of
staff, Col. Boutaud de Lavilléon, asked that he be informed three days in
advance the exact time of H Hour, his request was denied.
In
General Cochet's personal file can be found an organizational chart drawn up by
himself, almost pathetically trying to delineate the flow of command. The chart is a spider-web, with himself,
DMOS, at the center, and lines radiating in all directions, solid for command
relations, dotted for liaison. They go
to SACMED, AFHQ, SPOC, DGSS, FCNL, Seventh Army, French First Army, and to the
field, zonal and regional military delegates, Committees of Liberation, and
Chefs, FFI. There is no clear-cut line
of military command. Cochet penned a
succinct comment: "Mes pouvoirs et
les moyens d'accomplir ma mission ne sont pas ŕ la hauteur de mes
responsabilités."
NeverNevertheless, General Patch liked the idea of working through a
French military officer in the French Resistance and, with Wilson's approval,
directed General Cochet to embark with him from Naples so that he could have
close personal contact at the time of the landings. But when de Gaulle learned of Patch's desire,
he categorically refused to release Cochet, insisting that he remain in
Algiers. Cochet himself agonized over
the situation, apologizing to Wilson on August 7 that he had to obey de Gaulle,
and adding rather lamely that in any case "practically all instructions to
the FFI in the southern zone have been given without reference to me."
It
is interesting to note that a new directive on plans for the Resistance,
similar to SPOC's plan of July 15, bears the date August 8 and was issued over
Cochet's name. General Cochet did not,
in fact, reach France until August 21, when much of the south had already been
liberated. He still had a large
responsibility ahead of him, when thousands of FFI troops wished to become
incorporated into the regular French army.
But at the time of the landings, his voice was scarcely heard or even
recognized among the Maquis. PLANNING AND
ACTION AT SPOC
While Seventh Army planners sweated through the hot summer in Naples
organizing an amphibious operation involving a force of 50,000, the people in
SPOC, a thousand miles away in Algiers, labored on plans to coordinate the
regular army's assault with actions of the Maquis. SPOC received the first directives on what
Patch expected from the FFI on July 4: a
list of railway lines and roads, the cutting or controlling of which would
obstruct German efforts to bring its forces to focus on Marseille, Toulon, and
the beachhead. The planners listed three
routes as highest priority: first the roads and railways on both sides of the
Rhône as far as Lyon; second, the roads and railways stretching east and west
across France from Bordeaux on the Atlantic to Narbonne on the Mediterranean;
third, the major road from Milan and Turin into France via the Mt. Cenis
tunnel.
Using Using this directive as a guide, SPOC made plans to alert the
Resistance, to deploy the Jedburgh, Operational Group, and inter-allied teams,
and to increase drops of arms and equipment.
To meet the August 1 deadline given them by Patch, SPOC officials
modified their existing directives and by July 15 had produced Draft No. 2, a
twenty-three-page document (plus five appendices): "Plan for the Use of Resistance in
Support of Operation ANVIL." One of
SPOC nevertheless faced the necessity of supporting groups already in the
field, despatched before the strategic military objectives had been
delineated. For instance, for SPOC, the
Vercors held the No. 1 priority. The 2nd
and 4th priorities were the Drôme and Ardčche departments--quite properly since
they held the Rhône Valley between them.
However, the No. 3 priority lay in Savoie and Haute-Savoie, guarding the roads to the Little St. Bernard
and other passes. While this area had minor significance for the early
stages of ANVIL, it was important to SOE, because of MARKSMAN, a circuit that
under the leadership of XAVIER (R. H. Heslop) had functioned in Ain, Haut-Jura,
and Haute-Savoie since 1942 with conspicuous success.
The No. 5 priority was the Vaucluse,
important for communications with Algiers because, on the plateau southeast of
Mont Ventoux, the Maquis had constructed landing strip Spitfire, where small
planes such as Dakotas and Lysanders could land. The 6th priority lay in the Hautes-Alpes,
key to the Montgenčvre Pass, where the
Resistance was providing strong support for operations against the
occupiers. Cammaerts had made his
headquarters, after he left the Vercors, at Seyne-les-Alpes, and it was into
the undulating hills of this picture-postcard landscape that many paratroopers
and containers were dropped
ARRANGEMENTS IN R2
All of the people concerned with the Resistance--the British and
Americans in SPOC, the French in Soustelle's Special Services, the G-2s of
Patch's Seventh Army and de Lattre's French First Army--had to be disturbed
about the organization, or rather the lack of it, in R2, where the ANVIL
landings would be made. In particular,
planners had to scrutinize the department of Var, along whose coasts the
initial onslaught was scheduled, as well as Basses-Alpes (Alpes de
Haute-Provence) to the north and Vaucluse to the northwest.
In mid-July, a series of unfortunate events further ruptured the
Resistance organisation in R-2. Through
betrayals, the Gestapo had been able to identify a number of Marseille
Resistance leaders. They then learned
that the Basses-Alpes Liberation Committee planned to meet at Oraison on July 16. The local Milice, working with the occupiers,
broke in on the gathering and arrested eight, including one of the "Héros
de la Résistance," Louis
Martin-Bret. The next day, in Marseille,
the Gestapo located Rossi and arrested him with several others, including Lancesseur and Chanay. The prisoners, 26 in all, were taken to a
secluded spot about 25 km north of Toulon, near the tiny hamlet of Signes. There, on July 18, in a natural hollow
encircled by grubby shrubs and rocky outcroppings, all of them were shot and
buried in shallow graves. The lonely
grove, seldom visited, has been identified since as a melancholy memorial: le Charnier de Signes.
Less than a week later, the sea
communication system between St.-Tropez and Corsica, managed in France by
François Pelletier, was penetrated.
Pelletier was in the process of arranging transportation for the
American OSS officer, Muthular d'Errecalde. Both men were arrested, interrogated,
and later, on August 12, shot with eight others at the same isolated spot near
Signes already rendered infamous by the twenty-six graves of earlier
victims.
ConcerConcerned over the deteriorating situation, a group of R2 leaders,
including Lécuyer and Cammaerts, met on August 4 in an effort to reestablish a logical and
workable command structure. The
discussions, stormy and prolonged, parallelled in micro-form the divisions of
French society, right against left, politicians versus soldiers, and among the
latter, divergent views of strategy and tactics. Some of the assembled leaders turned on
Lécuyer. Many still held him accountable
for the unsuccessful attack on the Germans at Barcelonnette, and they accused
him of misappropriating the mission MICHEL for ORA purposes alone. LécuyerLécuyer had no intention of
relinquishing his regional command of the ORA, but he was willing to eliminate
himself from the regional FFI staff in exchange for departmental
authority. He would therefore become FFI
chief in Alpes-Maritimes and retain his authority as ORA chief in R2. This arrangement would have to be confirmed
by the military delegate and FFI chief when, as expected, they would be named
and begin exercising authority in France.
In fact, they had already been named
[Widmer and Constans] and the military delegate, "Willy"
Widmer (to be known in the field as Colonel CLOITRE), had arrived in the
Vaucluse three days before the meeting of R2 leaders.
WIDMER TO FRANCE; ZELLER TO ALGIERS AND
NAPLES
In mid-July, General Koenig in London, and Generals de Gaulle and Cochet
in Algiers, together with the officials at SPOC, had agreed that the two
principal French officers responsible for SPOC liaison with the French
provisional government--Widmer and Constans--should be named respectively as
regional military delegate and FFI regional chief in R2. De Gaulle, having conferred with them both,
signed their orders of mission on July 29 and told them to get to mainland
France as soon as possible. Constans' orders read as follows:
ORDRE DE MISSION
I - Le colonel CONSTANS est nommé Commandant
des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur de la Région R 2. A cet effet, il est habilité pour donner tous
ordres nécessaires concernant la constitution et l'encadrement des FFI. Il
dirigera leaur action et en assurera la coordination avec les opérations
prévues par le Haut Commandement.
II - Les limites de la Région R 2 sont fixées
comme suit : Cours de l'Isčre du Rhône ŕ
GRENOBLE, cours de la Romanche, limites du département des Hautes-Alpes jusqu'ŕ
la frontičre franco-italienne.
III - Le Colonel CONSTANS rejoindra son poste
dans les plus brefs délais.
ALGER, le 29 juillet 1944
/s/ C. de Gaulle.
Not trained as paratroopers, they had to be flown in, which meant
landing in the Vaucluse Plateau north of Apt, where landing strip Spitfire could
handle small bombers. Widmer was the
first to leave, reaching Corsica with his staff on August 2. There, two members of the Jedburgh team
GRAHAM, Major M. G. M. "Bing"
Crosby, a Scottish officer who enjoyed wearing his kilt, and Captain Pierre Gavet (code-name
GOUVET), found themselves
"bumped" to make room for Widmer and his party in three
Lysanders. (Widmer's party was not
large, since a Lysander generally carried no more than two passengers.) The planes reached zone Spitfire in the early hours of August
2. At the airfield the group ran into
Zeller, recently promoted to general, who had been waiting anxiously for
transport to Algiers. Constans'
departure was delayed, and is described later.
Since his departure from the Vercors, Zeller had remained at Seyne,
seeking to find some way whereby he could ascertain why the people at Algiers
had neglected the valiant Resistance fighters on the plateau and trying to sort
out the confused command relationships among the FFI in the coastal areas where
unity of command would be most needed.
He radioed Algiers for authorization to go there in person.
On
July 26, having received approval to visit Algiers, Zeller hurried to Apt,
where ARCHIDUC (Camille Rayon), the capable and hard-working R2 SAP
(Section d'atterrissage et de parachutage) officer, assured him that he
expected a Lysander shortly. With a few
days to wait, Zeller had time to reflect on the deplorable catastrophe in the
Vercors and gradually came to realize that the Vercors did not represent a true
picture of the occupation. In traveling
through the southeast, he recorded:
"Toutes mes sombres idées disparaissent:
aucun train ne circulait plus depuis le 15 juin sur les deux lignes des Alpes,
de Grenoble ŕ Aix-en Provence et de Briançon ŕ Livron. Aucune voiture allemande
isolée, aucune estafette ne peut prendre la route, aucun barrage ennemi, aucun
contrôle n'existe en dehors des villes de garnison. Pas de traces de travaux de
campagne ou de champs de mines. Les Allemands sont pratiquement prisonniers
dans leurs garnisons, dont ils ne sortent qu'en force pour leur ravitaillement
ou quelque expédition de représailles--et ces convois, ces colonnes sont
attaqués, une fois sur deux, par un ennemi insaisissable.
Aprčs deux mois de ce régime, le soldat allemand est ahuri, démoralisé,
affolé--nous le le savions, nous lui volions son courrier. Il considčre avec
crainte ces montagnes, ces foręts, ces rochers, ces vallées étriotes d'ou ŕ
tout instant pouvait sortir la
foudre. Il attend l'arrivée des
"réguliers," des soldats alliés, comme une délivrance. Si l'on en excepte le haut des vallées
alpestres (Durance, Ubaye, Var, Verdon, Tinée et Vésubie) oů se livrent encore
des combats, également les routes proches de la Vallée du Rhône et les environs
de Grenoble, le centre du massif est ŕ nous."
Such Such was the message that Zeller hoped he could convey to the
Algiers authorities. Anxious to be on
his way, the newly promoted general could spare only a few moments with Widmer
at the airfield before the Lysanders took off.
Zeller arrived in Algiers on August 3, but the labyrinthine bureaucracy
of wartime Algiers prevented him from seeing anyone at a high level until the
afternoon of the fourth, when he saw Jacques Soustelle. What Zeller had to say persuaded a reluctant
Soustelle to arrange an appointment with de Gaulle for the following
morning. When When he saw de
Gaulle on August 5, Zeller was filled with indignation and bitterness that
Algiers had neglected the guerrillas on the Vercors. As
Zeller recounts it: "Je lui
rends compte de la situation dans le massif alpin et de l'évolution des
événements depuis le 6 juin . . . Le Général de Gaulle me tend alors un
dossier ŕ couverture bleue: 'Les Alliés vont débarquer dans quelques jours sur
les côtes de Provence; voici l'essentiel du plan d'opérations; étudiez-le et
donnez-moi votre avis . . .'
Le dossier est vite parcouru. . .
. Je sursaute: Grenoble, J + 90. Grenoble prévu comme devant ętre atteint 3
mois aprčs de débarquement! C'est
impossible et impensable . . .ou alors nous serons tous morts!
"Je ferme le dossier, je me lčve.
. . .'Mon Général, je ne saurais ętre parfaitement d'accord.'
"Je lui expose alors mon opinion en lui déclarant que la manoeuvre
projetée me semblait top timide. . . .
Le Massif Alpin était pratiquement entre les mains des FFI. Une fois la côte occupée sur 20 kilomčtres de profondeur, les Alliés devaient
avoir du 'culot,' lancer audacieusement sur tous les itinéraires Sud-Nord des
colonnes légčres avec quelques blindés et quelques canons. . . .
Aprčs avoir atteint la ligne Aix-en-Provence--Brignolles--Draguignan,
les Alliés devaient ętre en 48 heures ŕ Grenoble, et de lŕ se rabattre sur la
Vallée du Rhône pour couper la retraite des Allemands aux environs de Valence
ou mieux, si possible, ŕ Lyon.
De Gaulle was impressedby
Zeller's arguments. It might not be too
late, he believed, to get this opinion to Patch and de Lattre. The French leader took immediate steps to put
Zeller on a plane to Naples.
Zeller arrived in Naples on August 6 and saw
Patch very early the next morning. He
was accompanied by Lt. Cdr. Brooks Richards from SPOC who served as
interpreter. Zeller's testimony:
"Devant la grande carte du future théâtre d'opérations, je lui
retrace ma conversation avec le général de Gaulle, en appuyant sur ma
conviction profonde d'un succčs rapide dans le massif alpin et en détaillant
l'appui qui pourrait ętre fourni par les FFI. Je conclus: direction générale,
la route Napoléon--mais, pour l'amour de Dieu, foncez! Suivit un long interrogatoire sur les
maquis, le terrain, les itinéraires; questioné sur les dangers pouvant surgir
de leur droite, je leur donnai l'assurance de l'appui des FFI dans la région
frontaličre; ils me demandčrent de prévoir les destruction des routes des cols
frontaliers. Les instructions ŕ cet égard partiront par radio de Naples dans
l'aprčs-midi męme.. . . Suivit entre les Américains une longue discussion, . .
. puis le général Patch me serre vigoureusement la main, me remercie. En
sortant, le jeune capitaine anglais qui me servait d'interprčte [Brooks
Richards] dit avec un large sourire: 'Mon colonel, je crois que vous avez
gagné.'
During the three days he remained in Naples, Zeller set forth his views,
experiences, and arguments to various other groups, including the French.
"Le général de Lattre me donna la magnifique occasion, d'entretenir, le
lendemain, tous ses commandants de Corps d'Armée et les officiers de l'Etat
Major de l'Armé B de l'organisation, de l'action, des efforts des Forces Françaises
de l'Intérieur et des résultats obtenus par elles. Je dois avouer que les
questions qui me furent posées dénotaient une méconnaissance assez générale du
sujet."
ORIGINS OF TASK FORCE BUTLER
Meanwhile, Major General Lucien Truscott, whose VI Corps would bear the
brunt of establishing a beachhead, had begun to think about his need for a
fast-moving cavalry-type force to exploit opportunities as they arose. A problem for Truscott lay in the fact that,
while his divisions had tank battalions, the landing schedule provided for only
one armored division, but that was French, under de Lattre's command. What Truscott wanted was a motorized armored
unit, capable of moving rapidly to exploit an opportunity or available to support
other units when needed.
Doubtful about obtaining a transfer of the French division, Truscott decided on his own to
fashion a cavalry-type task force from elements of his VI Corps. In his own words:
"On August 1st . . . I called a meeting of my planning staff,
informing them of my decision to organize a provisional armored group to be
commanded by Brigadier General Fred W. Butler, my assistant Corps commander,
and to be designated Task Force Butler.
His staff, and essential communications, were to be provided by the
Corps Headquarters. The group was to
consist of the Corps Cavalry Squadron, the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, one
armored field artillery battalion, one tank battalion less one company, one
tank destroyer company, one infantry battalion in motors, an engineer battalion
and the necessary service troops. It was
to be ready to mass in the vicinity of Le Muy on Corps' order at any time after
D-Day."
Zeller's explanations may have helped convince General Patch that Truscott's
idea of a special task force had considerable merit. Perhaps Patch saw that by giving his support
he solved several problems: he satisfied
Truscott's wish for a fast-moving contingent of motorized armor, he resolved
the question of reassigning a French unit, and he made a gesture toward
cooperation with the FFI. He therefore
authorized Truscott to form Task Force Butler.
On August 11, four days after Zeller conferred with Patch, General
Wilson gave the Seventh Army commander a new directive with an addition: "You should also be prepared to thrust
with light forces northward up the Durance River Valley towards Sisteron, with
a view to gaining touch with and stimulating the Maquis in the Vaucluse
area. Such action will have the
additional advantage of providing a large measure of protection to your right
flank."
Chapter
6 Eve of the
Landings
Hampered by uncooperative weather and a variety of problems, SPOC had
been able to mount fewer sorties than normal into southeastern France during
July. With the full moon coming on
August 4, the officers at SPOC knew they had to make maximum use of good flying
weather during the first two weeks of August if they were to dispatch into the
field the OGs, the Jedburghs, and the members of special missions--over 100
individuals--who were training in the back regions around Algiers. WhatWhatever the reasons for delays, SPOC
bent every effort to make up for the relatively quiet action that in June and
July had brought only a few Jedburghs
and three OGs into France.
In the first fortnight of August, with the benefit of long-awaited
moonlight and exceptional efforts from packers, schedulers, and pilots, British
and American bombers carried five OGs, ten Jedburgh teams, innumerable French
officials, and a dozen "British Liaison Officers," whose special
efforts would focus on the Alpine passes.
First, a Jedburgh team, PACKARD, was dropped into the Gard department on
August 1. This mission consisted of an
American, Capt. Aaron Bank, and two French officers, Lieut. Henri Denis
(nom-de-guerre Boineau) and Lieut. F. Montfort
Bank was instructed to coordinate his activities with the inter-allied
ISOTROPE mission, dropped on 9 June, the leader of which was French Commandant
Jean Albert Baldenperger, and Major Denys Hamson the British
representative. However, PACKARD did not
work closely with that primarily Anglo-French group. In his memoirs, Bank makes only one brief
reference to a "two-man SOE team" and has written the writer that
they "made contact with us infrequently.
They did their thing and we did ours."
Whatever his relations with ISOTROPE may have been, Bank obtained great
satisfaction from his initiation to guerrilla warfare, and his enthusiasm
increased after the war. Remaining in
the American army, he was later instrumental in developing American
paratroopers and guerrilla commandos within the military forces; indeed, he has
been called the Father of the Green Berets,
During the first week of August, three OGs flew to southern France from
North Africa. One, PAT, landed near
Toulouse, far to the west of the anticipated ANVIL beachhead, but the other
two, RUTH and ALICE, parachuted into areas directly ahead of a possible
breakout.
RUTH consisted of 15 OSS commandos, led by two first lieutenants, Mills
C. Brandes and Carl O. Strand, Jr. The
group's mission was to help prevent German use of railroads in the southern
part of the Basses-Alpes department and northern section of the Var. The RUTH team was dropped in the early hours
of August 4--night of the full moon--between Grasse and Castellane, to a zone
where the reception group--a small contingent of FTP maquisards--were prepared
for goods, not human beings. After
three arduous night marches, loaded with heavy equipment, the group reached a
Maquis camp at St.-Jurs, in the mountains south of Digne. For the next few days, until the ANVIL
landings on August 15, Brandes, Strand, and their men blew four bridges in the
area. A maquisard at St.-Jurs, Oxent
Miesseroff, later wrote memoirs that described, not too kindly, the OG's
operation: "Comme ils n'avaient
rien ŕ faire, vu que tout ce qui méritait d'ętre démoli l'était déjŕ depuis
longtemps, ils menaient dans leurs 3 tentes, ŕ 500 mčtres de nous, une petite
camp de vacances."
ApparApparently realizing that more blowing of bridges might be
counterproductive, SPOC ordered the group to concentrate on ambushes. Lieutenant Strand, therefore, moved with four
men into the Les Mées area, west of Digne, while Brandes, with the remainder,
set up ambushes along the Route Napoléon.
They had seen no action, however, when the first U.S. Army elements
reached them after the ANVIL landings.
The other OG, ALICE, led by Lieutenants Ralph N. Barnard and Donald J.
Meeks, was sent to the Drôme department "to organize and strengthen the
resistance forces," "to reconnoiter National Highway No. 7, and to
destroy enemy communication lines."
The parachute drop of the 15-man section took place without incident,
near Dieulefit, shortly after midnight on August 7.
It so happened that Commandant de Lassus, the Drôme FFI chief, was in
the south, near Nyons, when OG ALICE landed nearby. He assigned the section to Captain Kirsch, in
charge of the company located on the Combovin plateau southeast of the German airfield at
Chabeuil. The group set up headquarters
there on August 12 and organized its first sabotage operation, blowing two high
tension towers on the plain south of Chabeuil.
De Lassus, like many Resistance
leaders, believed that, when American paratroopers with their bazookas and
heavy weapons came in, they should preferably attack Germans rather than carry
out sabotage, which the maquisards, as long as they had plastic explosives,
could effectively do. In defense of
ALICE's leaders, it should be pointed out that SPOC had ordered them, as
essential to the mission, to destroy communication lines. When Jedburgh team MONOCLE reached de Lassus'
headquarters, the French leader requested the American member, Lt. Ray H. Foster, to talk the OG into attacking
German convoys rather than pylons and isolated bridges.
The ALICE team arrived in the area at a moment not conducive toward
pro-Americanism, at least not toward the U.S. Air Force, which was bombing far
and wide in anticipation of ANVIL. On
August 13, attempting to knock out the bridge across the Drôme
at Crest, American planes missed the bridge but destroyed much of the
town. Asked to assuage the townspeople's
misery, Lieutenants Barnard and Meeks, with three paratroopers, went down to
Crest. In their words:
"Upon arriving they were greeted by a very downhearted and somewhat
belligerent group of people. The damage
consisted of destruction of about one-fourth of the town, thirty-eight killed,
one hundred wounded. Lt. Barnard and Lt.
Meeks talked with the people, visited the hospital and encouraged the people
that the bombing was a mistake and would not occur again." One cannot help but wonder about Allied
bombings, so many of which seemed unnecessary. As the Drôme history (Pour l'amourde la France, p.383) has well stated it:
"Rien ne parait plus injuste que la mort d'un ętre cher mais cela paraît
encore plus injuste si, comme ŕ Crest, les objectifs ne sont pas atteints et
n'ont par ailleurs aucun intéręt stratégique. Aucun train ne pouvait en effet
circuler sur cette voie depuis le 6 juin et męme si cela avait été nécessaire,
si l'ordre en avait été donné, la Résistance aurait accompli sa mission de
destruction de ces ponts, sans aucune perte pour la population."
Missions
to the franco-italian border
Besides the Jedburghs, OGs, SOE Circuits, intelligence agents, and
inter-allied missions, there was another special group of agents sent into
France, sometimes characterized in the records as "British liaison
officers." The concept of British
officers going into France appealed to SOE, which was already helping Italian
partisans in northern Italy. If French
and Italian guerrillas could harass German forces in the Alps, the passes might
be closed to Axis troops attacking ANVIL's flank or, conversely, open for
Allied troops crossing from France into the Po Valley.
Early in 1944, SOE in Italy (No.1 Special Force) proposed an operation
known as TOPLINK, which would endeavor to make contact with Italian and French
maquisards in the high Alps. Several groups were formed and trained in Algiers,
but like so many other missions, could not get authorization to leave until the
end of July. When the teams finally
left, they were directed to the Hautes-Alpes with specific orders to get in
touch Francis Cammaerts and Resistance
leaders.
The
FFI chief in the Hautes-Alpes was 38-year-old Paul Héraud, known everywhere as
Commandant DUMONT or simply as Paul. He
is highly honored in Gap, whose historian, the Abbé Richard Duchamblo, renders
homage in this citation:
"Une bonne vingtaine de rues, squares et monuments de Gap
rappellent le souvenir de la Résistance et en particulier des résistants
gapençais qui ont donné leur vie pour la France.
"Qui fut, par exemple, le chef militaire des mouvements unis de la
Résistance (les MUR) Paul Héraud. . . .
A la route de Grenoble, la plus fréquenté de Gap, a été donné le nom d'avenue
Commandant Dumont. Au Centre
d'apprentissage a été donné le nom de Centre Paul Héraud, le chaisier de la
place St Arnoux, chaisier comme son pčre.
. . .
"Sa passion, avec celle du travail bien fait, c'est la montagne.
Alpiniste de classe, observateur-né, apte ŕ juger rapidement toute situation,
rien le met en difficulté. . .
."
Cammaerts held Héraud in the highest regard:
"Dčs ma premičre rencontre avec Paul, j'ai su que j'avais ŕ faire
avec le plus grand chef de la Résistance qu j'avais rencontré en France. Depuis
le premier moment, je lui fis pleine confiance et le résultat est connu. . . . Paul reste pour moi le plus grand ami,
l'homme le plus pur et le plus sűr qu j'aie connu dans ma vie."
In coordinating the missions of the officers assigned to TOPLIFT,
Cammaerts worked closely with
Héraud, as well as with Gilbert Galetti,
the Resistance leader who operated east of Guillestre into the Queyras, with
headquarters at a group of chalets above Bramousse. This is rugged country, guarded farther to the east by an ancient
fortress, Chateau Queyras, and beyond, as the road rises and the pine and larch
forest thickens, rendered almost impassable by the range of high Alps, its
crests delineating the frontier between France and Italy. Indeed, no road crosses the Alps at this
point, but Galetti's people regularly took trails from Abričs or l'Echalp, over
the Col de la Mayt or the Col de la Croix, to maintain contact with Italian
partisans under Marcellin, who tried to harass German convoys shuttling toward
the Montgenčvre Pass from Pinerolo and Turin.
The first TOPLINK mission, arriving in France on 1 August, parachuted into Savournon, an isolated spot
ringed with hills about 45 km southwest of Gap, directly west of Seyne, where
they were met by a dedicated resistant, René Guérin. The group included six persons: two British, one French, and three Italians. The British members were Major L.G.M.J.
Hamilton and Captain P.W.R.H. ("Pat") O'Regan. ("Hamilton" was in fact not British but a Belgian, Leon
Blanchaert, who had joined the British army and served in North Africa.) The French representative (and wireless
operator) was Lieutenant Simon Kalifa, while the Italians included Lieutenants
Ruscelli and Renato and a radio
operator. In order to obtain specific information for Hamilton's mission,
Cammaerts had assigned Christine Granville the difficult mission of making
preliminary contacts with the Italians.
Scarcely rested up from her ordeal in the Vercors, Christine moved from
Seyne to Gilbert Galetti's headquarters near Bramousse. From there a helpful ski instructor, Gilbert
Tavernier, took her on the back seat of his motorcycle up the Guil Valley to
l'Echalp, from which point she proceeded on foot across the 2500 m Col de la
Croix into Italy. There she met the
hard-pressed Marcellin, who was in the process of reestablishing his base in
another valley farther north.
Unfortunately, Hamilton did not meet Christine and therefore failed to
learn about the German attack that had provoked Marcellin's evacuation
plans. Learning that the Italian
partisans were scattered and in retreat, Hamilton returned to Galetti's
headquarters where they continued their efforts to help Marcellin and his
dispirited partisans by packing supplies on muleback up to the pass. In spite of these reinforcements, the
Germans soon captured the Col de la Mayt barracks, forcing the guerrillas to
withdraw farther south, to the Col St.-Véran area. Ultimately, when regular French troops
arrived, they beat back the Germans and
pursued them into Italy as far as Cuneo.
During the first ten days of August more French and British
officers, but no Americans, came in by
parachute, mostly to drop zones in the rolling pastures just south of Seyne.
The leader of the first inter-allied mission to arrive was French, Commandant
Christian Sorensen (code named CHASUBLE), member of a wealthy wine-producing
family of Algeria, whose name evinced his forebears' Swedish origins, He had
served in the Tunisian campaign and later, like Constans, became affiliated
with the "Service Action" section of Soustelle's DGSS. He had undergone the same sort of paratrooper
training at the Club des Pins as the British officers. Until Constans arrival,
he would serve as the senior delegate from Algiers. The other French officer, Captain Jean
Fournier (CALICE), also from "Service Action," had completed similar
training. He was a graduate of St.-Cyr,
had served with the French army during the 1940 debacle, and later in AOF.
The mission included three British oficers. Major Havard Gunn, of
Scottish origin, had joined the reserve of the Seaforth Highlanders before the war. An artist of considerable talent, he became
enamored of the Provençal countryside, like Cézanne and Van Gogh before him,
and when the war broke out was living and painting near St.-Tropez, where he
had purchased a cottage. Joining his
regiment after Hitler invaded Poland, he served in Italy and in 1944, seeking
an opportunity to go into southern France, he obtained a transfer to SOE. His
codename, BAMBUS (unique among the "religious" codenames of his
colleagues) was suggested to him by Christine during a walk in Algiers.
The remaining British team members include a radio operator, Sergeant
Campbell, and Captain John A. Halsey (LUTRIN), who would be assigned to the
Larche pass area. Halsey, sometimes
referred to in the records as Kerdrel-Halsey, possessed dual citizenship
through his father, the Comte de Kerdrel, London representative of the French
Railroads, who had married an English woman named Halsey. Captain Halsey had fought with the French
army in 1939-40, subsequently served in the British army, and finally joined
SOE.
Sorensen had injured his leg on landing, but nevertheless immediately
undertook to solve some of the problems in R2.
In the words of his deputy, Capitaine Fournier: "Excellent acceuil
ŕ Seyne-les-Alpes. Le męme jour (4
aoűt) a lieu une importante réunion au
Col St.-Jean (12 km au Nord de Seyne). Lŕ, le colonel Georges Bonnaire (NOEL),
FTP, est désigné comme chef départementale FFI [Basses-Alpes]. Il est alors
informé par Lécuyer, présent au Col St-Jean, que le commandant Sorensen,
parachuté au Fanget avec la mission interallié désire le rencontrer. Cette
rencontre se déroulera ŕ Seyne.
"A Seyne, Sorensen est présenté ŕ Bonnaire par Paul Meyere,
représentant du CDL. Le but de la mission CHASUBLE est 'd'apporter ŕ la
Résistance française toute l'aide nécessaire et coordonner son action avec
celle des alliés.' Sorensen et Bonnaire
abordent ensuite la question de la désignation du commandant FFI dans les
Alpes-Maritîmes. Se sera Lécuyer (SAPIN) qui sera nommé.” The conversation at Seyne also gave Bonnaire,
a Communist, an opportunity to express a principal FTP grievance, that when the
FFI commands were organized on orders from London, the FTP leadership was kept
on the sidelines.
Sorensen was anxious to set up a command post farther to the south and
closer to the Route Napoléon.
Following the counsel of Lécuyer,
he decided that Halsey would go to Barcelonnette, while Gunn would go farther
south to Colmars, where Lécuyer had previously maintained a headquarters. Because of his injured leg, Sorensen would for
the time being remain at Seyne.
Before Gunn left Seyne, another
inter-allied mission parachuted into the area in the small hours of August
7. This group consisted of six men, led
by a French officer, Commandant Jacques Pelletier (CONFESSIONAL), two British
officers, Major R.W.B. Purvis (MANIPULE) and Captain John Roper (RETABLE), an
American OSS radio operator, Lieutenant Mario Volpe (ROSSINI), and two men to
serve as liaison with the Italians.
Jacques Pelletier was pursued by bad luck, for two weeks later he was
accidentally shot in the shoulder by an immature recruit. He survived but could no longer continue with
the mission.
CONFESSIONAL, scheduled to work with Paul Héraud in the Hautes-Alpes and
with Hamilton's Italian mission, landed near Savournon, where they were
received by Guérin. Héraud greeted the mission and arranged for
them to meet the next day with the Hautes-Alpes Resistance leaders. On that day, August 8, Cammaerts and
Christine drove over to Savournon, west of Seyne, and conducted the team to a
forest hideaway east of Gap for the meeting.
Christine had just completed an arduous two-week reconnaissance
expedition in the area and into Italy. She had undertaken to recruit some Poles
out of the Wehrmacht and reported that thousands of Italian partisans might
join in cooperative ventures with the French.
Héraud's short notice for the August 8 meeting had not prevented all the
Resistance chiefs, traveling by car and bicycle or on foot, from reaching the
rendezvous site near Gap. There Héraud
outlined his plans for guerrilla attacks and for cooperation with the Allied
missions. Cammaerts proposed a vote of
confidence for Héraud's leadership. The CONFESSIONAL group agreed and proceeded
back to Savournon in preparation for a move to the eastern Alps. Cammaerts and Christine returned to
Seyne. Héraud and his deputy, Etienne
Moreaud, went to Gap, while the other leaders walked or rode to their homes and
command posts.
On the next morning, August 9, Héraud came to Moreaud's house in some
agitation. He had learned that Baret,
the pro-Resistance deputy prefect, had been arrested; he needed a vehicle to
get to Savournon as soon as possible.
Moreaud had gone out, but Héraud was able to find a motorcycle on which,
with a friend, the Gendarme Meyere, he started south on the Route Napoléon
toward Tallard. He never reached
Savournon. A short distance above
Tallard, the two men were stopped by a German patrol. Selon Duchamblo: "Il échappe aux
premičres balles mais la fusillade va durer une heure. Au bord du torrent de
Rousine une rafale finit par l'atteindre. Trahison? Le mystčre
demeure." (Histoires de notre
ville, 8).
Héraud's death, along with that of so many others, brought havoc and
grief in its wake. In a Resistance sewn
with internecine antagonisms and rivalries, Paul Héraud had virtually
single-handed wrought a fabric in the Hautes-Alpes where ORA could talk to FTP
and where career military officers would consult with Socialist
politicians. And a towering irony lay in
the fact that in ten days the Allied army would have thrust its way to the
threshold of Gap; but Paul would not be there to see it.
One can only imagine the shock to all those in the Resistance on
learning of the unexpected and brutal execution of Paul Héraud, whom everyone
not only respected, but viewed as unique, a person who could bring some degree
of unity to the frequently squabbling Resistance factions.
When he returned to Seyne, Cammaerts found that another Jedburgh team
had arrived: NOVOCAINE, comprising two
Americans and a Frenchman. The Frenchman
was Lieutenant Jean Yves Pronost (nom-de-guerre Lelanne), while the Americans
included the radio operator, Sgt. W. Thompson, and Lieutenant Charles
Gennerich. Cammaerts gave them the
same instructions that he had already given the CONFESSIONAL
(Pelletier-Purvis-Roper) mission: proceed to Guillestre, get in touch with
Gilbert Galetti in the Queyras, and move on to a Maquis post at Vallouise from
where they could carry out guerrilla actions along the roads to Briançon and
the Montgenčvre pass. The two teams
shortly moved out by gazogene trucks that Cammaerts arranged for, and they
reached their destination by August 13.
Thereafter, they cooperated with Capt. Jean Frison, the Sector
commander, who with his deputies Capt. Lucien Nortier and Capt. François
Ambrosi, had over 150 hardy maquisards under his command. Many were mountaineers, wearing the floppy
berets of the celebrated chasseurs alpins, and some of the paratroopers, well
trained as they may have been, could not always keep pace with them.
Meanwhile, and leaving Commandant Sorensen to recuperate at Seyne, Major
Gunn had moved south with Lécuyer to Valberg on August 8. In his official report, Gunn writes: "Difficulty of movement, area surrounded
by German garrisons; made first recce area BARCELONNETTE-LARCHE, had to travel
as Gendarme, uniform hidden."
Gunn's uniform, of course, consisted of the kilts of the Seaforth
Highlanders, difficult to conceal under any circumstances, but, wishing to let
it be known that Allied support had arrived, Gunn and the other British
officers (as well as Jedburghs and OGs) liked to wear their uniforms as
frequently as feasible.
Already, Captain John Halsey, having co-opted a sergeant of Spanish
origin, Fernandez (RUDOLPH), already in the field, had established a base of
operations at a ski resort just south of Barcelonnette, where he was able to
begin reconnaissance in the Larche pass area.
He was in touch with Christine Granville, who, with her ability to speak
Polish, was making efforts to persuade the 50-odd Poles in the Larche garrison
to desert the leaders outrageously inflicted upon them. This effort of Christine's embodied one part
of her mission, and since coming down from the Vercors, she had already reached
a number of Polish soldiers, who maintained a clandestine organization centered
at Mont-Dauphin. While at Valberg, Gunn
kept in constant touch with SPOC and with the various field missions, awaiting
the "Action" messages they all knew would soon be transmitted. On August 11, Cammaerts learned that
Constans had finally arrived, and he concluded that he should go see him at
once.
Constans
and Cammaerts
Because Constans was not qualified for jumping by parachute,
arrangements had been made for him to come in by Dakota (DC 3) along with
Jedburgh GRAHAM and half a dozen important Gaullists, including Charles Luizet,
slated to become de Gaulle's chief of police in Paris. Obstacles kept delaying this flight but after
a delay of over a week, the flight was finally approved. Constans, the other passengers, and the two
Jedburghs of GRAHAM, who had been replaced by Widmer on Corsica (Major
"Bing" Crosby of the Gordon Highlanders and Captain Gavet) flew to an
airfield at Cecina, south of Livorno in Italy.
After some more delays they were picked up by a Dakota and in the early
hours of August 11 landed at Spitfire, to be taken in charge by the
ever-vigilant ARCHIDUC.
ARCHIDUC escorted Constans and the rest of the group along the foothills to Drop Zone Armature, near the
hamlet of Lagarde, up a curving road from Apt, where Widmer was waiting.
Constans at once sent word to Resistance leaders in R2 to meet with him as soon as possible. D Day was now but four days away, though
neither Constans, nor Cammaerts, nor others in France knew the exact date or
place.
At the same time that Constans landed in the Vaucluse, another segment
of the Sorensen mission parachuted into the hills around Seyne. This group consisted of Major Xan Fielding
(CATHEDRAL), who had worked previously in Greece, and a personable South
African, Captain Julian Lezzard, who, having injured his back on landing, was
unable to participate in further activities.
On the morning of August 11, Fielding obtained medical aid for his
companion and soon located Cammaerts and Christine, who were staying at the home of the Turells in Seyne. During the day, while the containers dropped
along with Fielding were recovered, Cammaerts explained the local situation to
the newcomer and prepared to drive to Apt for a meeting with Widmer and
Constans.
Of the problems facing Constans, the most urgent related to commands and
command relationships, especially in those departments where the landings might
take place and along the Route Napoléon. The period following the Normandy
landings had witnessed a significant evolution from an essentially civilian
"waiting" Resistance, with its not-yet-mobilized sédentaires and its
stockpiling of material, to a Resistance of active and structured military
forces, receiving more and more arms, and captained in many instances by
self-promoted natural leaders or a handful of St.-Cyr graduates. The untimely deaths of Martin-Bret, Robert
Rossi, and Paul Héraud automatically established Constans' agenda: What should be done with Lécuyer? Who should replace Héraud? With Zeller absent, did Constans fulfill the
role of FFI commander? To what extent
would Constans, a regular army officer, presumably therefore sympathetic to the
ORA, find broad acceptance?
Cammaerts planned to travel to Apt in a Red Cross truck, driven by
Claude Renoir (a son of the painter), which had already provided him with safe
cover during trips in his area. Still at
Seyne was Commandant Sorensen who, because of his injured leg, had not
accompanied Gunn to the south, as well as the recently arrived Major
Fielding. Cammaerts had to weigh the advisability
of leaving them at Seyne or of having them accompany him. Because Fielding's French was somewhat rusty,
travel on open roads risked a possible interception, but in the end Cammaerts
decided to bring the two officers along with him.
The trip began on August 12. Fielding has described it:
"It was full of confidence, then, that I started out on my first
journey through enemy-occupied France, my only worry being the baggy Charlie
Chaplin trousers I was wearing. In these
flapping garments, I felt almost like a freak beside Roger [Cammaerts] and the
dapper Chasuble [Sorensen], a suave, silent man with greying hair, neat dark
features and a tired, urban manner."
When Cammaerts met Constans, it was not in Apt, but at the Maquis near
Lagarde, where ARCHIDUC controlled Drop Zone Armature. In the locality as well, "Bing"
Crosby and his French partner of Jedburgh team GRAHAM, Captain Gavet, fumed at
Constans' debates, which they considered unnecessarily prolonged. At the same time, in the small hours of
August 13, an OSS Operational Group, "NANCY," led by Capt. Arnold
Lorbeer, came in by parachute.
Constans discussed the general situation in the area with Cammaerts. He
approved the recommendation that Lécuyer, who had many contacts in the eastern
part of R2, should be continued as FFI chief for the Alpes-Maritimes
Department. In this department, the
German 148th Division maintained control of the principal cities, like Nice and
Cannes, as well as the main towns along N85, the Route Napoléon: Grasse and Castellane. Lécuyer had been coordinating operations just
north of the boundary between Alpes-Maritimes and Basses-Alpes. SPOC was not inclined to support leftist
efforts to remove Lécuyer; indeed, SPOC continued to send him arms, money, and
reinforcements.
The succession to Héraud, in Hautes-Alpes, proved more complicated. (L'HERMINE was not a consideration, since he
held a "regional" command in the Central Alps, in principal making
him senior to the departmental hierarchy.)
The possibilities included Etienne Moreaud (DUMAS), Héraud's deputy,
good friend, and companion of many years; Colonel Daviron (RICARD), the
departmental ORA chief; and Captain Bertrand (O'HERNE) of the Gendarmerie. In
the event, Constans chose Moreaud.
Having concluded his discussions with Constans by the morning of August
13, Cammaerts, along with Sorensen and Fielding, and with Claude Renoir at the
wheel, began the journey back to Seyne.
On leaving Digne, scarcely an hour's drive from their destination, they
were arrested. They remained in custody
until two days after the landings.
That he and his colleagues came through the ordeal unscathed resulted
from the enormously resourceful efforts of Christine Granville.
Learning of Cammaerts' capture, Christine,
then in Seyne, immediately informed SPOC and got in touch with a gendarme--an
Alsatian named Schenk--who served as go-between in her negotiations with the
Gestapo agent Max Waem, a Belgian in the Germans' employ. Christine was able to get over a million
francs parachuted to her from SPOC. With
the funds as bribe and the Allied landings as threat, she persuaded Waem, after
ten hours of arguing, that it would serve his best interests to accept an Allied
safe-conduct and release his prisoners.
Schenk, not Waem, ultimately obtained the money but, because he was murdered a short time
later, never made use of it. (The money
disappeared.) Waem, quite aware by
August 17 that no substantial German elements stood between Digne and Allied
forces in Draguignan, released his prisoners, sent them off to Seyne, and
placed himself at their disposition. In time, Waem got a safe-conduct to Italy
and, after the war, repatriation to Belgium.
On returning to Seyne, Christine and the three released agents were
greeted by John Roper. Undismayed after
his ordeal but euphoric at his release, Cammaerts realized that with the Allied
landings, he faced a number of tasks:
keeping in touch with the missions, and serving as liaison between the FFI and
the Allied forces. Half a dozen new
teams--Jedburghs and OGs--had been dropped into his area, and American troops
now controlled a great semi-circular beachhead, east and west of St.-Tropez,
extending eighty kilometers into the interior. He would have to make contact as
soon as possible with an American commander.
Chapter 7 The Landings
The landings of Truscott's VI Corps--the 3rd, 36th, and 45th
Divisions--would be made along French Riviera beaches stretching some thirty
miles from Cavalaire-sur-Mer in the south to the pleasant bay of Agay to the
north. All of these landing sites,
together with the first major objective, Toulon, lay within limits of the Var
Department. It might have been thought
that SPOC would have concentrated on the Var, with agents as heavily dispersed
as they were in the Ardčche, the Vaucluse, and the Alps, but this was not the
case. If there was not an unusual number
of contacts, it was not because the Var lacked a vigorous Resistance movement.
In fact, the Var possessed much hilly, forested land suitable for Maquis
encampments; indeed, with one-half of its stony terrain covered with woods, it
ranks first among all French departments in timbered acreage. Furthermore, with Resistance developing since
the early days, the Var had begun to unify its movements in 1943 and was the
first to organize a Committee of Liberation.
Its military components registered the same disputes and rivalries already
noted in the other departments. The FTP,
under the command of André Claverie (JEAN-PAUL), was represented by companies throughout the Var. The ORA, under
Lieutenant Colonel Lelaquet, was especially strong in the northwest part of the
department, with Joseph Ducret
commanding an area east of Brignoles and Colonel Gouzy, chef de l'ORA du
nordouest du Var, maintaining his
command post at Varages. Before the landings Gauzy had been
cooperating with the American SI (Secret
Intelligence) branch of OSS, which maintained a
réseau
de renseignements (Fitz-Crocus) centered at Seillons.
The GaulliThe Secret Army had organized itself principally in the Toulon
area and around the department's administrative center, Draguignan, where
Captain Fontes, chef de l'arrondissement, and Pierre Barrčme, chef local, maintained their clandestine
headquarters. At nearby Les Arcs, where
the railway from Toulon joined the line from St.-Raphael, Commandantd Jean
Blanc was in charge. By the time of the
ANVIL/DRAGOON landings, the AS had banded together with the Groupes Francs and
the MUR to form the CFL (Corps Francs de la Libération). With the establishment of the FFI in June,
Captain Salvatori, located in the Toulon area, attempted as chief of the FFI to
persuade all the diverse heterogeneous units to cooperate in the common effort.
The most successful unification effort had brought into existence the
Brigade des Maures. Stretching parallel
to the coast behind St.-Tropez, the Massif des Maures comprises some eighty km
of low-lying hills, covered with pines, chestnuts and cork trees, in some
places isolated and stark, belying the nearby activity along the coast. In this area, several résistants, Marko
Célébonovitch, Alix Macario, Jean
Despas, René Girard, Marc Rainaud, and others had forged a unit that contained
elements of the FTP, the ORA, and the AS, with Maquis cantonments throughout
the massif as well as on the St.-Tropez Peninsula itself. While the Brigade had been alerted for several
days before D Day, the leaders did not know that the beaches south of
St.-Tropez had been earmarked for "Iron Mike" O'Daniel's 3rd
Division.
Unfortunately, the Brigade des Maures had not been well served by
SPOC. Some 26 Drop Zones had been
confirmed in the Var Department, but a series of failed missions plagued the
effort to drop containers and packages.
After Normandy D Day, only eight deliveries were successful, and of
these, two occurred after August 15, scarcely providing time for recuperation
and distribution. While the Var might be
considered to be within the limits of Cammaerts's JOCKEY circuit, or part of
GARDENER, run by Robert Boiteux out of Marseille, neither Cammaerts nor Boiteux
had circulated much in the Var.
There were good reasons why, even though ANVIL/DRAGOON's first assaults
would be made along the Var beaches, widespread contacts with the Resistance
were lacking. Simply because the
department faced the Mediterranean and included the French naval base at Toulon,
German defenses and counterespionage were especially effective. From AugNevertheless, in the first two
weeks of August, SPOC feverishly
attempted to increase its drops, and to send in agents and teams that had been
training for months in the hills and deserts around Algiers. The plan called for teams to drop into all
regions just beyond the "blue-line" semicircle, which ANVIL planners
hoped to achieve as a bridgehead from which thrusts would fan out, chiefly to
the north and west. SPOC wished particularly to reinforce the antisabotage teams in
Toulon, Marseille, and Sčte, and also to have an agent on the spot to help Maj.
Gen. Robert T. Frederick's FABTF (First Airborne Task Force) when its 7,000
paratroopers landed on D Day near Le Muy and Draguignan.
THE
AIRBORNE LANDINGS
Farmers who trudged to their fields around Le Muy were startled, in the
dark predawn haze of August 15 to find that thousands of paratroopers had
floated through the fog from squadrons of Allied C-47s. They were observing the first units of the
FABTF, which had taken off from Italy several hours before.
The drops encircled Le Muy, a small town about 25 km from the coastal beaches where the 36th
and 45th US Divisions would land. Between Le Muy and the coast flows the Argens
River, separating the two rugged outcroppings of the Massif des Maures on the
south, and the picturesque Esterel on the north. Because few good roads penetrate the
pine-covered slopes and ravines, the Argens Valley provides an easy access to
the principal east-west highway, N7, and ten miles beyond, proceeding along the
Nartuby River to a junction at Draguignan, to those roads that connect Grasse
on the east with the Durance Valley to the west. If the paratroopers could hold a circle
around Le Muy and Draguignan, and if the landing forces could quickly join up,
then Patch would control key strong points on the three major east-west
arteries.
The German Nineteenth Army commander, Gen. Friedrich Wiese, had
correctly assessed the Allied need to gain control, farther west, of the major
ports Toulon and Marseille, together with command of the Rhône Valley. His major defenses against an invasion, other
than coastal batteries and block houses, consisted of seven divisions, four of
which protected the coast between the Rhône and Spain. His only armored division, the 11th Panzer,
had been stationed near Toulouse, far from the landing beaches. East of the Rhône, Wiese had deployed his
three remaining divisions, the 244th protecting Marseille, the 242nd defending
a stretch from Toulon to the landing area, and the understrength 148th covering
Cannes and Nice, eastward to the Italian border. The 242nd and 148th Divisions made up the
LXII Corps, under command of Generalleutnant Ferdinand Neuling, with
headquarters at Draguignan. Under the
Occupation Forces Command, Generalmajor Ludwig Bieringer held responsibility
for control and defense of the Var Department, of which Draguignan served as
the administrative seat.
With excellent intelligence about LXII Corps headquarters, and with
reports on the strength of German garrisons in the Draguignan-Le Muy area,
Seventh Army planners had good reason to believe that a vigorous airborne
attack could seize this strategic inland communications center. They knew also that Maquis groups had been
harassing the German occupiers and that their cooperation could be enormously
helpful to the paratroopers.
SPOC AND THE RESISTANCE
Responsibility for getting in touch with the Resistance fell, of course,
on SPOC. A preinvasion plan had called
for Muthular d'Errecalde, the agent who had operated in the Var Department with
the MICHEL mission in June, to rally the area FFI and organize them to support
an airborne operation. However, when d'Errecalde failed to return to Algiers,
SPOC sought a replacement. (D'Errecalde
had been captured and shot, but SPOC did not learn this until after the
invasion.) For a replacement, SPOC fixed
on 24-year-old Lieutenant Geoffrey M. T. Jones,
who had been training and organizing recruits at Blida airfield near
Algiers since June.
In his youth, Jones had lived in southern France, spoke French, and
before he joined OSS, had been attached to an airborne field artillery
unit. Resourceful and aggressive, he
would prove an ideal choice for the mission.
SPOC arranged for him to be dropped as soon as weather and facilities
would permit. Shortly before he left for
France, Jones received a promotion to captain.
Jones made up part of a two-man team, the other officer, senior in rank
to Jones, was Capitaine de Corvette L. P. A.
Allain (LOUGRE), the officer in charge of the anti-sabotage teams
already sent to Toulon, Marseille, and Sčte.
As Allain's groups were already in place, SPOC assigned him the
additional duty of assisting in the airborne attack. In Allain's words (from
his report):
"LOUGRE et YORK (Jones) se parachutent ŕ 0 h 45 le 11 aoűt avec 20 containers de matériel
d'armement et de radio. Ils atterrissent ŕ 800 m. du terrain fixé, dans un
ravin. Résultat: LOUGRE une entorse et une blessure ŕ la cheville droite; YORK
de multiples contusions. . . . Les deux
autres équipiers ne peuvent sauter et retournent ŕ Blida."
Allain and Jones had been dropped at Zone Prisonier, on the Montagne de
Malay, about 22 km (as the crow flies)
northeast of Draguignan. The two
officers quickly made contact with FTP
Maquis Valcelli, led by Joseph Manzone, an able and enthusiastic
Communist, at Mons, a picturesque
medieval "perched village" overlooking the plain below. They were joined by the American Sergeant
James Dyas, a member of OG RUTH, which had parachuted into the area a week
earlier. Injured in landing, Dyas had
been cared for by local maquisards.
In the seventy-two hours now remaining before D Day, Jones and Allain
were able to reach key Maquis leaders, Captain Fontes at Draguignan, Lieutenant
Silvani at Montauroux, Commandant Jean
Blanc at Les Arcs, who, along with Manzone could muster some 200
maquisards. They all met together near
Mons during the afternoon of August 14, and that night at 8:00 they received
the BBC messages warning that the invasion was imminent. They laid out a plan of action: First, Manzone, under the guidance of the two
Allied officers, would undertake to knock out the German radar installation at
Fayence, about thirty descending kilometers south of Mons.
If the Fayence radar could be put out of commission, it would leave
Generals Neuling and Bierenger with incomplete intelligence on Allied
intentions. The radar station was
located at an abandoned reservoir on the heights above Fayence, with its
antenna perched atop an immense boulder--La Roque--from which it could survey
the invasion landing beaches at St.-Raphael.
Jones remembers having had instructions regarding the radar before he
left Algiers and needed only a BBC message for execution. Brooks Richards recalls that, when he learned
the place and time of the invasion, he immediately realized how vital the
installation was. However, having been
given highly classified information about the landings shortly before D Day, he
was prevented by security regulations from taking any steps that might
jeopardize military secrets. In spite of
this, Richards instructed his deputy, under no such restrictions, to get off a
message to Allain and Jones) . They in
turn persuaded a local group to undertake the job. As recounted by one of the
members: "Le radar allemand était placé ŕ la Roque, sur l'emplacement des
anciens reservoirs d'eau de Fayance. Le radar a été détruit par des explosifs
introduits sous le poste allemand par des résistants qui y étaient parvenus en
remontant depuis l'aval des reservoirs par les conduites d'alimentation
d'eau."
Meanwhile, in the early hours of August 14, Jedburgh team SCEPTRE had
dropped on to the Montagne de Malay, at Zone Prisonier. The American member, Lt. Walter C. Hanna, had
trained with McIntosh of Jedburgh CHLOROFORM.
The steep, rocky slope brought disaster to the French member of the
team, Lt. François Franceschi (nom-de-guerre Tévenac), who broke his foot, and
to the American radio operator, Master Sgt. Howard Palmer, who sprained a
knee. They encountered Jones and Allain
on the mountain but, with Franceschi requiring a doctor, they remained near
Mons while the others went down the mountain toward the designated parachute
areas.
From Allain's report: "Nous décidons de rallier en camionnette,
pendant la nuit, le point de rendezvous.
Il s'agit de faire une cinquantaine de kilomčtres ŕ travers les lignes
allemends. Une escorte de gendarmes nous
accompagnera. Le brigadier André Charles de la brigade de Draguignan qui parle
allemend parfaitement, servira de médiateur en cas de rencontre inopportune. Il
doit nous présenter comme des
parachutistes qu'il a arrętés et conduit ŕ la gendarmerie de Draguignan, pour
interrogatoire. . . . En cours de route,
un chasseur bombardier nous gratifie d'une bombe ŕ trente mčtre sur l'arričre
de la camionnette. Drôle de sensation. Pour une fois, je suis le gibier et mon
chasseur est un aviateur ennemi!
"A 5 h 10, arrivant au petit village de La Motte, nous percevons un
bruit que je connais bien: le ronronnement du Douglas C47, notre appareil
d'entraînement ŕ l'école des parachutistes, qui augmente d'intensité et bientôt
remplit toute l'atmosphčre. Il doit y en avoir queslques uns: Et les voilures
blanches descendent du ciel par dizaines, par centaines, par milliers męme
pourrons nous le vérifier quand, le jour levé, nous les verrons, innombrables
petities taches blanches jonchant les prairies, accrochées aux arbres, aux fils
ŕ haute tension, aux maisons. Mes gendarmes n'en croient pas leurs yeux."
General Frederick's First
Airborne Task Force consisted of over 5,000 American paratroopers to which had
been added almost 2,000 members of the British Second Independent Brigade. The plan called for the British together with
the U.S. 509th Parachute Battalion (reinforced by the 463rd Parachute Field
Artillery) and the 517th Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team, to drop
into an area centered at Le Muy beginning at
0430 on D Day, August 15. These
forces would immediately attempt to gain control of Le Muy, establish
road-blocks, and safeguard the flat area just south of Le Muy where gliders of
the 550th Infantry Battalion would land late in the afternoon.
Jones and Allain, descending from the mountains, first encountered some
men of the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery who had landed about eight km off
target into the zone assigned to Col. Rupert D. Graves' 517th Regiment. In the confusion of the gray haze, Jones was
able to identify himself to the paratroopers and help establish a command post
for Graves at the Château near Ste.-Roseline, just northeast of Les Arcs, one
of Graves' objectives.
Between dawn and 0900 most of Frederick's troops had come in except for
two battalions scheduled for the afternoon, and two groups that through pilot
error had parachuted far from their objectives.
Since these two groups benefited from contact with the Maquis, let us
examine their adventures (and misadventures) before turning to the principal
exploits of the Airborne Task Force.
By an unanticipated error in navigation, five plane loads of
troops--company A of the 509th Battalion, and elements of the 463rd Field
Artillery--were dropped a few minutes too soon and found themselves deployed in
the hills just south of St.-Tropez, thirty km from their objective. Almost at once Captain Jess Walls of the
American paratroopers met detachments of the Brigade des Maures, which had
taken up positions in the peninsula since the 14th. The Americans were able to assemble five
guns, and before dawn, the paratroopers and the FFI decided to attack the
St.-Tropez German garrison, which had withdrawn to several pillboxes and to the
ancient citadel. The daughter of Marko
Célébonovitch, Nicole, achieved some celebrity from the part she played:
"Nicole, pistolet ŕ la ceinture, guidait dans Saint-Tropez une
partie de la compagnie de parachutistes
du capitaine Jess W. Walls qui allait libérer la ville. . . . Un peu plus tard, les Américains et un
groupe de résistants conduits par Mark Rainaud attacquaient la citadelle oů
allait mourir Guy Ringrave, un jeune homme qui tenait absolument ŕ participer
au combat et qui avait supplié Nicole Célébonovitch de lui pręter l'arme
qu'elle portait ŕ la ceinture. A 17 h
30, la garnison allemande se rendait et descendait place des Lices, les mains
en l'air, en criant 'Krieg fertig!' 'Guerre ininie!'" "Nicole, 18 ans, devint
pour le monde entier 'la jeune fille au pistolet,' une des images
symbole de la Résistance, aprčs la publication d'une photo prise par un
journaliste américain. Aujourd'hui [1994] Nicole a toujours le męme
sourire." (Article and photos in Le Figaro Magazine,
No. 34, 12 aoűt 1994.)
Saint-Tropez, with its harbor
cleared and good facilities for communication,
appeared ideal to Seventh Army staff officers seeking a shore-based
command post for General Patch. They
chose the Hotel Latitude 43 on D + 1,
and the Commanding General moved there
during the morning of August 17.
Learning how the Brigade des Maures had assisted his American forces,
Patch took time out from a pressing schedule to review these maquisards and to
award the Silver Star to Marc Rainaud,
with letters of commendation to seven others, two posthumously. The
otheThe other error in navigation brought three groups of Lt. Col. Melvin Zais'
3rd Battalion (of the 517th Parachute Regiment) to ground near Callian and
Montauroux, small "perched villages" about halfway between Grasse and
Draguignan, and 40 km east of their objective.
These villages, old fortified towns built on precipitous slopes, command
the wooded valley road to Grasse several kilometers inland from the coast. Even as villagers protected themselves from
Arab attacks in the Middle Ages, so now in 1944 small contingents of Germans
could hold off attackers from the main road below. As the FABTF gained control of its target
area, groups of fleeing Germans holed up in the little towns, attacked by the
FFI before the Americans could move in tanks and artillery. It took a day for most of the paratroopers to
orient themselves and march west through a region infested by German
patrols. Many had joined their units by
August 16, but a few remained behind.
These included about 35-40 injured men, cared for by their own medical
people and the French, at Montauroux and Fayence. They were not molested by the Germans.
Another group, about the same size, organized
defenses in the area and along with some FFI, harassed the batches of Germans,
pulling back from Le Muy and Draguignan, who were infiltrating the area. About 25 men, led by Captain Hooper of the
517th, withdrew to Montauroux, where they held off attacks until reinforcements
rescued them a few days later.
At Fayence, some of the paratroopers
joined Hanna's SCEPTRE Jedburgh team and the local Maquis group led by
Lieutenant Silvani. They fought
intermittently against Germans in the area, but could not dislodge Major
Turnov, commanding 200 Germans defending La Roque, the site of the demolished
radar installation, just above Fayence.
After five days, a patrol of the 517th, probing along the road south of
the town, received bursts of 20.-mm. gunfire and called in artillery. This shelling somewhat softened the German
will to resist, and Turnov sent word to Hanna that he was prepared to discuss
surrender, but only to Americans. Un
rôle important a été joué par les résistants locaux, en particuler par Madame
Michel-Jaffart. C'est elle et le percepteur du bourg, Monsieur Blanc, qui ont
servi d'intermédiaires pour l'amener ŕ la reddition. After three hours of
negotiation with the German commander, Turnov agreed to give up. On the next morning, the 21st, 184 Germans
filed out and stacked their arms.
In spite of the two erroneous drops, one south and one north of the
designated area, the bulk of Frederick's FABTF landed where they were supposed
to, and in the early morning haze of August 15, gathered up equipment and made
for the designated assembly points. By
noon, Frederick's troops had control of the small villages around Le Muy. Frederick established his command post at Le Mitan,
two miles to the north. Geoffrey Jones,
the OSS representative, was able to confer with the general and offer his
services as liaison with Resistance leaders.
Another OSS agent, Capt. Alan Stuyvesant, representing SI, had
parachuted with the Task Force, thereby providing Frederick with two OSS
officers who could make radio contact with their respective field headquarters,
with Patch, as well as with Algiers.
Captain Allain remained with Frederick for a few days until he was
joined by one of his team members, enseigne de vaisseau Sanguinetti,, and then
made off for Toulon, his principal objective.
In the In the afternoon of August 15, Frederick organized attacks at Le
Muy and Les Arcs, the latter of which had been occupied for a while by the FFI
when the German garrison withdrew. In
the late afternoon, two more battalions landed, Lt. Col. Wood G. Joerg's 551st,
which jumped, and Lt. Col. Edward Sach's 550th, which arrived in gliders.
Altogether over 7,000 men had come in,
with 220 vehicles, 213 artillery pieces, and 1,000 tons of equipment.
By dawn of August 16, Frederick resumed the offensive and, by early
afternoon, had taken Le Muy. Bitter
fighting developed around Les Arcs, as the Germans tried to retake it, but with
all three battalions of the 517th engaged, the town was in Allied hands by late
afternoon, when advance units of the 45th Division, coming up from the beach,
began to arrive. The Americans, faced
with another struggle to obtain Draguignan, considered calling in artillery,
but were dessuaded by the local resistants, who
sent emissaries to the
paratroopers. One these, Mademoiselle Vidal, daughter of the préfet provisoire, used her knowledge of English to
explain the situation to Colonel Joerg,
whose battalion advanced and by 1800 were in control of the town.
When the paratroopers and the FFI drove the Germans out of
Draguignan, the prefectural seat, the new prefect and the Department Liberation
Committee should have taken up residence.
But as Draguignan, with a population of 11,000 was dwarfed in size and
importance by the naval-base city of Toulon,
the Liberation Committee generally met at the port, not at the inland
town. When Draguignan became free, one
of the Committee's members, Henri Michel, went there at once to ensure that
Henri Sarie would be recognized as the préfet.
Michel, then a young teacher in charge of press matters for the
Committee, would later become France's foremost historian of the Resistance,
founder of the French Committee for the History of the Second World War, editor
of its Revue, and a leading influence in accumulating documents about the
Resistance. Without the archives and
inquiries that Michel was instrumental in developing, studies of the Resistance
(such as the present one) would be immensely more difficult to achieve. This book is dedicated to Henri Michel.
With Draguignan, which had served as an administrative center for the
Germans, in Allied hands, the paratroopers quickly destroyed the enemy
command. General Bieringer, the
departmental commander, was taken prisoner, although General Neuling and his
LXII Corps staff escaped to the northwest.
On the next day, General Frederick in person brought Bieringer to
General Patch's command post at St.-Tropez.
On the eighteenth, Colonel Hodge of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron,
now a part of Task Force Butler, routed Neuling and his staff from a cave. He, too, was brought to Patch. Thereafter, the German LXII Corps ceased to
exist, leaving its two components on their own:
the 242nd Division to defend Toulon and the 148th to protect Cannes and
Nice.
GUNN AND LECUYER
Jones and Stuyvesant were not
the only agents available to the invading forces on Patch's right flank. Farther to the north, at Valberg, Havard Gunn
and Capt. Jacques Lécuyer, the ORA commander for R-2, had received alert
messages and waited for the imminent Allied invasion. Lécuyer, named FFI chief for Alpes-Maritimes
on August 4, had to divide his attention between his ORA regional
responsibilities and his departmental FFI concerns. Fortunately, so far as Alpes-Maritimes was
concerned, he possessed an able deputy in Lt. Pierre Gautier (MALHERBE), who
like Lécuyer had been active in the ORA and had operated throughout the
department. He had maintained good
relations with the FTP, headed by Jamme (known as JOB), although he was not on
close terms with the former FFI leader, Melin (CHATEL). Melin had previously led MUR contingents and,
in any case, limited his activities primarily to the city of Nice. Through Gautier and by his own visits as ORA
head, Lécuyer had been in continual touch with the Maquis--especially those in
the northern mountain part of the department, where Resistance actions were
coordinated by Captain de Lestang-Labrousse (RODOLPHE).
Prior to the landings, Lécuyer's contacts with Algiers had been
reinforced by the presence of Havard Gunn, who for the most part had remained
at Lécuyer's command posts. Through
messages from SPOC, Gunn had already learned that an airborne attack would
occur, and had orders like Jones to demolish antiglider stakes at possible
landing sites.
Gunn found out that Cammaerts and Sorensen had been arrested at Digne at
the same time (August 14) that he and Lécuyer received the action message from
Algiers. Gunn hoped that he could reach
some American troops and persuade them to rescue Cammaerts. He, of course, did not know what efforts
Christine was already making to obtain his release.
Lécuyer and Gunn, with two FFI scouts, came down from the hills on D Day
and after some efforts reached General Frederick at his command post on the
sixteenth. The general, sympathetic with
the Maquis effort, ordered a detachment of armored jeeps to accompany the two
officers up to the Route Napoléon. Gunn
soon learned that Cammaerts had been released, and decided therefore to retrace
his steps to the coast with the idea of obtaining arms and equipment for the
Maquis.
Lécuyer moved on beyond the Route Napoléon, persuading the leader of the
jeep detachment that by following the hill roads he could reach the Var River a
few miles north of Nice without German interference. As Lécuyer recalled it: "Nous arrivâmes sans encombre ŕ Puget
Theniers, puis ŕ Chaudan (au confluent du Var et de la Vésubie).
"Lŕ nous fűmes accueillis par des rafales de mitrailleuses
installées sur les hauteurs de Levens.
Tout le détachement--heureusesment sans pertes--se mit ŕ l'abri dans le
tunnel routier de Chaudan. Je dis au
commandant du détachement qu'en se lançant ŕ toute allure, jeep par jeep, on
pouvait, en remontant dans la vallée de la Vésubie, atteindre un vieux pont
(nous avons, bętement! fait sauter le pont Durandy), se trouver rapidement dans
l'angle mort de ces tirs et revenir dans la vallé du Var pour se rapprocher
encore de Nice.
"Il me demanda ŕ quelle distance nous nous trouvions de Nice; je
lui répondis: 'A une bonne vingt
km.' Il me dit alors: 'Vous avez dit au
général que l'on pouvait aller jusqu'ŕ vingt km au Nord de Nice, sans tirer un
coup de fusil, c'était vrai, mais maintenant on en reçoit: je rends compte par
radio et je rentre.'
"Et ils repartirent, aprčs une nuit de repos ŕ Beuil, ce qui leur
permit de constater que l'arričre-pays était entičrement entre nos
mains." [Sapin, p. 71]
After he took leave of Lécuyer and the Americans, Gunn proceeded along
the Route Napoléon to Castellane, which had just been liberated, and then south
to Callas, which had been occupied by the FFI and some of Frederick's
paratroopers. By this time, most of the
Airborne had been relieved by elements of the 142nd Infantry team.
Quickly, members of the patrol escorted Gunn to company, then
regimental, and finally to division headquarters at Le Muy where he met General
Dahlquist. He dined that night with the
general, explaining to him how free the roads were, how few garrisons were left
in the mountains, and what opportunities existed for surprise strikes. Dahlquist appreciated the information and, on
the next day, authorized a 142nd Regiment patrol up the route Gunn had used, as
far as Castellane, some fifty miles north of his command post. On the same day (this was the day Task Force
Butler moved through Draguignan and on to the Valensole plateau), Dahlquist
enabled Gunn to see General Truscott who, having just conferred with Patch, had
reached agreement that Frederick's First Airborne would take over the right
flank position from Dahlquist. He found
Gunn's information helpful: Truscott's
diary is succinct: "Maj. Gunn (Br
of Maquis Forces) in with report that right flank is clear."
Gunn received encouragement from the American officers, who arranged for
a convoy of six trucks to bring captured German arms and other supplies to the
Resistance groups along the Route Napoléon.
With one of his trucks, he returned to Lécuyer's command post at Thorenc
early on the 20th. Both Gunn and Lécuyer
were prepared to cooperate with the Allied regular forces as they drove
eastward toward the Italian border.
But General Patch had other matters to contend with. He had to decide whether Task Force Butler
should be launched, he had to find out whether the French troops were landing
on schedule, and most of all, he had to determine the best methods of reaching
the Rhône valley.
Chapter 8
Task Force Butler and the Liberation of Digne
By D + 1, August 16, General Patch could view
with satisfaction the positions of his Seventh Army. In the south, the entire St.-Tropez Peninsula
had been cleared, and elements of the 3rd Division were moving inland. They would be joined later by de Lattre's
French First Army (Army "B") and together begin the drives westward
toward Toulon and the Rhá“áne.
With the German 11th Panzer Division still on the far side of the
Rhá“áne, German resistance had been sporadic and ineffectual.
North of the 3rd Division sector, General
Eagle's 45th Division had landed in the vicinity of Ste.-Maxime and was moving
rapidly across the Massif des Maures toward Vidauban, its objective on the
"blue line," in the flat country watered by the Argens River. Vidauban lay only a few miles southwest of
Les Arcs and Le Muy, now occupied by Frederick's paratroopers.
The 36th Division had run into strong
resistance when its landing craft pressed toward the St.-Raphael beach. Instead of a direct assault, Dahlquist's
troops came ashore to the east of their objective, then moved on Frá,ájus by
circling St.-Raphael. This maneuver
delayed the 36th's thrust up the Argens valley to join the paratroopers fifteen
miles away at Le Muy. The VI Corps
commander, General Truscott, was furious at Dahlquist's lack of drive but,
nevertheless, was sufficiently satisfied with his positions on D + 1 to judge
that further consolidation of the beachhead would not be required.
Except for some minor hitches, the
ANVIL/DRAGOON landing had been exceptionally successful. With the "blue line" virtually
achieved by the second day, General Patch controlled, within that semicircle
fifty miles long and twenty miles deep, a well-disciplined, well-equipped
combat force of almost 100,000, together with 10,000 vehicles. Also, in his VI Corps commander, General
Truscott, he had an able aggressive leader who believed, like the cavalryman he
was, in bold moves at the enemy's flank.
During the landings and the day after,
Truscott reviewed the situation several times with General Butler. By the end of August 16, he was convinced
that the Provisional Task Force could move north as planned, and he gave Butler
orders to convene the component elements at Le Muy.<M^>1<D>
After the talks with Truscott, General Butler
came to Le Muy on the 17th to take command of his heterogeneous
force<197>a selective group of fighting units that now, for the first
time, came together. In addition to the
117th Cavalry serving as the recon and communication core of Butler's Force,
Truscott allocated various other elements to provide the necessary mobility and
punch to this unique 20th-century cavalry:
a battalion of infantry (the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col.
Charles J. Denholm, from the 143rd Regiment, 36th Division); two companies of
Sherman tanks (from the 753rd Tank Battalion); a battalion of self-propelled
105-mm. howitzers (59th Armored Field Artillery); some Tank-Destroyers (Company
C, 636th TD Battalion), together with companies of engineers, trucks,
maintenance, and medical corps.
Altogether, the Task Force included some
3,000 troops and 1,000 vehicles, which with its tanks and mobile assault
batteries, provided Butler with a formidable armored scouting force, but
clearly one that lacked the punch of an armored division. Also, although the Force had a full
complement of radio receivers and transmitters, entirely adequate for internal
communications, the Task Force could not, in this mountainous country, always
rely on contact with Truscott's or Patch's command posts. Light Cub airplanes helped in scouting and
communication, but Butler had only one attached to his group.
The 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron not
only spearheaded the Task Force, but provided Butler with some of his
staff. Headed by Lt. Col. Charles J.
Hodge, the 117th formed part of the celebrated "Essex Troop" from
northern New Jersey. When they reached
southern France, the troopers, numbering almost 900, had gained some battle
experience in Italy. Completely
mechanized and mobile, the squadron could, in the tradition of its mounted
forebears, probe miles ahead of the main body.
The horses had given way to vehicles<197>about 240 jeeps, command
cars, half-tracks, and trucks; the sabers were replaced by 105-mm. assault guns
and by light M5 tanks firing 37-mm. guns.
The basic fighting units (aside from the headquarters and service
companies) consisted of three troops, A, B, and C, about 125 men and five
officers each.<M^>2<D>
ULTRA
and DRAGOON
While the Airborne Task Force was
consolidating its positions around Le Muy and Draguignan, while Truscott's
divisions were reaching and penetrating the "blue line," and while
Task Force Butler was assembling for its march to the north, an intelligence
breakthrough brought Patch information of extraordinary significance. This information came to him from the
deciphering and analysis of German Enigma coding machine messages that were
intercepted and sent to the field from Bletchley Park in England with a top
classification: ULTRA.
On D + 1, the British liaison officers and
the American ULTRA specialists had begun operations adjacent to General Patch's
command post at St.-Tropez.
Dissemination of the information was extremely limited<197>going
only to Patch of the commanding generals, but, of course, also to Wilson and
Devers. No division commander or any
French officer was privy to the ultrasecret messages that, once delivered in
the field, were destroyed. Because
knowledge of the system remained classified until 1975, no general who may have
used ULTRA could admit it in memoirs written before that date. Because both Patch and Truscott had died
before the declassification, they left no personal testimony as to ULTRA's
influence. On the other hand, the
American ULTRA specialist with Seventh Army, Donald S. Bussey, and the G-2, Lt.
Col. William Quinn, have been queried about the role these signals played, and
they agree that Patch "had been fully persuaded on the value of the ULTRA
intelligence."<M^>3<D>
Late in the afternoon of August 17, Bussey
received from Bletchley a deciphered message in which the German high command
ordered all forces in southern France to begin a withdrawal except for those
defending Marseille and Toulon. On the
next day, Patch had available a long message (XL 6919) expanding on details of
the Nineteenth Army's withdrawal. 4 The salient features of Hitler's order were:
1. Construction of a defense
line Sens--Dijon--Swiss border.
2. Withdrawal of all forces from
southern France, with 11th Panzer Division as rear guard of Nineteenth Army in
Rhône valley.
3. Defense of Franco-Italian
border by LXII Corps, with 148th Division (Cannes area) and 157th Division
(Grenoble area) protecting eastern flank of Nineteenth Army.
4. Protection of port cities of
Marseille and Toulon "to the last man."
Since the LXII Corps headquarters had already been overrun and the corps
commander was a prisoner of war, Patch knew that coordination of German
resistance to his north and east would be practically impossible. However, the Seventh Army commander had a
number of other factors to consider. He
had to ask himself whether Task Force Butler, together with the 36th Division,
could provide an adequate flank defense.
His decision was also made difficult by the attitude of his French ally,
General de Lattre, commanding the five French divisions that comprised over
half of the Seventh Army. Patch wished
to employ the French, especially their Moroccan mountain troops, to guard the
Alpine passes, but there were two problems.
First, de Lattre, feeling deeply that French honor needed combat in a
major theater, protested vigorously against his troops being tied up in the
mountain fastness. "Whatever the
cost," he wrote later, "I had to escape from the trap<197>pull
myself out from south of the Alps<197>and with the least delay, reach as
far north as possible." Second, the
schedule for unloading French troops meant that the mountain division would not
be available for a week.<M^>5<D>
Into this dilemma, which confronted Patch on
August 18, entered his senior, Gen. "Jake" Devers, who conferred with
Patch that evening. As commanding
general of the Seventh Army, Patch controlled the forces currently in action,
but overall command of the entire operation rested with the Supreme Commander
of the Mediterranean, Gen. Maitland Wilson, whose deputy was Devers. Furthermore, it was understood that, when de
Lattre had two corps ashore, he would become independent of Patch, but would
remain subordinate to Devers, who would command a newly formed Sixth Army
Group. Therefore, Devers, who liked to
remain on friendly terms with the French, was very much involved in decisions
relating to commands and overall strategy.
Interviewed in 1967, Devers said:
I happened to come into the
headquarters right then and I suggested to Patch, or his chief of staff, Doc [Major General A. A.] White,
"Let him go, let him go up the
other side. I'll take care of that flank
over there because we can keep the
airborne in there and some others to protect it."
In other words . . . the
airborne group under Frederick took over the job that had been originally assigned to the French. I didn't wire back for authority to do this. . . . I got them to do what they did. . . . Patch
issued that order after I told him I'd take the full
responsibility. 6
Taking into account all these factors, Patch issued Field Order No. 2 at
noon on August 19. De Lattre's French
forces would concentrate on Toulon and Marseille. Truscott's VI Corps would push the Germans
toward the Rhá“áne. Frederick's
Airborne Task Force, which had passed into reserve, would establish and hold a
defensive flank along the general line Fayence<196>La Napoule and protect
the army right flank. Since there is no
mention of flank protection north of Fayence or east of Digne, Patch did not,
at this time, have any real apprehensions regarding the more northern Alpine
passes. As Bussey put it in his postwar
report: "there was no indication
that the enemy would adopt an attitude other than defensive on the flank. Accordingly it was decided to pursue, and all
unloading priorities were altered with the whole emphasis given to fuel and
vehicles."<M^>7<D>
Patch now realized from ULTRA that a great
opportunity lay before him. With the
FABTF relieving the 36th Division on his eastern flank, Patch had at his
disposal Dahlquist's division to move on up to Grenoble, take care of the
passes into Italy, or reinforce Task Force Butler. What Butler reported could be crucial to the
decisions Patch and Truscott would soon have to make.
TASK
FORCE BUTLER GETS UNDER WAY
At dawn on August 18, Task Force Butler left
its dispositions around Le Muy, and with Capt. William Nugent's Troop C in the van,
headed for Draguignan and the Valensole Plateau. Following the 117th Cavalry's lead, the main
body was prepared to speed along the paved highways at over 20 miles an hour,
stretched out over thirty miles.<M^>8<D>
General Butler truly faced the unknown. Colonel Zeller had assured Patch that no
major German forces existed in the Durance Valley, but Zeller had left the area
over two weeks earlier. G-2 had little
precise information about enemy concentrations, and local intelligence was
sparse. To be sure, 4-SFU, the Special
Force Unit attached to Seventh Army, was supposed to provide interpreters and
radio contact with the Resistance, but no officers from this unit had yet
reported.
As the first units started off on August 18,
they had no idea what sort of opposition they might meet, but they assumed that
German units remained in the rolling shrub-covered hills. Their first encounter with the enemy occurred
only fifteen miles from Draguignan, when C Troop received some shots emanating
from one of the numerous grottoes near Aups.
One of the Task Force's tanks wheeled around and poured in a few rounds
of high-velocity shells. Quickly, there
emerged the staff of the German LXII Corps, headed by its commander, Lt. Gen.
Ferdinand Neuling, who surrendered his side-arm, a hand-crafted Luger, to
platoon leader Lt. Joseph Syms. Syms
turned the weapon over to Colonel Hodge, who after the war kept it as a
prized memento of the southern France
campaign.<M^>9<D>
Meanwhile, the main column, with Capt. Thomas
C. Piddington's A Troop in the lead, moved rapidly through Salernes and then
north toward Quinson. Forty miles
northwest of Draguignan, around 1:30 <MS>P.M.<D>, Piddington
reached the Verdon River south of the small town of Quinson. To the north lay the day's objective, the
vast Valensole Plateau, a large plain twenty miles across, set in among an area
of hills, small mountains, and gorges.
(A few miles to the east, the Verdon runs through spectacular gorges,
which are in peace time a great tourist attraction.) To reach the plateau, it was necessary to
cross the river and then mount a zigzag road up several hundred feet to the
plain, but the bridge was out.
Ironically, it had been the objective of Allied bombers several days
before, and when they failed to demolish it the local Maquis had finished the
job. What had been meant to hinder
German reinforcements or escape had boomeranged.
However, members of the Maquis got to
work. Together with the townspeople of
Quinson, they pitched in and built a ford at a shallow point of the river. Two tank bulldozers cut trails to the ford,
where the French guided the ponderous tanks and self-propelled howitzers across
the 16-inch deep stream. Only one 4 x 4
was flooded.<M^>10<D>
In crossing the Verdon River, at the southern
end of the plateau, the American forces entered the French department of
Basses-Alpes (now known as Alpes de Haute-Provence), of which Digne, a spa
celebrated for its sulfurous waters, is the principal center. To the FFI, it was imperative that Digne, the
department's prefectural seat, garrisoned by the largest German contingent in
the area, be liberated.
In the department of Basses-Alpes, the FFI
came under the military command of Commandant NOEL (Georges Bonnaire) who,
while a Communist and head of the FTP, had been accepted by the AS as FFI
commander for the department. He had
hopes of forcing the German garrison at Digne to surrender and had already
alerted the FFI units in the area regarding the plan of
action.<M^>11<D>
The area around Digne was well
organized. District I, in the south
around Manosque, had Captain Brondi (JANVIER) in command, while the Valensole
Plateau was the responsibility of Capt. Justin Boeuf (DECEMBRE). District II, to the west, was under Captain
Alain. District III, which included
Digne, had Captain Lindenmann in command.
To the southeast, covering Barrá_áme and Castellane, was District IV,
under Boiteux. Each of the districts
contained many Maquis detachments, such as the redoubtable <MI>Maquis de
Thoard<D>, northwest of Digne, and the FTP <MI>Maquis Fort de
France<D> to the southeast.
In the early afternoon of August 18, Captain
Boeuf learned from a messenger on bicycle that the Americans were coming up to
the Valensole Plateau. Boeuf rushed off
on his motorcycle and met an advance unit, which took him in their jeep to
Riez. Boeuf helped establish an
effective location for the CP and sent a message off to Lindenmann. When Butler arrived, Boeuf argued vehemently
for a detachment to move to Digne.<M^>12<D> The liberation of the departmental
<MI>chef-lieu<D>, while of great significance for the French, did
not have any political value for Butler, who had planned to advance up the
Durance Valley. He could see, however,
that Digne protected his right flank.
Set in the midst of mountains, the little resort town held a key
strategic position, dominating the Route Napolá,áon (N85) to the southeast and
cutting the road north that led to Cammaerts' headquarters at Seyne. These were the only roads by which the
Germans, if they chose to do so, could bring in reinforcements from Italy.
Butler agreed to dispatch part of Hodge's
squadron, Troop B, under Capt. John Wood, toward Digne. Thus, while the main force would continue
north up the relatively level Durance Valley, Wood, who was already bivouacked
five miles north of Butler's command post, would move north on a parallel road
about fifteen miles to the east. Unlike
the Durance road, however, Troop B's route led into rough mountain country, the
narrow highway snaking upward through forested slopes where a few heavy guns
could dominate the final eight miles of the approach to Digne.
By late afternoon, Captain Lindenmann had
arrived, and he was able to confer with Captain Wood, with Boeuf, and with
Lieutenant Brandes in command of OG RUTH, which had parachuted into the area a
week earlier. General Butler later
recalled his first contacts with the commander of RUTH and a local
<MI>maquisard<D>, whom he described as a "tough
bunny<197>about five feet tall and five feet broad."<M^>13<D>
Butler gave Brandes the assignment of
protecting Troop B's right flank even though only three men (of OG RUTH's
original thirteen) could go because "the rest of the men didn't have shoes
which could possibly hold up."
Brandes augmented his ragged commando with twenty-five
<MI>maquisards<D>, a bazooka, and a mortar.<M^>14<D>
While Butler bivouacked at Riez, 4-SFU, the
group that had been organized to maintain contacts with agents and the FFI,
finally set up a headquarters at St.-Tropez.
There were, in fact, two groups coming ashore at the same time: 4-SFU and SSS, the latter to serve as liaison
with intelligence agents operating in the path of the Seventh
Army.<M^>15<D> Both of them
arrived at St.-Tropez on August 16, D + 1, and established command posts on the
grounds of Hotel Latitude 43, Patch's headquarters. Col. Edward Gamble commanded the SSS
contingent, and Col. William Bartlett was in charge of 4-SFU.
Since vehicles and equipment had been loaded
on different ships, the men of 4-SFU and SSS worked under considerable
handicaps trying to find transportation from the beach to St.-Tropez. 4-SFU controlled operations<197>that
is, SOE and OSS' SO, both of which were administered by SPOC<197>while SSS
involved OSS' SI, the intelligence unit directed by Henry Hyde, also out of
Algiers. (British intelligence operated
separately.) Administratively, the two
units came under Colonel Gamble, but operationally, they were separate. Nevertheless, since the Americans were all
OSS, they frequently knew each other, and indeed some officers were
interchangeable. Both units had to be in
contact with the G-2s of army, corps, and division, but at the combat level,
distinctions as to whether information came from SO or SI contacts became
academic.
Under normal anticipated
circumstances<197>that is, a build-up within the "blue line"
leading toward a breakout, possibly weeks later<197>the delay in
obtaining a full complement and sufficient vehicles would not have hindered the
missions of 4-SFU or SSS. The planners
had arranged for only one-third of the units to come ashore with the assault
troops; a second third was to arrive on D + 10, and the final segment on D + 15
(August 30). In the event, however, by
the time the third group crossed the beach, Seventh Army had bypassed Lyon and
overrun almost all of the agents controlled from Algiers.
Colonels Gamble and Bartlett began, as soon
as possible, to establish radio communications with Algiers though Colonel
Gamble suffered from a leg injury resulting from a jeep accident, and Henry
Hyde had just come down with jaundice.
They wasted no time in sending SSS teams to each of the VI Corps
divisions: one under Lt. Robert Thompson
to the 3rd, one under Capt. Justin Greene to the 36th, and one under Frank
Schoonmaker to the 45th.
Similarly, Colonel Bartlett assigned the
4-SFU field representatives who reported to him on August 18 at
St.-Tropez: two Americans, Capt. Henry
Leger and Donald King; three British, Capt. Ralph Banbury, Sgt.-Mjr. Lloyd, and
a driver; and four Frenchmen, Lt. Marc Rainaud (the <MI>Brigade des
Maures<D> leader who had just been decorated by General Patch), Sous/Lt.
Comp., Sous/Lt. Fageot, and <MI>Adj./Chef<D> Maxent. Captain Leger's report explains the
situation:
@INDENTED = The vehicles consisted of one
motorcycle and two bantams [jeeps] (one of which was ours). We were to join the Task Force Butler.
@INDENTED2 = To the consternation of all
present, it was found that TFB had left on the morning of August 18, 1944, at
0545. It was jointly decided by Capt.
Banbury and Capt. Leger that the party would start immediately and find
TFB. After nine solid hours of riding
through friendly and unfriendly territory we caught up with TFB bivouacked in
vicinity of Riez. We reported to Major
Hansen, G-3 of TFB, who introduced us to General Butler who had us briefed by
Lt. Col. Hodge, operations officer, who gave us our assignments as follows:
@INDENTED2 = Capt. Banbury and S/Lt. Comp to
B Troop; Mr. Donald King to A Troop; Lt. Rainaud to CIC Hqs troop; Capt. Leger
to Hqs troop with order from Gen. Butler to be his liaison with the Maquis and
anything and everything French that might come his way.<M^>16<D>
With the 4-FSU personnel assigned, early on
the morning of August 19, Task Force Butler moved off the Valensole
Plateau. Captain Wood's Troop B, with
the mission of striking at Digne from the south, drove north to the Asse River,
which flows southwest ultimately to join the Durance. Besides his own troop, Wood had with him
Lieutenant Brandes and three men from OG RUTH, Captains Lindenmann and Boeuf of
the Basses-Alpes FFI, together with the 4-SFU representatives, Captain Banbury
and Sous-Lieutenant Comp.
Crossing the river, with Maquis fighters in
support, Troop B sped up the Asse Valley toward the formidable wooded slopes
that provided excellent cover for German machine gun fire. By 8:30 the column had reached Má,ázel, about
ten curving mountainous miles south of Digne.
Here the force ran into German opposition. Wood brought up some light tanks, forcing the
enemy into the hills, where they were pursued by Lá,áopold Comte's 3rd FTP
Company, by FFI under Deromas (FELIX), and units of the Asse Secret Army. Comte would later be the first member of the
FFI to enter Digne.<M^>17<D>
At Má,ázel another agent joined Wood's
staff. This was Capt. Jean Fournier
(CALICE), a member of the Sorensen mission.
While Sorensen had accompanied Cammaerts on the ill-fated trip to Apt,
Fournier had gone south with Gunn and Lá,ácuyer, where he checked out possible
landing sites in the Alpes-Maritimes Department. He then struck west to carry out a similar
mission on the Valensole Plateau. Moving
mostly on foot, Fournier had hiked to Má,ázel during the night of August 18/19,
and met Captain Wood in the morning.<M^>18<D>
Having broken up the German blocks at
Má,ázel, Troop B worked its way along the winding upgrade and shortly before
noon reached the southern outskirts of Digne.
The small force had run into mines hanging from trees and had received
scattered German fire, but was able to take up positions that threatened German
headquarters located on the edge of town in the Ermitage Hotel. Meanwhile the departmental FFI commander,
Commandant Bonnaire (NOEL), had sent out orders to all under his command. He ordered them to set up road-blocks on all
the roads leading to Digne. If or when
feasible, the Maquis elements would move cautiously toward the town, with some
units assigned the responsibility of seizing storage depots and fuel dumps.
It soon became clear to the German command
that it would not be possible to defend the Ermitage, and Generalmajor Hans
Schuberth, commanding the 792nd Liaison Staff (<MI>Verbindungs
Stab<D>), decided to capitulate, as long as he could surrender to the
Americans. He had been out of touch with
his superiors at Avignon for four days, and had no way of assessing the overall
situation.<M^>19<D>
The capture of Schuberth did not mean,
however, that the entire garrison at Digne had surrendered. Captain Wood saw that his small force and
light guns would have difficulty in attacking German defensive positions in and
around the town. As he moved into the
southern part of Digne, Captain Wood sent a series of messages to squadron
headquarters reporting heavy opposition.
By 3:00 in the afternoon, he had not been able to advance farther.
While Troop B and the FFI attacked Digne, the
main columns of Task Force Butler proceeded up the Durance Valley toward
Sisteron. Henry Leger, the OSS man from
4-SFU, located a serviceable bridge across the Durance at Oraison. Piddington, leading the advance, crossed the
river and moved his A Troop up the west bank toward Cháƒáteau-Arnoux,
while Troop B's 3rd Platoon sped north on the opposite bank (where OG RUTH and
the FFI had set ambushes), passed the spectacular rock formation called
<MI>Les Pá,ánitents<D> at Les Má,áes, and continued on to Malijai,
a key position that guarded the road branching off toward Digne ten miles to
the east.
In this area the Americans met up with more
Resistance fighters. During the night of
August 18/19, in accordance with Bonnaire's orders, the 16th and 19th FTP
companies had moved into the hills around Malijai. From the hills, in the early morning of
August 19, the <MI>maquisards<D> witnessed Germans executing three
civilians, but they were not strong enough to intervene.<M^>20<D>
Actually the Germans were attempting to
reinforce the garrison at Digne. From
Sisteron, early in the morning of August 19, a company of about 135 men (2nd
Battalion, 194th <MI>Sicherungregiment<D>) marched south with the intention
of crossing the Durance at Cháƒáteau-Arnoux to assist the troops on the
north bank of the Blá,áone. Between 2
and 3 <MS>A.M.<D>, however, the FFI blew the two bridges over the
Durance, thus preventing the Germans, who arrived at Château-Arnoux at dawn,
from crossing. The German
officer-in-charge was apparently reluctant, for fear of Maquis ambushes, to
march on to the next bridge, about five miles south. To cross there would in any case have placed
him south of the Blá,áone, in hilly wooded country infested with Maquis. He therefore remained at
Cháƒáteau-Arnoux, deploying his forces in the park adjacent to the old
castle. Meanwhile the commander of the
local gendarmerie had sent a message to the Maquis south of the town to alert
them regarding the German presence.
The German commander, with no way of making
contact with German headquarters at Digne, insisted to the mayor that he send a
French messenger to Digne, under threat of taking hostages and burning the
town. He gave the mayor until 1 <MS>P.M.<D>
to obtain a reply. A gendarme
volunteered for the mission. Instead of
going to Digne, however, he bicycled to the nearest Maquis command post and
turned over the message to the local FFI leader.
By this time, Piddington's Troop A had
reached a point about five miles south, and the well-informed Maquis knew that
the column would join them in a few minutes.
When Piddington arrived, he met with the Maquis leader and the gendarme.
Together they opened the German message and, laboriously translating it,
learned that the commander, in a quandary, sought instructions from his
superior. Knowing the approximate size,
armament, and disposition of the German force, Piddington prepared to attack
but agreed that the gendarme should return to see if the Germans might
surrender. He set 1:15 as the
deadline. It was now about noon.
Upon returning to Cháƒáteau-Arnoux, the
gendarme found the Germans still in the park, to which the iron grilled gate
was locked. Finally the German officer
agreed to meet Piddington, who had now moved into Cháƒáteau-Arnoux
itself. A few minutes later, the German
commander, without cap, jacket, or arms, came out of the park and met
Piddington at the gendarmerie, a few yards south of the park. The Germans surrendered, marched out of the
park, and stacked their guns.
Piddington, loathe as he was to reduce his number of vehicles, loaded
approximately 135 Germans onto some trucks and sent them to the rear. Troop A then moved on to
Sisteron.<M^>21<D>
Behind Troop A came the main body of Task
Force Butler. When Butler was about ten
miles from Cháƒáteau-Arnoux, he became aware of the situation at Digne,
where Captain Wood was reporting German resistance. Butler decided to send reinforcements and
ordered Maj. James C. Gentle, executive officer of the 143rd Regiment's 2nd
Battalion, to form a mini-task force and go to Wood's assistance. Task Force Gentle was made up of an M8
armored car, a tank company of eight Sherman tanks, and a company of
infantry. By 2:00
<MS>P.M.<D> this force had crossed the Durance at Les Má,áes and
dispersed the Germans, who began to withdraw toward Digne, attempting a vain
resistance from foxholes along the road.
Gentle moved steadily toward Digne.
Around 5:30, he was held up by a fire fight about seven miles west of
the town. As he proceeded, he was joined
by the <MI>Maquis de Thoard<D> and shortly reached a munitions
dump, defended by a few Germans. After
brisk fighting, in which Gentle's radio was knocked out, the munitions dump
blew up. An hour later, the Shermans
moved onto the Grand-Pont over the Blá_áone, on the outskirts of Digne. The arrival of the Task Force demonstrated to
the beleaguered Germans that they had a new and more formidable enemy to cope
with. All of the German points of
opposition surrendered. By 7:00
<MS>P.M.<D>, after two years of occupation, Digne had found
freedom. The Americans and the FFI
rounded up over 400 Germans.<M^>22<D>
If the Americans had anticipated that the FFI
would now join them in the push northward, they would have been
disappointed. Because the resistance
forces, whether FFI or FTP, were organized departmentally, they considered
their main task to be expelling the Germans from their department. They then sought to occupy the departmental
seat, oust the Vichy incumbents, and replace them with officials of their own
choosing. This meant a triumphal entry
of the Departmental Liberation Committee, representing a variety of political
views, but frequently dominated by Communists and Socialists who undertook to
play an interim role until the regular councils and administration could take
over. At the same time, the Gaullist
provisional government, represented by the <MI>Commissaires de la
Rá,ápublique<D>, would oversee the installation of a new prefect. As for the <MI>maquisards<D>,
after a period of exuberant rejoicing, these warriors tended to return to
civilian life or to continue to fight under their old leaders until such time
as they became absorbed into the regular French army. In the Basses-Alpes, Germans still threatened
Barcelonnette, where Commandant Bureau continued the struggle for control of
the Larche pass.
During the liberation celebration at Digne,
both Cammaerts and Major Fielding, freed from Gestapo headquarters only three
days before, visited the town, trying to locate a 4-SFU representative. Meanwhile, Captain Banbury had gone up to
Seyne, where he encountered Cammaerts by chance. He was able to bring him up to date regarding
Butler, at Sisteron, where Cammaerts, together with Christine, promptly went to
report.
Colonel Constans also learned about Task
Force Butler. He had completed his
reorganization, and after visiting de Lassus and Descour on August 16, he also
sought out General Butler and caught up with him at Sisteron on the twentieth.
Butler himself established his CP just south
of the city, and found himself more and more in touch with the FFI. Writing about his experiences a few years
later, Butler expresses high praise for the Resistance: "It is only fair to state that without
the Maquis our mission would have been far more
difficult."<M^>23<D>
The historian of the 117th Cavalry believed, however, that Butler might
have made even better use of them. He
writes:<M^>24<D>
We were beginning to meet more and more Maquis. The groups we were meeting were better
trained, better disciplined and more heavily armed. Their assistance is invaluable, as they mop
up the rough country between the roads up which we advance. Their enthusiasm and sincere desire to be of
assistance is most gratifying.
Unfortunately the commanding officer of the Task Force lacks confidence
in them, with the result that they are not being employed as well as they might
be. The information which they give to
us as to enemy movements ahead has, up to this time, proved accurate in
composition and timely to within six hours.
Chapter 9
LIBERATION
OF GAP AND GRENOBLE
With his Task Force bivouacked in the Sisteron area on August 19,
General Butler prepared for further action to the north. In prerevolutionary times, Sisteron guarded
the rocky pass between Provence and Dauphiné; in modern times, it serves as a
gateway to the Hautes-Alpes Department, with its prefectural seat at Gap, in
1944 a thriving attractive town of 15,000 set like a gem in a bowl of Alpine
hills.
After Paul Héraud, the Hautes-Alpes FFI leader, had been killed, Colonel
Constans had resolved the succession problem by naming Etienne Moreaud,
Héraud's deputy, to serve as departmental chief. In the four days since the landings, Moreaud
scarcely had time to exert real leadership and obtain cooperation from all the
other Resistance commanders. On the
other hand, the charismatic Colonel L'HERMINE, commander of the Central Alps,
believed the time had come for a general uprising against the Germans. As preparation for an onslaught against Gap,
he ordered that a strategic bridge to the east should be destroyed, and he gave
the mission to the Jedburghs of CHLOROFORM.
This long bridge, on piles, spanned the Durance at Savines, where the
road from Gap crosses the river and leads toward Guillestre and the Italian
passes. In the 1950s, a large dam
greatly enlarged the small lake (Lac de Serre-Ponçon), completely engulfed the
old town, and necessitated construction of a new bridge; but in 1944, while the
lake was smaller, it still required a long roadway from one side to the
other. Algiers approved the mission, and
on 14 August L'HERMINE ordered the
Jedburghs, McIntosh, Martin, and Sassi, as well as a handful of maquisards
loaded with explosives, to cross the high pass south of Orcičres in order to
reach the bridge without being observed.
For the mountain-trained guerrillas, crossing
the pass was routine; for McIntosh it was somewhat more arduous. One of the company recalled the climb:
"Ce fut pour tous une grosse épreuve,
mais surtout pour le lieutenant américain. Marcheur infatigable en plaine, il
peinait en montagne. . . . De vingt
minutes en vingt minutes, il demandait: "A combien du col?' Et on lui
répondait, 'A vingt minutes!' Et il lui
semblait que la montée n'en finirait jamais."
By morning of August 16, the bridge was out. Had the Germans crossed in
this direction, they would have found it extremely difficult to progress
westward. In the event, the road was
never required by them, for the Gap garrison surrendered and the Germans never
attempted an offensive over the passes. 2
When he received word of the landings, L'HERMINE radioed Algiers,
"Can we attack Gap?" and told the other Resistance chiefs that he had
received an affirmative reply. L'HERMINE
hoped that the German commander, with intelligence that the Americans were on
French soil, would be ready to surrender.
Through the officials in Gap he unofficially communicated this notion to
the Germans, while at the same time he consulted with the FFI leaders about the
feasibility of an attack. There were
more Germans in Gap than in Digne, and they had recently been reinforced by a
nearby garrison, bringing the number of troops to over a thousand. Although many of these Germans were
noncombatant administrators, they were attached to General Pflaum's 157th
Reserve Division, headquartered at Grenoble, which could readily send
reinforcements down from the north.
L'HERMINE insisted that the attack should be planned for the morning of
Sunday, August 20. Moreaud and other
officers continued to have doubts and were in favor of waiting until the
Americans actually came into the area.
On the 19th, the Hautes-Alpes Prefect went to the German headquarters to
obtain a reaction from Captain Hermann, the officer in charge. He obtained a firm reply: the Germans would
not surrender to the "irregulars," but he might be prepared to
negotiate with officers of a regular army.
This left the Maquis leaders in a quandary, since they were not
unanimous in their will to attack. There
were conferences by telephone and finally a meeting in the small hours of the
morning, wherein it was decided to make contact with the Americans. Word had come in that American advance units
were moving up the Durance River Valley.
Moreaud, learning that troops had already been reported about 20 km
north of Sisteron, went down with John Roper to find them. He met some men who conducted him to Butler's
CP, just south of Sisteron in the small hours of August 20. The shivering duty officer made an
appointment for the FFI leader to see Butler at 8:00. Moreaud and Roper therefore went back to
order the Maquis to hold off the planned attack and on the road encountered the
other commanders, L'HERMINE and Colonel Daviron of the ORA, along with the
Jedburghs Martin and McIntosh. Also with
them was Lt. Jacques Céard, leader of Sector D, whose 150 maquisards guarded
N75 north of Aspres. Returning together,
they saw Butler at 7:30. The general,
quite cognizant of the threat to his right flank, agreed to send aid. He had already concluded that Aspres, rather
than Sisteron, would be the key point from which to exercise his expected
orders--go north on N75 to Grenoble or west to the Rhône. He therefore planned two moves, one north to
guard the pass at La Croix Haute, and the other east to hold Gap. He told the Resistance leaders that one
element of the 117th Cavalry (Nugent's Troop C) would go toward Grenoble, and
the other (Piddington's Troop A) would take the right fork just north of Serres
in order to reach Gap by 17:00 that afternoon.
The French leaders, Moreaud, Daviron, and L'HERMINE, with the American
McIntosh, then left to order their troops (estimated at about seven hundred) to
take positions around Gap. Two officers
of the Maquis, Genty and Woussen, would remain with the Americans as
guides. The FFI would be deployed on all
sides of Gap: Captain Tortel's column
would attack by Puymaure, a hill in the northwestern part of Gap where the
Germans maintained their radio installation; Dusserre's maquisardswould block
the road from Embrun; Sector K would enter Gap from the south; and L'HERMINE's
commandos would come in from the north, through the Col Bayard. The Americans would be approaching Gap from
the heights lying to the west. Butler
gave orders to form a mini-task force, similar to the one used at Digne, this
time to be built around Captain Piddington's A Troop, now heading for the
Aspres-Veynes area about 25 km west of Gap.
Troop C had already started north.
Leaving Sisteron in an American jeep, Lieutenant Céard guided Nugent's
vehicles up N75 to the Col de la Croix Haute, where they joined 200
maquisards. Nugent sent patrols 15 km
farther on, to Mens and Clelles, halfway to Grenoble. They encountered no Germans, but received
reports of four hundred Germans to the north.
Butler sent a message to Truscott: "My main body control pass at
Croix Haute. Partisan support organized
and building up."
General Butler remained at his CP at Sisteron, where Colonel Constans
found an opportunity to discuss the campaign with him, together with
possibilities of deploying the FFI along with the Task Force. Butler felt comfortable talking to regular
military men: "Officers of the old French Army were coming in now,"
he wrote, "and the assistance of these trained officers was
invaluable." There is here possibly
a hint that military men could speak to other military men, whereas the
threadbare un-uniformed maquisards may not have engendered the same sort of
respect that the general accorded Constans, who, incidentally, is the only
French officer referred to by name (the code name, that is, SAINT SAUVEUR) in
Butler's memoirs. It may have been that
Butler, having been in Algiers from time to time before the landings, actually
recognized him, and, of course, he had Captain Leger of the 4-SFU team on his
staff as his liaison "with the Maquis and anything and everything French
that might come his way." Leger
states in his report
"Following instructions given by Gen. Butler, Col. St. Sauveur
[Constans] and I worked out a plan whereby a French liaison officer would be
attached to Task Force Butler as his representative and also that of the
Regiment de la Drome. . . . Regular
radio contacts were established between Task Force Butler (through 36th
Division) and Col. St. Sauveur's Hqs. and Commandant Legrand's [De Lassus] Hqs.
On this same day, Cammaerts, in uniform, accompanied by Christine and
the 4-SFU representative Banbury, journeyed from Seyne to Sisteron in order to
pay his respects and offer his assistance to General Butler. The effort proved disastrous. Perhaps the general felt he had already made
adequate contact with the FFI through Constans, or perhaps within him lingered
some anti-British sentiment; in any case, he made it clear he had no use for
Cammaerts' services, affirming that he was "not the slightest bit
interested in private armies."
Queried by the writer many years later, Cammaerts remained at a loss in
trying to explain why Butler literally "threw him out." "Christine and I went to see Butler
twice," he states, "the first time he snapped at us and his GSOI
(Intelligence) had to apologize....Perhaps Butler simply didn't like our
faces.... When you talk about Butler's
relations with members of the Resistance these were nearly all army men."
The historian can only wonder at Butler's short-sightedness in ignoring
a British officer who knew a great deal about the terrain and the people in
it. Clearly Butler preferred to deal
with the French military officers, but he could have done this without losing
the counsel and support offered by one of SOE's most capable agents.
While they were at Butler's command port, Cammaerts and Christine
learned about the imminent move on Gap.
With the help of a Task Force officer, they were able to reach the city
before Troop A began its attack.
Meanwhile, Captain Piddington had assembled his force near Veynes, north
of Sisteron, where he conferred with his FFI guides, and waited for the assault
guns and tanks to join up.
The road from Veynes to Gap offers no significant obstacles. For the most part, the road runs straight
alongside the Buech river. However, one cannot help but be suprised when, a few
kilometers before Gap, one sights the city nestling in a valley eight hundred
feet [250 meters?] below. At this point,
not far above the road stands an orientation table where a 360 degree disc
locates the distant towns and mountains.
Just beyond, the road begins to zigzag in sweeping curves down to the
town. From the fields and farms, one can
readily pick out, slightly to the north of Gap's center, the little round
wooded hill called Puymaure. It was
there that the German occupation force had established their barracks and radio
transmitter.
Piddington's miniature armored force reached the Table d'Orientation
around 16h00. Under his command, he had
his own motorized troop, augmented by five 105-mm. assault guns and three light
tanks. In addition, he had acquired
about a hundred maquisards who were piled on to the armored cars, jeeps, tanks,
and other vehicles. When he reached the point
overlooking Gap, he learned from local citizens about the location of the
German barracks. As Duchamblo records [Maquisards et Gestapo, Cahier 18, p. 12]: "Les chars quittent la route, montent
dans le champ derričre la Table d'orientation et prennent position de tir.
Woussen, Genty et un officier américain continuent d'avancer jusqu'ŕ l'embranchement
du chemin de Rabout. Lŕ, les curieux voient leur Jeep quitter tranquillement la
route, descendre ŕ travers les champs de Louis Trinquier, traverser le
ruisseau, remonter l'autre versant trčs raide pourtant et s'arręter prčs de la
maison d'Emile Trinquier. Une seconde Jeep, munie d'un poste émetteur et
récepteur, prend le męme chemin. L'exploit laisse ręveurs les
spectateurs."
Satisfied with the positioning, Piddington ordered Captain Omer Brown,
in charge of the assault guns, to emplace his howitzers in a meadow from which
he could readily hurl shells at Puymaure.
By 16h30 the assault guns had fired forty
rounds at German installations. The
first shot was particularly impressive, because it knocked over the radio tower
at Puymaure. Thereafter, Germans began
to come in, their hands high in surrender, to give themselves up to the
Americans. Shortly before 17:00, the
time designated for the attack, Piddington moved his CP down to the edge of
town. With indications that all the
Germans might be willing to surrender, Captain Brown volunteered to drive to
German headquarters under a flag of truce to see if there was a possibility of
avoiding bloodshed. Piddington obtained
permission from his own superiors to delay the attack until 18:00. It was, however, difficult to get the word to
the FFI groups, which were already beginning to move.
Captain Brown's mission was successful.
Around 18:30 he returned to report that the German officer-in-charge had
surrendered and had ordered the garrison to the town square, where they began
to report in groups of fifty to a hundred.
For the next few hours, Piddington, with the cooperation of Colonel
Constans, the FFI and the prefecture's secretary-general, Baret, tried to
establish some sort of order in the midst of a rejoicing population gone
wild. Thousands were parading in the
streets; some zealous citizens shaved the heads of collaborationist women, and
the crowd, identifying three Gestapo agents among the German prisoners, grabbed
them and, save for American intervention, might have executed them on the spot.
(They were, in fact, shot on the following evening.)
Around 19:30, just as it was beginning to get dark, the final groups of
Germans gave up. There had been some
confusion in the northern part of the town, when firing was heard at
Puymaure. It turned out that elements of
L'HERMINE's commandos had moved in and just narrowly missed being fired at by
the Americans. The FFI from all sides
moved into Gap, and while they rejoiced at the town's liberation, they had
tears in their eyes that the great Resistance chief, Paul Héraud, was not there
to join them.
Piddington and the Resistance leaders had their hands full. They held over one thousand German prisoners,
of whom several hundred were Polish, under guard, but they could imagine no way
of sending them to the rear. Piddington
saw a logical solution: Use the Poles, who detested their German masters, as
guards. He and Christine, who could
harangue them in their own language, encouraged them to shed their Wehrmacht
uniforms and volunteer to fight on the Allied side. However, General Butler would have none of
it, even threatening to have Cammaerts and Christine arrested for interfering.
This effort to recruit the Poles brought an unhappy termination of all
efforts the two SOE agents had made to rally the Resistance east of the
Rhône. They faced no alternative but to
leave the area and seek support from higher military authority. With help from a member of the Task Force
staff, they ultimately reached Seventh Army headquarters, but General Patch did
not send Cammaerts back to the area he knew so well. Instead, he assigned him to de Lattre, whose
Army B he later accompanied up the Rhône's western bank. With his knowledge of
the French people and language and with his official position as General
Zeller's liaison officer, Cammaerts could have been of considerable value to
General Butler, and later to Dahlquist and Truscott, whereas his experience and
talents were lost in an area assigned to the French, who could readily
establish their own liaison missions.
General Butler, still without specific orders, decided to move his CP
from Sisteron to Aspres. Learning that
Gap had been liberated, the general decided to drive to his new headquarters by
way of Gap. Delighted to see so many
German prisoners, he promised Piddington he would send help to take care of
them. Colonel Constans, who that evening had conferred with FFI leaders,
recommended to Butler that reports about German reinforcements coming down from
Grenoble should be taken seriously.
The Germans were, in fact, moving down the two roads from Grenoble, one
column threatening the pass at La Croix Haute (guarded by Troop C and Céard's
maquisards), and the other, marching south along the Route Napoléon, posing the
possibility of Gap being reoccupied.
Lucien Blache, commander of a Secret Army contingent at St.-Firmin,
about twenty miles north of Gap, learned that a sizeable German force,
estimated at 800 to 1,000 men, was approaching his sector. He set up road-blocks.
On the morning of August 20, a report had reached the FFI that the
Germans had passed Corps and were continuing on toward Gap. The report stated that the enemy had heavy
machine guns, mortars, and a 90-mm. field gun.
The local Maquis, numbering about one hundred, possessed one machine
gun, forty rifles, and a few revolvers.
On reaching St.-Firmin, the Germans spread out through the woods to
avoid guerrilla ambushes. By nightfall,
they had reached a point about 20 km north of Troop A's vulnerable outposts at
Col Bayard, where Piddington had positioned his assault guns. Jedburgh CHLOROFORM (McIntosh, Martin, and
Sassi), together with a number of L'HERMINE's maquisards, stood in support.
Meanwhile, at Aspres, Butler had received
orders to proceed west to Loriol, on the Rhône.
However, aware of the potentially dangerous situation at the Col Bayard,
he ordered Major McNeill (G3 of the 753rd Tank Battalion) to form a small task
force of Sherman tanks, tank destroyers, and infantry. This force pulled out of Aspres early on
August 21 and within two hours was in position at the Col Bayard.
At 10:00 the Germans
attacked. Piddington radioed his
headquarters: "1015: enemy patrols
trying to enter Col Bayard but are stopped." The Germans did not press the attack, but
turned around and started north. One
enemy group, of which half were Polish, broke off from the main body. A platoon of McNeill's tanks, along with
Jedburgh McIntosh and the FFI, pursued them and took three hundred
prisoners. Later some of these Poles
served briefly as guards when the Germans were put in trucks and sent to the
rear. Two American officers in a jeep
started after the remaining Germans and,
although unable to catch up with them, were able to estimate that about a
thousand men were retreating toward Grenoble.
Later that afternoon, Piddington's Troop A and McNeill's tanks, relieved
by elements of General Dahlquist's 36th Division, sped west along the road to
Aspres, Die, and Crest, to join up with the main body of Task Force Butler,
already taking positions for what would be known as the battle of Montélimar.
Chapter 9 The Liberation of Grenoble
If General Patch had any concern by this time that the eastern flank
held counteroffensive possibilities, ULTRA certainly had removed them. He had, in fact, before noon of the 20th,
authorized Truscott to send Task Force Butler west to the Rhône. As soon as possible thereafter, the 36th
Division would follow, with one regiment (143rd less 2nd Battalion already with
Butler) alerted for a move on Grenoble and the others following up the Durance. Butler only received his orders at 0400 the
next morning (August 21) but, in the course of the day, moved all except a few
elements to the Rhône.
Truscott had in mind that the entire 36th Division would follow Task
Force Butler to the Rhône, but he did not make this intention entirely clear to
General Dahlquist, who understood his mission as also protecting the east flank
and moving up to Grenoble. Consequently,
on the 22nd, Dahlquist ordered two battalions of Col. Paul Adams' 143rd
Regiment to move north. Adams had his
3rd Battalion, under Lt. Col. Theodore Andrews, proceed beyond the Col de la
Croix Haute, and sent his 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. David M. Frazior, over
to Gap, where it took the Route Napoléon north beyond the Col Bayard. (The 2nd Battalion was with Butler.)
Grenoble served as headquarters for the German 157th Reserve Division,
consisting of three infantry regiments and two artillery battalions, commanded
by Generalleutnant Karl Pflaum. Pflaum
had fought on the Russian front in 1941 before he was transferred to
France. The 157th, having been assigned
to antiterrorist duties, had elements scattered around the cities of
southeastern France, such as Gap, Embrun, and Chambéry, as well as at
Grenoble. Lacking sufficient power, with
its communications constantly harassed by Maquis groups, and uncertain how the
invasion was progressing, the 157th could muster no concentrated or effective
measures of defense.
German intelligence as to the exact position and movement of the Allied
forces was meager and delayed. German
records complain of the lack of air reconnaissance. The commander at Digne, when captured,
admitted that partisans had kept him out of contact with his superiors for four
days. On August 20 (with Task Force
Butler already in Aspres and Gap, 100 km from Grenoble), the Nineteenth Army
was insisting that elements of the 157th hold Grenoble until August 30. At the same time, the German C-in-C
Southwest, Kesselring, assuming that the 157th was now under his command,
ordered the division to retire to the Mont Blanc--Montgenčvre pass line,
"leaving rear guards in regiment strength at Grenoble and sufficient
forces to control roads leading from Grenoble to the passes. Efforts would be made to leave rear guards
until about the 30th, depending on Allied advance from the south. To delay this, roads south of Grenoble to be
destroyed, beginning immediately."
Clearly, C-in-C Southwest did not realize how harassed General Pflaum
had been. In early August, Pflaum had
mounted Operation Hoch-Sommer, in which he sent detachments southeast, into the
valleys of the Romanche, Drac, and Eau d'Olle, to destroy the Maquis of
Oisans. He needed to secure the road to
Briançon, which guards the Montgenčvre pass to Italy. Pflaum had sent other troops down the two
main roads south of Grenoble, but these had been stopped on August 19 and 20 at
the Col de la Croix Haute and at the Col Bayard. On the 21st, they also were retreating in the
direction of Grenoble, ambushed and attacked by FFI units along the way.
These FFI companies came from both the Isčre and the Drôme Departments for,
while Grenoble lies in Isčre, the boundary between Isčre and Drôme extends
north and south only a few miles west of N75, the Aspres-Grenoble road. The Drôme FFI chief, de Lassus, had
authorized the newly arrived French commandos under Lieutenants Muelle and
Beaumont, with several Drôme FFI companies, to harass the Germans near Clelles,
north of the Col de la Croix Haute.
The official Drôme history, Pour l'amour de la France,
deplores with good reason the official American account: "laconique, en ce
qui concerne la participation des FFI de la Drôme." [p. 404] The US Army official history does not give
credit to the Resistance for clearing the way to Grenoble. From the Drôme
history: "Les Américains nous avaient demandé de nous saisir les deux
ponts de Pont-de-Claix, le 21 aoűt ŕ 10h30 afin d'assurer le passage des chars
U.S. qui devaient déboucher ŕ cette heure précise.
"L'attaque de Pont-de-Claix est donnée par surprise ŕ 10 heures de
maničre brutale et rapide. Les ponts sont enlevés, la mairie occupée ainsi que
le piton qui domine la ville. En trente secondes les sentinelles qui gardent le
pont ont été abattues. Les occupants d'un blockhouss sont grenadés ŕ la Gammon,
le poste de garde - une quinzaine d'hommes en train de se restaurer - est
'liquidé' ŕ la mitraillette. A 10 h 30,
les Américains auraient pu pénétrer dans Pont-de-Claix mais ils n'étaient pas
lŕ: manquant d'essence, ils n'arriveront que tard dans la nuit."
The commandos sent messages to the Americans, still at the Croix Haute
pass, that the way was clear. (By this
time Colonel Adams, commanding the 36th Division's 143rd Infantry, had relieved
the Task Force Butler units holding the pass.)
On August 21, General Pflaum concluded that he should carry out the
order to abandon Grenoble so that the 157th Division could guard the Alpine
passes. His effort to hold the road to
the Montgenčvre pass having failed, he had only one option left--to withdraw to
the northeast up the Isčre Valley (Route N90) to the Little St.-Bernard, as
well as into the Maurienne leading to
the Modane tunnel and the Mont-Cenis pass.
During the afternoon and evening of the 21st, the German garrison burned
documentary records, destroyed installations, and began to pull out. By midnight, the city had been
evacuated. With Pont-de-Claix already
lost to the FFI, not many elements remained to protect the rear guard, only the
companies that, retreating from Oisans, had reached Vizille, and the scattered
units retreating from the Col Bayard.
All of the German units were hard pressed by the FFI, which did their
best, with their limited firepower, to cut off isolated enemy groups, block
roads, and occupy key positions. Because
Grenoble is surrounded by mountains, the Resistance fighters could control all
areas except those where the Germans had become well entrenched. With the German withdrawal, however, elements
of the Isčre FFI were able to enter the city during the night of August 21/22
and occupy the more important installations.
Cdt. Louis Nal (BRUNET) with his Groupes francs took over as the enemy
departed. Into the city came units from
the Chartreuse mountains to the north: Sector II under LE BARBIER (Lyautey de
Colombe) along with companies HUGUES (Guyot), PAUL II (Weill), STEPHANE
(Etienne Poitau), and many others.
Commandant Alain Le Ray
(BASTIDE), Isčre departmental Chef FFI, set up his CP at the Hotel de la
Division, and the newly designated prefect, Albert Reynier (VAUBAN), with
members of the Departmental Committee of Liberation, began to take over the
administration.
There were still enemy forces at Vizille,15 km from Grenoble, and along
the two roads, N75 and N85, leading into the city from the south, there were
groups of Germans. Nor was it impossible
that the Germans retreating to the northeast and northwest, finding their ways
blocked, would return. From the FFI
point of view, it was necessary to get American forces into Grenoble as soon as
possible.
The American forces were on the way.
The first recon units of Andrew's 3rd Battalion reached Pont-de-Claix,
occupied the day before by French guerrillas, around dawn. About two hours later, Colonel Adams ,
commanding the 143rd regiment, arrived with an infantry company, a few tanks,
and a field artillery battery. However,
with no information about the German withdrawal, he was hesitant to proceed
into town with his small force
On this morning of the 22nd, a journalist with the 143rd, Edd Johnson of
the Chicago Sun, hopped onto a trolley bringing French commuters into
Grenoble. He wore a correspondent's
khaki, but was soon recognized and hailed as the first American to help
liberate the city. He was escorted to a
hotel, where he took a bath, and then in the early afternoon reported to Adams
what had happened. The city was exuberantly celebrating its liberation. Crowds swelled into the main thoroughfares,
along which proudly marched detachments of the Resistance--from the Vercors,
from Chartreuse, from all the mountains around Grenoble.
By 14h00 most of Andrews' 3rd Battalion had reached the city. Adams conferred with Commandant Le Ray about
the possibility of a German counterattack.
Adams' resources were pitifully thin, and the maquisards were poorly
armed, but together they established road-blocks on the main roads out of
Grenoble, northwest toward Lyon and northeast where the road led toward the
Franco-Italian frontier. Just east of
Grenoble, at Gičres, Adams placed a platoon reinforced with FFI. He could only hope that his other battalion,
coming up the Gap-Grenoble road, would soon appear, but Frazior's 1st Battalion
had not made rapid progress. It
encountered more German resistance than the 3rd.
The German forces involved were the remnants of those who had
participated in Operation Hoch-Sommer.
Units of the 157th Reserve Division had progressed some thirty miles up
the Romanche/Eau d'Olle Valleys, on the eastern side of the 8,000-foot [3000
meters?] Belledonne chain, when word of the Allied invasion reached them. They had been fighting principally against
Sector I of Commandant LANVIN (André Lespiau), who has described the actions in
detail in his book Liberté provisoire. By the 21st, LANVIN had lost
contact with the Germans and assumed that some had continued northeastward over
the mountains into the Maurienne, which, since it leads to the Mont-Cenis pass,
would permit withdrawal to Italy. The
others he assumed would be withdrawing down the Romanche Valley.
As LANVIN and his FFI troops followed down the valley, they were hailed
as liberators. Some Germans had, in
fact, retreated ahead of them, and in the morning of August 22, were reported
moving along N91 between Séchilienne and Péage de Vizille, where the road
crosses the Romanche. Shortly after
noon, an advance reconnaissance of Frazior's battalion made contact with the
enemy. Learning that Germans were up
ahead, the 93rd Field Artillery, attached to the battalion, set up batteries at
Laffrey and began to shell N91. At this
point, between 15h00 and 16h00, LANVIN located the Americans, meeting a
lieutenant in charge of a small contingent of tanks and jeeps, about halfway
between Séchilienne and the bridge.
LANVIN believed that the bombardment was doing more harm to civilians
than it was to the Germans and requested a cease-fire. The Americans agreed. LANVIN was impressed by the rapid radio
communication between the observation post and the battery.
LANVIN and the Americans planned a
coordinated attack, directed against the Germans at the bridge over the
Romanche, to commence at 17h00. One American company would circle around north
and west of Vizille, with the other coming up from the south. There was a misunderstanding, however, since
the American movement began an hour earlier, and the FFI moved at 17:00. Unfortunately, the maquisards came under the
fire of the American battery, and there was some wild scrambling before the
French were identified. There was more
confusion as the Americans moved north into Vizille, mixed up with the Germans,
estimated as 500-600, withdrawing into the Chateau and its park. In the end, the Germans surrendered. The American report estimated 150 enemy
casualties, and 150 prisoners, who were turned over to the FFI. French reports mention 700 prisoners.
The action at Vizille slowed the advance of the 1st Battalion, which was
only able to reach Grenoble between 20:00 and 21:00 that evening, but it had
developed real cooperation between the Americans and the FFI. Colonel Adams later testified how helpful the
French had been in pointing out areas where Germans still operated. Adams recalled that a lot of maquisards
attached themselves to Capt. Zerk O. Robertson's L company. "He is a nice country-type
fellow," Adams said, "brave as
anything. So, he had a company of Maquis
as well . . . .I later got into a little bit of trouble over it, but I didn't
mind it . . . because they were real helpful to us and fought alongside
Robertson's company."
Just as the 143rd Infantry (minus the 2nd Battalion) was getting
organized in the city, with its command post at the Hotel Napoleon, Colonel
Adams learned that his units were ordered to leave Grenoble and proceed to the
Rhône where the rest of the 36th Division was trying to block the German
retreat.. Consequently, General Eagles, commanding the 45th Division, ordered
his179th Regiment to move into the Grenoble area as soon as possible.
At dawn on the 23rd, the day following liberation, the first recon
elements of the 179th's 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Michael Davison,
began entering the Grenoble area. By the
afternoon, the 3rd Battalion under Lt. Col. Philip Johnson had arrived, along
with Colonel Harold Meyer, commander of the 179th, who set up his CP at the
Hotel Suisse et de Bordeaux.
Relations between the French and the 179th Regiment, which remained in
Grenoble for four days, established a bond that lasted into the postwar
years. Colonel Adams had set a good
precedent, fighting together with LANVIN's maquisards at Vizille and
cooperating with Commandant Le Ray. The
exhilaration of the rejoicing populace was shared by the troops, which, to
their pleased surprise, had faced no German panzers on their march north.
By the 23rd, when Colonel Meyer relieved Adams, the city had somewhat
settled down. Meyer, who had taken over
the 179th Regiment at Anzio only five months earlier, was delighted with the
French. He wrote his wife:
"Every soldier and officer, to a man,
loves the people of southern France.
There were throat lumps and tears for all of us from the uncouth, the
unlettered, to the cultured as our convoys rolled through the villages, along
country roads, and as we were greeted by a happy, courteous, dignified and
proud people.
Colonel Meyer was fortunate in the capable staff that supported
him: His much-more experienced deputy,
Lt. Col. Preston Murphy (who had been acting commanding officer), cooperated
with good grace and enthusiasm; his supply officer, Capt. Harlos V. Hatter,
supervised the 300 km truck route to the beach so capably that the regiment
never had to "pull its punches for lack of ammunition." The two battalion commanders at Grenoble
would be affectionately remembered by the French: Colonel Davison would later
destroy a troop of German panzers at Meximieux, where "Place Davison"
now commemorates the town's liberation.
Meyer's other battalion commander, Lt. Col. Philip Johnson, has been
especially honored in Grenoble, almost as if he, not Meyer, held the regimental
command, and as if he, not Adams, had liberated the city. Johnson stands alone as the only American
officer who is mentioned by name in the French accounts of Grenoble's
liberation. For example, Paul and
Suzanne Sylvestre have written (in Chronique des Maquis de
l'Isere, p. 331): "Les troupes du colonel Phil Johnson défilent
dans ce qui deviendra le cours de la Libération, fleuris, adulés, fętés,
lançant chewing -gum et cigarettes, avant de camper ŕ l'Esplanade. . . . cavalcade assez picaresque, joyeuse et
décontractée . . ." And Jean-Pierre
Bernier, in Maquis Rhone-Alpes (103): "Le Ray-Bastide s'installe ŕ
la Division tandis que les nouvelles autorités civiles, abandonnant leurs noms
de guerre, se mettent en place au grand jour. Le commandant Reynier-Vauban devient le préfet de la Libération. Dans
l'aprčs-midi, les Américains du colonel Phil Johnson défilent sous les
vivats." Johnson, a veteran of
World War I, had remained in France after the Armistice, and spoke French. In
1951 he was named chevalier of the Legion of Honor by the French government. No doubt his knowledge of French and of
France caused the Grenoblois to emphasize his actions more than those of the
other American commanders.
Soon after the liberation of Grenoble, Colonel Huet (HERVIEUX), the
Vercors commander, established headquarters in the city. After the Vercors
dispersal, the various commanders had hidden in the wooded western slopes of
the Vercors and then, in early August, had gradually begun to regroup the
survivors. While Geyer (THIVOLLET)
organized his 11th Cuirassiers in the Royans area between the Vercors and
Romans, Huet established a command post at Tullins, about 20 km northwest of
Grenoble. He kept with him André Pecquet
(PARAY), the American bilingual agent who had served as radio operator for the
British EUCALYPTUS team in the Vercors.
When Huet learned that American forces were arriving at Grenoble, he
quickly moved, with Pecquet, from Tullins to the city. Pecquet carried with him orders signed by General
Caffey (on the staff of General Wilson, Supreme Commander for the
Mediterranean), which affirmed in French and English: "Cet officier
porteur des présentes est le représentant pleinement accredité du Commandment
Supręme Interallié. Il a reçu pour instructions de se joindre partout oů cela
sera possible aux groupes de résistance pour poursuivre ŕ leurs côtes contre
l'invahisseur allemand une lutte que ne doit cesser qu'avec la libération de
territoire français."
On August 23 Pecquet reported to
Meyer's CP in Grenoble and introduced Huet to the 179th Regiment
commander. Meyer and Huet became friends
and thereafter shared a headquarters office with the sign: "Colonel Meyer-179th, and Lieutenant
Colonel Hervieux." Pecquet became
the official liaison officer.
Although in fact liberated, Grenoble remained vulnerable to possible
German counterattacks from the northwest and the east. After consultation with Huet and Le Ray, Meyer
reinforced the road-blocks, of which there were six encircling the city. He assigned Colonel Davison's1st Battalion to
look after the west along N 92 leading
toward Romans) and the north, the rugged Chartreuse escarpment, which as
Sector II had been the responsibility of Captain Lyautey de Colombe (LE
BARBIER), whose command post was located at Voreppe, northwest of
Grenoble. Davison recalls that LE
BARBIER (as he knew him) was wounded on a patrol toward Romans. Davison ordered him into an ambulance, but
the FFI leader persuaded the driver to drop him off at his home, rather than a
hospital, so he could continue the fight.
A
particularly vulnerable area, as far as a German counterattack was concerned,
lay along N523, the road on the southern bank of the Isčre, going east and
northeast from Grenoble. With numerous
FFI in the slopes overlooking the road, the Germans would find it hard going to
continue toward the Little St.-Bernard or into the Maurienne. They
might, therefore, try to return and break through the city to the road
leading northwest to Lyon. Meyer had
posted a road-block, consisting of an American platoon plus several hundred
maquisards, at Gičres. on the eastern outskirts, but it was not strong enough
to repel a serious attack.
Indications that the Germans would try to break through developed in the
afternoon of August 23, the day following the liberation, when shells began to
fall on Gičres. German forces were
reported all along the road northeast of Grenoble, and Maquis groups in the
mountains began planning ambushes. About
midnight the Germans attacked the road-block, overran it, and took a number of
prisoners, including Lt. Clarence E. Coggins, commanding company A of the 179th
Regiment. Learning of the attack, the
Americans rushed artillery to the east of town, and all day long on the 24th,
an artillery duel developed between the Americans and the Germans. The Germans, with a CP at Domčne (about five
km northeast of Gičres), were grievously harassed. They could not break through the line which
Colonel Johnson was continually reinforcing, yet their escape route to Italy
was rendered almost impossible by FFI harassment.
Lieutenant Coggins later reported that German officers conferred with
him several times during the afternoon, each time more courteous than they had
been before. Finally, around 17:00 they
told him they wanted to discuss surrender terms. Coggins was ready to go along with them, so
he, a German officer, the mayor, and a nun, Sister Marie-Françoise of Assisi,
drove with a white flag through the French and American lines to the Allied
command post. Huet recounts the
episode: [radio, le 20 avril 1954]
"L'officier allemand, raide, descend.
'Heil Hitler, je viens prendre les conditions de reddition. Vous ętes trop
nombreux et trop forts. Nos hommes n'en peuvent plus. Ils sont mille, nos
munitions ont sautés.' Tout ŕ coup, il me jette un regard de haine. 'C'est aux
Américains que je me rends, pas aux Français.'
Le Colonel Johnson me prend par le bras, me serre contre lui et
réplique: 'Lui et moi, c'est la mčme chose. Nous ne faisons qu'un. C'est ŕ prendre
ou ŕ laisser.'
By nightfall, the surrender had been arranged, and by dawn of the 25th,
the thousand Germans were rounded up as prisoners. FFI groups came down from the hills and rounded
up stragglers along some thirty kilometers of highway. With this surrender the threat of a
counterattack from the northeast was ended.
It was now a matter of trying to destroy the Germans before they escaped
entirely.
Chapter 10 The 3rd Division to the Rhône
Patch and a few officers on his staff knew from ULTRA that on August 18
Hitler had ordered the withdrawal (except for the two divisions in Toulon and
Marseille) of all German units in southern France. Patch certainly realized that de Lattre,
responsible for the two port cities, would encounter strong resistance, but he
could anticipate that the three American divisions of Truscott's VI Corps would
face rear guard defenses rather than a vigorous counteroffensive. In any case,
Truscott urged O'Daniel and Eagles to drive as rapidly as possible to the west.
There would be three thrusts from the beachhead to the Rhône. First, de
Lattre's First French Army (technically Army B) would fight its way along the
coast, capturing the ports and continuing on to Arles, Montpellier, and
Toulouse.
Next, north of the French, Truscott sent "Mike" O'Daniel's 3rd
Division, with its 7th, 15th, and 30th Regiments, along the principal highway,
N7, which connects the Riviera resorts of Cannes and Nice with Aix-en-Provence
and then follows the Rhá"áne valley northward. Parallel to the 3rd Division thrust, about
twenty miles north, run secondary roads through hilly country, which Eagle's
45th Division--157th, 179th, and 180th Regiments--would cover, protecting the 3rd Division's
flank. Truscott controlled the French "cavalry"
unit, Combat Command Sudre, which moved rapidly along the secondary roads. Farther north lay the Valensole Plateau,
immediate objective of Task Force Butler, behind which followed Dahlquist's
36th Division.
Patch received the German retreat order via ULTRA about the same time,
August 18, as General Blaskowitz, commanding the German Army Group G, and
General Wiese, in command of the Nineteenth Army, obtained the message through
their own channels. By the 18th, the
German high command could assume that the principal Allied thrust would come
from the St.-Raphael--St.-Tropez beachhead, headed for the Rhône. Wiese had to form defensive positions hastily
along a line hinged on Toulon and running straight north to Brignoles on N7 and
to Barjols in the undulating wooded country twelve miles farther north. He assigned Kampfgruppe von Schwerin to be in
charge of these defenses at the time of the landings. Wiese's strongest division, the 11th Panzer,
stationed in Toulouse, had already started to cross the Rhône and would be
joined by the 198th Division, but neither could move rapidly enough to defend
Brignoles and Barjols, which were left to Schwerin and to elements of the 242nd
Division, already in the area.
Following the basic strategic plan for use of the French Resistance,
SPOC might logically have sent agents, Jedburgh teams, and OGs into the
highlands north of the bridgehead to do what they could, in cooperation with
the local Maquis, to harass German reinforcements of the strongholds.
Only one team, however, was sent to that part of the western Var that
might have vitally impeded German defenses.
This was Jedburgh team CINNAMON, that included a British officer, Capt.
R. Harcourt, and two Frenchmen, Capt. F.
Lespinasse-Fonsegrive (nom-de-guerre: Ferandon) and Sous-Lt. Jacques
Morineau (nom-de-guerre: Morin). They
were dropped on August 13, two days before the invasion, at a point between
Barjols and St.-Maximin just west of the anticipated German defense line. This team was to make contact with the
British SOE agent, Major Boiteux (FIRMIN), head of the GARDENER circuit, which
coordinated Resistance groups in the Marseille area. They were also to work with Colonel Lelaquet,
ORA Chief for the Var Department.
The team was plagued with misfortune.
As Lt. Col.Gouzy later reported:
"Malheureusement le capitaine Harcourt s'est cassé les deux jambes.
Le transport et le camouflage de cet officer avant l'action, alors que l'ennemi
circulait librement dans notre secteur, souleva des problčmes énormes. Il faut
croire que le blessé fut bien soigné parmi nous, car lors de notre prise de
contact avec les troupes alliées, il fut transporté dans un bloc américain;
mail il a demandé ŕ revenir parmi nous, ce que fut fait ŕ sa grande
satisfaction."
Although the team could not locate Lelaquet, Captain Lespinasse-Fonsegrive finally made
contact with Colonel Gouzy, ORA chief for the western part of the Var Department,
and also with Lieutenant Galvain, chief of staff for the Var FFI.
There were few Maquis in western Var, and many members of the
Resistance who had suffered reprisals after June 6 were loathe to take arms
until they were certain that the landings had taken place. Nevertheless, once word of the fighting at
the beachhead reached the western Var leaders, they rapidly began to organize
small groups in order to harass the Germans. Realizing that Brignoles and
Barjols held key positions for the German defense, the FFI tried to ambush and
interfere with German reinforcements going to those points.
On August 18 O'Daniel's 3rd Divison and Eagles' 45th ran into serious
resistance from German artillery and mortars trying to hold Brignoles and
Barjols. The full strength of Col. Lionel McGarr's 30th Infantry Regiment (3rd
Division), 3,000 men with tanks and artillery, took up positions around
Brignoles.
Farther north, at Barjols, which is surrounded by hills, Colonel Meyer,
commanding the 45th Division's 179th Regiment, deployed two battalions. There was genuine cooperation between
Americans and Maquis. Reports had
reached the 179th that partisans were
already engaged with 300 Germans. The
guerrillas had made contact with another American regiment (the 157th) of the
45th Division, which coming from Salernes, was by-passing Barjols to the north,
and heading toward Varages. The 157th
had already sent company C to Aups, five miles north of Salernes, to help an
FFI group that was fighting the German garrison. Behind the 179th's positions at Barjols, 11
km to their rear--at Cotignac--enemy mortar fire was threatening their line of
communications.
Colonel Gouzy reported on the operation in
his area, and recounted a situation that unfortunately sometimes occurred.
"18 August. Varages.
Established Command Post . . . formed a guerrilla group under the
command of Lieutenant GALVAIN. 3 P.M.
open fire. Germans surprised. 4
German mortars firing on us. We
continue firing with guns and grenades.
The enemy breaks off and retreats.
We are held down by the American bombardment. Our guerrilla groups retreat covered by the
fire of the others."
By evening of the 18th, Colonel Meyer was prepared for an all-out
assault on Barjols the next day. The FFI
was ready to help. They swarmed around
the regimental CP. Captain Dean, S-2,
began organizing a combat group, incorporating guerrillas with a 3rd Battalion
rifle company, to go back to Cotignac to mop up the German remnants. At Cotignac they took eight prisoners,
bringing the total in that area to 204.
The FFI had already been harassing the German elements around Barjols,
at one point taking as prisoners three Poles who said they had gone without
food for three days because of guerrilla ambushes and Allied air raids.
In the course of August 19, the 179th, helped by two battalions from
the 157th, overwhelmed the German garrison trying to hold Barjols. The two American regiments then hastened
westward, passing through Varages and Rians, with advance units as far as the
Durance River by nightfall. Meanwhile,
the 180th Regiment, which had been held in reserve, moved up to Rians, about
fifteen miles west of Barjols. Thus, in
two days, the 45th Division moved its three regiments about 50 miles through
the German defensive lines, and now massed the power of some 9,000 men, backed
by tanks, tank destroyers, 105-mm. howitzers, and a truck supply system
ferrying gasoline, ammunition, and food from the beachhead over 100 miles of
roads, some of them winding through very hilly terrain.
Where possible, the Maquis helped the regular troops, and the Allies
helped the French guerrillas. With its
desire to reach the main body of the German Nineteenth Army at the Rhone, the
American force by-passed many German garrisons in smaller towns. Some of these Germans wandered about, trying
to surrender; others attempted to rejoin their companions over the back roads;
some held fast in the towns. The Maquis
did yeoman work in flushing out these isolated units, in guarding prisoners, in
establishing road-blocks, and in getting information to the American
commanders.
The guerrilla forces under Colonel Gouzy
moved to Varages, a few miles north of Barjols, and for the next few days, they
mopped up German troops stranded in the area.
On August 20, the 179th Regiment picked up a message from Colonel Gouzy:
I am at Varages. Learned that sizeable detachment of Germans
is on road Varages--Brue. They are from Barjols. . . . An officer of the American M.P.'s for Varages is with us. 3
Because the 179th, after capturing Barjols on
the 19th, had assembled just west of the road connecting Barjols and Varages
(they are about five miles apart), it was a simple matter for the 179th to send
a reinforced company to the area designated.
They captured over one hundred enemy stragglers<197>mostly Poles.
A few miles to the south, on August 19, 30th Infantry (3rd Division)
assaulted Brignoles and virtually destroyed those elements of the German 757th
Regiment that were trying to hold this key town. Meanwhile, the two members of the CINNAMON
team, with two dozen <MI>maquisards<D>, moved on to St.-Maximin,
still held by the Germans. But in the
course of the day, Sudre's First French Combat Command, together with the 30th
Regiment, broke the German defenses and moved rapidly on to the west.
By taking Brignoles, St.-Maximin, Barjols,
and Rians, the Seventh Army had now gained control of the north<196>south
roads whereby the Germans could reinforce Toulon, the first major objective of
de Lattre's Army B. While the French
forces would lay siege to Toulon and Marseille, it would be the task of the 3rd
and 45th American Divisions to complete protection of the French flank by
taking Aix-en-Provence and getting control of the Rhone. By nightfall on August 20, the 30th Regiment
had reached the outskirts of Aix, with the 15th in control of route N96, which
goes from Aix in a southeasterly direction toward the sea.
THE
VAUCLUSE DEPARTMENT
By August 19, the 157th Regimental Combat
Team (45th Division) was pressing ahead toward the Durance River, the level
valley of which, south of the Luberon mountains, serves as the natural direct
route to Avignon and the Rhone. The
bridge over the Durance at Mirabeau, though damaged, permitted foot soldiers
across, and some patrols of the 1st Battalion, encountering no enemy, reached
the north bank during the 20th. In
crossing the river, the Americans moved from the Var Department to the
Vaucluse, the prefectural seat of which was the celebrated old city of Avignon,
resting on the Rhone, dominated by the great 14th-century Palace of the
Popes. Within the Vaucluse boundaries,
fifty miles north rises majestic Mont Ventoux, surrounded by a vast plateau
that harbored innumerable Maquis, well-armed and waiting for American tanks and
howitzers to support them.
In this region, about 1,000 Maquis forces
aligned themselves under the leadership of Lt. Col. Philippe Beyne, a former
tax collector and officer of the Colmar 152nd Infantry, who with his deputy Max
Fischer, had organized the Maquis Ventoux into groups that could be counted
among the best equipped and best trained of the Vaucluse
Department.<M^>4<D> One of
the inter-allied missions, headed by Cdt. Gonzague Corbin de Mangoux and Maj.
John Goldsmith, had been dispatched in July to the Vaucluse to improve
coordination between Beyne, as head of the Ventoux FFI, and the FTP and
<MI>Groupes Francs<D> in the area.
Among the latter was one of Cammaert's units, centered at St.-Christol
and led by an able dental surgeon from Avignon, Louis
Malarte.<M^>5<D>
The first member of the mission, the
Frenchman Corbin de Mangoux (code named AMICT) had come in by Lysander on July
12, landing at the Spitfire strip south of Sault where he was received by the
SAP officer ARCHIDUC (Camille Rayon), known generally among the Resistance as
Jean-Pierre, or simply J-P. (This
landing strip is the same from which Zeller departed on August 2.)
Goldsmith was parachuted in a week later, on
July 19, together with a Canadian officer, Maj. Paul Emile Labelle, and two
Frenchmen, Robert Boucart and Rená,á Há,ábert.
(A radio operator had been dropped earlier.) The Frenchmen were soon incorporated into
Beyne's forces, while Goldsmith remained with ARCHIDUC, whose activities he has
described in colorful postwar memoirs.<M^>6<D>
While the Vaucluse mission worked with Beyne and other Maquis on the
plateau, the German Nineteenth Army Command, then operating out of Avignon,
scarcely ten miles from the plateau's edge, decided to send a punitive
detachment toward Sault, known to be Beyne's command post. The Germans needed supplies, and they had to
keep open a route across the plateau north of Mont Ventoux in case the southern
roads were lost. A series of attacks
along the road north of Apt was carried out starting on August 4 by some 400
Germans of a motorized transmission unit, KNA 485. They were repulsed, dangerously close to the
Spitfire landing strip, but reformed on the 7th and, breaking through the
Maquis defenses, ultimately occupied Sault and ten miles beyond, Montbrun-les-Bains.
In gaining control of the road from Apt to Sault, German patrols passed
within a few hundred yards of Spitfire.
With a dangerous situation developing on the plateau, Goldsmith returned
to Algiers on August 12, to report on what he had
experienced.<M^>7<D>
About five miles east of Spitfire, ARCHIDUC operated a Drop Zone,
Armature, near Lagarde. Although,
because of the rocky terrain, Armature should have served only as a reception
field for containers, SPOC kept sending teams into that area. True, Commandant
Rayon<197>ARCHIDUC<197>controlled very efficient crews at both
sites, and Colonel Constans, when he first arrived in France, maintained his
command post at Lagarde; nevertheless, since the Germans now kept a contingent
at Sault, operations on the Vaucluse Plateau had become somewhat
precarious. When the Germans threatened
nearby St.-Christol, some the <MI>maquisards<D> felt they should
withdraw, and indeed, Constans moved his headquarters a few miles east, to the
Maquis of the 10th FTP company, in rugged hills between Cá,áreste and
Vachá_áres.<M^>8<D>
Before he left Lagarde, however, two more Jedburgh teams came in. The first, CITROEN, included two Englishmen,
Capt. J. E. Smallwood and Sgt. F. A. Bailey, together with a Frenchman, Capt.
Rená,á Alcá,áe. During the night of
August 13<196>14, they landed on the rough ground at Armature without
mishap, were received by ARCHIDUC, and met Constans and Widmer. Some time later, a second unexpected Jedburgh
team, MONOCLE, dropped seemingly out of nowhere. This group was made up of a Frenchman, Capt.
J. Tosel, and two Americans, Lt. Ray Foster and Sgt. Robert Anderson, both from
Minneapolis. MONOCLE had been ordered to
the Drá"áme, where they would obtain further instructions from the FFI
chief, de Lassus. They moved up to Crest
on the 16th, the day after the landings took place far to the
southeast.<M^>9<D>
Smallwood's CITROEN group, scheduled to
remain in the Vaucluse, shortly met Commandant Beyne and proceeded to his CP at
Sault, where they met the Canadian Major Labelle, of the Goldsmith mission, now
serving under Beyne as a technical counselor.
Beyne assigned the Jedburghs to two <MI>Corps Franc<D>
companies, commanded by Cammaerts' friend Louis Malarte (PAULO), which were to
cover the right (northern) bank of the Durance River in the important sector
between Manosque and Pertuis. This
sector lies between the Montagne Ste.-Victoire, so beloved of the painter
Cá,ázanne, on the south and the Luberon mountain chain on the northern side of
the river. If the Germans sought to
follow the Durance northeast from Aix, they would come this way; if the Allies,
landing on the Riviera beaches, wished to drive toward the Rhone, they would
logically try to control the Durance Valley.
Shortly after word of the landings reached them, CITROEN and the two
Maquis companies established a command post at La Bastide-des-Jourdans, in the
Luberon hills about ten miles north of the Durance River, and just a few miles
from the line separating the Vaucluse and the Var Departments. There they awaited news of the Allied
advance.
The departmental boundary held no meaning for the Americans, but it
played a part in the actions of GRAHAM and CITROEN, the two Jedburgh teams in
the area. Maj. M. G. M. "Bing"
Crosby, of the Gordon Highlanders, and his French colleague, Captain Gouvet, of
GRAHAM, had landed at Spitfire in the Dakota which had brought in Colonel
Constans. Crosby, who like Havard Gunn
wore the kilts of his regiment whenever feasible, had been deputy president of
the Jedburgh Selection Board in England and a company commander at Milton Hall
(where the Jeds trained) before coming to Algiers. It was ironic that a person so involved in
the program reached the field only four days before the invasion, and even more
ironic that his area should have been overrun within a week. It was also ironic that French
departmentalism should have affected his mission.<M^>10<D>
Crosby and Gouvet (without the third member, who was to join later) had
been assigned to the Basses-Alpes, although their orders permitted a wider
range if appropriate. Nevertheless,
Colonel Constans confirmed the assignment at Spitfire (which is in the
Vaucluse), and shortly after landing, the two GRAHAM team members went to a
Maquis near Cá,áreste, just over the departmental line. It was understood that they should work in
cooperation with the Basses-Alpes FFI chief, Georges Bonnaire (NOEL), who
happened to be a Communist and not over-enthusiastic about British
missions. Also, like many FTP officers,
he was especially interested in liberating the prefectural seat, in this case
Digne, in the eastern part of the department.
Crosby did not get along with Bonnaire, whom he categorized as hating
action, more interested in parades and military reviews than real work. On the 19th, when both Crosby and Bonnaire
saw Butler at Sisteron, they reached a mutual agreement that Crosby should
devote himself to the western part of the department, which would leave
Bonnaire to concentrate on Digne.
Because Digne was liberated that same day, Bonnaire could feel that for
him the task of departmental FFI chief
had been for the most part successfully concluded, since no German forces,
except at the Larche pass, remained in the Basses-Alpes.
Crosby, however, received reports that Germans had occupied Apt, in the
Vaucluse Department, but only ten miles west of Cá,áreste, where he already had
made good contacts with the FFI leaders in the area. Knowing by this time that American forces
were pushing west, he alerted the Maquis<197>numbering about six
hundred<197>to a possible attack on Apt.
During the 21st, on a reconnaissance around Apt, he ran into several
Americans on a jeep patrol, from the 157th Regiment's 1st Battalion, at this
time just south of the Luberon mountains.
The battalion coed by Louis Malarte, possessed a good quantity of arms
and was eager for action. 11
Smallwood had met the commander of the American battalion when the
Americans crossed the Durance and had accompanied him on a patrol toward
Cadenet, where a German rear guard with tanks was blocking the road. A skirmish involving the FFI produced an
extraordinary heroic act. Smallwood
recalled that the tanks came “rumbling down the street at us and we beat
a hasty retreat. One of these tanks was
knocked out by a man from the FTP who slipped a grenade through the visor into
the tank, killing the entire crew. The American colonel unpinned his
decorations from his own jacket and awarded them to the maquisard.” The German column turned back.
On August 22, Crosby and the 600 FFI from Céreste moved to the
outskirts of Apt and waited for the Americans. Smallwood and Alcée came up from
the south with a miscellaneous group of maquisards and undertook to block the
roads leading north and west from Apt. When the American detachment showed up
on the morning of the 22nd, there were inordinate delays which frustrated the
FFI and the Jedburghs. The Americans were not ready to attack immediately but
insisted on surveying the situation. Thus the element of surprise was lost and
the German rear guard, observing that they were outnumberd, quietly withdrew.
By late afternoon, Apt had been liberated.
GRAHAM and CITROEN had the satisfaction of having contributed to the
victory, and of helping to bring about the cooperation of FFI and regular
Allied troops.
The Germans were continuing their retreat, and General Wiese hoped
especially to hold the strategic gap at Orgon, where the Durance flows toward
Avignon. He began to pull his small units out of the vast Vaucluse Plateau,
reassigning them to protect N7, the major route north. He also wanted to keep
open the departmental D938, a few miles farther east, that runs along the
foothills from Cavaillon to Carpentras, and then through Vaison to Nyons.
It was this latter route that Colonel Beyne believed he could block
with the Maquis Ventoux. On August 20 he had ordered his men down to the plain,
where they took up positions around Malaucčne, rough country ideal for
ambushes, between Carpentras and Vaison.
They were successful in blocking the road, forcing the Germans to use
the Rhône passage--N7--and alternative routes to Nyons. 14
By the 23rd, both Wiese and Truscott were revising their
strategies. For Truscott, the success of
Task Force Butler in reaching the Rhone between Montelimar and Loriol presented
him with the possibility of cutting off the German retreat. He knew, of course, from ULTRA and tactical
intelligence, that the German Nineteenth Army would continue to fall back; he
knew also that as more and more of de Lattre's regular French divisions came
ashore he could count on them for pursuit of the enemy rear guard. Accordingly, he decided to pull Eagle's 45th
Division out of the pursuit and, by sending it north, use it to reinforce or
relieve the 36th Division. O'Daniel's
3rd Division, in the process of being relieved by de Lattre, would take over
the pursuit north and south of the Luberon mountains, with Avignon as the
immediate objective.<M^>15<D>
General Wiese also appreciated the dangers of being forced to push his
entire army through the narrow defile north of Montelimar. In consultation with General Kniess,
commanding the LXXXV Corps, he decided to rush his 198th Division from the rear
guard defense around Avignon to Montelimar, with his lone armored division, the
11th Panzer, protecting his flank. By
August 21, the first formidable Mark III and Mark IV tanks had arrived east of
the Rhone, and in the days to come, they would prove themselves a virtually
impenetrable barrier along the Nineteenth Army's eastern flank. Von Wietersheim, commanding the armored
division, was ordered to guard a line about 25 miles east of the Rhone: Vaison,
Nyons, and Crest. The unexpected
encounter of a patrol to Crest with Task Force Butler elements surprised both
parties.<M^>16<D>
The U.S. Seventh Army also moved with great rapidity, and the units of
the 3rd Division soon swept through the Vaucluse Department. On the 24th, the Germans pulled out of
Avignon, the department's administrative center. With the arrival of the American units, the
Jedburghs' work came quickly to an end.
Crosby, of GRAHAM, assigned to the Basses-Alpes, went back to
Barcelonnette, carried out a hazardous patrol in the Larche area, and returned
to find that the regulars<197>Sach's 550th Battalion<197>had taken
over. The CITROEN team, Smallwood and
Alcá,áe, with FFI companies under Vincenzini and Malarte, reconnoitered ahead
of the 7th RCT's 2nd Battalion, along the road to Avignon, which they entered
on August 25 about an hour before the regiment.
The liberation of Avignon, prefectural seat of the Vaucluse, called for
great rejoicing. The Departmental
Liberation Committee took over, and Colonel Beyne, FFI Chief, with Juan as
deputy, established his FFI headquarters in the city. Regular French and regular American troops
met there on the same day. The French
now had the mission of crossing the Rhône (all bridges having been destroyed),
wiping up a vast sector to the south, and pursuing the Germans up the Rhône's
western bank. The American 3rd Division
would chase the Nineteenth Army, which was now more concerned with developments
at Montélimar than with the pressure in the Vaucluse.
The FFI and the CITROEN team pressed ahead a little too
vigorously. Only stopping for lunch in
Avignon, they ran into trouble about ten miles north, at Courthézon, not far
from the celebrated vineyards of Châteauneuf-du-Pape:
We were trapped in an ambush and badly shot up. The autobus in which our patrol was travelling was fired and blown up
with a hit on the 300 kilos of plastic lying
in the baggage compartment. The defense
of Courthezon was taken over by an
American column [2nd Bn, 7th Regiment, 3rd Divison].
Commandant Alcée sent out
several patrols and captured three Germans.
He was kept busy with the
need to maintain peace between the men of the FTP and the FFI who were at each other's throats most
of the time over their political differences. His own troops bothered him much more than
did those of the enemy. 17
The Germans were attempting to hold the road
between Courthézon and Vaison, guarding one of the ways to Nyons. On the same day that Avignon was liberated,
some patrols of the American 7th Infantry came over the Vaucluse Plateau to the
north of Mont Ventoux, and others followed the 2nd Battalion toward Orange. On
the next day, August 26, the entire 3rd Division controlled a sector from the
Rhône at Orange to the hill country twenty miles to the east, and was rushing
on, six battalions abreast, to Montélimar and Nyons.
Chapter
11 Task Force
Butler to the Rhône
Five days after the landings, General Patch's strategy was proving to be
more effective than anticipated. The
primary Allied objective, to seize the ports of Toulon and Marseille, was being
achieved by de Lattre's army. The danger
of those seaports being reinforced was minimal, a fact that Patch knew from
ULTRA and from situation reports. All
evidence pointed to the fact that the Germans were pulling back to a defensive
line around Avignon. Confronted only by enemy holding actions, Patch felt
confidant that the French could control the seacoast, and that the11th Panzer
Division, currently crossing the Rhône, would play no more than a defensive
role. He knew from local Intelligence that
the destruction of bridges was already hampering the German retreat. The bridges over the Rhône and its
tributaries in the fortnight before D Day had become major targets for Allied
planes and members of the Resistance.
Of enormous importance for ANVIL were the bridges over the Drôme River
between Crest and the confluence, near Loriol and Livron, where it joins the
Rhône. Two major bridges spanned the
Drôme in this area, a railway bridge and the vehicular bridge on N7, the
principal route for a German withdrawal from the southeast.
On August 13, waves of heavy bombers struck at a railway bridge at
Crest, but unhappily caused more damage to the town and its population than to the bridge. On D + 1, August 16, bombers flew in again
and this time inflicted serious damage on the railway bridge at Livron.
The highway bridge was left to the Resistance. Back in July, Commandant de Lassus had
consulted with one of his capable subordinates, Henri Faure, head of SAP for
the Drôme and Ardčche Departments, whom he charged with responsibility for
blowing the bridge when ordered. On
D-Day, de Lassus gave Faure the green light; he also ordered Captain Pons,
comanding the 10th Company (Buckmaster-Roger)
to put two smaller bridges near Crest out of action.
Faure gathered a large amount of explosives which he kept hidden. (To Christine: you might use the terms use by Faure in his
report: "J'avais réuni une grande quantité d'explosifs que Pierre Chabanne
avait enterrés ŕ sa ferme de Soulier." See "Pour l'amour de la
France" 379 et les pages suivantes) On the night of 16 August, he posted half a
dozen men with machine guns at each end of the bridge while the rest of his
20-man commando sneaked past the German guard and quietly set their
charges. Fortunately for the guerrillas,
the Germans had posted no sentries but remained inside a shack with the blinds
closed. By one o'clock in the morning,
the plastic had been set in place. Faure
lit the fuses and led his men away from the bridge. Half an hour later, a violent blast shattered
the southern arch, leaving a gap of 27 meters, more than the German engineers
could span with temporary girders.
Destruction of the bridge caused an enormous traffic jam of German
vehicles that, because of Hitler's retreat order, were beginning to rumble
northward on N7. The Germans tried to
place planks on the railway bridge, and they began to construct fords in the
Drôme, which in summertime sometimes, if rainfall is slight, becomes quite
shallow. Some tanks could cross, but
lighter vehicles bogged down. Three days
later, when Task Force Butler's first artillery reached Crest, the shells that
poured down on the retreating columns turned the bottleneck area into a
cauldron of blood and destruction. The
damage might have been even heavier except for the almost impossible task of
ferrying gasoline and ammunition over mountainous roads from a beachhead 400 km
away
It was not until the evening of August 20 that General Butler received
an official command to leave Aspres and proceed along N93 to the Rhône. He immediately ordered the 117th Cavalry to
move. Anticipating that they would be
leading their troops to the west, Capt. John L. Wood, commanding Troop B, and
Capt. William E. Nugent of Troop C drove to Crest, on August 20. They found no Germans along this important
artery. Butler has left his own
impression of the road:
"The route lay over a formidable mountain range with a twisting
road cut into the side of the cliffs.
Movement off the road would have been impossible. Our path could have been blocked in any one
of scores of places, but no enemy action developed, nor had demolitions been
executed. Whether we have the Maquis to
thank for this free open road I do not know, but open it was. . . . I was horror-struck at the grade and nature
of the road but all elements had made excellent time and none of the heavy
vehicles had succumbed."
At Crest, Wood and Nugent had no trouble in making contact with Captain
Pons, whose men had been armed over the previous months with the help of
Cammaerts. Pons relates: "Le 19
aoűt, vers 7 heures du matin, une Jeep arriva ŕ mon P.C., amenant deux
officiers qui, dirent-ils, venaient prendre contact avec moi. Tous les hommes se précipitčrent. Les
premiers soldats de l'armée américaine!
Cette premičre Jeep, autour de laquelle ils tournaient, leur paraissait
un animal fabuleux longtemps ręvé. Ce premier contact, cette poignée de mains
amicale, sans arričre-pensée, qui abolissait en une seconde quatre ans de
combats dans l'ombre. .. . . .
'Quelle est la situation dans votre région?'
Je
dus trčs vite faire le point car, le lendemain, leurs propres troupes devaient
arriver.
'Depuis Barcelonnette nous n'avons pas tiré un seul coup de fusil. Les
maquis étaient partout. Voyez-vous, commandant, c'est merveilleux. Tous les
endroits qui pouvaient ętre dangereux nous ont été signalés ou avait été
dégagés par les maquis avant notre passage. Quel temps nous avons gagné!'
" [Pons 21]
Pons put them in touch with a resident of Crest, M. Hoffčte, with whom
they spent the night. They were also
quickly in touch with the recently promoted Colonel de Lassus, the Drôme
commander, who designated one of his officers--actually a priest, Captain
XAVIER (Lucien Fraisse)--to serve as liaison with the Americans.
On the next morning, Wood's troopers, having left Aspres at first light,
reached Crest around 9:00. With guides
provided by de Lassus, two platoons of Troop B headed south to Puy-St.-Martin,
then southwest across the Marsanne Plain to the outskirts of Montélimar. Between the plain and the Rhône River, the
protective hills of the Marsanne forest extend to Savasse, about five
kilometers north of the town. As an FFI
officer put it, "this is as far as we control things."
The Resistance forces that would be most involved in the battle of
Montélimar were those of the south Drôme's 4e Battalion, headed by Captain
Bernard, who had taken over a reorganized command only two days before the
Allied landings. The battalion, with headquarters near Marsanne, included about
1000 men and comprised five companies: 7th (Bonfils), 13th (Didio), 14th
(Apostol), 17th (Vernier--known also as Valličres), a Corps Franc (Rives) and
8th in reserve (Rigaud--known also as Georges).
Wood proceeded close enough to Montélimar to note that the perimeter was
guarded by German road-blocks too strong for an attack. He reported to Butler and withdrew to Savasse,
along with the 13th and14th companies, awaiting reinforcement.
The main body of Task Force Butler had meanwhile followed. General Butler had consulted with FFI
leaders, who explained to the Americans the tactics used by the German convoys
traveling north on N7. With the forces
at his disposal, Butler could harass the German movement, and he could test the
possibility of throwing road-blocks across the highway, but he could not attack
in force.
Butler established his CP near Marsanne, nestled in the eastern slope of
wooded hills about halfway between Montélimar and the Drôme River. From there, as he waited for the 36th
Division to reinforce his widely dispersed units, he sought ways and means of
accomplishing his mission: denying N7 to
the enemy.
To the north, he had Nugent's C Troop carry out a reconnaissance along
the north side of the Drôme toward Livron.
This was the area assigned to Pons' company, which had been regularly
ambushing and attacking German traffic on N7.
At this time, several days before the German rear guard reached the
Drôme, the retreat was disorganized and erratic--sometimes a car, sometimes a
convoy of trucks, horse-drawn wagons, individuals on foot and on bicycles.
Knowing that the Americans would soon be coming, Pons and his captains,
Fié, Antoine, and Didelet, carried out raids on 20 August, both south and north
of the Drôme, destroying trucks and soldiers.
At dawn, Didelet, only thirty meters from the road, knocked out three
German cars with his machine gun.
Luckily he escaped back into the woods with no casualties.
Encouraged by this raid, Pons decided on a daylight attack with several
hundred maquisards toward Fiancey, about eight km north of the Drôme. By 14h30 he had hidden his men in the
orchards and small hills facing the town.
An hour later, the company struck a convoy of twenty German trucks,
hitting them with salvos from a bazooka, six machine guns, and small-arms
fire. The attack played havoc with the
Germans, but with their habitual resourcefulness, they quickly counterattacked,
driving Pons' men back into whatever shelter they could find. Struggling back to Allex, about eight km from
N7, they were reinforced by some of Captain Bentrups' 6th company and Captain
Chapoutat's 2nd company of about eighty men--which were in contact with
platoons of Nugent's Troop C.
Troop C had reached Crest shortly after 9:00, and Nugent had cautiously
started west toward the Rhône, outposting one platoon to the north as
protection for his right flank and reaching Allex with the other two. He encountered no Germans. If his actions seemed overly cautious to the
French guerrillas, it should be remembered that Nugent was in completely
strange country with only that information about the Germans he obtained from
the FFI. In describing their contact
with the Americans, the French spoke of
"chars," but Nugent
knew that his M8 armored cars, with their 37-mm. guns, were not tanks and would
be excruciatingly vulnerable if faced by a German Mark V Panther.
After considerable discussion with the French and checking by radio with
Butler, Nugent and the FFI moved west, one platoon toward Livron and the other
toward Fiancey. With the earlier raid of
Pons and the afternoon attack, the combined efforts left 50 to 60 enemy trucks
destroyed. However, with his cars and
jeeps stretched out over fifteen km, Nugent prudently withdrew his units back
to Crest for the night, leaving the maquisards to trudge back as best they
could. He reported to Butler, now at
Marsanne, what he had observed.
Meanwhile, Butler had been deploying his forces in order to hamper
German traffic on N7. He had the report
from Captain Wood of Troop B that Montélimar was defended with
road-blocks. With the advice of FFI
members, Butler placed his heaviest unit, an infantry battalion, at Condillac,
in the forest about halfway between Marsanne and the Rhône, where the chateau
served as an ideal CP. From Condillac
there is a long descent to N7, which runs at this point through the village of
La Coucourde. The Marsanne hills crowd
the highway, the railroad, and the river into a passage less than a thousand
meters wide, and on the farther side (in the Ardčche Department), a flat area
permits only2000 meters of passage before hills rise steeply from the valley
bottom. The Germans retreating northward
had to work their way through this pass or seek an alternate route across the
Marsanne plain in the direction of Crest.
Butler knew he had to place an effective road-block at La Coucourde and
throw a defensive line along the Roubion River which, flowing from Manas westward to Montélimar, provides a
natural barrier of 20 kilometers..
To the north, Butler kept the 117th Cavalry's Troop C along the Drôme
River, and he also heeded the recommendations of Captain Bernard, leader of the
Drôme's 4th Battalion, to deploy the 117th's tanks and artillery in the hills
north and east of Cliousclat, a few kilometers from Loriol. Bernard assigned the Corps Franc along with
his 7th and 8th companies as support to the American guns. From their hill
position the assault guns found targets beyond belief among the German forces
backed up into the flat ground for miles around the knocked-out Loriol bridge,
but shortage of ammunition kept them from making full use of this
opportunity. While the Ameerican tanks
laid down their barrages, the FFI carried out raids in the direction of
N7.
On the evening of the 21st, Captain Pons' company had withdrawn to
Crest, where the men tried to get some rest after their open fight with the
enemy. That night, an American officer
took Pons by jeep to see General Butler.
A veteran of guerrilla warfare, Pons could hardly believe what he saw at
the American CP: "Nous nous
trouvions au milieu d'une véritable mer de véhicules. Le général était absent.
En attendant son arrivée, nous admirâmes, le mot n'est pas trop fort, les
véhicules évoluant dans un silence absolu. Pas un choc, pas un cri. Chaque
chauffeur semblait savoir, ŕ un centimčtre prčs, oů se placer, et cependant il
y avait lŕ, dans cette plaine, des centaines et des centaines de véhicules de
toutes sortes, qui évoluaient: camions, chars, auto-mitrailleuses, auto-canons,
Jeeps, ambulances, artillerie tractée, etc.
J'avais connu l'armée française et vu l'armée allemande, mais quelle
différence avec ce que j'avais sous les yeux." [Pons 223]
When Butler returned, he told Pons he was aware of the operation the
French guerrillas had just carried out, and asked him to attack again the next
day at the same place--Fiancey. He
promised armored support, and Pons with considerable hesitation agreed to
assemble his men next morning at the same positions, ready for an attack by
14:00 that afternoon,the 22nd.
Colonel de Lassus also discussed the situation with Butler that same
evening. Since Sisteron, Butler had
continued to be in touch with the regional FFI commander, Colonel Constans, who
had now established a CP east of Montélimar at Dieulefit. Butler also had available Captain Leger, the
French-speaking OSS representative of 4-SFU, who remained in touch with Constans
as well as with Captain XAVIER (Father Lucien Fraise), the Jesuit liaison
officer. De Lassus had some doubts
regarding FFI collaboration with the Americans, whose reliance on artillery,
air strikes, and rapid motorized deployment facilitated by radio communication
differed vastly from the hit-and-run guerrilla tactics his men were capable of.
Nevertheless, on the 22nd, Pons deployed his men once more along the
approaches of Fiancey, beyond the several wooded hills that might have provided
cover. Early in the afternoon, a convoy
approached, but this time guarded by tanks--identified by Pons as
Tigers--against which the embattled guerrillas had no recourse but to withdraw
to the woods halfway back to Allex.
About 17:00, a platoon of Wood's Troop C hove into sight, began firing,
and the Germans withdrew. Wood set up
defensive road-blocks around Allex but did not believe he had enough power to
take offensive action. There is nothing
in the American records that suggests he had been ordered to coordinate an
attack with Pons' company. Fortunately,
Pons was able to return to Crest with no men killed, although seven were
seriously wounded.
It was clear to Colonel de Lassus that there should be a better
understanding between his forces and the American command. He wrote to Pons: "Nous ne sommes pas ŕ l'Entičre Disposition des Américains, qui ont tendance ŕ
engager nos troupes comme l'infanterie d'une armée réguličre. Vous ne dépendez
que de vos chefs FFI. Mes ordres sont inchangés. Opérations offensives vers
l'ouest en guérillas. Je sais le beau
combat que votre Compagnie a fait prčs de Fiancey. Au moment des récompenses,
elle ne sera pas oubliée. Pour l'instant, nous sommes engagés dans une lutte dont
peut dépendre l'avenir du pays. Malgré leur fatigue, renvoyez vos hommes en
embuscade."
De Lassus' criticism of Butler is justified. In all his task force, Butler controlled only
one battalion of infantry and he desperately needed more. Learning of the withdrawal at Fiancey, Butler
despatched an urgent message to Dahlquist, whose 36th Division was supposed to
reinforce him: "French infantry
support proving absolutely unsatisfactory.
Request one battalion infantry by motor without delay." When one
recalls that Butler, with an American battalion and field artillery
concentrated on la Coucourde, could not keep a road-block there because of
German counterattacks, one has to place his criticism in context. If the super-armed Americans could not stand
up against German Mark V Panthers, what could be expected of French guerrillas
with Bren guns and an occasional bazooka?
So urgent did Butler find the need for infantry, he even brought his
engineer company into the line with results so disastrous he was severely
criticized (in postwar unpublished memoirs) by Colonel Hodge, commander of the
117th Cavalry, then serving on Butler's staff.
On the previous evening, August 21, having been relieved at Gap, Captain
Piddington brought his Troop A into the new battleground. On the 20th, reinforced by a mini-task force
of Sherman tanks and tank destroyers, he assumed responsibility for guarding
the north bank of the Roubion River, a stretch of about 12 km between Manas in
the east and Sauzet on the west. For a
cavalry troop of 125 men with a handful of armored cars and jeeps, together
with six tanks and two tank destroyers, this meant small patrols with large
gaps in the line. Piddington had the
assistance of several hundred maquisards from Captain Bernard's 4th Battalion
of FFI.
What neither Butler nor Piddington knew was
that General von Wietersheim's formidable11th Panzer Division, charged with the
defense of the Nineteenth Army's flank, was carrying out reconnaissance
missions, probing Allied positions along a 150 km stretch. The most northern patrols had actually
crossed the Roubion and, before Piddington deployed his units, had penetrated
beyond Puy-St.-Martin in the direction of Crest. This fluid situation was well attested to by
Captain Dominique Hepp (HENNEQUIN), parachuted into the Drôme as head of an
Equipe d'Encadrement: "Avec mon chauffeur Popaul, je revenais ŕ mon PC
suivi par une Jeep de l'E. M. du général Butler, occupée par un officier
américain et son chauffeur. A Puy-Saint-Martin,
pris entre le feu des FFI placés sur les hauteurs et celui d'une colonne de
Panzer qui arrive, nous devons abandonner nos véhicules criblés de balles. . .
. Aprčs nous avoir fait prisonniers, les Allemands décident de nous fusiller
tous les quatre . . . . Le péloton
d'exécution est en place lorsqu'un char, destroyer, américain tire sur le
village, semant la panique chez les Allemands.
. . .L'officier qui allait commander notre exécution nous fait monter
dans une grand voiture 'Viva, grand sport.'
La colonne allemande reflue alors vers la Bégude (et nous avec elle)
. . . .
Les Allemands avaient volé du vin rouge. . . .Nos tętes reposent sur les
bouteilles couchées ŕ l'arričre de la voiture lorsqu'une balle de mitrailleuse
U.S. les traverse. Nous sommes aspergés. Le feldewebel, prenant ce vin pour du
sang, relâche sa surveillance. Je fais alors signe ŕ Popaul qu'il faudra sauter
et l'explique en anglais aux Américains mais ceux-ci refusent, confiants en
l'application de la convention de Genčve qui oblige ŕ respecter les prisonniers. Le lendemain on trouva les corps de nos deux
amis tués d'une balle dans la nuque, malgré leur uniforme de l'armée
américaine." [Drôme
history, 425-26]
The 36th
Division arrives
The first elements of the 36th Division did not begin to enter the
battle zone until the afternoon of 22 August.
Until the 36th's commanding officer would come on to the scene the
following day, Butler remained in charge. The first unit of the 36th to arrive,
the141st Regiment's 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James Critchfield, was
ordered by Butler south to the hills around Savasse to
reinforce Troop B and the FFI. For the
next two days, Critchfield's men tried to attack toward Montélimar but were
thrown back by elements of the11th Panzer Division.
In the hard-hitting duel between tanks and artillery around Savasse and
in the Marsanne forest at Cliousclat, neither the 117th Cavalry troopers nor
the FFI could bring much to bear. Nevertheless, they did their best. On 23 August, the 7th Company commander, Bonfils, carried out under heavy
fire a reconnaissance on N 7 and brought back
intelligence which enabled American tanks to enfilade and destroy
numerous vehicles. A second patrol
farther north sent information to battalion HQ which, by means of the GIP-radio
given to Captain Bernard, alerted the American artillery to potential targets..
On the 23rd, General Dahlquist and the remaining battalions of the 141st
Regiment had arrived in the battle zone.
Dahlquist had been given a hard time by Truscott who, hoping to cut off
the Germans at the Drôme, blamed him for dispersing his forces and not moving
them rapidly enough to Crest.
In actual fact, considering the availability of trucks and fuel, the
141st Regiment had moved as fast as it possibly could. Truscott had conferred with Col. John W.
Harmony, the capable and highly esteemed commander of the141st, on the road to
Aspres and, in Dahlquist's absence, ordered the 141st to Montélimar. By
nightfall the 141st had already engaged the enemy.
On arriving in the battle zone, General Dahlquist told General Butler to
maintain his dispositions until he became oriented. Taking over in the afternoon of 23 August, Dahlquist
set up his CP near Marsanne but next day moved
to La Répara about eight km south of Crest.
By this time, Truscott had decided to throw the entire 36th Division
into the Montélimar battle, while Butler's Task Force would be dissolved but
held in reserve. The 141st Regiment,
already in place, would try to block highway 7 north of Montélimar, especially
at the narrow passage south of La Coucourde.
The 142nd, coming in from the Nyons road to the southeast, would take
over a defensive line along the Roubion River.
As to the 143rd, the 2nd Battalion already made up part of Task Force
Butler, while the other two had just occupied Grenoble. Truscott decided to send the 179th Regiment
(45th Division) up to Grenoble to relieve the 143rd Regiment, which would in
turn then come back southwest to the battle area. This caused logistical strains, but had the
advantage of enabling the Texas Division (the 36th) to fight together as one
unit.
Chapter 12 Montélimar and Valence
When General Truscott ordered Colonel Adams, whose two battalions were
in Grenoble, to join the rest of the 36th Division, a new attack possibility
opened up. The shortest route from
Grenoble to Montélimar follows the Isčre Valley to the Rhône, and then joins N7
at Valence. Valence, a major objective
of the politically minded Resistance, stood directly in the way of Truscott's
effort to reach Lyon. Dahlquist wondered
whether Adams' two battalions, cooperating with de Lassus, whose FFI controlled
the feeder roads to the east, could take Valence from the Germans and place a
block across N7.
A few kilometers northeast of Valence, on the Isčre River's northern
bank, lies the town of Romans and, on the south bank, Bourg-de-Péage. Another fifteen km to the east, in the
Vercors foothills, stretches the Royans area where Commandant Geyer (THIVOLLET)
had reassembled his 11th Cuirassiers Resistance fighters after the Vercors
debacle. On the 22nd, at his own
initiative, attacking Romans with his own and other groups, he was able after
some sharp fighting to occupy the town
and take over 100 prisoners, mostly administrative personnel who, in spite of
the peoples antipathy to the occupier, were treated according to the Geneva
Convention.
For Truscott and Dahlquist an opportunity seemed to beckon. If the
Germans had seen the need to evacuate Grenoble and did not vigorously defend
Romans, might they not also be leaving Valence? The plan also appealed to de Lassus and to
Colonel Constans, who had established his command post at Dieulefit. De Lassus conferred with Constans on the
22nd, reporting on the general situation, and in particular on the anticipated
arrival of the American 36th Division into the battle area.
When de Lassus returned to his CP, he learned that FTP leaders, irked
that Geyer had occupied Romans without consulting them, had undertaken an
attack by 350 maquisards on Valence. The
Germans had definitely not withdrawn from Valence and repelled the FTP units
with artillery and machine-gun fire.
Butler knew quite well that there was a strong force in Valence: he had
reviewed a French report of the 22nd that approximately eight batteries of
antiaircraft guns were protecting the Chabeuil airfield southeast of the
city. But Butler's superior, General
Dahlquist, not yet in the battle zone, thought that Valence could be
taken. At the same time, the Seventh
Army operations officer (G4), Colonel Clyde E. Steele, made contact with De
Lassus, who recalled:
"Voulant avoir des renseignements auprčs
des prisoniers pris ŕ Romans, il m'y emmena dans sa jeep par Léoncel et
Saint-Jean. Nous n'y trouvions pas le
commandant Thivollet parti ailleurs, mais nous laissions l'ordre de nous faire
parvenir pour le lendemain matin tous les prisonniers. Notre arrivée ŕ Romans
avait soulevé d'abord une crainte passagčre, les habitants ne connaissant pas
l'uniforme et les voitures américaines, mais dčs qu'ils nous eurent reconnus,
un enthousiasme indescriptible souleva la ville; nous eűmes toute la peine du
monde ŕ repartir. En repassant par Saint
Jean, le colonel Steele fit un discours devant le monument aux morts, ŕ toute
la population rassemblée; au moyen d'un interprčte, il annonça avec
grandiloquence que les successeurs de La Fayette venaient délivrer le peuple
française."
On the following day, August 24, having taken over from Butler,
Dahlquist assured Truscott that in spite of the delayed arrival
of his full division, he could block the Germans escaping on the east side of
the Rhône. He believed he could also take Valence, although Truscott was not
sure the plan was feasible. They both agreed that Task Force Butler had
fulfilled its mission and should be held in reserve.
With Truscott's unenthusiastic approval, Dahlquist then authorized
Colonel Adams, who had only reached recently-liberated Romans/Bourg-de-Péage at
noon on the 24th, to carry out an attack, together with the FFI, against
Valence. By this time, the Germans had
withdrawn from the airfield at Chabeuil, which became the command post for
Adams and Colonel Steele, along with Constans and de Lassus.
There were others besides Truscott who had misgivings. The FFI had agents inside Valence, and
possessed solid information concerning the German tanks and artillery defending
the city. When the Pons company learned
of the impending operations, Lieutenant Armand, who had recently verified the
German dispositions, sent a message to Pons:
"Je ne comprends pas qu'avec les
renseignements que je l'ai donné, l'on tente un pareil coup, car aucune pičce
d'artillerie que j'ai signalée et pointée sur la carte, n'a été déplacée. Je
suis persuadé que l'on va ŕ un échec, mais je pars avec les chars
américains."
Another officer in this area also thought that better use could be made
of Adams' force. This was Commandant
NOIR (Vuchot), sole remaining member of Jed VEGANINE, who had more or less
abandoned his Jedburgh role by taking command of an FFI battalion in Drôme
Nord. (His somewhat ambiguous relations
with Huet, commanding in the Vercors, and with de Lassus, commanding in the
Drôme, need not concern us here.)
Learning about the capture of Romans, he realized that control of the
heights at nearby Tain l'Hermitage, with
artillery overlooking the gorge, could
make passage along N7 virtually impossible.
When Adams came to Romans, NOIR talked to him:
"I asked him if he could not come near
the banks of the Rhône, and he replied that he had his orders and that he was
going to attack Valence. I made the
point that it was perhaps not very useful to take Valence, Tain, or any other
town on N7, that the Germans would certainly use sufficient strength to force
the passage, but that it would be extremely useful to have a few ambush tanks,
hull down amongst the hills on the banks firing down N7 and that he would then
produce quite different results than with our small arms, and compel the
Germans to use minor roads." Had
the Allies held on to Romans, they might
have inflicted heavy damage to the Germans as they retreated through the gorge
at Tain. In postwar questioning, General
Blaskowitz affirmed that failure to do this was one of Truscott's major errors.
Much as Adams might have liked to heed NOIR's advice, there was no time
to make any changes, and the order to attack Valence remained firm. Adams dined with de Lassus on the evening of
the 24th, but only told him at 18 h 30 that he planned to attack at 20 h.
"Je me récriais alors," recalls de Lassus, "lui disant qu'il ne
m'était pas possible de prendre mon dispositif d'attaque pour 20 heurs. . . .Il fut décidé que l'attaque commencerait
ŕ 22 heures."
"Le dispositif suivant fut adopté:
a) - une colonne au nord sur l'itinéraire Alixan--RN92,
Saint-Marcel-lčs-Valence; cette colonne serait protégée par deux chars TD. Elle
comprendrait les compagnies Morin, Sabatier, Chrétien et Sanglier.
b) - une colonne au centre sur l'axe Chabeuil-Valence était composé par
le gros des forces américaines [les deux battaillons de Frazior et d'Andrews]:
colonel Vincent (36th division chief of staff) avec 2 bataillons de chars TD, -
1 bataillon d'Infanterie porté; les compagnies Perrin et Kirsch
accompagneraient les bataillons de chars.
c) - une colonne au sud sur l'axe Beaumont-Valence, protégée par 3 chars
TD et comprenant les campagnies Roger, Pierre, Wap, Chapoutat, Brentrup,
Pequiniot et Pons. . . .
Vers 22 heures, accompagné du colonel Saint-Sauveur (Constans), qui
était revenu me voir, je me trouvais au PC du colonel Adams dans une baraque de
l'aérodrome de Chabeuil. . . .Deux groupes d'artillerie américaine en batterie
prčs de Chabeuil arrosaient les défenses est de la ville de Valence. Vers 23
heures 30, alors que l'attaque progressait, quelques pičces allemandes de 88
situées dans les faubourgs, entrčrent en action. 3 chars américains flambčrent.
La réaction américaine fut immediate: Le colonel Adams abandonna la partie sans
essayer de poursuivre l'attaque."
Adams' unwillingness to renew the attack left his French allies at a
loss. Adams explained that at the very beginning of the attack he had received
a message from General Dahlquist: "You must have bulk of your force in
Crest by daylight 25 August 1944 "
At the insistence of de Lassus and Constans, Adams enabled the French
leaders to query Dahlquist directly by
radio. But the 36th division commander was adamant, only permitting Adams to
leave a tank battalion and some artillery in the Valence area.
Fortunately, the disengagement had brought few casualties: one wounded
for the French, and for the Americans, one killed, 20 wounded, and 28
missing. Of the Americans who lost
contact with their units in the dark, some were captured, several made their
way to Romans and Grenoble (two wounded were hospitalized in Romans), and
another group of eight joined the Resistance!
This latter group included Steve Weiss, then 18 years old, whose unusual
story has been told in detail in Vincent Lockhart's T-Patch to
Victory. The group found refuge with a farmer who, through contacts
with the Valence police, enabled the American soldiers to be ferried across the
Rhône to Saint-Peray, where they joined a maquis under Colonel Binoche, in
charge of FFI operations in that part of the Ardčche. Later they were attached to an OG operating
south of Lyon.
In ordering Adams to pull back and come to Crest, Dahlquist had very good reasons. He knew that his
operations order for August 25 had been captured, and he believed that the
Germans, possibly the 198th Division and elements of the 11th Panzer, were
assembling for a major attack. The general
realized that his southern defense along the Roubion River would be
particularly weak, since Truscott had ordered the 117th Cavalry's Troop A
(Piddington) out of the line for patrol duty on the Italian frontier. Dahlquist concluded that, needing all the
force he could muster, the fighting in the Montélimar area took priority over
Valence.
In sending Piddington's Troop A back to Gap, Truscott assumed that the
remaining regiment of the 36th division, Colonel George E. Lynch's 142nd, would
be able to defend the north bank of the Roubion.
But the 142nd had suffered from Dahlquist's
indecision, and on 22 August was still patrolling east of Gap, waiting to be
relieved by elements of the 45th division. Finally, late on the 22nd, Dahlquist
ordered Lynch to proceed toward Nyons.
Situated about 40 km east of N 7, Nyons controlled two important
highways, D 94 and D 541, that could enable American forces to reach the German
retreat route. Recognizing this possibility, General Wiese wanted elements of
the 11th Panzer division to maintain flank protection in that area. The only
opposition encountered by the Germans had come from the Maquis Ventoux, which
had blocked the route to Nyons by way of Vaison. Now, as they moved along the
Orange-Nyons road (D 94), the Germans were again being hit by the FFI: the
first and second battalions of Commandant Girard's 1er Régiment FTP
sud-Drôme. There was sharp fighting
throughout the day of 22 August, but the Germans were too strong. Constans sent
an urgent message to Butler, explaining in detail the German dispositions, and
asking for armored cars, tanks, and gasoline.
As reported in the Drôme history:
[427]
"Les FFI attendent, une attente lourde de menace qui les prend ŕ la
gorge, ils obervent, guettent le moindre bruit, ils savent que ça va
recommencer. A 7 heures du matin, le 23 aoűt, un bruit qu'ils ne peuvent
identifier s'amplifie puis le canon tonne, des obus éclatent sur . . .les
positions ennemies! C'est le 142e
régiment US du colonel Lynch qui, sur l'ordre du général Dahlquist, est venu ŕ
toute vitesse depuis Gap, passant ŕ Serres, ŕ Monclus, pour parvenir ŕ Nyons
par la RN 94. Les Allemands se replient. Il était temps. Nyons est sauvé. La
population accueille comme des héros les maquisards qui entrent dans la
ville."
Nevertheless, Dahlquist did not immediately order Lynch to the
Montélimar area, leaving the 142nd to patrol west and south of Nyons for a day
before he had them move north. Lynch made full use of FFI support, as attested
by his official journal:
"0230, 24 August 1944. . . . German self-propelled guns 900 yards
west of roadblock approximately 8 kms west of Dieulefit. Partisans holding that
block with one 37-mm gun and 30 men. Approximately 250 partisans had been
ordered to take security post south of the route of advance between Montjoux
and Montbrison with orders to follow behind our column if ammunition was
available to them. 3rd Bn route: Between three and four hundred partisans are
ordered to take security positions protecting the right flank east and west of
Novecar with same orders as other partisans."
Throughout the night of 24/25 August Lynch's 142nd moved into the battle
area, taking up positions betwen Cléon and Puy Saint-Martin.
Montélimar
Dahlquist was finding that the Germans not only protected their retreat,
but were in a position to attack. On
August 25, with the American operational order available to him, General Wiese
planned a thrust across the Roubion River.
Traffic to the north virtually stopped as the Nineteenth Army massed for
a three-pronged offensive: one, across
the Roubion near Cléon where a weak corridor had existed until the arrival of
Lynch's 142nd Regiment from Nyons; two, thrusts north of Montélimar to dislodge
the American forces holding the hills south and west of Condillac; three, an
attack eastward from Loriol along the Drôme River toward Allex and Grane,
ultimately to Crest. By this time, the
full strength of the German 198th Division and Von Wietersheim's 11th Panzer
Division, with the 305th Division not far behind, were available, while the
Americans had but one division (plus artillery) and a 400 km supply line.
During the afternoon of the 25th, the Germans pushed across the Roubion
well up into the Marsanne Plain, but were stopped by Frazior's battalion of
Adams' 141st, one of the units pulled back from Valence. But the strong German
attacks toward Sauzet and Condillac had
the Americans and their FFI allies reeling back from their hill positions.
The Resistance forces were sticking firmly with the Americans. On the 24th, a service platoon of the Secret
Army's 14th company had crossed the Rhône to try to destroy the roadblock on
the far side of the river. An FFI
officer, Lieutenant Gerard, was taken prisoner but managed to escape, bringing
with him information about German artillery emplacements. But the following day, the beginning of the
German offensive, was a grim one for
both the FFI and the Americans. At the
request of the U.S. commanders, the 13th company withdrew from the Savasse area
to provide protection for the artillery batteries in the Marsanne forest. Lieutenant Apostol's 14th company, having
also pulled back, was surprised by a German patrol and lost two men. Later in the day, Commandant Bernard's entire
4th Battalion withdrew eastward for twenty-four hours of much-needed rest.
In the north, along the Drôme valley, the Germans launched a thrust with
100 vehicles and tanks toward Allex and Grane.
Dahlquist called up Task Force Butler, which had been held in reserve
near Puy-St.-Martin, to rush toward Grane, on the south bank of the Drôme. Here
Captain Omer Brown, who had commanded the 117th Cavalry's assault guns at Gap,
was killed while trying to insert a grenade into a German tank. On the northern bank of the Drôme, the
Germans were held by elements of the
45th Division's 157th Regiment, sent over by Truscott to hold Crest at all
costs. Even then, the threat forced a rerouting of American supply
trucks.
The German offensive continued through
the 26th until the 27th when the American lines were restored. In the north, Grane and Allex were retaken as
well as the hills along the Rhône; in the south, the Germans had been forced
back across the Roubion. The situation
had been desperate but not hopeless.
While the German offensive failed in opening up an alternate escape
route across the Marsanne Plain, it did succeed in enabling forward units of
the11th Panzer Division to cross the Drôme and forge ahead toward Lyon. Although the vehicular bridge at Livron could
not be used, German engineers had fashioned four or five fords that enabled the
bulk of the Panzers to cross at night.
Late on the 26th, torrential rains poured across the battle area
resulting in floods, which made the fords unusable for several days. By that time, however, although losses in
trucks, cars, mobile artillery, and railroad guns were enormous, many of the
Nineteenth Army's troops had escaped the trap and were aleady stretched out on
roads to Lyon and beyond. Concerned
about his eastern flank, General Wiese sent elements of the 11th Panzer to
Romans, which was reoccupied on 27 August, preventing patrols of the 45th US
Division, still in Grenoble, from making any impact on the main German body.
Incidentally, because of the fair treatment German prisoners had received at
the first liberation, the Germans perpetrated no reprisals against the
population. A Romans historian acknowledges that "les unités de la
Wehrmacht qui ont réoccupé Romans du 27 au 30 aoűt sont encore organisées,
disciplinées, bien différentes de celles en déroute sur la N 7."
By the 27th, units of the German 198th Division were fighting rearguard
actions around Montélimar, which had now been reached by reconnaissance patrols
of General O'Daniel's 3rd Division, pressing up the Rhône Valley from the
south. Hundreds of motionless and
wrecked vehicles had piled up along N 7 and some US road-blocks were finally
thrown across the road.
Nevertheless, although the Germans had been pushed back across the
Roubion, they still held ground east of
Montélimar on the road leading to Dieulefit.
Fighting side by side with elements of Lynch's 142nd Regiment, Jean
Abonnenc's FFI 11th company (3rd Battalion) pressed an attack against the
perimeter of the German defensive circle.
In Abonnenc's words: "La compagnie a reçu l'ordre de reprendre La
Bâtie-Rolland. A l'entrée, du côté Est, un piton paraît ętre fortement tenu par
les Allemands. 'Il faudrait le prendre ŕ l'assaut, pense Jean, ŕ la française,
mais il y aura de la casse.' Au moment oů il va prendre ses dispositions
d'attaque, un officier américain lui dit: 'Laissez-nous faire, ramenez votre
compagnie en arričre.' Quelques minutes
aprčs, l'artillerie US se déchaîne. Les obus incendiaires mettent le feu ŕ la
colline, les autres bouleversant le terrain oű les Allemands avaient déjŕ
creusé tranchées et abris autour du piton. A ce moment, Jean réalise la terrible
efficacité de cette armée moderne, économe des vies humaines."
On the 28th, the 3rd US Division occupied Montélimar and from the east
poured in the valliant guerrilla
companies of Bernard's 4th Battalion, Noël's 3rd Battalion, and Girard's FTP
regiments, to be met by enthusiastic citizens who, for the first time in weeks,
could open their shutters and breathe the heady air of freedom. On September 3 the Resistance forces paraded
triumphantly through the city, reviewed by de Lassus and Constans, who awarded
decorations and gave due recognition to the commanders.
However, although the Germans had withdrawn from Montélimar, they still
had numbers of troops south of the Drôme.
General Wiese ordered the 11th Panzer to serve as rear guard and hold a
ring around Livron and Loriol until noon of the 29th, with all remaining
units to try to escape to the north as
best they could.
Dahlquist brought everything at his disposal to attack the passage: three battalions of the 157th
Regiment, together with elements of Task Force Butler and all the 36th Division
regiments. But in spite of this massive
assemblage of fire power, the Germans managed to hold the Allied forces at bay
long enough to get sizeable numbers of personnel--if not equipment--across the
Drôme. On the 29th, the Germans holding the flank position at Romans blew up
bridges across the Isčre, and next day withdrew in the direction of
Beaurepaire. They had not been attacked by Allied forces.
By the 30th the last Germans departed from the Drôme and the battle of Montélimar
was over. It was a victory for the American foreces and their FFI allies, but
it was not decisive. The Germans may have lost thousands of men killed,
wounded, and captured, and seen 2,000 vehicles and over 300 pieces of artillery
destroyed, but General Blaskowitz' Army
Group, which still counted 130,000 troops, including the almost intact 11th
Panzer Division, had not been destroyed, and was digging in around Lyon, with
retreating groups still stretched over
hundreds of kilometers. Advance units
had already passed Bourg-en-Bresse and
were heading for Mâcon.
With the Germans withdrawing north, de Lassus planned again to move on
Valence, where the departmental Committee of Liberation could take over, and
the Resistance prefect, Pierre de Saint-Prix, already chosen, could replace the
Vichy appointee. De Lassus did not plan
his attack this time in coordination with the Americans, although he remained
in touch with Colonel Steele, who since August 24 had succeeded the wounded
Colonel Harmony as commanding officer of the 141st Infantry. De Lassus organized his companies much as he
had during the fruitless effort six days earlier, and began moving into Valence
during the early hours of August 31.
Colonel Steele also sent a reconnaissance company, with two tank
destroyers, into the town, but the patrol was not coordinated with the
FFI. Resistance ended around noon, with
about 600 Germans in FFI custody.
De Lassus, along with Colonel Constans (whose command extended only to the Isčre River), kept themselves
occupied with liberation celebrations throughout the department and with
military reorganization. Among the final
acts de Lassus was able to perform in his role as Colonel Legrand, Chef FFI
Drôme, were three in which he took particular pride, enough for him to record
them in his memoirs: one, persuading the pro-Vichy bishop to celebrate a mass
"en honneur de notre victoire et du rétablissement les lois de la
République," two, cutting through formalities to enable government functionaries
to be paid, and finally, presenting his wife and revealing his real name, J. P. de Lassus
Saint-Geničs, along with his daughter Dominique, born five days after Valence
was liberated.
Today a magnificent monument, overlooking N 7 some fifteen km south of
the Drôme river, stands as a memorial to those who here gave their lives. From the official text: "Le choix du
site est hautement symbolique puisqu'il domine la vallée oů la XIXe armée
allemande fut mise en déroute aprčs l'action d'éclat du commando F.F.I. Henri
Faure qui réussit ŕ faire sauter le pont de Livron ŕ la barbe des
Allemands. . . . Le monument a 16 mčtres
de haut et s'élčve comme une flamme de pierre, comme une Drôme debout, fičre, combattante,
ceint d'un mur aux 1300 noms gravés ŕ tout jamais."
The list of1300 includes not
only French names but American names as
well. In October, 1996, the monument was visited by a delegation of the US
117th Cavalry, headed by Colonel Harold J. Samsel and Colonel Tom Piddington.
This unit had received in 1946 the Croix de Guerre avec Palme, signed by Juin
and Bidault, for contributing to "L'anéantissement de forces importantes
dans la région de Montélimar" and working "en liaison étroite avec
les éléments des résistance locaux et a heureusement coordonné l'activité des
Maquis qui sont joints ŕ lui." During the battle Samsel was executive
officer for Task Force Butler and Piddington, commanding Troop A, had defended
the north bank of the Roubion. After the visit, Samsel wrote: "We were
deeply impressed by the majestic monument that represents the dedication to the
memories of so many fallen French Resistance fighters and American soldiers. We
received a list of the Americans whose names are inscribed along a wall. There
were more than 250 names of American soldiers, mostly from the 36th division,
and two names of members of the 117th."
la bataille de Montélimar fut véritablement une opération de symbiose
entre les Français et les Américains, qui furent particuličrement reconnaissants
de l'appui des maquisards. Dans ses mémoires, le général Butler évoquait leur
soutien: "Les Maquis ont renforcé les maigres effectifs de notre
infanterie dans les moments critiques et ont protégé nos lignes de
communication sur nos arričres. Il est certainement juste d'affirmer que, sans
les Maquis, notre mission aurait été beaucoup plus difficile, sinon
impossible."
Chapter
13 The Southern
Alps
Patch, Truscott, and the ANVIL planners had never been too much
concerned with the threat of a German attack across the Alps from Italy. From his experience with the mountain
fighting in Italy, Truscott could well assess the problems the Germans would
face in sending reinforcements through the southernmost passes, the Tende, the
Larche, and the Montgená_ávre. Not only
were there formidable gorges and hairpin curves in the French Alps, but on the
Italian side, assuming forces were based logistically on Cuneo or Pinerolo,
there still remained many miles of mountain roads before reaching the
passes. 1
It did not seem logical or likely, in the
early part of the ANVIL campaign, that the Germans would rely on other
resources than the two divisions already in place. A Seventh Army intelligence officer
commented:
We were told by the G-2 of the
Army several weeks before the invasion that there
was no need to put men on the Italian border.
As a result, we placed all our situation
on that border was dangerous and when we found we had no one covering the strategic points. 2
To be sure, SPOC, not SSS, had agents in the
area--half a dozen British Liaison Officers, several Jedburghs, and an OG--but
these were "operations," not primarily gatherers of
intelligence. Nevertheless, it is clear
enough that neither Patch nor Truscott believed it would be necessary to make
an offensive move toward the passes as long as reconnaissance patrols and air
observation failed to report evidence of a threatening enemy move. This meant that, except for small scouting
expeditions, the Seventh Army was content until regular French troops would
come in to leave the Alpine passes to SPOC and the French Resistance.
SPOC had long since included Alpine
operations in its plans, especially with Operation TOPLINK and the dispatch of
the British officers. There were
schedules to send even more agents into the Alps, where they would operate
under the general supervision of Francis Cammaerts. Up until August 13, the date that Cammaerts,
along with Fielding and Sorenson, fell into Gestapo hands at Digne, SPOC had
already placed in the Alpine area two Jedburgh teams and half a dozen British
agents. On the day of the ANVIL/DRAGOON
landings (while Cammaerts remained in prison), these missions were deployed as
follows:
The Jedburghs: CHLOROFORM (McIntosh, Martin, Sassi) had just
destroyed the bridge over the Durance River at Savines, and had returned to
L'HERMINE's headquarters in the Champolá,áon Valley northeast of Gap. NOVOCAINE (Gennerich, LeLann, Thompson) had
carried out a similar mission, blowing up a bridge at Prelles, south of
Brianá‡áon, after which they returned to their camp at Vallouise.
The British Liaison Officers: Of the TOPLINK group, Hamilton, injured in an
accident, was hospitalized at Aiguilles, while his colleague O'Regan, keeping
in touch with Gilbert Galetti in the Queyras, patrolled on the Italian side of
the frontier.
Major Purvis and John Roper maintained their
CP at Vallouise, in contact with Maquis in the area. John Halsey remained near the Larche pass,
with his headquarters near Barcelonnette.
He kept in touch with Captain Bureau, commander of the FFI, and also
with Christine Granville, who at the time of the landings was doing her utmost
to get Cammaerts released. Havard Gunn,
working with Lá,ácuyer from their CP at Valberg, had been the first to make
contact with Allied troops shortly after the first wave of paratroopers came
in.
Cammaerts, imprisoned at Digne from August
13<196>17, had missed the excitement that followed as news of Allied
landings spread to the north. On his
return to his headquarters at Seyne, he found that several missions had already
arrived and needed instructions. The
first to come in were a Jedburgh team, EPHEDRINE, and an inter-allied mission,
both of which had orders to go north.
EPHEDRINE was led by the French Capt. L.
Rabeau, whose teammate was an American, Lt. Lawrence E. Swank of Washington,
D.C., "Larry" to his friends McIntosh, Gennerich, and Bank with whom
he had trained in the States and at Milton Hall. The radio operator was French: Corporal J. Bourgoin.<M^>3<D>
Shortly after they landed, a few miles west
of Seyne in the small hours of August 13, another group from Algiers, the
PROGRESSION mission (a continuation of UNION), an Englishman and a Canadian
together with five French officers, were parachuted to the Drop Zone. The British officers were Maj. D. E. F. Green
and Canadian Maj. C. B. Hunter, whose objective was to get to the Savoie
Department, many rugged mountainous miles to the north. Along with the personnel came over fifty
containers. The landscape was strewn with unopened cylinders that needed to be
stored, together with the broken contents of others that were poorly packed or
whose parachutes failed. The reception
committee had not been prepared for either the number of men or the number of
containers.<M^>4<D>
Late in the afternoon of the 13th, having
learned that Cammaerts had been arrested, the entire group<197>Green and
Hunter, the three Jeds, and the five Frenchmen<197>decided to move toward
Barcelonnette and the Larche pass, but having run into Christine the next
morning, they decided on her advice to join those groups already in
Vallouise. While Christine embarked on
her efforts to get Cammaerts released, the ten men, in a charcoal-burning
truck, turned north from Barcelonnette, and started up the road toward
Guillestre.
About 9 <MS>P.M.<D>, near
St.-Paul, a tragic accident occurred.
One of the French instructors, Lieutenant Hook, had left his loaded gun
stacked in the trunk and a sharp turn caused the rifle to discharge. The bullet struck Swank, who died several
hours later. He was buried in the local
St.-Paul cemetery on August 15<197>D Day<197>while the ANVIL forces
began their landings many miles to the south.
Three days later, the remaining men reached Vallouise, and joined forces
with Roper, Purvis, Gennerich, and the other contingents keeping an eye on the
Montgená_ávre pass.
Among these contingents in the area were the
fifteen American paratroopers of OG NANCY, led by Captain Arnold Lorbeer and
1st. Lt. William F. Viviani, who had been dropped the same night as Swank's
EPHEDRINE. Although NANCY, as an
Italian-speaking group, had been assigned to operate at the Montgená_ávre pass,
the section was dropped at Armature, the area at Lagarde where Constans had the
day before conferred with Cammaerts.
Armature was too rocky for personnel drops and over 200 miles from the
Italian border, but the group suffered only minor injuries and camped out in
the area along with the airmen stranded when the rescuing Dakota had to leave
them behind.
The question posed itself: How was NANCY to get from Lagarde to the
Montgená_ávre pass? The official report
best describes this effort:
After a little haggling with the local Maquis, we obtained a good-sized
wood- burning truck with three
guides. Our sleeping bags and ruck sacks
were used to line the sides of the
truck, and then men were crowded in the center prepared to fire through cracks. A tarpaulin was placed over the truck and we
departed that night [14
August]. 15 August--It was a highly
uncomfortable, but at the same time
exciting 250 mile trip. At first flat
tires and lost guides jinxed us, but the
truck continued on, often along
main roads under the noses of German patrols and
garrisons, without being stopped. At
Sisteron, our guides bribed the local gendarmes
to let us cross the Durance river. From
there to Guillestre it became a parade
of wine and roses. It was D-Day, and the
radio was calling upon southern France
to rise and oust the Germans. The
spectacle of 15 Americans traveling this far
north a few hours after the invasion of southern France created a tremendous impression.
At Seyne, we unexpectedly
contacted Christine, famous secret agent.
The stories of her womanly
charms had not been exaggerated. At
Guillestre we met Lt. Volpe [radio
operator] of the Anglo-American mission.
Lorbeer and his men did not go to Vallouise,
where the other groups watching the Montgená_ávre pass were camped. Instead, he took a road east of the main
highway to Brianá‡áon, and established a command post at Cerviá_áres, set
in the mountains just south of the Montgená_ávre pass, about ten miles east of
Vallouise.<M^>5<D>
While the British, American, and French
agents in the field knew that the invasion was imminent, none of them knew the
date or place of the landings. The
increased bombing raids provided some indication, but more specific were the
warning messages that gave notice of action to follow. For example, on the day of the landing, SPOC
ordered the Alpine area:<M^>6<D>
This is the plan for cutting the
roads and principal Alpine passes which are:
Mont-Cenis, Montgenčvre, Col
de Larche, Petit Saint-Bernard.Following phrase will indicate temporary obstruction in 24 hours: "Le Vésuve fume" [Vesuvius is smoking]. Following phrase will
indicate destruction prolonged blocking and must be carried out in 48 hours:
"Voir Naples et Mourir" [See Naples and die].
On the
next day, August 16, not only was the "Naples" message broadcast over
the
BBC, but SPOC dispatched a specific exhortation:
"Operation Col de Larche being primordial, I agree on its rapid
execution. Let us however take
all measures to protect the civilian population from reprisals."
In carrying out these orders, Commandant Bureau worked closely with
John Halsey and Fernandez, who had been in the Barcelonnette area for over a
week, surveying the region and, with their limited supplies of explosives,
destroying bridges and roads. Together
they had agreed on a demolition plan that, on August 14, ruptured the road to
Larche just south of Meyronnes. In the
town of Larche (which lies some four miles below the pass at the frontier),
there was a small German garrison of 150, of whom about a third were Poles
whose hostile attitude toward their German superiors paralleled that of the
Resistance. Around August 12 or 13,
Christine Granville had gone up to Larche with a <MI>gendarme<D> to
persuade the Poles that, when the time was right, they should sabotage the
military installations and join the FFI.<M^>7<D>
Two developments precipitated action: the Allied landings on the 15th and the
decision of the German commander to force the citizens of Meyronnes to repair
the road. When work on the road began,
Halsey, Commandant Bureau, and the <MI>sous-prá,áfet<D> Jean-Pierre
Cuin, after some deliberation, mustered about 50 <MI>maquisards<D>
to threaten the Germans in charge of the work crews. Shots were fired; a German soldier was
wounded.
The German commander faced an impasse:
Half his garrison was mutinous; the Resistance had cut his
communications to higher command; he had no assurance that reinforcements would
come from Italy; he needed a doctor for his wounded soldier. Faced with an ultimatum, he agreed to confer,
but only with regular officers, not with the FFI. All parties concurred that they would meet at
Meyronnes in the evening of August 19<197>about the same time that the
garrison in nearby Digne was surrendering to Task Force Butler. To this meeting proceeded a firm Allied
front: Roper, Fernandez, and
<MI>sous-prá,áfet<D> Cuin in uniform, together with one of
Lá,ácuyer's men, Bob Ceccaldi, who for the occasion donned the uniform of a
Chasseurs Alpins Captain. John Halsey
reported what happened:
After an hour's talking the
German commander refused to surrender so I suggested very forcibly that I, Rudolph [Fernandez] and Bob should dine
at Larche as the enemy had plenty
of food there. To my surprise the German
commander agreed, and we went up by
bike. After the meal the commander
assembled practically the whole
garrison in the hotel and we argued. . . .
The Poles deserted with all their arms,
and at 0230 hours the German commander accepted my terms and I took him away with his dog which I have kept
to this day.
Before they deserted, the fifty-odd Poles, as
admonished by Christine, had removed the breech-blocks from the heavy guns,
bringing with them some mortars and machine guns. They were incorporated into Bureau's FFI as a
heavy-machine-gun company, and fought with the French
<MI>maquisards<D> in their attempt to keep Larche from being
reoccupied.<M^>8<D>
With news of the Allied landing, Bureau's companies increased in
number, and he was able to deploy his men in small groups along the road from
Meyronnes up to the Larche pass. The
Germans still occupied the pass, and began to move in troops and artillery,
which they mounted on the ridges overlooking the Ubaye Valley. Bureau did what he could to prevent the
reoccupation of Larche and Meyronnes, but he had only meager supplies of guns
and ammunition. He had not obtained any
materials from Algiers and, while he knew that Allied troops had liberated
Digne and Gap, he had received no assurance that an American relief column
would be coming to help. John Halsey
alone provided a slender link with the Allies.
While Halsey negotiated the surrender of the small German garrison at
Larche, John Roper was playing a similar role at
Mont-Dauphin.<M^>9<D> After
seeing Butler at Sisteron with the Hautes-Alpes Resistance chiefs, early in the
morning of August 20, he and Gilbert Tavernier, on their overworked motorcycle,
rode beyond Gap up the road to Guillestre.
Just beyond Embrun, they met Gilbert Galetti together with Lieutenant
Braillon of the FFI and a German interpreter.
As Roper recalled:
I accompanied these two French
officers to Fort Mont Dauphin where we had an interview
with the garrison commander who agreed to surrender the next day, which he did. Major Purvis came down for the ceremony on
21st August.
As in all these instances, the Germans,
numbering eighty-six, wished to surrender only to authentic Allied officers,
not to the Maquis chiefs. Roper insisted
that the German officer in charge surrender to the French, and after some
hesitation, he agreed to do so. For the
surrender of the garrison, not only did Purvis make an appearance, but also
Captain Lorbeer with some of his men from OG NANCY. Lorbeer reported:
The terms were simple. The prisoners were permitted to take all
personal belongings and were moved
to Chateau Queyras, later to be gathered in by Allied troops. Weapons were
left to the Maquis. Except for the
officers, the garrison consisted of
old customs officials in ill-fitting army uniforms, and they left no doubt about their contentment at this turn
of events. It was a Hollywood scene with general handshaking, flag-raising, and
conducted tours of the spacious German
quarters. 10
Several days earlier, Lorbeer's group had
withdrawn from their camp south of Brianá‡áon and, on Major Purvis'
advice, were now bivouacked at one of Galetti's posts, the chalets above
Bramousse about halfway between Guillestre and Cháƒáteau-Queyras. From this camp, they patrolled down the road
that Germans would have to mount if they came over the Larche pass in
force. Although Gap had now been
liberated and American road-blocks set up, no evidence had reached the
embattled FFI in the high Alps that Allied reinforcements were on the way.
THE
AMERICANS AND THE FFI AT LARCHE AND BRIANÇON
While Colonel Adams' 143rd Infantry moved
into Grenoble on the 22nd, Col. George E. Lynch's 142nd had assembled in the
Gap area. (The remaining regiment of
Dahlquist's 36th Division, the 141st, had struck westward to reinforce Task
Force Butler.)
Lynch, understanding that he should patrol
north and west of Gap, sent elements of his 2nd Battalion, under Lt. Col. David
P. Faulkner, east to Embrun. It was
there, early on the 22nd, that the regular military forces began to meet up
with the irregulars<197>Gennerich (of Jed NOVOCAINE), McIntosh (of Jed
CHLOROFORM), Lorbeer (of OG NANCY), Purvis, Roper, Hamilton, and Halsey of the
BLO group, and the Maquis. Unfortunately
Cammaerts, who would have been the person most competent to coordinate the
actions, had been summarily dismissed by General Butler and was on his way to
see General Patch at St.-Tropez.<M^>11<D>
After participating in the surrender ceremony
at Mont-Dauphin, John Roper went along the road to Gap with the intention of
locating American troops, which he knew had liberated the town. At Embrun he met Colonel Faulkner, who had
been ordered to carry out reconnaissance toward the Alps passes. Faulkner's forces included two tank destroyer
companies, three antitank batteries, and three infantry companies, including
jeeps with machine-gun mounts. Roper
rode with them toward Guillestre, where Faulkner established his CP. From Guillestre he sent patrols up toward
Brianá‡áon and into the Queyras where, guided by Purvis, his men found
Major Hamilton at Aiguilles. Hamilton
had injured his leg in an automobile accident and was recovering in a
hospital. Another patrol under
Lieutenant Frank motored south to check on enemy dispositions in the St.-Paul,
Meyronnes, and Larche areas.
At 10 <MS>A.M.<D> on August 22,
orders came through from Dahlquist:
"142 Inf will force and take Brianá‡áon and establish road
blocks in that vicinity." Faulkner
was already getting information from Gennerich, Purvis, and Roper, and was
testing the roadbeds and bridges to see if his heavy tank destroyers could
proceed north.
Then everything came to a halt. Dahlquist had not perceived, as Truscott had,
the great opportunity of cutting off the Germans at the Rhá“áne. He had permitted his 141st Regiment to sit
idle, he had sent two battalions up to Grenoble, and he was preparing to throw
another battalion at Brianá‡áon.
New to the command of troops in battle and not privy to ULTRA, Dahlquist
had given emphasis to his role of protecting the flank. Truscott was furious and wrote him an angry
letter: 12
Apparently I failed to make my mission clear to you. The primary mission of the 36th Infantry Division is to block
the Rhone Valley in the gap immediately north of
the Montelimar. For this purpose you
must be prepared to employ the bulk of your
Division. If this operation develops as
seems probable, all of your Division will
be none too much in the Rhone Valley area. . . . The elements of your Division now in Grenoble should be moved without delay to the area
now occupied by the Butler force. . .
. On the roads in the vicinity of Gap
and east thereof, I desire that you
employ blocking forces only. Keep in
mind that your primary mission is to
block the Rhone Valley.
By noon of the 22nd, Dahlquist had
ordered: "Due to critical shortage
of gasoline the use of motor vehicles will be held to an absolute
minimum," and two hours later, the mission to take Briançon was called
off. By nightfall, orders directed the
142nd Infantry to move west from their current position, although Faulkner's
2nd Battalion would continue at Guillestre until relieved by elements of the
45th Division.
In spite of the limitations on gasoline, Faulkner did his best during
the 23rd to push patrols in all directions.
Purvis accompanied one to Brianá‡áon, where they made contact with
another recon that had come over the Lautaret pass from Grenoble. Gennerich's Jedburgh team with 250
<MI>maquisards<D> moved toward the town, and Captain Frison with
over 1000 FFI took up positions in the area.
The appearance of the American armored patrols alarmed the Germans, and
around noon, they began to withdraw as the Resistance forces swelled. Although the American attack had been called
off, Frison and the FFI decided to attack the town<197>carefully, because
although the Germans may have left, they still occupied the forts above the
city and controlled the Montgená_ávre pass.<M^>13<D> Purvis reported:
The reception was terrific. The Germans had left two hours before. They had blown
the road at Fort des Salettes with the town water supply on leaving. . . . Found
it very difficult to have any defensive units put out toward Montgenevre as Americans had left for Grenoble. Town was in a very natural state of hysteria and those responsible thought more of
wreaths on monuments than any possible return
of enemy.
CONFESSIONAL [Pelletier, head of the mission] and Captain Frison
arrived late evening. While going to Grand Hotel for night,
CONFESSIONAL was accidentally
shot in shoulder by a boy with a revolver who had been in F.F.I. one hour.
This proved serious and he took no further part in the mission.
Faulkner also sent a recon under Lieutenant
Frank to the Larche road to verify whether an enemy column was coming over the
Larche pass to threaten the FFI defensive positions. In the small hours of August 23, Frank returned
to report that indeed the Germans had broken through several road-blocks and
were approaching the Ubaye Valley.
Faulkner had promised Roper that he would send a mini-task force to
Larche, but having received orders that his division was moving west, had to
cancel the mission. Nevertheless, as
Roper recalled: 14
Captain Lorbeer . . . and I took a
subaltern of Colonel Faulkner's staff down to the Larche valley and as far up it as Meyronnes where, by close
reconnaissance and resulting fire, we
convinced him of the presence of Germans who had, in fact, advanced through Larche to Meyronnes that
afternoon. The local FFI under Captain Bureau of Condamine were in
disorderly retreat.
Although the bulk of the 142nd Regiment had
already moved west to the Rhône, Faulkner remained in the Guillestre area until
he was relieved by elements of the 180th Infantry under Col. Robert L.
Dulaney. Roper and Lorbeer continued
their reconnaissance with one of Dulaney's officers, Major Smith, and planned
countermoves against the German advance.
Farther to the south, at Barcelonnette, John
Halsey was equally concerned that, with Bureau's conservative reluctance to
face the Germans, no American help had yet come to the rescue. On the night of August 22/23, he drove off to
Embrun to see what he could do. Not
having come into contact with the helpful and sympathetic Faulkner at
Guillestre, he ran into reluctant cooperation.
As Halsey reported:<M^>15<D>
"[at Embrun] the Lt. Col. in question was so disinterested that he
would not even get out of his bed and more or less said he did not believe that
there were any enemy within a hundred miles of his troops." In any case, the division was moving out, so
there was no point in trying to get reinforcements. Halsey had better luck with the units that
were coming in:
I contacted one of the [45th] Infantry battalion commanders who was
most understanding and introduced
me to the divisional [sic. Should be
regimental] infantry commander
Colonel Dulaney, who promised me all his help.
True to his word, Dulaney sent reconnaissance
patrols out on the night of August 23 to St.-Paul ("everything
quiet"), to Guillestre (contacted Lorbeer's Operational Group at
Bramousse), to Condamine ("Halsey talked to the FFI at Larche on the
telephone"), and to Brianá‡áon (in touch with Purvis). However, at ten o'clock next morning (August
24), everything once more ground to a halt.
A command from Division Headquarters read: "All vehicles in the Division in this
area except those necessary for water and LOs [Liaison Officers] are
grounded. No rations or gasoline will be
drawn until the dumps are moved up."
Clearly the requirements of the battle on the Rhône took priority over
operations in the eastern Alps. The
lower command echelons would not have known what Patch learned through
ULTRA. On August 22, a message had
notified him: "157 Division . . .
ordered to retire to pass line Mt. Blanc-Montgenevre leaving rearguards in
regiment strength at Grenoble and sufficient forces to control roads leading
from Grenoble to the passes." On
the next day, a signal mentioned that the formidable 11th Panzer Division would
be in the area of Nyons,<M^>16<D> the position to which Faulkner
had been ordered. The highest priorities
kept supplies shuttling to the Rhá“áne; the Alpine passes would have to
wait.
Again, Truscott faced an important
decision. All of the 3rd and 36th
Divisions were now concentrating their efforts on the German retreat up the
Rhá“áne. Truscott had two
regiments that were relatively unengaged:
Colonel Meyer's 179th in Grenoble and Colonel Dulaney's 180th at
Gap. Until the battle at Montá,álimar
was resolved, he could not afford to send these regimental combat teams farther
north, yet he would require them for the major task of attacking the main
German column if it escaped the trap and proceeded toward Lyon. He did not want the 180th to involve itself
too much in the Alps, but he needed reconnaissance in the area. Indeed, Truscott was well aware of the
embattled FFI effort to harass the Germans.
Under date of August 24, he wrote in his memoirs:<M^>17<D>
I stopped at Aspres to see
Eagles [Commanding General, 45th Division]. . . . Eagles was having his troubles with the Maquis who were active in
all the border towns, and badgering
Eagles to send American troops to support them.
To
relieve some of this pressure, Truscott decided to send part of Task Force
Butler over to the Alps. The unit he
chose was Captain Piddington's Troop A of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron.
Although Piddington was already heavily
engaged in holding a line on the Roubion River northeast of Montá,álimar, he
disengaged on the 24th and backtracked to Gap, the town he had liberated only
four days before. Here he reported to
Dulaney, who ordered him to send one platoon to Barcelonnette, while he with
the remaining two platoons would patrol from St.-Paul to Brianá‡áon.
At the same time, Halsey learned that Dulaney
was unable, because of the orders to ground all his vehicles, to send any
assistance. As Halsey recalled the
situation:<M^>18<D>
Accompanied by Major Fielding who had just
arrived, I went to Gap and contacted L'Hermine who let me have 60 maquisards
(commando-trained) commanded by Lt. McIntosh [of Jedburgh CHLOROFORM] and then
proceeded to 45th Division HQ and demanded an interview with Major-General
Eagles to whom I and Major Fielding explained the situation. It is doubtful today even in my mind whether
it was an act of the Almighty or whether the General understood the situation
but on my return to Colonel Dulaney's HQ there was a message for me to pick up
an armoured car reconnaissance patrol and take them to the Larche area.
Of
course it was neither the Almighty nor Eagle's wisdom; it simply happened that
Piddington and his Troop A, already ordered to patrol to the east, were ready
and available.
For the Larche mission, Piddington assigned his second platoon,
commanded by Lt. Kenneth Cronin, who was ordered to make a "show of
force" in the Barcelonnette area, to coordinate his activities with
McIntosh, and to remain until relieved by the First Airborne Task Force. The platoon, which consisted of three M-8
armored cars, firing 37-mm. cannon, and a half-dozen jeeps, could not, because
of bridge demolitions, follow the direct route to Barcelonnette but took all
day, traveling about 200 miles from the Rhá“áne, to reach its
destination. About five miles west of
Barcelonnette, Cronin met McIntosh and Martin of Jed CHLOROFORM, with their
company of <MI>maquisards<D>.
Cronin recalls meeting McIntosh:
"He is a Georgian [actually from Florida] with the most southern
accent I have ever heard and who spoke French exactly as he spoke English but
the Maquis understood him, and were quick to obey his
commands."<M^>19<D>
(With the two other members of CHLOROFORM being French, there was never
a communication problem.)
Once in Barcelonnette, Cronin and McIntosh
quickly got in touch with John Halsey and Captain Bureau, who now had six
companies spread out in the valley facing the German positions in the
mountains. For the next few days, the
FFI, the American platoon, and John Halsey patrolled the road between Jausiers
and Condamine, "moving around," as Cronin put it, "a great deal
to give the appearance of more strength than we actually had." The Germans showed no signs of an offensive
but, with 110-mm. howitzers in the mountains, could put down a deadly
barrage. At one time, Halsey and Cronin
together salvaged a jeep that had been abandoned by its driver. With the rescued jeep "going like hell
to town," Cronin spotted a little movement up on the
mountain<197>either a machine gun or observation post. "In order to lay the gun on the
target," he remembered,
I had to elevate to maximum elevation since
it was so high up on the mountain. I put
a couple of rounds into the suspected target and [Halsey] who was sitting next
to me and who was supposed to be keeping an eye on the field above the
embankment to keep anyone from sneaking up on us, was sitting there watching
the gunnery and saying "Lovely, lovely, lovely," as only a Brit can
say it.
Meanwhile, John Roper had been cooperating
with patrols from the 2nd Battalion of the 180th Regiment, up to
Brianá‡áon and across the Col de Vars to St.-Paul and to that same road
net, St.-Paul<196>Condamine<196>Meyronnes, which Halsey, Cronin,
McIntosh, and Bureau were keeping under observation. The British officers deplored the caution of
the Americans and the Maquis: the former
being under orders to carry on reconnaissance but not to attack, and the latter
realizing how vulnerable they were to a German barrage. In any case, although the Germans did not
mount a serious offensive from the Larche pass, they reoccupied the villages
along the Larche road and kept up such intensive shelling that the Allies,
without heavy reinforcements, could do nothing except maintain contact.
On August 25, Patch ordered General Frederick
to send elements of his Airborne Task Force up to the Larche pass. This meant that, as soon as Lt. Col. Edward
Sach could move some of the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion to Barcelonnette,
Cronin would rejoin Piddington north of St.-Paul. During the days between the 25th and the
28th, when the first Glider troops came in, the Germans almost closed the road
between Jausiers and St.-Paul by their bombardments. To quote Cronin:
The
Germans didn't react until we started to move north . . . then everything hit
the fan. The enemy had those roads
leading to the pass taped and registered with artillery and really let us have
it. We beat a hasty retreat into
Condamine and the artillery followed up.
We finally had to retreat behind a small mountain spur to the rear of
Condamine to get into a defilade position.
Luckily no injuries were sustained except to our feelings. One thing was certain; we weren't going to be
able to get jeeps through that pass. It
would have to be armored cars traveling at high speed to make it and that was
problematical.
Cronin did take an armored car up to
St.-Paul, where he met Piddington, who told him to have the platoon make a dash
for it. Knowing that the airborne forces
would possess much more offensive power than a recon platoon, Piddington's
superiors believed that the entire troop would be more useful in the
Guillestre--Briançon area. Cronin
returned to Barcelonnette, bringing with him the regional military delegate,
Willy Widmer, who would be conferring with NOEL and Bureau about further
actions.<M^>20<D> On the
next day, August 28, Cronin's platoon made a run for it and rejoined the other
units of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron at Voiron, north of Grenoble. That evening, the first elements of Colonel
Sachs' battalion moved into bivouac around Barcelonnette.
The historian of these events would like to report that, with tanks and
howitzers reinforcing Bureau's FFI, the Allies soon repulsed the Germans and
raised a triumphant banner on the Larche pass.
This did not happen. Although
Bureau's FFI expanded to more than twelve companies with over a thousand
maquisards, the Germans made ever more vigorous efforts to hold the pass, with
artillery emplacements along ten miles of mountain crests. Halsey and Jed CHLOROFORM patrolled and
advised, the Airborne battalion did what it could, the Allied air force bombed
enemy installations, and beginning on September 6, elements of the French
regular forces--the 2nd Moroccan Division--reinforced the line. By the end of September, these French units
had relieved the weary <MI>maquisards<D>, who had fought in the
high mountains for two months.<M^>21<D> Even then this Alpine campaign, possibly the
least celebrated of World War II, would continue through the frigid winter and
well into the spring of 1945.
TASK
FORCE BIBO AND BRIANÇON
Since the Larche area had been assigned to
the First Airborne Task Force, VI Corps now had to be concerned more with the
passes to the north, the Montgená_ávre (controlled by Brianá‡áon) and the
Modane and Mont-Cenis passes, approached by way of St.-Michel in the
Maurienne. Truscott decided to pull the
180th Infantry out of the area, so that it could follow the 179th to
Grenoble. The 2nd Battalion of the 180th
still had one platoon at Brianá‡áon.
On August 27, Truscott ordered Lt. Col.
Harold S. Bibo, of the Headquarters staff, to organize a task force to relieve
the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 180th.
The Task Force was to consist of Troop A of the 117th Recon Squadron,
already in the area; a Chemical battalion; two platoons from the 180th's
Anti-Tank Company; one battery of 105s from the 171st Field Artillery
Battalion.<M^>22<D>
In the evening of August 27, Bibo was briefed
at VI Corps headquarters at Aspres and, around midnight set off toward Chorges,
to confer with officers of the 180th Regiment, which his task force, officially
designated as PFPF (Provisional Flank Protective Force), was to relieve. Captain Piddington, whose Troop A was
operating north of the Col de Vars in the Guillestre/Brianá‡áon region,
conferred with Bibo on the road to Brianá‡áon.<M^>23<D>
Clearly, Brianá‡áon, which guarded the
Montgená_ávre pass and which had already been occupied by Maquis along with
Jedburghs and one platoon of the 180th's 2nd Battalion, was the key point of
Bibo's responsibility. Consequently,
after a conference with his officers early in the morning of August 28, Bibo
drove up to Brianá‡áon and set up his command post in the Grand
Hotel. There were many Maquis forces in
and around Brianá‡áon, under the general command of Captain Frison, who
had outposts and road-blocks in the mountains near the town, at Cerviá_áres, and
along the road from Brianá‡áon to the German-held pass at
Montgená_ávre.<M^>24<D> The
members of the NOVOCAINE Jedburgh team, Lieutenant Gennerich and his French
colleague, Lieutenant LeLann, were there, together with the British officers
Major Purvis and Captain Roper, and an American, Lt. Mario Volpe, the radio
operator for the CONFESSIONAL (UNION III) mission.
During the night of August 28/29, German
elements occupied strong points around Brianá‡áon and in the morning they
began shelling the town. With bombs
falling in the vicinity of the Grand Hotel, Bibo ordered his headquarters to
withdraw, around 11:00, to positions at Le Monáˆátier, about twelve miles
on the Grenoble road. All the American
outposts were overrun, and company C of the 83rd Chemical Battalion was surrounded. Its losses were heavy: three officers, fifty men, twelve 4.2
mortars, and about twenty-five vehicles.
Some men from the company were able to straggle through and escape the
German patrols. The Resistance also
suffered. Ten men from Captain Cá,áard's
company, driving up to the Fort des Táˆátes, were intercepted and
summarily executed by the Germans. At
the fortress, Paul Baldenberger, a member of the local Liberation Committee,
was shot.<M^>25<D>
The Germans had indeed occupied the area and
on the next day, August 30, rounded up 250 able-bodied citizens from whom the
officer in charge, Major Schneider, chose twelve hostages. Two townspeople, a physician, Dr. Lepoire,
and an attorney, former public prosecutor Daurelle, sought to save the hostages
by guaranteeing the town's neutrality.
For the next few days, terror reigned:
German soldiers requisitioned what they chose and destroyed
buildings<197>wantonly it appeared to the citizens. Until the local German forces were reinforced
by Afrika Korps elements from the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division,
Brianá‡áon had no power, no water, no telephones, and little
food.<M^>26<D>
Early in the morning of August 30, Bibo did
in fact receive corps orders (issued the previous day) that he would be
relieved very shortly by the French.
While Bibo's CP was now at Lauteret, Piddington's was about halfway
between Lauteret and Brianá‡áon, in the shadow of mountains, which showed
patches of snow and glacier even in summertime.
That evening, Major Howes, from Seventh Army,
turned up at Bibo's CP with a French liaison officer to make preliminary
arrangements for the relief by the French.
With knowledge that his task force would soon be relieved, Colonel Bibo
went to Chambá,áry, north of Grenoble, to meet with French Colonel Bonjour,
whose forces would be taking over the northern
sector.<M^>27<D> While he
was away, Troop A patrolled and skirmished around St.-Chaffrey, with the 2nd
Platoon generally under fire. Jed
NOVOCAINE participated in the patrols.
Bibo returned to his headquarters late in the
evening of September 1 with word that everything was ready for the French
takeover. All units were to be prepared
to leave and rejoin their parent units on the following
day.<M^>28<D>
In Brianá‡áon, by September 3, some
order had returned: Electricity had been
restored, and the hostages had been released.
The Germans, although reinforced, did not intend to attack, simply to
safeguard the escape routes along which stragglers from the Maurienne were
still limping eastward. In any case,
elements of the French 4th Regiment of <MI>Tirailleurs
Marocains<D>, forerunners of General Dody's 2nd Moroccan Infantry
Division, had now reached the outskirts of the mountain city.
On September 5, the Germans withdrew back to
the forts protecting the Montgená_ávre pass, leaving only rear guard units that
were captured on the next day when the Moroccans, along with Frison's FFI,
entered Brianá‡áon. For the second
time, the townspeople hailed their liberation, this time without fear of
reoccupation; but the pass remained in German hands until the following spring.
Chapter 14 Cannes and Nice
Although General Truscott had not been able
to cut off the retreating Germans at Montélimar, General Patch could view the
accomplishments of his Seventh Army with a certain satisfaction. The move north had been accomplished in
record time, far ahead of schedule, and the whole of southern France required
only a mopping-up of stragglers. With
Toulon and Marseille besieged by de Lattre's Army B, it was simply a matter of
time before the ports would fall into Allied hands. Hitler had no way of reinforcing the two
divisions that stubbornly carried out a last-ditch defense.
On the other hand, the Germans could, if they
chose to do so, reinforce their 157th Division (Pflaum) and their 148th
(Fretter-Pico) across the Alpine passes.
Patch had good reason however, through air reconnaissance and ULTRA, to
believe that the enemy would continue to withdraw, not mount a
counteroffensive, in the east.
On August 20, a stream of ULTRA reports from Bletchley
had come through. One of these, dated
1:20 <MS>P.M.<D> London time, revealed that the German High Command
had ordered General Fretter-Pico to pull back toward the Italian border. The part applying to the eastern flank read:
148
Reserve Division to defend area around Grasse as long as possible without
running risk of annihilation. Then to
withdraw with main forces via Nice, Breil, Cuneo to take over new sector with
left boundary coast at Menton, right boundary Embrun, Chianale-Varaita valley. If situation allows, groups to be pulled back
fighting into Tinßéße and Var valleys as far as Larche-Condamine to bar a
possible Allied outflanking thrust across Maddalena [Larche] Pass. . . .
At
0900 August 19, leaving strong rearguards in contact with Allies, main body 148
Division to withdraw from evening 19th onward first to east bank of the Var
sector and to start from there movement ordered into new sector. In no circumstances to let Allies push them
back by outflanking movement to north.
Late in the evening, another long message was
deciphered. It mentioned that LXII Corps
(whose headquarters had already been overrun) "will gradually be withdrawn
to former Franco-Italian frontier and employed in its defense." It continued:
"148th Division's task is to defend possible retreat route Grasse
to Cannes." The 157th Reserve Division
"to withdraw when pressed, behind 19th Army, to line
Brianßçßon<196>Chambßéßry<196>Aix-les-Bains. Later task to defend Alpine Sector, left at
Embrun, right at Mt. Blanc."<M^>1<D>
Patch certainly gained reassurance from these
messages, but was disturbed that de Lattre had protested vigorously against
having his divisions bottled up against the Alps. Patch had however accepted General Devers' suggestion
about transforming the First Airborne Task Force into a regular offensive
unit. The official orders for the FABTF
to relieve Dahlquist and assume responsibility for the eastern flank reached
General Frederick late on the 19th. The
British Second Brigade would leave the theater, but it would be replaced by the
"Black Devils," the First Special Service Force, a
Canadian<196>U.S. Commando of regiment size that had previously served
under Frederick's command in Italy. Now
under Col. Edwin A. Walker, the Special Service Task Force had reduced
off-shore batteries on islands near Toulon
and had been held in reserve
since D Day. Frederick would
"establish and hold defensive flank along the general line
Fayence<196>La Napoule," positions occupied by the 36th
Division.<M^>2<D>
The "general line" must not be
thought of as a 1914<196>1918 length of trenches. Beyond the coast lie valleys and hills,
dotted with small villages, served by a labyrinth of winding dirt roads. In some of the hill towns, a German garrison
might hold out for days while traffic continued unopposed on nearby roads;
elsewhere demoralized Axis troops, preponderantly made up of impressed Poles,
Ukrainians, and Cossacks, eagerly surrendered when they had the chance.
The left, or northern limit of Frederick's
responsibility, Fayence, had held out until the 21st, when the Germans
surrendered to Jedburgh team SCEPTRE.
Another stubborn defense took place at Callian. This was a little perched village where some
of the wounded paratroopers had been left, and where patrols of the 141st
Regiment's 2nd Battalion, under Lt. Col. James Critchfield, had penetrated as
early as D + 2. With a French Resistance
contingent ready to help, the Americans found themselves faced by a garrison
unwilling to surrender. It finally took
a mini-task force under the battalion's executive officer, Maj. Herbert Eitt,
to subdue the Germans. The 141st, which
controlled the Route Napolßéßon (N85) from a point a few miles northwest of
Grasse all the way to Digne, began to move out as the paratroopers took over
their positions.<M^>3<D>
The Airborne Task Force now assumed
responsibility for protecting the Seventh Army's eastern flank. General Frederick moved his headquarters to
the Hotel Courier in St.-Raphael. Just
outside the city limits, at Valescure, the OSS men, Captains Geoffrey Jones and
Alan Stuyvesant, set up a headquarters.
It was here that Jones joined forces with Pierre Escot, director of a
Gaullist intelligence network that possessed wide information sources in the
direction of Cannes and Nice. With
Frederick now responsible for offensive moves eastward, the association with
Escot became extremely valuable, and he was absorbed into a burgeoning SO/SI
type of operation attached to Frederick's G-2.<M^>4<D>
General Frederick now deployed his units
along the highways leading to Italy. By
the 22nd, the Airborne's line ran just a few miles west of Cannes, extending
northwest until it reached N85, the Route Napolßéßon, several miles south of
Castellane. The Germans still held some
rear guard units in Grasse, the celebrated perfume center on the winding
Cannes<196>Castellane road. As
Frederick's troops moved east, they approached the boundary between the
departments of Var and Alpes-Maritimes.
The 509th Parachute Battalion, outside Cannes, had already crossed the
border.
All this movement seriously affected
Commandant Lßéßcuyer, who since early August had been FFI chief for
Alpes-Maritimes and who, as ORA regional chief, knew the area extremely
well. Many of the mountain towns had been
or could be liberated by the FFI, and he realized the strategic significance of
the Var River, which meets the Mediterranean just west of Nice, the
departmental seat. While the Germans
were strongly fortified around Nice, they had only small garrisons in towns
beyond a twenty-mile defense line.
Lßéßcuyer believed that troops could reach the little town of
Plan-du-Var, where a wide flat valley extends to the south with mountains to
the north, without encountering serious resistance.
Since the landings, Lßéßcuyer's companies had
plagued German garrisons in the Alps, striking at German concentrations toward
the Italian border. The French knew, at
a time when American plans had scarcely been formulated, that key positions in
the high valleys had to be controlled if the Germans were to be forced out of
France. The valleys and ridges lie at
right angles to the coast, and make a series of potential defensive lines north
of that Riviera coastline stretching from Nice to Monte Carlo.
By August 19, Lßéßcuyer could be assured that
no German troops remained in the mountain quadrilateral roughly defined by the
Italian border in the north, by the Tinßéße River in the east, and the Var
River on the south. (By this time the
U.S. 36th Division occupied the territory to the west.) The last of the German garrisons in the
Tinßéße Valley, those protecting a hydroelectric plant at Bancairon, had just
surrendered to three of Lßéßcuyer's companies.
Lßéßcuyer himself had gone there to accept the enemy commander's
surrender, explaining to the German officer that, while his Maquis uniform was
somewhat improvised, he was indeed a legitimate French officer.
East of the Var<196>Tinßéße line, a
series of ridges running north<196>south could serve the Germans as
defensive bastions. East of the Tinßéße
Valley, the next strategic positions lie along the Vßéßsubie River Valley,
marked by the town of Lantosque and farthest north, St.-Martin-Vßéßsubie, ten
miles (as the crow flies) from Italy. On
August 17, a band of Lßéßcuyer's <MI>maquisards<D>, Groupe MORGAN
(Foata), entered St.-Martin and forced the garrison to surrender. The conquest was short-lived, however, since
German plans were being formulated to hold the Tende pass, and elements of the
90th Panzer Division were beginning to take up positions along the border. On the 21st, the Germans reoccupied
St.-Martin.<M^>5<D>
Havard Gunn, now at Thorenc (Lßéßcuyer's CP),
understood the implicit strategic import of St.-Martin and did his best to
persuade the FFI into another assault.
Several Resistance groups responded.
(One of these, known as the <MI>Battalion<D> HOCHCORN from
the code name of its leader, Commandant Dormois, included in its heterogeneous
makeup a section of navy firemen, <MI>marins pompiers<D>, from
Marseille.)<M^>6<D> Gunn went
to St.-Martin and later succinctly reported:
Entered town.
Tried to organize FFI who were very disordered and very political. Largely FTP.
Gained very interesting military information. Entered all villages not occupied by enemy
along frontier but position obviously very insecure. Enemy patrols all along parts of Italian
frontier and raiding villages, etc. Left
St.-Martin for Plan-du-Var.
Both
Gunn and Lßéßcuyer believed the Americans should be advised that it might be
possible to reach Plan-du-Var from the north.
Organizing a small convoy, Lßéßcuyer, Gunn,
and some staff on motorcycles set out for the Allied CP and finally reached
General Frederick at his headquarters in St.-Raphael. While he agreed with the possibilities of an
attack from the north, General Frederick explained that his orders required a
defensive position, with only reconnaissance to Grasse and
Cannes.<M^>7<D>
Frederick told Lßéßcuyer and Gunn that, even though he was supposed
only to recon toward Grasse, he was going to attack it the next day. He did also obtain a modification of his
orders. The written version (Patch Field
Order No. 3, 6, August 25, 1944) read:
FABTF:
(1)
Seize and hold the West bank of the VAR in zone.
(2)
Protect the right (East) flank of Seventh Army along the general
line: LARCHE PASS (incl)--TOUDON--West
bank of the VAR river to its mouth.
(3)
Reconnoiter to NICE.
Patch had of course been able to
digest the information, derived from the ULTRA decrypt of August 20 ordering a
German withdrawal. Thus, on the
twenty-third, as Frederick prepared to take Grasse, Patch possessed a
reasonably good assessment of what the enemy might do on the Italo-French
frontier. Knowing that Generalmajor Otto
Fretter-Pico, the 148th Division Commander, would hold the east bank of the
Var, he could readily authorize Frederick to go that far, and then wait and
see.
Patch gave Frederick responsibility also for
the Larche pass, where Piddington's Troop A, John Halsey, and Jedburgh team
CHLOROFORM had been giving what support they could to Captain Bureau's
embattled FFI. Frederick detached
Colonel Sach's 550th Battalion, which in the next few days made its way to
Barcelonnette and began taking up positions along the roads leading to the
pass.<M^>8<D>
When Lßéßcuyer and Gunn told General
Frederick how free the mountain roads were, they were somewhat disconcerted
when the general told them he would look into it if the intelligence they
brought could be verified. While
Frederick's immediate objectives were Grasse and Cannes, and his orders limited
him to reconnaissance no farther north than thirty miles, Lßéßcuyer and Gunn
were describing a route via Puget-Thßéßniers on the upper Var, more than fifty
miles from the coast. Lßéßcuyer pointed
out that over the lower Var no bridge remained intact except at Plan-du-Var,
where the Var Valley mountain road emerges onto the plain less then twenty
miles from Nice.<M^>9<D>
In the event, General Frederick chose not to
take the northern route to the Var River, which made it more imperative in
Gunn's and Lßéßcuyer's view that the Maquis must at all costs hold the bridge
at Plan-du-Var. By this time, Commandant
Sorensen (CHASUBLE) and Xan Fielding, the officers who had been imprisoned with
Cammaerts, had joined them. Ostensibly,
Sorensen was FFI chief, as Constans' deputy, for the eastern part of R-2, and
he needed to develop familiarity with the Alpes-Maritimes.
Meanwhile, the 517th and the First Special
Service Force struck at Grasse on August 24, entered the town without
opposition, and moved ahead to the German defensive positions along the Loup
River. On the next day, August 25,
Frederick transferred his Task Force headquarters to Grasse. With this move went Captain Stuyvesant, the
SSS officer responsible for intelligence and contacts with French agents, as
well as Capt. Geoffrey Jones, who had been providing various liaison and other
services for FABTF since he joined them on D Day.<M^>10<D>
Along the coast, Yarborough's 509th Regiment,
having reduced the German strong points west of Cannes, by-passed that most
elegant of Riviera resorts and the nearby resort of Antibes, so that the troops
could take a shorter route to Nice and the Italian border. Therefore, while patrols of the 509th probed
along the coast road at Mandelieu and La Napoule, others sounded out German
defenses away from the coast.
On August 23, a three-jeep party had
encountered members of a Cannes Resistance patrol outside the city, where
Germans were entrenched with mortars and heavy machine guns. Reinforcements came up, but a sharp
fire-fight, in which both Americans and FFI took casualties, enabled the
Germans to hold on.
The German group, however, formed no more
than a rear guard for the withdrawal from Cannes of the German garrison, under
Colonel Schneider, planned for the dawn of the 24th. The Resistance within Cannes had long prepared
for this opportunity, with MUR forces under Vahanian in the city's western
sector, and those of Miniconi (FTP Commandant JEAN-MARIE) in the east and
north. Schneider had orders to destroy
the city before he evacuated it, but, either because of Resistance pressure or
from repugnance toward such useless and savage destruction, he left the hotels
and civic structures intact. On the
24th, the Germans withdrew, leaving the city to a rejoicing population, to the
FFI, hailed as liberators, and to the Committee of Liberation, headed by
Gabriel Daville, an officer in one of Miniconi's FTP companies. Yarborough's 509th came along without
opposition, joined in the parade, and hastened on to their next objective,
Nice.<M^>11<D>
To attack Nice it would be necessary to cross
the Var, which, with its bridges blown, provided a nasty obstacle. Ironically, while the ABTF had not yet
crossed the Var, Resistance forces planned an attack in a strategic area fifty
miles ahead, the value of which the Americans would appreciate three weeks
later when they<197>and the FFI<197>would face the German decision
to hold the ridges north of Monte Carlo.
This defense line lies barely five air miles east of the Vßéßsubie
Valley, and the leaders of Lßéßcuyer's groups, Foata (Group MORGAN) and Mazier
(Group FRANßÇßOIS), having control of the Vßéßsubie, believed the Germans might
be prepared to relinquish positions around Turini. Should these strong points be grasped, the
way might be open to Sospel, a key point on the road to Italy. Unfortunately for Foata and Mazier, the
Germans saw control of the passes as essential to their defense: They undertook to reoccupy St.-Martin and to
reinforce their defenses at Turini. The
Maquis attack turned into a disaster.
Gunn, then at Plan-du-Var, learned of the effort too late:
Knew
this area heavily defended by German Alpine troops. Tried to change orders but SAPIN [Lécuyer]
left no competent staff officer in charge.
All his staff moved to Nice. Left
to contact US forces. Crossed Var river,
found US regimental HQ [presumably Col. Graves' 517th regiment]; colonel
commanding promised to give small mixed patrol for dawn next morning for recce
of valleys concerned also make enemy think Americans advanced farther than they
had. My idea also was to try and support
FFI attack on Turini at dawn if I was unable to get troops orders changed. Given jeep.
Tried all night to cross river Var to reach Nice, impossible because of
mines. Returned lead patrol up
valleys. FFI had attacked Turini before
my arrival. Complete defeat and ten
killed. Operation very rash and badly
managed.<M^>12<D>
For Gunn and Lßéßcuyer, the bridge at
Plan-du-Var still offered a great possibility for Frederick's
paratroopers. Although in summertime the
Var River is no more than a trickle threading its way through a vast pebbly
riverbed, the Germans had sown mines that would make a precarious crossing for
men and vehicles.
Operational Group RUTH had now joined
Lßéßcuyer. Under the leadership of
Lieutenants Brandes and Strand, the group had worked with Task Force Butler
until Digne was liberated, and was then reassigned to the area in which Gunn
and Lßéßcuyer were operating. They never
did locate Gunn, but, after a conference with Lßéßcuyer and Sorensen at
Thorenc, they joined the Maquis units that were protecting the bridge at
Plan-du-Var. Although the Germans held
Levens, from where they could fire toward the bridge, FFI units and members of
OG RUTH harassed them so effectively that they could neither occupy the bridge
nor destroy it.
Meanwhile, although he had not accepted the northern approach, on the
26th, Frederick ordered the 517th Regiment to fan out along the Loup River,
crossing it to the north in the direction of Coursßéßgoules and Bßéßzaudun, and
to the south toward Vence (the picturesque old village where Matisse would
later decorate his celebrated chapel).
Advance elements reached the Var, where they could fire across the river
at the German installations; and on the next day, the three battalions of the
517th occupied Bézaudun and Le Broc.
Lieutenant Gautier (later general) recalls:
The
American command understood that we held Plan-du-Var and maintained contact
with the eastern bank. Artillery was
placed at my disposal and its accurate fire hit the German positions. On the evening of the 27th the Americans
crossed the Var, and, guided by a number of our people, took Levens and La
Roquette [two miles south of Levens].
The crossing of the Var had taken place just as, to the south, another
American group reached the river banks. . . .
We had succeeded in what we wished, that is to get the Allied forces
east of the Var, although their mission at this moment did not extend beyond
this line.<M^>13<D>
The other "American group" was
presumably Lieutenant Brandes and OG RUTH, which encountered advance patrols
from the 517th parachute regiment on the 27th.
When Brandes reported to the Regimental command post in Grasse, Colonel
Graves sent an anti-tank company to relieve the OG. By this time, Geoffrey Jones, attached to the
Task Force's G-2, had moved his headquarters to Grasse. He found a truck for the well-worn
group<197>they had been in the field for almost a month<197>which
reported back to 4-SFU.<M^>14<D>
Captain Jones became more and more useful to
General Frederick by providing accurate information about enemy
dispositions. Although originally
trained as an artillery paratrooper, Jones moved readily into the SI (intelligence)
sector, where his energy and knowledge of the area enabled him to feed valuable
information to Frederick's G-2.
LIBERATION OF NICE
On August 27<197>as German forces
evacuated Nice and an insurrection began.
Jones obtained a copy of General Fretter-Pico's field order for the
day. Jones recalls the situation:
An SO
probe of young agents behind enemy lines in Nice ambushed a German command car
and brought back a bloody knapsack full of papers. As we began to sort out this lode with the
help of a (I will never know why he was visiting us) British officer, we made
an astounding discovery: these
"papers" were the just written plans for German forces on the eastern
flank to withdraw for the next three days to fortified positions on the Italian
frontier<197>and the Field Order and maps to carry them out! Working all night by candlelight, we
translated/processed a complete report that by early morning was ready for me
to wake up the General, who immediately gave me his L. S. aircraft and had me
flown to General Patch's headquarters.
The order made it clear that the 148th
Reserve Division would pull back toward the Italian border, but would hold a
line roughly ten miles west of the frontier, blocking the coast to Italy at
Monte Carlo, and defending the mountain road leading by way of Sospel to the
Tende pass. The order warned: "Watch out<197>terrorists are
everywhere. . . . Do not go singly, only
armed and in groups. . . . Skirt the
terrorist infested city of Nice."<M^>15<D>
The liberation of Nice, the largest city on
the French Riviera, provoked for the French not only joyous celebrations, but
also the beginning of intense political infighting. Whether the new administration would be Gaullist
or Communist provided heady grist for the mill of a local power struggle. If Nice had been the same as other liberated
cities, then, as the Germans withdrew, Frederick's airborne troops would have
made a token parade through the city and then passed rapidly ahead in pursuit,
even as Truscott and de Lattre would by-pass Lyon. Happily or unhappily, as the case may be, the
Americans became more immersed in Nice than they anticipated.
The protracted mountain stalemate, which kept
the First Airborne Task Force in the area until mid-November, meant that Nice,
within 25 miles of the front lines, of necessity became Frederick's
headquarters and the nearest center for rest and recreation. The attractiveness of this celebrated resort,
which even in wartime gushed with enough wine to inspire the term "Champagne
campaign," stood in marked contrast with the deadly Alpine conflict so
close at hand.
Like all departments, the Alpes-Martimes (of
which Nice was the prefectural seat) had produced a Departmental Committee of
Liberation (CDL). However, well before
the August 15 landings, a split between those who looked for a people's
insurrection led by FTP units and those who wished to cooperate with the FFI
and Gaullist appointees had developed.
As Frederick's Airborne Task Force approached Nice, the department had
become divided: pro-Communist political
leaders and the FTP dominating Nice, the administrative center; and in the
mountains, the FFI structure of Sorensen, Lßéßcuyer, and the latter's deputy,
Pierre Gautier (MALHERBE), maintaining control.
It took some time before Nice settled down to
something resembling normalcy. On August
27, with the Americans still on the Var's western bank, the CDL called for
insurrection. Fortunately (as the Allies
knew from Fretter-Pico's captured "Order of the Day"), the Germans
were withdrawing. The Nazi departure
kept bloodshed at a minimum, and the uprising prevented the Germans from
destroying important hotels and other facilities. On the next day, as Maquis and paratroopers
paraded in the streets, hysterical Gallic joy poured forth in ecstatic
exuberance. Some rioting and vandalism
continued for several days.<M^>16<D>
Sufficient order had been established in Nice
by September 5 for General Frederick to move his headquarters from Grasse to
the resort city. While the Leftist CDL
professed no great affection either for the Americans or for the ORA domination
of Maquis units fighting in the Alps, the city administration cooperated to the
degree necessary to continue the fight against the Germans.
THE
STRUGGLE ON THE FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
General Frederick, at the beginning of
September, now witnessed a third evolution of his troops from, first, a
contingent of paratroopers with the mission of seizing a limited strategic
objective, second, an infantry division in pursuit, and now a group of mountain
fighters holding a line (memories of World War I), with continual patrols and
limited offensives. The "line"
concentrated on three passages into Italy:
along the coast, beyond Monaco as far as Menton, the Tende pass 30 miles
north, and finally, northwest, the Larche pass.
Between Tende and Larche, along the Italian border, stretch miles and
miles of snow-capped roadless Alpine peaks.
By September 6, the disposition of the Task
Force covered a front, which would be held for months to come: Based on Menton on the Mediterranean,
Frederick's troops controlled l'Escarßčßne, Luceram, Peira Cava, and ultimately
Turini. The brunt of fighting developed
in the 517th Combat Team area, with efforts to break through German defenses on
the road to Sospel.
Alongside the G.I.s, units of the FFI
continued to fight. Noteworthy among
those was the Hochcorn group, which had chased the German garrison out of
St.-Martin de Vßéßsubie a week before the Allies reached Nice. The group worked especially with the Special
Service Force and is recognized in the Force's history:<M^>17<D>
Shortly after crossing the Var, Lieutenant
Colonel Becket received a visit from Major Hochscorn who came to offer the
services of his battalion. Hochscorn
Battalion was put to work on several reconnaissance missions, the first near
l'Escarene and later with Second Regiment on patrols in strength around Mt.
Agel [west of Roquebrune]. Veterans of
two and three years clandestine resistance against Germans, the Hochscorns
performed courageously and well while under Force command. Their main limitations were lack of unified
training, lack of uniform ordinance, and lacks in warm clothing and proper
supply in the mountains. Both discipline
and command were good. The lieutenants
were mostly graduates of St. Cyr, and most of the officers and NCO's had gone
through the invasion of France with regular regiments.
Appreciating the needs of the FFI, Havard
Gunn continued to act as liaison between Lßéßcuyer and the Allied Command. Early in September, he went to Brignoles,
where 4-SFU had established its CP, and consulted with Colonel Head about
reorganization in the Alpine area<197>from the coast to
Larche<197>where the ABTF had responsibility. Although the arrangement arrived at did not
change the situation already in existence, 4-SFU established an
"Interallied Mission" in which the two British officers, Gunn and
Halsey, would continue "operational" liaison, and the American,
Geoffrey Jones, would concentrate on intelligence (which he was already doing
in cooperation with Frederick's G-2).
Major Gunn developed a staff that included
Capt. Yves Hautißčßre (VESTIAIRE, who had been dropped with Major Fielding),
Lieutenant Etienne, and others. Halsey
was technically part of Gunn's group, but he remained at Barcelonnette in a
liaison capacity with the FFI and with the Americans after Colonel Sach's 550th
arrived. The Gunn group did its best to
provide arms and material to the FFI fighting with the ABTF, remaining in
operation until October 10.<M^>18<D>
Capt. Geoffrey Jones continued to work in
coordination with the Airborne Task Force's G-2. He had in fact made his services
invaluable. General Frederick, while at
first somewhat indifferent, was impressed by Jones providing the German
operation order, and also by the expeditious way in which he later obtained
information about the port at Nice. As
Jones recalled:
Frederick never really accepted us until after
the German defense plans were authenticated.
Of course, I never asked him if he was pleased with us because he was a
formidable gentleman, but the very fact that he began to use us for something
besides translating and running errands showed that he felt that we were a tool
he could rely upon.
From modest beginnings at Valescure, where he
first became associated with Pierre Escot, Jones built up a considerable
organization for providing intelligence to Frederick and to Colonel Blythe's
G-2. Again in Jones' words:
We were able to build up a multinational
group of over 120 volunteer men and women from local indigenous and refugee
resistants<197>who served as translators to cooks and couriers to
counterintelligence and coup-de-main agents<197>complete with its own
network of clandestine radios (built from local materials) and behind the line
infiltration systems by sea and mountain pass.
We also had our own ski patrols (with uniforms homemade from sheets) and
a small fleet of sail and motor boats which supplied from tactical targets for
naval guns to guerilla groups for sabotage actions. And from our first typed notes of August
19th, we eventually provided General Frederick and/or his G-2 with over 500
properly processed (i.e., translated, evaluated, etc.) reports of all types of
special operations and intelligence from French, Italian, Polish, Russian and
even refugee German informants . . . we were able to recruit/direct in support
of the FABTF.
By mid-September, Jones was setting up chains
out of his headquarters at the Manoir Belgrano in Nice to obtain information
about enemy positions and intentions in Italy.
He also developed special missions, such as JARGNAC into the Po Valley,
TALBOT into Monaco, and HENRI to Sospel, and he remained in touch with John
Halsey at the Larche pass and with the Hamilton mission farther north. Another group, mission MICHEL, provided
intelligence and guides for the 517th's 3rd Battalion under Lt. Col. Melvin
Zais. The work done was complex, in
Jones' words, "a classic example of how an SO operation can be equally
effective in the SI field during its operations."<M^>19<D>
After September 15, when General Devers, as
commanding general, Sixth Army Group, began liquidating OSS operations in
southeastern France, Frederick requested that Jones<197>but not
Stuyvesant<197>be exempted from the recall and transferred to the First
Airborne Task Force, as head of the Strategic Services Subsection. "The organization which he has
developed," read the request,
is a
coordinated, energetic, dependable group of French and Italian people, many of
them working without remuneration for the Allied cause. This headquarters desires to retain this
organization and the benefits of its activities. The organization depends entirely upon the
energetic leadership of Captain Jones, and it is believed that it will dissolve
without his continued presence.
The request was approved, and
Jones continued his work on the Italian border, even after the Airborne was
relieved, until March 1945.<M^>20<D>
The month of September 1944, which witnessed the final activities of
SPOC and 4-SFU, brought about inevitable changes among the Resistance
fighters. With Paris liberated and with
the provisional government installed, de Gaulle wasted no time in either
liquidating the FFI or bringing them under regular army command. In theory, the FFI ceased to exist after
August 27 (before either Lyon or Nice had been liberated), and the Resistance
regions, such as R-1 and R-2, became once more traditional military
districts. By the middle of September,
the government had decided that <MI>maquisards<D> who wished to
continue fighting should be reassigned, after formal agreement to enlist until
the end of the war, to regular army units.
It goes without saying that confusion was rampant as old organizations
persevered alongside the framework of new ones, and in places the Maquis simply
disregarded orders, fighting in the mountains under their old chiefs. Although all Resistance fighters, AS,
<MI>Corps Francs<D>, FTP, and ORA, came under the government's
decrees, clearly the more manageable units, as far as amalgamation was
concerned, were those already under regular army officers and, in particular,
the ORA.
In eastern R-2, for which Commandant Sorensen
held responsibility as representative of Colonel
Constans (chief, FFI, R-2, under General Zeller, chief FFI Southeast) and
General Cochet (Military Delegate, Operations South), the various FFI units
were amalgamated into seven battalions to form a "Southern Alpine
Group" (<MI>Groupement Alpin Sud<D>), attached to de Lattre's
French First Army. Assigned to the
command was a rigid regular officer, Colonel Lanusse. Commandant Lßéßcuyer served as Lanusse's
deputy, and Lieutenant Gautier took charge of several of the newly organized
battalions fighting in the Alps with the FABTF.
The combat elements remained essentially the same, but their
designations changed. Later, the Alpine
Group South was absorbed into the 3rd RIA [Alpine Infantry Regiment], under the
command of Colonel Lelaquet, former FFI chief in the Var Department. Gradually, French divisions took over the
combat in the Alps, but Americans, first the FABTF, then elements of the 19th
Armored Division, kept fighting along that "forgotten front" until
March of 1945, when the units facing Italy all became
French.<M^>21<D>
Chapter 15 TOULON and MARSEILLE
While O’Daniel’s 3rd Division
prsued the Germans north beyond Avignon, de Lattre’s Army B was organing
for attacks against Toulon and Marseille.
The latter had special significance for the Resistance as headquarters
of R-2, and potential seat of the regional Commissaire de la
République.
In the area was an SOE circuit, GARDENER,
heaed by Major Robert Boiteux (FIRMIN), and Cammaerts had some contacts in the
area. SPOC also supported a French DGSS
anti-sabotge project of trying to save the ports of Toulon, Marseille, and Sčte
from being destroyed by the departing Germans.
The plan originated in the French navy or, more precisely, in the
Aeronavale, which assigned the teams and placed the operation under the command
of Capitaine de Corvette L. P. A. Allain (LOUGRE). According to the official
report:
"Aprčs avoir reçu l'instruction de parachutiste, de commando, et de
sécurité au Club des Pins, le groupe d'officiers et d'officiers-mariniers a
étudié ŕ fond les méthodes de sabotage employés par les allemands dans les
divers ports méditerranéens liberés et plus particuličrement dans celui de
Naples. . . . Les équipes sont
réparties de la façon suivante:
Région de TOULON 1čre équipe -
L.V. de la Ménardičre (SAMPAN)
Région de MARSEILLE 2čme équipe -
I. M. P Parayre (CAIQUE)
Région de SETE 3čme équipe - I.
M. P Kervarec (SCHOONER)
Les ordres de mission sont établis en accord
avec le BCRA, les représentants anglais et américains du SPOC, et le
représentant délégué par la Marine, Capitaine de Frégate Trautman.
The first group, SAMPAN, parachuted into France in the middle of June
1944. It consisted of Lieutenants de la
Ménardičre (SAMPAN), Midoux, and Sanguinetti, with a radio operator, all of
whom soon made contact with FFI regional ORA head Jacques Lécuyer, with the
Toulon FFI chief, Salvatori (SAVARY), and with sympathetic French naval
officers stationed in the port. Allain
remained in Algiers, where he and another member of the Toulon team, Enseigne
de Vaisseau Jean Ayral, stood by, not certain whether they could get to
mainland France prior to D Day. (Ayral était l'ancien délégué de Jean Moulin en
zone occupée.)
SAMPAN collected a considerable amount of information but, while the
team could transmit messages by radio, it had no way of sending maps and
photographs, which would be of tremendous value when the Allies attacked
Toulon. With a quantity of these
materials, Midoux made his way in early August to ARCHIDUC's CP in the
Vaucluse, 160 km north of Toulon, where he took the next flight out; but when
he reached Algiers he learned that the invasion was under way, and that Allain
had already been dropped in France. (Allain in fact had been dropped near
Draguignan in a mission related to the Airborne attack, and did not reach
Toulon until 23 August. His adventures are related elsewhere in this
narrative.)
Leaving Allain with the Airborne Paratroopers, we must comment briefly
on team GEDEON, which included Enseigne de Vaisseau Ayral, Sub-Lt. Horace Moore
of the British navy, a radio operator and three French quartermasters. They landed north of Toulon on August 12 and, in the next few days,
allied themselves with Maquis groups in the area of Signes (not yet known as a
German execution spot) as well as with Ménardičre and his SAMPAN team.
After the port's liberation, Seventh Army engineers, working with French
personnel, were able to get the base in operating condition by September 20.
Meanwhile, on July 18, the mission (CAIQUE) destined for Marseille,
headed by an engineer, Parayre, was dropped about 100 km north of the port and
soon learned about the arrests that the Gestapo had made. The team managed its clandestine movements
with great care, and by the time of D-Day, had made contacts with ARCHIDUC for further drops, with the Toulon team, and
with sympathetic French naval officers within the Marseille port.
Unfortunately, Parayre did not receive his
action messages on time, and after the landings, the Germans increased their
security arrangements. Realizing that
the Germans, if defeated, would try to sink vessels in the channel entrances,
Parayre hoped to scuttle ships that might be available for this purpose. Needing an armed group to protect his
engineers, he met Major Boiteux on the 19th and obtained from the SOE agent
fifty kilograms of explosives, but by the time he was able to muster the
necessary people, he learned that the Marseille Resistance was planning an
insurrection. If this took place, the
Germans would certainly impose such security measures that the antisabotage
plans would be useless.
It may be well at this point to review what
had been happening along the coast.
General de Lattre, restless because the American divisions had landed
before his, wanted to get his forces into action. Four days after the landings, both de Lattre
and Patch agreed that the French should move all out against Toulon and
Marseille, while the American 3rd Division would proceed in the same direction
just to the north.<M^>4<D>
When he received Patch's order, de Lattre had
available to him General Brosset's 1st Free French Division, General Magnan's
9th Colonial Infantry Division, and General de Monsabert's 3rd Algerian
Infantry, all of which began an encircling movement against the French naval base
at Toulon. Before he began his attack,
de Lattre had received Sanguinetti, of the SAMPAN team, who had come through
the German lines. De Lattre recalled the
young officer as "something thin and feverish looking like a Corsican
bandit," who told him about the German dispositions. The report impelled de Lattre to waste no
time and to strike before German Admiral Ruhfus had deployed the 242nd Divison
to points of maximum effectiveness.<M^>5<D>
De Lattre analyzed the Toulon operation as
consisting of three phases: the
<MI>investment<D> (August 21<196>22), in which Monsabert
covered the north while General de Larminat coordinated actions of Monsabert
and Magnan; second, the <MI>dismantling<D> (August
22<196>23), during which the French regular forces broke through the
outer belt; and third, the <MI>final reduction<D> of the inner
defenses, primarily the work of the 9th Colonial Infantry, ending with Admiral
Ruhfus's surrender on the 27th.<M^>6<D> It was during the "investment" that
groups of the Resistance and members of the SAMPAN and GEDEON teams met the
first <MI>Bataillon de Choc<D> troops as they filtered into the
city. Unfortunately, when he was
carrying out a liaison mission to General de Linarßčßs, Ensign Ayral, not
properly identified, was killed in error by French soldiers. The remaining members of the team fought side
by side with the FFI and with the regulars during the street fighting that
followed. This effort, combined with
artillery and bombardment from sea and air, brought the great naval base into
allied hands.
While the fighting at Toulon continued, de
Lattre fixed his attention on his next objective, Marseille, which with its
outlying forts and suburbs, stretches along fifteen miles of coastline. He did not have to concern himself immediately
with Sßčßte, 100 miles west of Marseille, where the third antiscorch team,
SCHOONER, had gone, because the Germans abandoned Sßčßte on the
20th.<M^>7
General de Lattre did not wish to attack
Marseille prematurely, wanting assurance that Toulon posed no threat to his
flank and guarantees that sufficient fuel would be available. However, events caught up with him as a
workers' strike and popular insurrection demanded the presence of the regular
army.
Within Marseille, in spite of its population
of almost a million, the Resistance was so divided, so disorganized, and so
poorly armed that scarcely 500 FFI could provide a "fifth column" to
hamper German defenses. Part of the
disorganization had followed the arrest, in July, of Burdet, the regional
military delegate, and Rossi, the regional FFI chief. The local Resistance,
dominated by Communists and fellow-travelers, did not recognize either Widmer
or Constans as replacements, with the consequence that the city had two rival
FFI chiefs, Commandant Pierre Lamaison (VAUBAN), supported by COMAC and the Departmental Liberation
Committee, and Jean Comte (LEVIS), head of the Bouche-du-Rhßôßne
<MI>Groupes Francs<D>, who had contacts that might have enabled him
to get more arms and explosives than the FTP.
The rivalry produced a fundamental strategic difference, whether to
foment a city-wide insurrection or, in line with a long-standing SOE policy, to
concentrate on guerrilla attacks especially in the countryside. The insurrection, which would be dominated by
leftist and FTP elements, could mean popular support, after liberation, of a
local Communist government. Whether it would save German demolitions, as it did
in Cannes and Nice, would depend on how rapidly the Germans evacuated the city. In the cases of Toulon and Marseille, where
Hitler had ordered the garrisons to hold on to the last bullet, an insurrection
would only increase security measures and reprisals. Nevertheless, it was Lamaison (VAUBAN) who
was generally recognized. Comte sought
out Constans, whom he found at Dieulefit, too late for an effective
intervention.<M^>8<D>
Parayre, of the Marseille antiscorch team
CAIQUE, had learned that the German engineers responsible for destroying the
port facilities were berthed in Hangar Three.
He arranged for an attack only to find the engineers had been moved to
more secure facilities. Meanwhile, in
Parayre's words,
I received a visit from VAUBAN, chief FFI
Marseilles. . . .áI asked him to hold off the insurrection planned for the
night Sunday/Monday [20-21 Aug.] to avoid increased German security measures. .
. .áHe agreed and asked me to wire General Cochet. However, access to the port . . . became
practically impossible by the 21st. On
the 22nd the insurrection began.
Although Parayre possessed plans of German
defenses in the port, he considered an FFI attack certain to fail; it would be
better to wait for the regulars, especially since General de Monsabert's troops were already in the outskirts.
With the insurrection in progress and the FFI
calling for help, Monsabert could scarcely hold back. Taking advantage of "an
opportunity," Colonel Chappuis, commander of the 7th Regiment of
<MI>Tirailleurs Algßéßriens<D>, moved into the city on the 23rd,
beginning an occupation that took another five days to complete. great havoc<197>there was "an
indescribable chaos of twisted ironwork, shattered concrete, and entangled
cables." Without the efforts of the
CAIQUE team, however, the damage would have been worse. By pouring cement into the primer ducts
leading to preset charges, Parayre had thwarted the demolition of several
quays. His people also prevented
complete destruction of facilities at Port du Bouc, which, because it served as
a pipeline terminal, was of crucial importance for Seventh Army
operations. There, three tankers were
sunk in such a way that they could be refloated.
The Germans had sunk over 75 ships in the
channels, mined the basins, and sabotaged 257 cranes, but Marseille was so
important to the Allies that an all-out effort began at once to make the harbor
usable, to make the basins safe, and to get pipelines in operation. Engineers found that, in some cases, Liberty
ships could pass around the sunken vessels; by September 30 they declared one
basin to be free of mines and serviceable.
Within three weeks of liberation, a Liberty ship was unloading directly
alongside a Marseille quay.<M^>10<D>
For the French, the liberation of Marseille
brought forth an enormous emotional outpouring. Although Paris had been freed
at the same time, Marseille had fallen in consequence of an entirely French
attack, the second city (after Toulon) in France to recover its independence in
this manner. Although already planning
maneuvers far to the north, de Lattre returned on the 29th to participate in a
victory parade that included de Gaulle's ministers for war and interior. There they listened to the
<MI>Marseillaise<D> in the
city that had given the national anthem its name, and they watched
the
unforgettable and poignant procession of all the makers of this second
victory<197>the <MI>tirailleurs<D>, the Moroccan Tabors,
troopers, zouaves, and gunners<197>followed by the motley, fevered,
bewildering mass of the FFI, between the two lines of a numberless crowd,
frenzied, shouting with joy and enthusiasm, whom the guardians of order could
not hold back.<M^>11<D>
Chapter 16 Across the Rhône--The Ardčche
Although a super highway, constructed since the war, now carries
north–south traffic along the Rhône River at incredible speeds, in 1944
the two lanes of the principal highway, N 7, were strained to capacity during
the retreat of General Wiese's XIX Army.
Day and night the German convoys streamed northward, two and even three
abreast when one–way traffic would permit. For the Germans, N 7 held an enormous
strategic significance because their best divisions, the 198th, the 338th, and
the powerful XI Panzer, had all been deployed east of the Rhône to confront the
attacking Allies.
On the western side of the river ran another road,
N 86,
which would serve many of those German forces, some largely administrative,
which had been stationed farther south and along the Pyrenees. Germans obliged to escape by this winding
route would find N 86 and its feeder roads unpleasantly hazardous to traverse
due to the aggressive hostility of Maquis encamped in the mountainous Ardčche
and Loire Departments. For a hundred
miles along the Rhône from Pont St.–Esprit to Serričres, N 86 is never
far from the wooded hills in which lurked bands of 50 to 100 guerrillas whose
constant ambushes and sabotage had made the Ardčche so inhospitable to German
garrisons.
Recognizing the strategic importance of the Rhône Valley, SPOC had
given the Drôme and the Ardčche Departments (which straddle the river) a high
priority for supplies and missions. In
the weeks before the ANVIL landings, however, SPOC had not been able to send as
much support as the original planning called for. Granted the strategic importance of the
Ardčche, SPOC had to give more attention, during the first week after the
landings, to the action zones well east of the Rhône.
What Allied representation existed in the Ardčche had been there for
some time––before the Normandy landings. The PECTORAL mission, headed by Major Chassé
and Commandant Vaucheret, had grown by the beginning of August to about twenty
persons. Also operating in the area were
OG's LOUISE and BETSY, as well as Jedburgh WILLYS. Nevertheless, although SPOC sent virtually no
persons to the Ardčche in July and early August, it kept the missions well
supplied with explosives and weapons.
The abundance of materiel coming into drop–zone TANDEM, near
Devesset, produced in fact some altercations between the GI's and Commandant
Vaucheret, who considered the distribution of arms to fall within his
responsibilities. It should be
emphasized that OG's operated quite differently from inter–allied
missions and Jedburghs, whose members were all officers well indoctrinated in
the political as well asmilitary features of the campaign. The OG's on the other hand were commandos,
trained to fight with bazookas, machine guns, and light cannon, led generally
by lieutenants. As military units they
were subordinate to the FFI area command.
There was no question, therefore, but that Lieutenants McKensie and
Rickerson of LOUISE, and Lieutenants Boutreau and Barner of BETSY, took orders
from Vaucheret and from the Ardčche FFI Chief, Commandant Calloud. It is also understandable that, from the
point of view of the OG officers, they would assume that equipment dropped at
Devesset belonged to them, with any surplus going to the Maquis. The French themselves were far from clear as
to distinctions in authority between the "delegate," who generally
came in from the outside, and the "FFI Chief," generally a local
leader. There was also confusion between
the powers of the delegate as contrasted with those belonging to the leader of
an inter–allied mission.1
Major Cox, who had command of the OG's dispatched from Algiers, later
stated that "French officers sent in on missions tended very quickly to
lose their identity as Allied leaders and become French political chiefs
instead. The employment of only American
and British personnel in the coordination of the Maquis efforts in support of
the Allied Armies could have prevented a great deal of political
difficulties."2 It may be observed
in passing that to theeast such a situation had existed in the person of
Francis Cammaerts, but had been obliterated when Cammaerts was summarily
dismissed by General Butler and not reinstated by General Patch. The uncertainty of command relations simply
emphasizes the fact that no one at the top Seventh Army planning level, in
spite of the existence of SPOC and 4–SFU, had given serious and adequate
attention to the complex problem of coordination with the FFI.
Allied Strategy
There were no regular American troops west of the Rhône. The basic plans called for Truscott to remain
on the eastern bank at least until Lyon was reached. Patch altered the overall troop disposition
on August 25 when he agreed that de Lattre, once the French controlled Toulon
and Marseille, could cross the Rhône and "reconnoiter in force"
northward along the west bank.3 Now
grasping an opportunity he could exploit, de Lattre quickly decided to dispatch
a task force, under the general command of Major General du Touzet du Vigier,
which would rush elements of the First Armored Division across the Rhône as
fast as possible.
De Lattre knew that he had to complete the occupation of Toulon and
Marseille, and he champed restlessly at thebit when fate kept him from
rivalling Truscott's northward advance against the main German forces. Unfortunately de Lattre, who was completely
dependent on the U. S. Seventh Army for supplies, could not take the chance of
committing all his forces unless he knew he could make certain the gasoline and
ammunition would be forthcoming. He had
very few trucks at his disposal and, until port facilities at Marseille began
functioning, could not count on an improvement in logistic support. De Lattre was hampered further by the lack of
bridges across the Rhône. He could use
temporary bridges to transport personnel and light equipment, but his tanks and
howitzers had to wait for days before an adequate bridge became available. He continually badgered Patch and Devers for
a more meaningful share in the campaign.4
It was not until 28 August, while the rearguard battle of the German
XIX army at Livron was being fought, that Toulon and Marseille finally
surrendered, releasing French troops for further assignment. General Patch accompanied de Lattre in a tour
of Toulon and later that day issued orders which outlined the next phase of the
campaign.
The new instructions, Field Order No. 4, regarding which de Lattre had
not been consulted, assigned Army B responsibility for the Alpine flank, not
only as far as Switzerland but beyond, to Bourg and Besançon. It alsoapproved the French moving across the
Rhône, cleaning up areas to the southwest as far as the Pyrenees, and
instructed them to advance "thereafter rapidly North along the West bank
of the Rhône and assist in the capture of Lyon." The order called upon Truscott's VI Corps to
capture Lyon and advance toward Beaune and Dijon.5 Thus de Lattre's Army B would be split into
two parts, but after Lyon was taken, one part (II Corps) would range to the
east, with Truscott on its left flank.
At this time of course Patch did not know whether General Wiese would
elect to hold Lyon, which could entail a major siege, or simply pass through to
a defense line farther north. Patch had
good reason to believe the latter, as an ULTRA message received on 24 August
had affirmed that the German defense line would lie along the Seine and the
Bourgogne canal, with XIX Army passing northwest of Dijon.6
De Lattre seized the opportunity, the following day, to obtain a
clarification of Patch's orders when he met General Patch, General Devers (who
would later assume overall command when the 6th Army Group was formed), and
Supreme Mediterranean Commander, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. At the conference if was made clear that the
French would not simply "assist" in the capture of Lyon, but would
have responsibility for the encirclement of the city on the west and northwest. As Lyon is split in half by the Rhône,
thisclarification provided some assurance that at least part of the city would
lie within a French sphere. (As it
turned out, the Americans elected to bypass Lyon, leaving the entire control to
the French.) De Lattre also used his
considerable persuasive capabilities to avoid responsibility for the Italian
frontier south of the Larche pass––in his words, "the most
thankless and paralyzing of tasks."7
Accordingly this area remained with General Frederick's Airborne Task
Force, whose actions there have been already recounted.
Operational Groups in the Ardčche
With the rapid advance of the Seventh Army, there had to be concern
within SPOC, back in Algiers, as to its best policy. The two teams in the field, 4–SFU and
SSS, while coordinating the moves of various agents, would shortly reach the
northern limit of their responsibilities.
General Cochet, theoretically in charge of SPOC's contacts with the FFI,
had come ashore on August 21, along with Colonel Bartlett, head of 4–SFU. Yet there were still Jedburghs and
Operational Groups in Algiers, in training there long before the landings,
eager to see action before the front line receded beyond aircraft range.
The Americans in OSS were particularly anxious for the OG's, specially
trained volunteer OSS paratroops, to be tested. Colonel Russell Livermore, in charge of OG
forces in the Mediterranean, from his command post in Corsica, urged Major
Alfred Cox, the OG officer in SPOC, to get his men to the mainland. Uncommitted on the ANVIL/DRAGOON D–Day,
four OG teams, two Italian–speaking and two French–speaking, waited
their turn. Cox had tried to send in one
of the Italian groups, HELEN, led by Captain Leslie Vanoncini, to the Larche
area on August 11, and he had personally seen the men take off; but, prevented
by overcast from making the jump, the team returned to base. There they waited. As Vanoncini put it: "Day after day operations alerts would
come up, only to be scrubbed later on in the day."8
After D–Day, in the dark moon period, few teams left Algiers for
France. Only the Ardčche Department,
with its convoluted forested hills ideal for guerrilla warfare, and the Drôme,
offered suitable targets. It was
therefore to these two departments, lying adjacent to each other on opposite
sides of the Rhône, that SPOC concentrated its efforts. At DRAGOON D–Day there were only two
OG's, LOUISE and BETSY, in the Ardčche.
From one point of view an emphasis on the Ardčche did not make sense
because the FFI had already taken over mostof the towns when the German regular
garrisons began to depart early in August.
There were only isolated enemy groups still in the department, and most
of these, with high concentrations of Russian and Polish
troops––"Mongols" the French called
them––were willing to surrender, indeed even to join the Resistance. But with Hitler's retreat order of August 17,
German contingents from the south began moving in north–bound
convoys. Most of these had either
crossed the Rhône to march up N 7 or had avoided the mountainous Ardčche by
travelling via Clermont toward Dijon and Besançon.9 There still existed the possibility, however,
that major forces would be using the west–bank highway N 86, and this
possibility became reality when on August 20 a new threat developed from the
south.
Just as it appeared that most German garrisons had left, the Ardčche
Department became the focus of heavy combat.
Lieutenant McKensie, in charge of LOUISE and then at
already–liberated Privas, learned on August 22 that a German column had
been reported about 35 miles to the south.
Furthermore some elements of the German Nineteenth Army had crossed the
Rhône at Montélimar and were pursuing their flight north in small groups along
the west bank. The FFI chief, Commandant
Calloud, alerted several AS groups, among them Lieutenant Charles Escudier's
51st and 52nd companies, which he ordered to set up a road block at Baix,
aboutmidway between Montélimar and Loriol, but on the opposite bank. For several days they tried to stop the
Germans but, exhausted and famished, the maquisards had to break off and
fall back.10
The column reported to McKensie included forward elements of an entire
German corps, the IV Luftwaffenfeldkorps, commanded by General Petersen,
which had been stationed between Narbonne and Carcassonne, 100 miles from the
Spanish border. The corps, which
included paratroopers, airport defensive units, and trainees, consisted of
about 20,000 men, streaming north by two routes, one along the Rhône and the
other inland, toward the Ardčche by way of Montpellier, Alčs, Aubenas. The convoy extended for some 30 to 40 miles,
its rearguard crossing the Gard River, west of Avignon, while its advance units
probed the roads around Les Vans. As
some elements pushed through the area which Jed PACKARD surveyed, between Uzčs
and Alčs, Captain Aaron Bank tried to persuade de Lattre's staff to send a
regular army force against them. But the
French, short of gasoline and with only a few troops across the Rhône, were not
yet in a position to take up the pursuit.
Almost 100 miles north, forward German elements reach St. Peray, across
the Rhône from Valence, on August 25, the day after Colonel Adams and
Commandant de Lassus had made their premature attempt to seize Valence.11
Approximately halfway between the forward and rearguard units of Petersen's
Corps, the FFI had spotted several German convoy groups apparently headed for
Aubenas, about ten miles beyond which lay Vaucheret's headquarters at
Vals. Captain Georges Picard
(code–named GEORGES), the FFI chief in whose sector the threat was
developing, called upon Lieutenant Escudier, whose maquisards had just
fallen back on Privas, to move over to Vals, and upon Lieutenant McKensie to
block the fork about twenty miles farther south, where the Germans might choose
Route N104 to Aubenas or N579 to Villeneuve–de–Berg.
Other German troops, some of them disbanded garrison forces, were
coming in from the west toward Les Vans, where they joined up with columns
making their way north, producing perhaps another 15,000 men in addition to
Petersen's Luftwaffe Corps.
Commandant Calloud alerted many companies, AS and FTP, and they kept
harassing the straggling Germans as best they could. Even though the Germans were not
front–line combattants, they nevertheless possessed enough mortars and
field guns to prevent the maquisards from completely blocking their
path.12
McKensie set up his headquarters ten miles south of Aubenas and posted
two sections of his LOUISE paratroopers, under Lieutenant Rickerson, a few
miles farther south, eachwith one of two 37–mm. guns. There was only a little action during
daylight but throughout the night of 24 August a blacked–out German
convoy took two hours to pass by. In the
morning the FFI reported that there were 1500 Germans at Vallon, just northwest
of the spectacular Ardčche River gorges.
McKensie ordered the 37–mm. guns mounted above Vallon, commanding
the town and its approaches. He was
startled at the enemy numbers:
"Instead of the reported 1500 Germans at Vallon, there were
10,000." Nor were they ready to
surrender.
The Resistance forces around Vallon consisted mostly of FTP units under
Captain Ollier de Marichard, but they lacked the fire power to make a
significant impression on the enemy columns.
The 37–mm. guns of LOUISE provided the only real threat available
to the Ardčche Maquis.
The Operational Group knocked out three trucks, some half–tracks
and guns, and killed possibly 200 German troops. But the enemy countered the fire, flanked the
position, and after a day–long fight forced McKensie, Rickerson, and
their men, together with those FFI who stuck with them, to withdraw. The Germans captured the two 37–mm.
guns. Escudier meanwhile had gone to Vals
but, learning the Germans had taken a more easterly route, withdrew toward
Privas. He skirmished with Germans
southwest of Privas and took 80 prisoners.13
On this same day, August 25, Major Alfred Cox, the OG officer at SPOC,
parachuted into Devesset with a seven–man French–speaking Group,
LEHIGH, headed by Captains Morin and Hamblet.14
Realizing that there had been some friction between McKensie and
Vaucheret, Cox hoped to resolve the problem as well as develop better
coordination of guerilla activity.
Vaucheret had come to Devesset, where he and Cox (who incidentally
equalled him in rank) came to an understanding.
Out of the discussion Cox learned something of the French
attitudes. Vaucheret told him that the
department, with 5,000 armed men, was essentially liberated except for the
escape route by way of Privas and Route N86 along the Rhône. Cox and Vaucheret then drove to Vals, now FFI
headquarters, where he met other members of the PECTORAL team, as well as
Captain Montague (of Jedbergh team WILLYS) and Major Carl Nurk, a British
officer of Russian ancestry,15 sent in by SPOC to subvert the Poles, Cossacks,
Ukrainians––the "Mongols"––who made up a
fraction of the German army of occupation.
Later Cox met with McKensie and his men who had to withdraw to a
position south of Aubenas. He learned
quickly about the recent operations and returned to Vals prepared to
restructure his command by assigning OG's to specific sectors and by
establishing a central reserve. He knew
that two or possibly three more OG's would soon be coming in. He could not tell, however, how long
theGermans would continue to move through the Ardčche, or when units of the
regular French army would arrive.
Cox would soon find out about Germans.
He and his team, learning from the FFI that "a huge German
column" (the head of Petersen's IV Luftwaffenkorps) was headed for
Tournon, on the Rhône's west bank, drove at once to a hilltop observation
point. In Cox's words:
Unfortunately we did not know that the column
had left the Rhône to by–pass a blown bridge, and was headed west on the
same road on which we were proceeding.
We had good distance, about 40 or 50 yards between men, with two men on
each side of the road. I had reached a
point approximately 125 yards from a tunnel carrying an aqueduct over the road
when the advance guard of the column––two open cars and a double
line of foot troops––pushed through the tunnel. They deployed and opened fire immediately and
machine guns opened up at almost the same moment from flank patrols, about 150
out in each flank . . . .
The fire was intense and too damned close for comfort, with mortar shells beginning to drop fairly
close . . . We dropped into a ditch, lying in water up to our chests, and
covered ourselves with brushwood. The
fire continued for quite some time and several flank patrols passed near us,
but did not discover us. The German
advance guard was fighting very intelligently . . . . Their air protection, march discipline, and
camouflage were excellent. Time and time
again, Allied planes flew overhead and it was heartbreaking to see that they
had not spotted the column. The column
was moving by foot, bicycle, motorcycle, horse cart and motor car and was
setting a fast pace of march.
Cox and the men with him finally made their way to a French farmhouse
where the family, at the risk of their own lives, sheltered them until
morning. Then, disguised incivilian
clothes, they darted through a gap between the German convoys, took to the
cover of adjacent hills, and ultimately found their way back to Devesset. Major Cox had very rapidly learned about the
Maquis, the heroism of French civilians, the competence of the Germans, and
Ardčche terrain. Cox estimated the enemy
column, which took four days to pass through Tournan, as numbering 50,000. "Some of the equipment," he noted,
"indicated that in addition to an infantry division many of the service
units, Ordnance, Q. M., etc. from the south of France were included in the
column. There was no armor, a few
half–tracks and artillery, but in the main, foot troops and
bicyclists."16
Without heavy weapons neither the OG's nor the FFI could directly
confront the Germans, but they could observe and possibly take prisoners if
they could find isolated groups or garrisons––especially those with
a high proportion of disgruntled Slavs.
While Major Cox was observing the main German column passing through
Tournan, and while the men of OG LOUISE busied themselves assembling a third
recently dropped 37–mm. gun, the German column harassed at Vallon
continued to press on toward Privas.
Although weakened by lack of food and motorized transport, the column of
possibly 7,000 still possessed artillery and around 500 vehicles, many of them
horse–drawn. As they struggled
northward, they wereconstantly attacked by over fifteen AS and FTP companies
which Calloud had managed to deploy in the hills on either side of the German
escape route. On August 29 some maquisards
blew three bridges in the vicinity of Darbres, ten miles southwest of
Privas. In the ravine–studded
country, the lack of bridges caused a complete bottleneck for vehicles and
heavy guns, many of which had to be abandoned in riverbeds. The Germans scattered, some to the hills
where they were taken prisoner––over a thousand––by the
maquisards. The principal column,
numbering about 5,000, pressed on, seeking to bypass Privas to the south,
hoping to join the main convoys––such as Major Cox had
encountered––working their way along N 86.
By August 30, still hounded by the Maquis at their heels, this group
reached Chomerac. Ahead of them lay more
hazards, and having lost their heavy guns, they had no advantages over
Resistance forces armed only with small caliber weapons. Among the FFI groups east of Privas were
George Maleval's 6th and 7th AS Companies, together with some members of OG
LOUISE and one 37–mm. cannon. (The
newly–arrived gun, however, with parts damaged in the drop, did not fire
satisfactorily.)17
On this same day, LAFAYETTE, an Italian speaking OG commanded by Lt.
Odilon J. Fontaine and Lt. Leonard Rinaldi, had dropped into Devesset and had
been ordered by Major Coxto join LOUISE at the Maquis command post north of
Privas. Learning from the Maquis that
Germans had been reported a few miles east of Privas, Fontaine and Rickerson
(of LOUISE), with an FFI patrol under Captain Maleval (MARGUERITE), drove out
to investigate. They soon found a
prisoner held by some FFI, and through him finally made contact with a German
colonel who had five battalions scattered in the hills, including a
"Mongol" company which wanted desperately to join the Allies.
This group represented a majority of the worn–out Germans, who
were determined to make a last stand at Chomerac. The German colonel expressed willingness to
negotiate if he could obtain the approval of his battalion commanders, and if
he would have a guarantee he was surrendering to the American Army, equipped
with artillery, not the Maquis.18
At the moment the highest–ranking American officer in the area
was Major Cox, who had gone to Devesset for a rendezvous with the
newly–parachuted OG's. An urgent
phone call brought him quickly over the fifty miles of winding mountain roads
which separate Devesset from Chomerac.
The artillery was a different matter.
The Americans could come up with nothing more formidable the a 37–mm.
gun. However, word had come in that
advance units of the regular French Army had reached the Ardčche Department the
day before. Aresourceful French
engineer, Raphael Evaldre, jumped on his bicycle and pedalled fifteen miles
(downhill) to Le Teil, where he encountered advance units of Combat Command
Sudre.
When Major Cox arrived at Chomerac, he explained to the German colonel
that his forces were surrounded.
Finally, late in the afternoon, a French tank appeared and with a few
shots persuaded the weary German officer to surrender. The OG's and FFI rounded up groups of enemy
troops scattered among the hills, to a grand total of 3,824, including two
colonels, six majors and ten captains.
Unable to cope with such numbers, the OG's stood by while the FFI
rounded up the prisoners.
In most instances, the FFI abided by the Geneva Convention regarding
prisoners, even though the Germans, when they caught "terrorists,"
invariably executed them, sometimes after abominable torture. Unknown to the Americans, who had guaranteed
proper POW treatment, maquisards summarily executed some of the
Germans. Reports reached the Americans
that two colonels, a major, and 150 German prisoners had been killed. Lieutenant Escudier comments on this
incident:
“The prisoners were taken to Privas,
Vals–les–Bains, Aubenas,
Largentičre, and a number of other places.
A German colonel was executed in
the neighborhood of Privas, by Captain Maleval, known as
"Marguerite," responsible for the Privas sector, under the orders of
Commandant Calloud, FFI chief for Ardčche.
This colonel was responsible for the massacre at Nîmes––they
called him the "Butcher of Nîmes."
At Vals–les–Bains, 54 prisoners were executed by Commandant
André Bourdin (code names: Richard, Dina) . . . the total was 54 Germans
shot (150 is a fabrication). The
Interallied Commission [i.e. PECTORAL] was opposed to these
executions.” 19
The capture of over 3,000 Germans proved to be the final operation for
the two OG teams LOUISE and LAFAYETTE.
With the prisoners in FFI custody, members of these groups finished up
their duties, bade farewell to their FFI comrades–in–arms, and
reported to Grenoble for debriefing. The
remaining OG's prepared for the assault on Lyon.
Chapter 17
North of Grenoble
Pflaum
evac 231
Ortiz 233
Progression 233-35
Maurienne
Isere Dept
North to Lyon 235 move to
Bourgoin contact with Descour
Planning the Liberation of Lyon: the Resistance
The French held Lyon in a very special regard.. Lyon was not simply the third city of France
(after Paris and Marseille), nor simply the prefectural seat of the Rhône
Department, it represented for the south what Paris was to the north. It was in the south, before 1943, in the
Unoccupied Zone, that organized Resistance had begun. When the three southern Resistance groups, Combat, Libération and Franc–Tireur
had coalesced into the MUR––Mouvements Unis de la
Résistance––Lyon became the center for clandestine
action in the south. When late in 1942
the Germans swept into the previously unoccupied Vichy–dominated area,
Lyon provided them a center for administration:
it was here that the notorious Klaus Barbie concentrated his efforts to
destroy Jews and resistants; it was here that Jean Moulin, de Gaulle's choice
to unify all Resistance movements, had been arrested and tortured; it was at
Lyon where the stark Montluc prison, holding hundreds of political prisoners,
represented for all Frenchmen a horrible symbol of Nazi persecution and
cruelty.
The enthusiasm for liberating Lyon, manifested throughout the FFI ranks
outside, pulsated as well in the hearts of those residents within the city who
for two years had suffered under Nazi domination. The popular opposition
surfaced especially among workers, many of them Communists, whose ranks had
been thinned by forced labordeportations.
On the morning of August 24, even though the German garrison remained
intact, workers and FTP guerrillas in the Villeurbanne section began an
uprising. The action was premature: with thousands of German troops now streaming
through Lyon, General Wiese could scarcely brook a movement that might
jeopardize his use of the Rhône bridges.
The insurrection was quickly and ruthlessly put down.23
The uprising in Lyon brought into focus a fundamental issue: should an internal insurrection liberate a
city, or should the citizens wait for regular Allied troops. Communists and leftists, supported by FTP
guerrillas, saw the first alternative as a means of seizing political power
before the armies arrived, whereas de Gaulle, with the backing of the FFI and
de Lattre's army, exerted every effort to ensure order by means of authorities
whose loyalty to his provisional government could not be questioned.
So far as Lyon was concerned, the issue divided itself neatly into east
and west. Alban Vistel, recognized as
the regional (R–1) FFI chief, exercised authority over his subordinates
Henri Provisor, west of the Rhône, and Marcel Descour, on the east. Provisor,
whose forces were heavily FTP, advocated an insurrection within the city, while
Descour, a regular army officer, already in touch with VI Corps commanders,
preferred an attack from outside. There
is a certain irony that a high OSS involvement––theOG's under Major
Cox––should have been giving support to a command strongly
influenced by the Left.
Vistel found himself on the fence, but he could not help but be
impressed by the strength he observed building up in the east. As reports of Allied successes multiplied,
many Frenchmen, previously uncommitted, left their homes to join the constantly
swelling ranks. Vistel considered the
Villeurbanne insurrection thoughtless and premature, and while he harbored some
doubts about an outside FFI attack, he could not conceal his pride when he
counted the numbers, perhaps three or four thousand, bivouacked within fifty
miles of Lyon, increasing constantly as veterans and recruits poured in from
south, east and north .25
From the Vercors came those forces, Geyer's 11th Cuirassiers, Costa de
Beauregard's 6th Battalion of Chasseurs Alpins, as well as Colombe de
Lyautey's (LE BARBIER) Charteuse section, which had fought with Colonel
Davison's battalion around Romans and Bourg–le–Péage. When Huet went to Grenoble, operating
side–by–side with Colonel Meyer, he left the Vercors group command
to his deputy, Colonel René Bousquet (CHABERT) and himself became Descour's
deputy. The American, André Pecquet,
provided liaison between the French leaders and the
Americans––General Eagles of the 45th Division, Dahlquist of the
36th, and ultimately Truscott himself.26
Bousquet also absorbed Maquis groups from the entire region east of
Lyon as far as the Chartreuse mountains.
When Bourgoin fell he moved his command post there, not far from
Descour's headquarters at Les Abrets.
With over a thousand enthusiastic guerrillas, he was ready to attack
Lyon, even though an entire American division had not been able to break the
11th Panzer's defense of the German flank, and de Lattre's Army B had not yet
reduced Toulon and Marseille. On the
23rd, Descour had asked Vistel's opinion and two days later wrote him: "I have proposed a plan to the
Americans. I hope it will be adopted . .
. our dispositions are tightening around the city hour by hour."27
Vistel, who remained in Lyon trying to coordinate all the guerrilla
activity, could not too well comprehend the American strategy, but he had no
illusions about German strength. On
August 27 he wrote Commandant Raymond Basset (MARY) who commanded FFI forces in
the Rhône Department northwest of Lyon: "It
is urgent that you make contact with Romans and send a liaison officer to him .
. . . We ask you to carry out a series
of raids on the outskirts of Lyon to hold down the German troops which remain
in the city, estimated at about 3,000."
Ain and Isčre Departments: North to Lyon
"Romans" was Colonel Henri Romans–Petit, commanding FFI
forces in theAin Department. The
insurgent forces of the Ain have justifiably taken their place in Resistance
history as tough, resolute, and well organized.
They had become hardened from innumerable skirmishes with Germans, and
by the time of the Normandy landings, had virtually liberated two thirds of the
department, especially in the mountainous east.
The Ain, as well as the Jura and Haute–Savoie Departments, was
covered by the CANTINIER/XAVIER mission,
with two able agents, one French, Jean–Paul Rosenthal (CANTINIER), and
one British, Robert Heslop, whose code name XAVIER in R–1 matched in
celebrity that of ROGER, his colleague Cammaerts working in R–2 farther
south. A third member of the team, the
radio operator, was American: Denis
Johnson, who over the months graduated from his communications role to become
liaison officer, organizer, and in the absence of Heslop, chief of mission.
The team worked closely with Romans–Petit, bringing about such
formidable parachuting of weapons and explosives that, unlike many other
Maquis, those of the Ain were unusually well armed. In spite of this, they suffered greatly when,
after the Normandy D–Day, General Pflaum's 157th Division, based in
Grenoble, undertook to regain areas of which the Germans had lost control. In a disastrous ten–day period after
July 9, Germans forced the guerrillas out of Bellegarde, Hauteville, Pont
d'Ain, back into the easternhills. Then,
later in July, determined to scotch the flaunting independence of the Vercors,
Pflaum withdrew most of his forces, attacked the Vercors and let
Romans–Petit gradually regain what he had lost. So complete had been Resistance control of
some areas that Romans–Petit in fact had taken over administrative as
well as military duties. This act did
not endear him to persons like Yves Farges, who deemed it essential that he, Commissaire de la République, must reestablish in the name
of de Gaulle a civilian authority.29
Romans–Petit believed that guerrilla forces should do what
guerrillas do best: ambush, attack,
disappear. But when news that American
troops had reached Grenoble spread northward, it became clear, even as Alban
Vistel and Descour had analyzed the situation, that cooperation with the Allied
regular army was essential. Such
cooperation would naturally first develop with Roman's southern group, headed
by Commandant CHABOT (Girousse), who had moved his command post to Ambérieu, in
the foothills about forty miles north of Bourgoin. Some of CHABOT's men had helped in the
defense and liberation of Bourgoin, and it was CHABOT, with Denis Johnson, who
first made contact on August 27 with elements of the 45th Division. By this time, CHABOT had about 2,200 men
under his command, of which some 1,200 were deployed in the area being
approached by the 179th and 180th regiments.30
Although uncertain about the feasibility of attacking Lyon, Romans
directed CHABOT to move toward the outskirts, establishing command posts in key
areas. Accordingly on the 25th, CHABOT
had Captain Clin in Meximieux with Lieutenant Roger Giraud taking up defensive
positions northeast of Lyon. This
roadblock would protect the lower reaches of the Ain River which running north
and south, might serve as a dividing line between Germans and Allies.
On August 28, Alban Vistel began sending orders to the FFI leaders
regarding an attack on Lyon. A study of
these orders helps to clarify the relations between the Resistance and the
Allied regular forces. This one was sent
to Commandant Basset:
According to the latest news a powerful
Allied force is now at Bourgoin, but it does not seem about to adopt an
offensive deployment. I just received a
liaison agent from Colonel Bayard [Descour], who confirms this news and lays
out a possible plan of action. Bayard
will move into the south of Lyon . . .
You will come in from the north . . .
Villeurbanne has been evacuated. I am ordering the FFI to move to the
outskirts to establish liaison with all the columns coming from the
outside. You must push reconnaissance along
your axes and in the course of the 29th all our liaisons must be
completed. All our detachments must be
deployed around the city by the 29th evening.
The attack order will be given by the
regional commander [i.e. Vistel] when all liaisons have been established and account taken of theposition
of the Allied Armies. I am asking
Colonel Bayard, regional chief of staff, to assume overall command.
At the same time, Vistel tried to bring about a closer association with
the leaders west of Lyon. Although he
was in constant touch with Descour, he had not seen Henri Provisor in two
weeks, and he deplored the lack of coordination, the unwise premature
insurgency, and the apparent absence of a sense of responsibility among his
Resistance colleagues.
Provisor shared Vistel's concern for uncoordinated actions, but held
Vistel to blame for not including the FTP contingents in his plans and for his
unwillingness to cooperate with FFI units within the city. On August 28, Provisor and
Bourgčs–Maunoury attended a meeting, at which the FTP was represented by
Colonel Guillemot, military commissioner for the southern zone. Guillemot set forth a plan in which
guerrillas within the city would block roads with tram cars, and concentrate on
the Rhône bridges. The command post for
the operation would be at Yzeron, located in the hills at the center of roads
approaching Lyon from the southwest.
Date for the operation: dawn of
September 1.
This plan embodying an effort to control points within the city, could
not be adapted to that proposed by Vistel. When the western group received
Vistel's plan, they found it completely unacceptable: Descour, tainted in their view by his ORA
affiliation, must not exercise the overall command; Romans–Petit was
suspect because of his British connections; and the idea of the FFI units
already in the city pulling out to the suburbs completely vitiated the concept
of blocking the bridges.
Alban Vistel continued, nevertheless, to support Descour as overall
commander of operations, and he himself intended to remain in Lyon. It appeared that two separate operations, one
from the east and one from the west, uncoordinated, might develop to the
disadvantage of both. A last minute
conference of Vistel with the western leaders came to nothing except for a
mutual agreement to postpone the attack date until September 2.
By the first of the month, thousands of FFI had encircled the city, but
it had now become clear on both sides of Lyon that the Resistance attack should
be geared to that of the regular Allied forces.
On the western side, advance patrols of the French First Armored
Division had reached St. Etienne, fifty miles from Lyon, and on the eastern
side, Dahlquist was on the outskirts prepared to move on the city if Truscott
gave the order.
Planning the liberation of Lyon: the Allied Army
While Vistel and all the French would have liked an immediate Allied
attack on Lyon, Truscott had no desire to get bogged down inside a city unless
he possessed clear indications that the Germans intended to make a stand there. With the last rearguard German units crossing
the Drôme bottleneck on August 28, Truscott, while disappointed in his failure
to destroy the Nineteenth Army, had to plan his next moves. He was operating under orders to advance
north toward Dijon and to capture Lyon.
By the same orders, Patch had directed de Lattre to advance along the
west bank of the Rhône and assist in the capture of Lyon.
On August 29, when he received these orders, Truscott was not yet in a
position to move on Lyon, which in any case he was reluctant to attack if it
meant possession of a sack with the contents gone. He had held the 179th Regiment at Grenoble
from the 23rd until the 27th while he shunted all the available gasoline and
ammunition to Dahlquist during the Montélimar battle. With the last German elements crossing the
Drôme, Truscott found himself still unable to pierce the flank protection which
the Eleventh Panzer so ably provided.
The mobile armored defense extended all the way to
Bourg–en–Bresse. It ran
roughly about fifteen miles east ofthe Rhône, and when the Rhône axis veered
east–west at Lyon, followed the Ain River to Meximieux and Bourg. Truscott saw no way of penetrating this line
south of Lyon, and on the 26th had already authorized General Eagles to start
pushing advance patrols out from Grenoble, seeking weakness in this long
stretch––some 100 miles from Romans to Bourg–en–Bresse.
The first major unit to move from Grenoble, Colonel Philip Johnson's
3rd Battalion (of Meyer's 179th Regiment), set up road blocks around Bourgoin,
already liberated a few days before and serving as headquarters for Bousquet's
(CHABERT) FFI.35
Bourgoin, lying midway between Grenoble and Lyon, straddled the defense
line which General Wiese hoped to control.
On the 28th, the Germans dispatched a small force to retake the town. (André Pecquet recalls how all the French
flags came down and the populace disappeared as the German threat drew
close.) But Johnson's roadblocks
reinforced Bousquet's guerrillas and the counter–attack was
repelled. A grateful French government
later awarded Colonel Johnson the Legion of Honor. The citation (with slight errors of dates)
reads in part:
At the request of the French Forces of the
Interior his battalion moved to BOURGOIN the 24th of August at the farthest
point of the Allied advance. The city
had been liberated the day before and his energetic and daring entry into
action permitted the conquered ground to be held. The moral and material assistance given to
thetroops of Commandant CHABERT [René Bousquet] permitted the intensive
guerrilla action which terminated in the taking of Lyon the 2nd of September.
The 3rd Battalion remained in the Bourgoin
area until August 31 (leap–frogged by the other two battalions),
safeguarding the highway from Grenoble northward to the Rhône.
Colonel Descour hoped that the battalion was being readied to spearhead
an Allied thrust toward Lyon. With his
headquarters at Les Abrets, only fifteen miles north of the 45th Division
command post, Descour, through André Pecquet, maintained constant liaison with
General Eagles. He also kept in touch
with Raymond Basset, to whom he confided his hopes for American cooperation:37
. . .
If the Germans resist [at Lyon] the FFI can seize Lyon only in
cooperation with American troops. But it
may be that with the pressure on them, the Germans will not try to hold
Lyon. It thus follows that the FFI
should take advantage of the situation offered to them to liberate the city
themselves, to take as many prisoners as possible and reduce the sufferings of
the population.
But Truscott had no intention of deploying the 45th Division against
Lyon: if it should prove necessary to
move into the city he would use Dahlquist's 36th Division coming up along the
Rhône. Furthermore, he had good
information from Seventh Army G–2 and from French agents about the German
defenses.
Some of Truscott's intelligence came from espionage sponsored by
OSS. One of the members of the Strategic
Services Section (SSS) team, Justin Greene, had been attached to the 36th
Division since the landings. He had met
Colonel Daviron (ORA chief in the Hautes Alpes) after Gap had been liberated,
and the two had gone along to Grenoble on the following day. Once in Grenoble Greene was able to round up
a number of French agents who had been working for OSS, and obtain intelligence
data from the Rhône to the Alps. Among
the agents were two from Penny Farthing, Henry Hyde's most successful
circuit. Greene infiltrated them into
Lyon where they obtained "the complete defense plan" of the city,
which in due course was delivered to General Dahlquist as his division moved up
to the outskirts. The General "was
very happy and called the captain of the team in to compliment him on the
material".38
The plan about an uprising in Lyon was transmitted to Patch's
headquarters. It may have been discussed
on August 29 when Patch went over his tactical plans with General Sir Maitland
Wilson, General Devers, and others at St. Tropez. Later in the same day the group met with de
Lattre. According to the Seventh Army
history, regarding Lyon: “General
de Gaulle's military representative warned against premature action. On 30 August the FFI at Lyon was given orders
to be ready to establish contact with Allied columns, which were rapidly
approaching the outskirts. The enemy was
to beharassed but not actively engaged.
An all–out attack was to take place only in cooperation with
troops of the American and French armies.”
Truscott received Patch's order
during the afternoon of August 30.
Subsequently, according to Truscott, Patch "ordered me that, for
political reasons, it would be desirable to permit the French forces to enter
Lyon first." This order, exactly
what Truscott wanted, came at the crucial time when the VI Corps commander was
galvanizing his forces for a strong thrust northward.41
Truscott could assume that the German Nineteenth Army, once through
Lyon, would go straight north to Mâcon, Chalon–sur–Saône, then to
Dijon or Besançcon, ultimately to the Belfort Gap. In keeping with past experience, Truscott
could also expect a flank protection by the Eleventh Panzer Division some 20 to
30 miles east of the main column. This
would presumably mean defense of the main highway from Lyonto Bourg, N 83, with
possible patrols to the east. Truscott
could send his troops more safely along the Grenoble–Bourg
road––the Route Napoléon, N 75––to the east
beyond reach of enemy patrols. Along
this thoroughfare he had General Eagles send Colonel Dulaney's 180th
Regiment. To Dulaney's left, protecting
the 180th's flank, would go Colonel Meyer's 179th.
General Wiese viewed the situation much the same as Truscott. He had to hold the Lyon–Bourg road as
flank protection for his main body. He
ordered von Wietersheim to prevent the Americans from crossing the Rhône or,
assuming they may have in any case crossed farther east, to hold a line of
defense along the Ain River, with destruction of all bridges.42
The tactical maneuvering consequent to the German and American
decisions brought elements of the Eleventh Panzer and the 179th RCT into a
confrontation which climaxed at Meximieux, a small town lying twenty miles
northeast of Lyon, a few miles west of the Chazey bridge over the Ain.
In the midst of this confrontation fought several hundred maquisards
of the Ain, Rhône, and Isčre Departments.
Certainly the FFI irregulars and American GI's had fought together from
the first days of the landings––at Digne, Grenoble, Montčlimar,
Bourgoin, along with hundreds of other skirmishes and ambushes––but
the combats at Meximieux andits approaches were unique in the almost
spontaneous way in which maquisards and Americans came to be fighting
side by side. Unlike other battles, there had been no agreed–on strategy
at higher staff levels, for indeed the 179th was pressing north, and the French
guerrillas were moving southwest toward Lyon.
Chance brought them together when the German Panzers struck.
Chapter 18:
End of Dragoon: Meximieux and Lyon
It should be borne in mind that a Maquis needs concealment––in
mountains or forests where German patrols find themselves at a
disadvantage. The guerrilla pounces from
an ambush and withdraws before the enemy can reorganize. But as the prospect of liberating Lyon
beckoned them, the FFI came out of the hills and, reinforced by sédentaires
and new recruits, deployed their poorly–armed thousands across that
gently rolling farmland which lies east of Lyon. Vulnerable outside their normal habitat, they
could be easy prey for Nazi patrols.
What could happen was sadly demonstrated at the Camp Didier Maquis,
north of Lyon, just before the action at Meximieux.
This Maquis had been named in honor of Commandant Chambonnet
(code–named DIDIER), former FFI Chief in R–1, who after a period of
imprisonment at Montluc had been executed in July.43 The Maquis, containing about 800 men, was
located in the small Noyer forest, scarcely ten miles from the city. On August 27, while the northern exodus of
theGerman army still remained a trickle, a group of twenty maquisards from Camp
Didier ambushed a three–truck convoy proceeding toward Bourg in open
country. Reacting to the attack, the
Germans quickly surrounded the over–zealous young patriots and killed
them all except one who, hiding in a ditch, escaped. The guerrillas executed a quick reprisal,
however, when a few miles along the road another group surprised the convoy,
killing some German soldiers and capturing almost 100.
It was clear to the leaders at Camp Didier that their forest, no more
than a few square miles in size, could provide scant cover for a determined
enemy patrol. They therefore decided to
evacuate unarmed maquisards, about 300 in number, and send them east
toward Camp de la Valbonne, where Lieutenant Giraud of the Ain FFI would
determine their further deployment.
Under the command of a young lieutenant, Raymond Mollard, they set out
on August 31, keeping to the woods, avoiding the highways. Late in the afternoon they heard gunfire and
soon afterward near La Valbonne, came into contact with an American patrol
which directed them to Meximieux. There,
in the town's chateau, they bedded down for the night.
Lieutenant Giraud had been ordered to guard
the road at La Valbonne by his superior, Captain Clin (code–named COLIN),
whose command post was located at Meximieux.
WhenRomans–Petit decided to participate in the liberation of Lyon
he sent his southern group, under CHABOT, with headquarters at Ambérieu, in the
direction of Lyon. Clin's advance
section, which would fight with the Americans in the Meximieux area, had taken
up positions there on the 30th. At that
time Clin had at his disposal six companies:
Giraud's 60 men already in the roadblock at the Camp de La Valbonne;
Mazaud (SIGNORI), whose 118 men came mostly from a military prep school; a
company from CHABOT's headquarters (that of Marcel Vion, known as CHOUCHOU);
and three others, Philippe, Martin, and Gabriel. Altogether, the Maquis companies accounted
for somewhere between 300 and 400 men.44
These maquisards were all armed, if not with cannon and tanks,
with small arms, grenades, machine guns, and bazookas. And they all remembered vividly the
atrocities perpetrated on them and their families over the months of
occupation. "Never before",
recalled Colonel Grace of the 179th 2nd Battalion, "have I seen a body of
men with such an honest desire to kill."
As Grace moved on beyond
Meximieux to Chalamont, he left his F Company at La Valbonne to support the FFI
roadblock. 45
Confident that Dahlquist's 36th
Division could control the situation around Lyon, Truscott resumed the race
northward. On August 29, he ordered the
45th Division to lead the advance.
Colonel Meyer, commanding the 179th RCT, had his 2nd Battalion start for
the Rhone, where advance patrols from Johnson's 3rd Battalion had found that
the bridge between Pont-de-Charuy and Loyettes stood intact and defended by
Maquis guerrillas of Martin's Company (French Forces of the Interior). The FFI had repaired a small airport close by
which served thereafter as a base for Piper Cub observation and liaison
planes. A jeep patrol sped up to
Meximieux and encountered no enemy. On
the next day, Capt. Fred Snyder drove his jeep just beyond Meximieux up to the
old medieval fortress town of Pérouges, where he signed the "Golden
Book" of the Hostellerie de Vieux Pá,árouges: "We are happy to be in France."
Behind Snyder, on the 31st came the 1st Battalion, taking over at
Meximieux, with the 2nd Battalion
already ahead at Chalamont, seven miles farther on. Philip Johnson's 3rd Battalion remained behind
at Loyettes, protecting the bridges over the Rhone and Ain, and safeguarding
the line of supply.
Colonel Meyer and his deputy Col. Preston Murphy spent the night of
August 31-September 1 at Meximieux, now occupied by Lt. Col. Michael Davison's
somewhat depleted 1st Battalion. When
the 2nd Batalllion passed through Meximieux, Colonel Grace had been ordered to
send F company to reinforce an FFI road-block at La Valbonne. The FFI company, about 100 men under Lt.
Giraud, had occupied the area, a military encampment and small town, several
days before. When Grace inspected it,
Captain Snyder recommended that the whole battalion should be posted there but
Colonel Meyer, having no information about Germans to the west, was anxious to
push on to Chalamont. To replace company F, Davison had released B company to
Grace's battalion. Since he had left
company C to guard his rear, this left Davison with only companies A and D ,
Headquarters company, and two tank destroyers.
Colonel Meyer had outposts and artillery
around Meximieux, but assuming the German threat, if any, would come from the
west, he had not kept a guard at the Chazey bridge, due east of Meximieux. During the night, German forces moved on the
bridge, encountering only a small group of maquisards who unfortunately mistook
them for Americans. Five of the
guerrillas, members of the Martin company, were killed. Blowing the bridge shortly before dawn, the
German troops then prepared to strike Meximieux with an encircling movement
from from the northeast, east ande west.
Elements of the 11th Panzer Division took the offensive at Pont d'Ain
and Meximieux, but also attacked the bridges to the south at Pont-de-Chazey,
Loyettes and Port Galland and in the west, following National Route 84 from
Lyon, the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment moved toward La Valbonne. The Americans could count on help from the
160th Field Artillery batteries emplaced along the Ain River.
F Company arrived at La Valbonne in the late morning of 31 August,
about 160 men, supported by two tank destroyers from the 645th tank
battalion. Giraud, heading the FFI
group, placed himself under the command of the Americans and was ordered to set
up defenses south of the RR tracks. F Company was divided into three
groups, one at the "Cité des
Bains," one on the wooded plateau of Fouilloux, and one, as reserve, in
the town itself. The TDs were deployed
in strategic positions. The American CP was located at the Café Central.
During the afternoon of the 31st the Germans moved closer to La Valbonne.
One of the TD s made a direct hit on a German tank, and this discouraged them
from continuing the direct advance, but during the night they moved some forces
to Bressolles, about two km to the north.
No clear word had reached Colonel Meyer about the bridges at Pont d'Ain
and Chazey, nor did reports from La Valbonne suggest a major enemy thrust. "My rest was quite complete," he
recalled. "I found there was no
news, everything was going as scheduled, so I mounted the jeep and in high spirits
took off up north to watch the action of the [2nd] battalion which was `up
front'." When he heard firing
behind him, he thought "a group of wandering or waiting Germans must have
picked a scrap with some of Mike's [Lt. Col. Michael Davison] men." Meyer then learned from his executive
officer, Colonel Murphy, that "there was a distant threat of tanks to the
southwest. . . . Then the communications
went out."
Around 9:00, about 150 Germans began an attack from the southwest
toward the railroad station where Davison had his command post. The German infantrymen had support from
tanks, but when a Panther was knocked out by 155-mm. artillery fire, the
remaining tanks kept their distance. The
S-2 journal reported "3 enemy tanks 800 yards southwest. Look like vultures awaiting the
kill." With the tanks not joining
in, Davison's men, with FFI <MI>maquisards<D> alongside, repulsed
the threat in a heavy fire-fight. By
1:00, the Germans had withdrawn<197>but only to regroup.
By 10 <MS>A.M.<D>, Murphy knew
that he had to cope not with a group of "wandering" Germans, but with
a full-fledged assault supported by formidable Mark IV and Mark V Panther
tanks. Left in command at Meximieux,
Murphy established his headquarters in an old convent. Unable to reach Colonel Meyer, he sent a
message to Colonel Grace, ordering his 2nd Battalion back to Meximieux. Meyer did not learn of the order until noon
but, with faith in Murphy's assessment, did not question it. Murphy also requested General Eagles, then at
the 45th Division CP at Voiron, to divert some tank destroyers and antitank
guns from the 157th Regiment, which he knew was moving rapidly north behind the
180th.
Murphy realized he would be confronted
shortly with another attack. Although
the morning thrusts from east and west had been turned back, Murphy now knew
that a sizeable German force had surrounded Meximieux and had captured some
outposts. Wounded men from company F and
from Giraud's FFI section were coming into the convent, cared for in the
basement by French and American doctors.
The FFI group at Pá,árouges, where Captain Snyder had been posted with
two tank destroyers, had been attacked.
The tank destroyers, one out of gas, the other with its turret jammed,
were abandoned. (Two Germans siphoned
gas from one to the other and later drove it around town.) The Cháƒáteau north of Meximieux had come
under attack.
Colonel Murphy, still without word from Meyer
or the 2nd Battalion, repeated his appeal to General Eagles for reinforcements
and pulled in his outlying positions for a defense of the town. Colonel Davison deployed the few forces he
controlled as effectively as possible.
His men<197>interspersed with <MI>maquisards<D><197>fought
from roof tops, windows, behind walls, and in railway cars pulled up on a
siding. He stationed his two tank
destroyers near the City Hall back to back on Meximieux's main street, the
<MI>Rue de Gená_áve<D>, where they commanded the two roads leading
into town.
The German attack developed about 2:30
<MS>P.M.<D>, when six tanks, with infantrymen aboard, rumbled into
town from the south, continued under heavy fire, which dispersed their riders,
and turned into the main street heading for the City Hall. A shell from one tank struck the City Hall
tower and killed the observer posted there.
Davison later recalled what happened:
The first tank, knocked out by the M-10 [tank
destroyer], burst into flames and ran into the lobby of the Lion d'Or. Then the second was hit. The third and fourth got into high gear and
charged the tank destroyer, scraping the paint as it went. But the other tank destroyer knocked it
out. Number 4 tank went by the TD: Number 5 not sure. Meanwhile the tank destroyer was re-loaded
and hit No. 4 and "D" Company hit No. 5 with a mortar, and blew it
all to hell.
The hulks of these monsters, charred and
smoking, remained as silent testimony of a German last effort to protect the
Nineteenth Army retreat. Another tank,
coming in from the east, was hit, turned tail, and rejoined others that stood
guard but did not enter the town. Two
great 105-mm. self-propelled guns had tried to set up positions south of town,
only to be knocked out by bazookas.
By late in the afternoon of September 1, the
Germans began to withdraw. General Wiese
had given the order for all troops defending Lyon to pull out during the night
of September 1<196>2, and he needed the 11th Panzer Division for a
defensive ring around Bourg. Wiese had
received only fragmentary reports about the fighting along the Ain River, but
he had enough information to believe "that the Americans had given up the
plan to proceed to Lyon and instead would shift their attack to the north,
advancing from Ambá,árieu."<M^>4<D>
Although many German tanks and infantrymen
withdrew, a token force remained along the Ain River into the night, trying to
pull a last-minute victory out of what had become a stalemate. With six smoldering hulks<197>tanks and
self-propelled guns<197>left in the Meximieux area, the Germans, although
unwilling to risk another strike against the American tank destroyers and
artillery, left two tanks to support the riflemen closing in on stubbornly held
positions.
The Germans kept hammering into the evening
. They directed artillery fire at the
Cháƒáteau, where a group of Americans and FFI, including the company of
Chouchou (Marcel Vion), had been holding out during the day. While trying to repair his machine gun, Vion
was killed by an exploding shell. The defenders repelled a series of attacks
until finally the tank destroyer, abandoned at Pá,árouges and now manned by
Germans, moved in and, with infantry surrounding the post, forced the
garrison's surrender.
Late afternoon also saw the death of another
Maquis officer, Lieutenant Giraud, whose group had fought at La Valbonne, and
later, side by side with Americans, at the convent. He had gone on an exploratory patrol and died
instantly from a direct hit near the square that now bears his name.
The final stage of the Meximieux battle was
unique in the way French <MI>maquisards<D> and G.I.s became
completely brothers-in-arms as they defended themselves from a desperate
assault on the convent. Neither tanks
nor artillery could be brought to bear in the semi-darkness of hand-to-hand
fighting. As reported by the FFI
commander, Captain Clin:
In
front of this big building is a rather large courtyard. In accord with Colonel Murphy, . . .
Colin [Captain Clin] transformed the
convent into a fortress. The Maquis lads
were at all the doors, all the windows.
The order was to hold until reinforcements arrived, but not to waste
ammunition. An enemy detachment climbed
over the walls, slid into the courtyard and deployed in ditches. After heavy firing, the barrage stopped all
of a sudden. The Germans let us know
through prisoners that they demanded our surrender. They advised the "terrorists" not
to obey their chiefs because they are all sleazy foreigners. Maybe they believed it, but they were quickly
interrupted by a loud "merde."
Gunfire sprayed from all the windows.
One of our patrols sneaked into the courtyard, and moved up within a
yard of the Germans, whose chief was knocked out by one of our lads. Ten minutes later, we had chased off all our
assailants. A second attempt to climb over the wall was stopped cold by our
machine-guns. Colin sent out a strong
reconnaissance detachment. He got word
back: the Germans were
withdrawing.<M^>5<D>
By two o'clock in the morning of September 2,
all the German forces were pulling back to the Lyon<196>Bourg road. Although the bridges at Chazey and Pont d'Ain
had been destroyed, the 11th Panzer had failed to cut those at Loyettes or
Poncin, and the way was clear for Truscott to keep moving on toward Bourg.
Meximieux stands as a unique monument,
however, for FFI and American cooperation.
Obviously, only American tank destroyers and artillery could oppose
German tanks and self-propelled guns, but at the level of infantry combat, the
<MI>maquisards<D> fought side by side with the G.I.s and with equal
valor. The French had possibly
300<196>400 deployed, numbers comparable to those of the Americans who
were engaged. One estimate, for the
final fight in the convent, has 150 Americans and 150
<MI>maquisards<D>. In
casualties, the French counted 39 killed, 40 wounded, and 12 prisoners; the
Americans 11 killed, 30 wounded, and 50 prisoners.
The citizens of Meximieux keep alive the
memory of American participation in this engagement. Colonels Murphy and Davison were made
honorary citizens, and Colonel Davison (in 1972 a general in command of U.S.
forces in NATO) is commemorated by "Place Davison," named in his
honor.
THE
LIBERATION OF LYON
Following the advice of the regular army
commands, both east and west Resistance groups postponed the date for attacking
Lyon from September 1 to September 2, and then to September 3. On the morning of the 2nd, however, Lyon's
streets showed no signs of German occupancy; during the night, the rear guard
had blown all but one of the many bridges over the Rhá“áne, and a good
many over the Saá“áne. Had the Resistance armies been so ordered, they
might have entered early on the second, to be confronted only by some scattered
<MI>Milice<D> fire and by a few Germans left
behind.<M^>6<D>
General Dahlquist, whose command post was then several miles south of
Lyon, learned about the German withdrawal that same morning. With his entire 36th Division advancing to the
outskirts, he could have pressed on and entered the city. The southeast part of Lyon forms a quadrant
bounded on west and north by the Rhá“áne, which makes its right angle
turn in the city's heart. Outside the
arc, about four miles from the center, perimetered by what is now the Boulevard
Laurent-Bonneray, advance patrols mapped out bivouac areas for the half-tracks,
trucks, and armored cars that would be moving in around noon.
One
142nd Regiment patrol, under Lt. James R. Crocker, guided by Tony Brooks (of
SOE's PIMENTO circuit), reached the city's center around 11:30 and reported the
Germans had left, but had blown up the dozen Rhá“áne bridges that
separate the eastern half from the "peninsula." One of Crocker's guns, aiming at snipers, set
the roof of the Há“átel Dieu on fire.
German artillery, he reported, still protected the rear guard, menacing
the French and Resistance elements to the west.<M^>7<D>
Truscott saw no reason for American troops to enter Lyon. The only problem for the VI Corps would occur
if Lyon, an administrative and rail center, would become so entangled in local
riots that logistic support would be impaired.
Dahlquist, however, had received no orders to move, either into or away
from Lyon. A patrol, returning from the
city around 5:00 in the afternoon, confirmed that no enemy forces remained in
the section east of the river. By this
time Truscott had informed Dahlquist definitely that he should not enter Lyon
but could send some engineers to examine the bridges, as well as some light
forces to reinforce the FFI.
Shortly before dark, Lt. Weldon M. Green, of
the 142nd Regiment, led a company of infantry and tanks as an honor guard (and
as a protecting show of force) for the new
administration.<M^>8<D>
Alban Vistel had taken over the prefecture and notified Yves Farge,
<MI>Commissaire de la Rá,ápublique<D>, that he should openly assume
his new responsibilities. The Lyonnais
populace was in the streets, shouting and rejoicing. Nevertheless, although the eastern sector was
clear, and many of Descour's men held key positions, the official date for the
FFI attack remained the same: dawn of
the following day, September 3.<M^>9<D>
Meanwhile, the Allied special forces were receiving reinforcements from
the pool of OGs, Jedburghs, and other agents remaining in Algiers. In the week prior to the attack on Lyon,
almost forty people were dropped by parachute into the Ardá_áche
Department: one individual, two
operational groups, and two Jedburgh teams, all coming into the drop zone near
Devesset in the early hours of August 30.
Air force Lt. Paul C. Sheeline, unconnected
with any field unit, had been sent to help resolve the reported friction
between Vaucheret and OG LOUISE.
Sheeline met both Vaucheret and Major Cox when he landed, and quickly
obtained assurances that the problem had already been resolved. Vaucheret asked Sheeline to remain on his
personal staff in a liaison capacity.<M^>10<D>
After a few hours' sleep, Sheeline
accompanied Vaucheret to Henri Provisor's CP at Yzeron, west of Lyon, where he
learned that the FFI leaders, in planning the assault on Lyon, wanted the
participation of as many OGs as possible.
Major Cox believed that, while some of his men would be needed to help
with the German prisoners, he could send Lieutenant McKensie and a crew to Lyon
with one of the 37-mm. guns, as well as the other OGs.
Landing at the same time as Sheeline, OGs
LAFAYETTE and HELEN, and Jedburghs SCION and MASQUE hoped they could serve some
useful purpose before their value would be lost.<M^>11<D> One of the OGs, LAFAYETTE, reinforced LOUISE;
the other, HELEN, was immediately assigned to the projected assault on
Lyon. Led by Captain Vanoncini, the team
marched to St.-Etienne, southwest of Lyon, where it joined the Maquis battalion
commander, Captain GEORGES [Georges Picard], and his next in command, Charles
Escudier.
Of the two Jedburgh teams, SCION was
Franco-British (Maj. O. P. Grenfell and Sergeant Cain with French Captain
Revard), and MASQUE Franco-American, Capt. N. Guillot and Sergeant Poche (U.S.
Army in spite of their French-sounding names), and French Captain de
Gramont. These teams landed far too late
to carry out the instruction and leadership expected of the Jedburghs, and
simply became attached, more or less as observers, to Commandant Vaucheret's
staff.
These units did not comprise all the special
forces in the area. Another Jedburgh
team, JUDE, had been sent to the field from England on August 15, along with
part of a French SAS (Special Air Service) unit. The team consisted of British Capt. W. L. O.
Evans and Sgt. A. E. Holdham, together with French Capt. J. Lavisme. They had been attached to Colonel Basset's
(MARY) FFI force north of Lyon and accompanied his forces when the city was
liberated.
In addition to the Jedburghs, OGs and
inter-allied missions, there was a scattering of downed airmen and isolated
G.I.s who had joined up. Among these
must be counted Stephen Weiss and seven companions who had become separated
from their unit during the attack on Valence.
They had been taken in tow by the Resistance, ferried across the
Rhá“áne, and attached to Binoche's sector for several days before joining
an OG.<M^>12<D>
In the course of September 2, the Maquis
forces, the OGs, the Jedburghs, and French regular troops moved into position,
mostly in the hill country directly west and northwest of Lyon. Since this deployment was of course west of
the Saá“áne River, the French could readily occupy the heights commanded
by the great Fourviá_áre basilica, but they would still have to cross the
Saá“áne to reach the "peninsula," where the City Hall
(Há“átel de Ville) was located, and again, cross the Rhá“áne to
reach the prefecture.
On the morning of September 3, section after
section of Maquis fighters poured into Tassin and the entire western section of
Lyon bordering on the Saá“áne River.
Only a few isolated German positions remained, but there were still
pro-German members of the hated <MI>Milice<D>, sniping at the
oncoming guerrillas from windows and roof tops.
The Jedburghs and the American OGs advanced
toward Lyon alongside their French comrades.
The Jedburghs MASQUE and SCION joined the Ardá_áche FFI commander
Calloud at Dentilly, northwest of Lyon.
HELEN and BETSY came up just south of the FFI CP at Yzeron, along with
McKensie and the gun crew from
LOUISE. Lieutenant Sheeline went
back to Devesset in an attempt to shepherd another OG, WILLIAMS, just landed,
toward Lyon. Unfortunately, with no
transport available, he had to leave this section, which only reached Lyon the
day after its liberation. Major Cox and
the LEHIGH group joined Captain Vanoncini's section (HELEN), which was
traveling with Lieutenant Escudier's company from Privas.
Although the Germans had left the city, some
danger remained from the <MI>Milice<D>, whose sniping provided a
macabre counterpoint to the general happy rejoicing. As Major Cox, describing the actions of HELEN
and LEHIGH, recalled it:<M^>13<D>
Somehow or other we got out in front of the
attacking Maquis who were still forming up, and had to fight our way through
wildly cheering crowds to get to where we wanted. We reached the Cathedral overlooking the city
just about as the first Maquis and French Army units arrived at the river bank
below us, and for half an hour enjoyed the spectacle. . . . The Germans had
blown all RHONE bridges (although one still was usable for foot traffic), and
all but two SAONE bridges. When the
French Armored Cars began to cross on our bridge, we dashed across on the
other, and aided them in hunting down the Milice. It would be interesting to
record something of the mad hysteria that sprang up in LYON. The Milice were hunted down and killed with
mad displays of hate. The actual battle
casualties consisted of one or two Maquis and one or two civilians, but for the
next two or three days, simply pointing a finger at a person and yelling
"Milice" was enough to have him torn limb from limb. . . . The FFI as quickly as possible regained some
semblance of control, and the sporadic firing gradually died away.
In the course of the day, both Major Cox and
Lieutenant Sheeline were able to locate 36th Division headquarters and confer
with General Dahlquist's staff. The
general himself sneaked into the city for a quick look-see. He wrote his wife:<M^>14<D>
I went
in . . . unofficially because I was not supposed to be there even though my
patrols had been in the night before.
The reception was tremendous.
When they found I am a "General" which none of them believe (I
guess I do not look the part) they really let loose.
General Dahlquist, however, could not
tarry. On that day, Truscott was already
laying siege to Bourg-en-Bresse, forty miles to the north. He needed the Texas Division for pursuit, not
for the good life in France's third city.
By September 4, the men of the 36th Division had put Lyon behind them
and were entering Bourg.
With the date September 3, the liberation of
southeastern France, objective of Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON, comes to an
end. The basic directive did not
consider actions beyond Grenoble and Lyon, and the jurisdiction of SPOC over
special operations extended no farther.
Except for those involved in combats along the Italian frontier, the
OGs, the Jedburghs, the inter-allied and liaison missions, and 4-SFU could
consider their work completed, and their activities overrun. For many of the Maquis, the war also was
finished, but for others, the liberation of the southeast meant joining the
French regular army or becoming immersed in local politics. In any case, the heroic days were over.
Chapter 19 Epilogue: The Push toward the Vosges
After the
liberation of Lyon, the aggressive Major
General Lucien Truscott, commanding the VI Corps, obtained Patch's approval to continue his momentum toward
Franche Comté in the hope that by crossing the Doubs he could cut off General Wiese's 19th Army before it reached
the Rhine. But on 4 September, the day
after Lyon was liberated, Truscott had lost contact with the enemy.
Nevertheless, he had his 3rd Division leapfrog over the 45th pushing beyond
Lons le Saunier in the direction of Besançon.
The 117th Cavalry, in spite of losing Troop B and half of Troop A at
Montrevel, led the van, scouting to the west of Pontarlier, northward toward
Dole. Along the right flank of the Americans, de Latte's Army B was keeping pace, with the 3rd and 4th
RTT (of Linarčs' 1 Regimental Combat
Team) at Pontarlier and beyond. In their
first cooperation with the Franche Comté FFI, Goutard's Groupement had liberated Mouthe. But the
French were running up against severe opposition: Kampfgruppen,
formed from miscellaneous retreating units, and rearguard elements of the 11th
Panzer stood in their way, defending the route between Mouthe and Ornans. All
the 7th Army divisions, particularly the French, suffered from shortages of
fuel and ammunition, all of which had to be trucked from the beachhead 500 km
away.
In continuing to the
north, General Patch lost some of his autonomy as the 7th Army left the Mediterranean Theatre of General
Wilson to enter the European Theatre, controlled by the Supreme Commander,
Dwight Eisenhower, from London. Furthermore, from being the principal armed
force in a large area, 7th Army now became but one of many, stretched across a
vast front running from Switzerland to Belgium, and confronting German forces
currently ordered by Hitler to hold, not retreat, at the Moselle and the Doubs,
in front of the line Metz, Nancy,
Epinal, Belfort, to the Swiss border.
Special Operations beyond control of SPOC
So far as special
operations were concerned, SPOC's authority would be replaced by SFHQ, Special Force Headquarters, attached to
Eisenhower's G-3. But with General
Koenig recognized as commander of the FFI, the powers of AFHQ related to France
had since 17 July come under Koenig's
EMFFI. "Ainsi, au moment précis oů
Bradley [12e Groupe d'Armées] faisait irruption en Normandie, . . . l'EMFFI
intégrait du personnel du SOE et de l'OSS, et recrutait des officiers français,
au total environ 450 hommes qui s'installeraient dans de nouveaux quartiers le
22 aoűt. De Gaulle mit officiellement
fin aux FFI le 27 aoűt et, un mois plus tard, le 23 septembre, l'EMFFI fut
dispersé, ses pouvoirs retournant au SFHQ."
These alterations of
Koenig's role, made during the British 2nd Army's seizure of Antwerp and
Patton's drive across France, generated some confusion and inefficiency,
especially as many French staff officers were inexperienced and EMFFI had no
direct control over aircraft and
supplies.
Not only did EMFFI have
responsibility for special operations, but also had to take over contacts with
people already in Burgundy and Franche Comté (Region D), in particular
communications with the Conseiller de la
République at Dijon (Jean Bouhey, and after Bouhey was wounded on 2
September, Jean Mairey ad interim), the DMR (Délégué Militaire Régional)
Colonel P. Hanneton (LIGNE), the Chef FFI Colonel Monod (Colonel CLAUDE), as
well as other FFI Chiefs, SOE circuits,
SAS groups, Jedburgh teams, and miscellaneous missions.
Although special
operations were now controlled from London, there were still agents in the
field reporting to SPOC. Attached to 7th Army,
Colonel Bartlett's 4 SFU continued to keep in touch with missions in the
field, and reported to Army headquarters. The same was true of SSS, the OSS
Strategic Service Section, under Lt. Col. Gamble, which kept feeding information about the enemy into the army's
G-2. Most of the French intelligence
agents had transferred to the French service, DGSS, but one Frenchman, André
Beau, continued to infilter German positions and commnicate back to the army. In early September, when the forces from the
Mediterranean linked up with those from Normandy, 4 SFU would get in touch with
Colonel Robert ("Rip") Powell's 12th Special Force Detachment,
operating with Patton's 3rd Army.
The German Defense
The main German forces
were no longer retreating. Hitler had
ordered Field Marshal Model, C-in-C West, to hold a defense line protecting the
West Wall, which in the southern area meant that General Blaskowitz, commanding
Army Group G, must hold Metz and Belfort, and keep open a 100 km gap between
Nancy and Dijon that would permit the thousands of Germans in southwestern
France to fall back to the Rhine. By 4
September Patton's Third Army was spread out north of the Loire, and his
advance units, planning attacks on Metz and Nancy, were in sight of the Moselle.
On the same day, from the south, units of Combat Command Sudre were
approaching Chalon-sur-Saône, hot on the
heels of the retreating IV Luftwaffenfeldcorps but short of fuel. Between the two Allied forces, moving toward
Autun, Beaune, and Dijon, streamed over 200,000 German troops, many bedraggled
and discouraged, but including some formidable units of General Sachs' LXIV
Corps. The columns of Brodowski, Offenbacher, and Hackel, were by 4 September
already west of Dijon, and the Marschgruppe Taglichsbeck, with some 12,000 men,
was approaching Autun. The column of General Elster, the last to leave the
southwest, harried by the FFI, would never make it to Dijon, but some of his
advance units, under Colonel Bauer, would reach Autun at the same time as
elements of Monsabert's II Corps. On 4
September the southern German defense line line extended from Autun through
Beaune, Dole, and north of Pontarlier to the Swiss border.
North of Beaune, a gap
of over 50 km between Dijon and Langres remained open with no Allied forces in
a position to close it: Patton's 3rd Army was directed at Metz and Nancy,
Leclerc's 2nd DB was still in Paris, de Lattre personally was concentrating on
Languedoc (he was in Perpignan on 3 Septembre), and Truscott was unconcerned,
heading for Besançon and Belfort. Only
Monsabert (just taking over the newly formed II Corps) posed a threat to the German escape corridor,
but his advance unit, CC Sudre, threatening Chalon-sur-Saône on 4 September,
had virtually run out of fuel. [See
Truscott, 438-39; Riviera to the Rhine, 205-08]
Truscott's VI Corps and de Lattre's 1st Army
On 5 September, two days
after the fight at Meximieux, both French and American vanguards had reached
Pontarlier: elements of the 3rd and 4th Regiment des Tirailleurs Marocains
(RTT), part of General Duval's Division d'infanterie algérienne (DIA), and
units from Colonel Meyer's 179th from Eagles' 45th Division. Although Patch had
authorized de Lattre to thrust toward Belfort, there had not been time enough
to allocate sectors, and both French and Americans, with consquent confusion,
were moving along D 471, the main artery between Lons le Saunier and Belfort.
On the sixth, Truscott discussed the problem with Béthouart and Duval with the
decision, later ratified by Patch, that the Americans would head for Besançon
and Vesoul, essentially the area bounded by the Doubs and the Saône, leaving
Montbéliard and the Belfort gap to the French.
This arrangement pleased
neither Truscott nor de Lattre, although both had to accept it as the best
compromise under the circumstances. De Lattre did not like his army being split
into two segments with the Americans in
between, but it enabled him to get his forces onto the major front; Truscott
had hoped to avoid mountain fighting--he had had enough in Italy--by moving
south of the Vosges to the Rhine.
Truscott had thought of
bypassing Besançon, but the new allocation meant that Besançon would become the
base of his operations, now directed toward Vesoul, chef lieu de la
Haute-Saône.
He therefore ordered
General O'Daniel's 3rd Division to concentrate on Besançon. Assisted by the Groupement FFI de Besançon
under Commandant Jean Carnet, who was killed in the attack, the Americans were
able to liberate the city on the 8th. They then moved on to the Ognon valley,
the area in which the British George Millar headed an SOE mission,
CHANCELLOR. A Jedburgh team, CEDRIC, was
cooperating with him.
At the time that
Besançon was liberated, General Blaskowitz, commanding Army Group G, planning a
counter-attack at Nancy, ordered the 19th Army to defend Vesoul. The Germans
were now trying to hold a line along the river Ognon, while the 338th Division
fell back along D 15, in the heart of Millar's area, to establish stronger positions to the
northeast. No longer could easy victories and unresisted liberations be
explained by Hitler's order to withdraw. The order now was hold and
counter-attack. The 11th Panzer was deployed along the Doubs to the Swiss
border, Gruppe Degener was defending the Doubs on both sides of
Baumes-les-Dames, and units of the IV Luftwaffefeldkorps were aligned before
Vesoul.
On the Right: toward the Belfort Gap--the
French
With the Germans
resolutely determined to hold the Belfort Gap, the Allied forces opposing them
had a great deal to cope with. Advance
units of Duval's 3rd DIA--the 1st RCT (Linarčs) and 3rd RCT (Guillebaud), the
Groupement Goutard, 2nd and 3rd RTA, 3e Spahis, the 2e/4e RTT--were putting
muscle alongside the maquisards of the Lomont area, together with the 1st
Regiment of Franche Comté, the SAS, and the Jedburghs. General de Lattre
praises the FFI: "L'événement le plus marquant de cette journée de
prestabilisation se passe ŕ l'extrémité orientale de la chaîne du Lomont oů
Linarčs prend la liaison avec un groupement F.F.I. qui, sous les ordres du
commandant américain 'Paul', tient depuis trois mois, en dépit de son isolement
et de multiples attaques allemandes, ce plateau escarpé et le vieux fort qui le
couronne. Cet exploit, digne d'admiration, nous livre un incomparable
observatoire sur la plaine de Montbéliard et le 'chien de garde' de la trouée
de Belfort." [156]
But the French forces,
short of ammunition and fuel, could not withstand the German counterattacks. De
Lattre realized that he must wait for reinforcements, and that the operation
would not be easy. "Au cours des journées suivantes," he writes,
"la cristallisation du front se confirmera en dépit de tous les efforts du
4e RTT et du 7e RTA venu relever le 3e. Pourtant, le RCT Guillebaud appuyé par
les TD du 7e RCA, réussit encore aprčs un premier échec, ŕ faire tomber
Pont-de-Roide. Mais le 11e Panzer qu'étoffent maintenant des régiments de la Luftwaffe ŕ pied interdit aussitôt les débouchés. Il faut
definitivement perdre l'espoir d'une reprise du mouvement, avant qu'ait pu ętre
montée une opération de grande envergure.
. . . De fait, de 14 septembre, le général Béthouart est amené ŕ
suspendre les opérations de détail. . .
. Ainsi, le 1er Corps s'étoffe--et se repose." [159-60]
In the center: The Americans
While the French 1st
Corps held the line south of Belfort, the American VI Corps had succeeded in
crossing the Doubs and was striking at the defenses of Vesoul. On the left
flank, Truscott ordered the 117th Cavalry to scout along the east bank of the Saône and make contact
with Monsabert's troops which were directed at Autun with patrols along the
Saône's west bank. Badly damaged at
Montrevel, the 117th had been reorganized with new trucks and other equipment,
and on 9 September struck out across the Doubs toward Gray. By the 12th the
Squadron had reached Port-sur-le-Saône, a few kilometers northwest of Vesoul.
Jedburghs
In addition to the Jedburgh team CEDRIC, already mentioned as operating in Franche
Comté, by 12 September there were eleven
(BASIL, BRIAN,MAURICE, RODERICK, NORMAN, GREGORY, DESMOND, NICHOLAS,
HENRY, GODFREY, and TIMOTHY), with two in London waiting orders (DOUGLAS II and
JIM). Bad weather had prevented earlier dispatch, but the Jeds, restless for
action after their vigorous training, were as anxious as SFHQ to get them to
the field.
But there was an embarras
de richesse. The Jedburgh program called for parachuting into occupied
territory, making contact with the maquis, bringing in arms and training the
men in their use, and finally serving as liaison when the regular troops
arrived. But in D1, the regulars had
already arrived, and although a spectacular arms drop was achieved on 9
September (56 planes, 1200 containers), the FFI that received the weapons would
be preparing to join de Lattre's army rather than develop independent ambushes
and sabotage. Some of the Jedburgh teams
adopted to the new situation but others felt they were simply duplicating
efforts made by earlier arrivals. The
missions were making less and less sense as the regular armies engaged in
combat with heavy weapons not available to the FFI and Jedburghs. SAS units, with heavier equipment, were
better able to keep up, and SAS Abel fought alongside the American 45th
Division while Truscott's VI Corps made its way toward Vesoul. But by the end
of September, most of the Jedburghs, as well as the SOE missions, had left
France. This was not only because, from the Allied point of view, the missions
had accomplished their purposes, but because de Gaulle, preoccupied with
establishing the authority of his government, was anxious to eliminate British
and American influence from France as soon as possible.
The French 2nd Corps--toward Dijon
After the victory over the
German rearguard at Villefranche, units of Monsabert's 2nd Corps pursued the
retreating 19th Army toward Mâcon, Châlon-sur-Saône and farther west, toward
Autun, where Demetz' 2e Dragons were heading.
In the van were Sudre's CC1 on the right flank covering the west bank of
the Saône opposite the American 117th Cavalry.
To their left, CC2, under Kienst, headed for Beaune, while du Vigier's 1
DB and the 1ere DFL (DMI), under Brosset, followed after as rapidly as fuel
would permit. It was important to reach
Autun as soon as possible, because thousands of Germans, and in particular Kampfgruppe Bauer,
strained to reach the gateway between Dijon and Langres before it was shut.
De Lattre himself had been
preoccupied with mopping-up operations in the south, and had come up to Lyon
only after its liberation on 3 September, finally establishing his headquarters
at Mâcon on the 6th. While focussing his
attention on the liberation of Autun, de Lattre also came to grips with another
problem that would concern him to the end of the war. This was the amalgamation
of FFI units into the regular army.
This book has dealt
continuously with the cooperation of the Allies with the FFI as they pursued
Wiese's 19th Army up the Rhône valley. On the American side, there was no
question of an amalgamation, even though many commanders were grateful for the
assistance of the FFI. American GIs had fought side by side with maquisards,
but attempts on the part of junior officers to keep FFI units with them had
been frowned upon by higher military authorities. Many Resistance groups
returned to their homes after liberation, but hundreds of others wanted to
continue the fight, either as separate units or incorporated into the regular
army.
At Autun the matter reached
an acute stage with the presence there of numerous elements of Colonel
Schneider's GMSO, Groupement Mobile des FFI du Sud-Ouest. This was not a group of several maquis under
a departmental command, but a force of thousands organized under the auspices
of General Cochet, Délégué Militaire Opérations Sud, and of newly designated
Commandant des FFI du Sud-Ouest, General Chevance-Bertin, with Colonel
Schneider authorized by them to consolidate the maquis of the south, southwest,
and center into a force that could protect de Latttre's flank. With his men fighting at Autun alongside of
Demetz' Dragons, Schneider sought from
de Lattre a recognition and regularization of the FFI contribution. He believed his FFI men, with their own
traditions and tactics should be independent, even more, should provide the
nucleus of a revamped military force, made up of French youth, not veterans
from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
De Lattre, as well as de
Gaulle, knew that the FFI had to play their part in the final liberation of
France--but they could not accept action that would undermine Army B, now the
First French Army. De Lattre wanted the amalgamation to succeed--"je
voulais ce succčs de toute mon âme parceque je le savais nécessaire"-- and
he became a staunch champion of this vital requirement. But there were heavy arguments and many disputes. General Catroux, governor general of Algeria,
and two prominent Americans, Henry Cabot Lodge, liaison officer with de Lattre,
and William Bullitt, former ambassador to France and now an officer in the
French army, witnessed a stormy session on 13 September involving de Lattre and
Schneider. But in the following days a working plan was developed, basic
principles laid down at a meeting on the 22nd, promulgated thereafter by
Minister of Defense Diethelm. By the end
of September some 50,000 members of the FFI had been incorporated into the
French army, but more months would be needed to smooth out the formidable
problems that the amalgamation involved.
Juncture of Normandy and Mediterranean
Forces.
On the same day, 11
September, that the French II Corps was preparing to move on Dijon, radio contact was made with Leclerc's 2nd DB,
whose main force was pressing toward Chaumont and Epinal. More contacts
developed during the twelfth as both Leclerc and Monsabert joined together in
assaulting the vigorous defense of Taglichsbeck and Brodowsky at Langres.
De Lattre was inordinately
pleased that the junction of the Mediterranean forces with those from Normandy
had been achieved by French troops. When Eisenhower later reported the occasion
as a junction of the 3rd Army of Patton (an American) with the 7th Army of
Patch (an American), de Lattre protested. As the French elements were parts of
the respective armies, Eisenhower was technically correct. But de Lattre felt
that at least mention should have been made of Frenchmen meeting Frenchmen in
the liberation of France--an event of great significance in the development of
a rejuvenated and reinvigorated French army.
Before the end of
September, the mission and organization of Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON had so
completely changed that a new orientation is necessary to comprehend the role
of what was the Seventh Army in the final phases of the war. These alterations
call appropriately for another study and provide a logical termination for this
one.
From Pursuit to Attrition
It had long since been
decided that when the junction with the Normandy forces occured, providing a
common front under Eisenhower's command, de Lattre's First French Army would
become independent, with both it and the US Seventh Army constituting the Sixth
Army Group under the command of General Jacob Devers. By 15 September,
therefore, with the Germans no longer retreating but determined to hold a line
along the Moselle and west of the Vosges and the Belfort Gap, Devers had no
mission except that formulated by Eisenhower.
Unfortunately for Devers,
de Lattre, Patch, and Truscott, who saw the possibilities of reaching the Rhine
via Belfort, Eisenhower held to a completely different strategic concept. He
believed that pressure should be exerted all along a broad front, with special
exertions at selected points. He favored an advance toward the Ruhr and the
Saar, and at the moment was giving maximum support to General Montgomery's
assault plan, MARKET GARDEN, scheduled for 17 September. In spite of Devers' arguments for a southern
offensive, Eisenhower thought of the Sixth Army Group as simply maintaining
pressure on a low-priority segment of the broad front, while the main assaults
got underway elsewhere.
With Devers forces not
under consideration for a major assault, there was no longer any reason to
accept Truscott's argument that his VI Corps should leap ahead with the
unwieldy consequence of splitting de Lattre's forces. Patch agreed with de
Lattre that his two corps should be brought together, and on 14 September
ordered Monsabert's 2nd Corps to move behind Truscott, relieve his 45th
Division, and take up positions facing Belfort alonside Béthouart's 1st Corps,
hinged on Switzerland. Truscott was to terminate plans for an American move on
Belfort, now left to the French, and to thrust farther north, toward St.-Dié
and Strasbourg. As the official American historian notes, in Riviera to the Rhine, "For all purposes the campaign in
southern France was officially over and a new one begun. . . ." And in de Lattre's words, "Le 'Fuhrer' a
donné ŕ ses soldats . . . l'ordre de défendre les avancées de Belfort jusqu'ŕ
la derničre goutte de sang. Pour Monsabert comme c'était déjŕ le cas pour
Béthouart la poursuite est terminée. Une bataille d'usure va commencer." .
Chapter 20 Conclusion
Inevitably, in concluding a study on the
French Resistance, one must ask: How
helpful were the Maquis? Was there a
solid and effective relationship among the FFI, the special forces, and the
Allied regulars?
To a direct question, a direct answer: The Maquis brought substantial assistance to
the regular forces. Comments from Allied
units, even though they rarely identify individual persons or groups, bear
consistent witness to Resistance cooperation and aid, just as German statements
reiterate the repugnance and fear that governed the occupiers' attitude toward
the "terrorists."
"The Maquis scour the hills . . . bring
in prisoners . . . patrol at night . . . they work in close collaboration with
the regular Allied forces." So ran
the comment of a war correspondent with the 45th
Division.<M^>1<D> The 180th
Infantry Operational Report for August 1944 acknowledges FFI aid "from the
first day." The Combat Team
"received information in every town," "reports of enemy strength
were accurate," a cut-off platoon "escaped with the aid of the French
who cared for them and guided them back."
"The continual harassing by the Maquis of the German supply lines
and communications weakened the enemy to the extent that he was unable to put
up an organized resistance."<M^>2<D> A report from an officer of the 142nd
Infantry echoes this refrain: "The
FFI have been a constant and thorough help in giving us valuable information,
in posting lookouts on high ground around us, and in actually fighting and
capturing the enemy. They deserve a
great deal of our gratitude and respect."<M^>3<D> Occasionally one finds that a good word for
special agents crops up: The 117th
Reconnaissance Squadron reported that "strong support was received from
the local Maquis who were well organized in this vicinity by the OSS. Their splendid assistance although
ill-equipped was indeed an inspiration to the American forces. . . . Their
deeds will live forever in the memory of the
Squadron."<M^>4<D> At
higher levels, officers also expressed their appreciation of Resistance
help. General Butler is generous in
recalling how his Task Force benefited from FFI actions:<M^>5<D>
These
stalwart sons of France, and sons of the Blue Devils....proved invaluable to
us. They reinforced the meager infantry
in critical situations and guarded over our life line to the rear. . . . It is only fair to state that without the
Maquis our mission would have been far more difficult, if indeed not possible.
The VI
Corps commander, General Truscott, echoes these sentiments:<M^>6<D>
The
Maquis were well provided with arms and explosives by the Allies, and Allied
officers with communications had parachuted in to assist them in coordinating
their operations. We had expected a good
deal of assistance from them and we were not disappointed. Their knowledge of the country, of enemy
dispositions and movements, was invaluable, and their fighting ability was
extraordinary.
Unarmed, the <MI>maquisards<D>
could of course help the Allies with information and guide service, but the
assistance they could provide as soldiers depended on what kind of weapons and
training they had. Some of their arms
came from hidden French army supplies, but the most effective ones, the Sten
and Bren automatic guns, the bazookas and P.I.A.T.s, the plastic explosives,
reached them in the cylindrical containers, over 20,000 of them in southern
France, parachuted by the Allies to hundreds of prearranged drop zones. To southern France, more than 3,000 tons of
supplies, as well as 500 persons<197>organizers and
instructors<197>arrived by parachute.
When the program reached its highest efficiency in mid-1944, more and
more material reached the Maquis: For
example, on the night of August 12, eleven aircraft took off from Algiers, flew
to their assigned pinpoints, and dropped 67,000 pounds of ammunition and
supplies, 18 "Joes," and 225,000 pamphlets. Any estimate of Resistance success must
assign credit to those outside France<197>the British, American, and
French organizers in SOE, OSS, and BCRA, the directors and packers in the
supply depots, the pilots and crews of aircraft, the communication experts and
radio operators<197>all of whom contributed to the end result: harassing and driving out the Nazi
occupiers.<M^>7<D>
Several specific actions highlight the value
of FFI assistance. A prime example has
to be the destruction of the bridge over the Drá“áme River between Livron
and Loriol. There the retreating Germans
confronted a devastating road-block, with men and equipment backed up for
miles. Had Truscott's VI Corps been able
to concentrate more fire power at the Drá“áme, the Americans might
literally have destroyed the Nineteenth Army, stymied and forced to a
last-ditch fight by reason of Maquis sabotage.
Even then, although most of General Wiese's troops managed to escape,
the Allies were able to wreak enormous havoc, as anyone who in August 1944
witnessed the wreckage could testify.
Another service worth special emphasis must
be the argumentation of Gen. Henri Zeller, who persuaded Patch to accept the
merits of a thrust toward Grenoble.
Zeller arrived in Naples in early August when Seventh Army operational
plans gave major attention to reaching Toulon, Marseille, and the Rhá“áne,
with no more than flank protection to the north and east. Zeller served as the influential catalyst in
getting those plans altered; General Wilson, at Patch's request, modified the
ANVIL/DRAGOON order to permit a march toward Sisteron. When Task Force Butler and VI Corps elements
drove quickly to Sisteron, Aspres, and Gap, they took Pflaum's 157th Division
by surprise and caused it to abandon Grenoble on August 22. With Pflaum's withdrawal, Wiese's Nineteenth
Army lost a buffer against an attack from the east and, had it not been for the
extraordinary mobility of the 11th Panzer Division, would have found its flank
dangerously exposed.
The FFI played a significant role in areas
that the Seventh Army by-passed. Along
the Alpine frontier, more FFI than regular troops kept harassing the Germans
until elements of de Lattre's French First Army appeared on the scene. In that vast mountainous area south of Lake
Geneva<197>the Haute-Savoie, Savoie, and eastern Ain
Departments<197>the Seventh Army left the Maquis to cope with the Germans
as best they could. Also, to the west,
once Seventh Army joined Patton's Third Army, thousands of Germans found
themselves trapped, confronted not with regular troops, but with the FFI. Any account of Maquis contributions must
examine the Alps and southwestern France, although this study, limited to the
cooperation of Maquis and Seventh Army, makes no attempt to chronicle
Resistance activity in regions where the guerrillas fought essentially on their
own.
Examples and testimony can be repeated to
make a conclusive case: The French
Resistance seriously hampered the German forces and provided effective
assistance to the Allied forces of ANVIL/DRAGOON. This is not to say that in all situations
complete harmony governed relations between the regulars and the
guerrillas. There were instances in
which the Allied commanders, not comprehending the capabilities of the
insurgents, called upon the <MI>maquisards<D> to serve as if they
were a well-trained infantry. Such
situations caused unnecessary casualties and occasional hard feelings. On the other hand, many of the underground
fighters, imbued with an implacable compulsion to kill Germans, complained when
they were assigned to minor roles, such as the guarding of prisoners.
While most of the French within the
ANVIL/DRAGOON area hailed the Americans as welcome liberators, enthusiasm for
all aspects of Yankee tactics was not unanimous. Many French civilians believed that Allied
bombers missed more bridges and hit more towns than was necessary. Criticism of badly aimed air raids came
consistently from Communists, but all French people deplored wanton destruction
that served no purpose. Even the
guerrillas, much as they admired American tanks and howitzers, sometimes
expressed shock at the overkill tactics whereby shelling might destroy a town
in an effort to oust a handful of enemy defenders.
The foregoing problems, however, were minor
when viewed in terms of the overall accomplishments of regular troops supported
by thousands of <MI>maquisards<D>.
Particularly impressive was the way in which much of the cooperation had
to be improvised. The G.I.'s had
received virtually no briefing on French guerrillas, and were agreeably
surprised at the difference between the French and the Italian civilians they
had encountered south of Rome. As one
Yankee soldier told a Frenchman in Digne:
"If the Italians had supported us the way the French have, the war
would already be over."<M^>8<D> The cartoonist Bill Mauldin, who had been
with the 45th Division in Italy and followed it to France, recalled: "The French were honestly and sincerely
glad to see the Americans come, and the farther north we worked the more
hospitable the people became. I had the
feeling we were regarded truly as liberators, and not as walking bread
baskets. It was a far cry from
Italy."<M^>9<D> With
little information about Seventh Army strategy, the Maquis could sense the
general direction of the Allied offensive and rallied round, "out of the
woodwork," to render what assistance they could. They provided immediate on-the-spot
information about German positions, even though their estimates of enemy
numbers tended to be exaggerated.
Advance units, such as Task Force Butler, urgently needed tactical
intelligence and could not wait for army's G-2 to factor in the information
from air surveys and ULTRA messages.
Butler's decision to occupy Digne and Gap, providing him with flank
protection, was clearly influenced by Maquis arguments.
Could this mutual assistance between Maquis
and regulars have been less improvised and better organized? Indeed it could have been, but only with
direction at the highest levels, and with an organization less cumbersome than
the one that existed. Even so, if the
ANVIL decision had been made earlier and the advance not so rapid, many of the
problems might have sorted themselves out.
Symptomatic of the entire operation's complexity stands the organization
diagram, referred to in Chapter 5, wherein General Cochet attempted to outline
the relationships: to the French chief
of staff, under the minister of war, in de Gaulle's provisional government; to
Soustelle's DGSS and the "Service Action" within it; to General
Maitland Wilson and sections of AFHQ; to SPOC; to 4-SFU; to General Patch's
Seventh Army; to General de Lattre's Army B; to the military delegates in
southern France as well as to the <MI>chefs<D> FFI. This simplification leaves out, of course,
the complicated divisions within each office<197>for example, relations
between SOE and OSS within SPOC, or other activities such as communication and
codes, intelligence and counterintelligence, scheduling of aircraft. With three nationalities involved, together
with air, naval, and ground forces, in a complex amphibious operation, no
improvement in coordination could have been made in the short time available
for planning and execution.
Normally a major operation requires months of
preparation, and, if the campaign is to progress smoothly, it needs to
correspond approximately to the planners' time schedule. ANVIL, however, was not normal: The final decision came only on July 2, six
weeks before the landings. To be sure,
planning for ANVIL had proceeded since the Teheran Conference where, late in
1943, the Big Three agreed on a landing in southern France, but this planning
could not, for security reasons, bring the French Resistance into top-level
decisions. To include the French would
have required, on the Allied military side, a directive at the highest
echelon<197>specifically the Combined Chiefs of Staff<197>but the
Combined Chiefs could not take initiative without the approval of Churchill and
Roosevelt, and the American president refused to recognize de Gaulle's National
Committee as the French provisional government.
Roosevelt's unbending position prevented a clear cut early acceptance of
Gaullist officers as the legal and official representatives of France. Churchill, while supporting SOE and the
Resistance in southeastern France, so strongly opposed ANVIL that he forced a
postponement until scarcely a month remained before the troops were scheduled
to land.
Suppose Roosevelt, Churchill, and the
Combined Chiefs of Staff had unanimously and enthusiastically concurred that
ANVIL must coincide with OVERLORD in late May or early June, and that the Big
Three had recognized de Gaulle as heading a French provisional government. Assume also that the Italian campaign
proceeded on schedule and that no Anzio prevented an early release of landing
craft for ANVIL. Under such conditions,
the Allies would have supported Gaullist delegates and liberation plans. Would there then have been in France a
unified military organization, more effective than the FFI structure headed by
General Koenig? If this hypothetical
Allied recognition had come in, say, February or March 1944, would the FFI have
been, in June, a stronger and more effective force? An affirmative answer would have required a
unification of Resistance movements as well as a massive introduction of
weapons, instructors, and qualified officers to mold the FFI into a cohesive
force. It is unlikely that these
conditions could have been met.
Even if we assume that the Combined Chiefs of
Staff agreed to send significant amounts of aid to the Resistance, we are still
faced with a formidable problem: The
Supreme Command would have to divert material, officers, and aircraft from
other programs. If planes capable of
dropping supplies were to be used, they would have to be acquired from missions
already going to Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy.
Note the actual situation in 1943 to 1945:<M^>10<D>
Number of Sorties
Gross tonnage
Greece 2,064 4,205
Yugoslavia 11,632 16,469
Italy 4,280 5,907
17,976 26,581
Compare these figures with those for southern
France:
S. France 1,713 2,878
When one considers that, in
spite of Churchill's personal efforts to intensify aid to southeastern France,
the actual assistance authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff was so far
below the quotas for the Balkans and Italy that it would have taken enormous
pressures at the very highest levels to alter the
priorities.<M^>11<D>
Granted that political and practical
considerations militated against sending significant aid to the Resistance,
there is still another element that must be factored in: How many Allied officers in 1944 were sold on
guerrilla warfare? Consider not simply
the Marshalls and Alanbrookes, or even the Eisenhowers, Montgomerys and de
Lattres, but the generals who commanded corps and divisions, the colonels and
majors who were close to the firing line.
No courses in commando operations then graced the curriculum of
Sandhurst, West Point, and St.-Cyr. Such
courses did exist in 1944, but many were sponsored by SOE and OSS,
organizations frequently viewed with mistrust by regular officers. During World War II, no television series
romanticized the Green Berets.
Clearly, the regular military staffs were
willing to obtain whatever help they could from guerrillas, but no planning
officer would have dared place such reliance on Resistance support that he
would have based an operation on it.<M^>12<D> Planning officers in 1944 did not think in
FFI terms; they thought about air support, artillery, tanks, mobility, and
logistics, while the <MI>maquisard<D> talked of surprise attacks,
ambushes, sabotage, living off the land, and knowledge of seldom-used mountain
passes. Colonel Zeller was surprised, in
Naples two weeks before the landing, how little French regular officers
understood conditions inside France.
While the FFI, if recognized earlier and more
strongly supported, could have been somewhat more effective in the
ANVIL/DRAGOON campaign, Resistance forces could not have been the decisive
element. But any attempt to evaluate the
relative effectiveness of the Resistance in southeastern France runs into an
insurmountable road-block: Hitler's
retreat order of August 16 produced a unique situation. With the Germans abandoning their hold on the
south, the Seventh Army advanced way ahead of schedule. Based on assumptions valid for Salerno and
Normandy, the ANVIL planners assumed a beachhead build-up of several weeks,
then a breakthrough, and finally possession of Grenoble and Lyon in three
months. In actual fact, the Allies
reached Grenoble in one week and were almost to the Rhine before three weeks
had passed.
If the planners' timetable had prevailed, the
historian, facing a completely different situation, might have reached
different conclusions. The Jedburghs,
the OGs, and other missions, all of whom complained that they were sent in too
late, would have had several months with the FFI before they were overrun. There would have been time to work with the
Maquis, to coordinate operations with regular forces, and to promote
fifth-column-type activities to hamper German defenses. The 4-SFU group, with its mission of
facilitating cooperation with the FFI, would have had a month to organize and
get all its personnel and transport ashore.
As it was, the first agents on land found the units they were to
accompany already 100 miles ahead of them.
The full complement of 4-SFU reached the beach after the Seventh Army
had left the Mediterranean Theater. If
cooperation with the Resistance appeared to be helter-skelter and improvised,
it was in part due to a rapidly moving retreat-and-pursuit situation.
While the liberation of Digne, Gap, Grenoble,
and Lyon came easily, in areas where the Germans decided to fight, the
conflicts reached different proportions.
In the two port cities, Toulon and Marseille, the Resistance had not in
the years of enemy occupation made any dents in the German defenses and, while
the Maquis hindered truck movements in the cities proper, it took de Lattre's
French First Army, with howitzers and armor, along with naval bombardment, to
force a surrender. Along the
Rhá“áne, where General Wiese was able to deploy three divisions, all of
the formidable array of artillery and air bombardment the Allies could
concentrate on a fifteen-mile stretch did not prevent the Germans from breaking
through. Also, defenses along the
Italian frontier, which the Germans were determined to hold, kept the Americans
and French at bay until well into 1945.
Thus, southeastern France does not provide
the conditions on which a complete and fair assessment of
Allied<196>Resistance cooperation can be based. However, if one is willing to forgo an exact
and quantitative analysis, one can affirm that, without help from the French
Resistance, the Allied task would have been extremely more difficult. Conversely, the regular armies boosted Maquis
morale and helped them accomplish tasks otherwise impossible. This was a symbiotic relationship, and the
Allied forces gratefully pay tribute to the French Resistance for the
incalculable benefits they reaped from their hidden ally.
Notes
Archives Nationales French
National Archives, Paris
FRUS
Foreign Relations of the United States.
Volumes published by the
Department of State.
NARA
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. RG = Record Group. E = Entry.
PRO Public
Record Office, Kew, London. WO = War Office. FO = Foreign Office. PREM = Premier. DEFE
= Defense.
SOE Archives Archives
of the Special Operations Executive, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London. As these
archives are not all open to the public, some citations
refer to material provided to the researcher in
writing on request.
Reports of Jedburgh teams and Operational
Groups (OGs) are identified by the mission's code name (e.g., CHLOROFORM
Report). Unless otherwise indicated,
these reports are located in NARA: RG226, E 154, Box 156. (Duplicates in E 190, Box 741, and E 143,
Boxes 10 and 11.) U.S. Army reports and
histories, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, supervised
by NARA's Military Reference Branch.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1. The pros and cons of
ANVIL have been dealt with in detail:
See Alan F. Wilt, <MI>The French Riviera Campaign of August
1944<D> (Carbondale, Ill., 1981), 1<196>24; Maurice Matloff,
"The ANVIL Decision," in K. R. Greenfield (ed.), <MI>Command
Decisions<D> (New York, 1959); A. L. Funk, "<MI>Considá,árations
stratá,ágiques sur l'invasion du sud de la France<D>," in Henri
Michel (ed.), <MI>La guerre en Má,áditerranná,áe<D> (Paris, 1971),
439<196>65; F. H. Hinsley, et al., <MI>British Intelligence in the
Second World War<D>, III, Part 2 (New York, 1988), 316<196>18.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = United States Seventh Army,
<MI>Report of Operations in France and<D>
<MI>Germany<D>, 1944<196>1945 (Heidelberg, 1946), I,
1<196>14. Forrest Pogue,
<MI>George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory<D> (New York, 1973),
373<196>77. <MI>The
Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943<D> (Foreign Relations of the
United States [hereafter FRUS], Washington, D. C., 1970), 898, 945, 1025, 1038.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Charles de Gaulle,
<MI>Má,ámoires de guerre<D> (Paris, 1956), II (Politique); English ed. (New York, 1959)
section "Politics." Arthur L.
Funk, <MI>Charles de Gaulle: The
Crucial Years<D> (Norman, Oklahoma, 1959), 177<196>236; Marcel
Vigneras, <MI>Rearming the French<D> (Washington, D.C., 1957),
86<196>129.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = A. de Dainville, L'ORA: La Résistance de
l'Armée (Paris, 1974).
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Henri Michel, <MI>Histoire
de la Rá,ásistance<D> (Paris, 1950), is the classic while his
<MI>The Shadow War: Resistance in
Europe 1939<196>1945 <D>(London, 1972) covers a wider field. On the MUR:
John F. Sweets, <MI>The Politics of Resistance in France,
1940<196>1944<D> (DeKalb, Ill., 1976). See also H. R. Kedward, <MI>Resistance
in Vichy France<D> (Oxford, 1978) and the massive 5-volume study, in
French: Henri Noguá_áres,
<MI>Histoire de la Rá,ásistance en France<D> (Paris,
1974<196>81).
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Charles Tillon, <MI>Les
F.T.P.: la guá,árilla en France<D> (Paris, 1972).
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = For details on the BCRA, see Passy
(Andrá,á Dewavrin), <MI>Souvenirs<D> (vol.I, <MI>Deuxiá_áme
bureau á…á Londres<D>, vol. II, <MI>10 Duke Street,
Londres<D>, vol. III, <MI>Missions secrá_átes en France<D>
[Monte Carlo, 1947]); Jacques Soustelle, <MI>Envers et contre
tout<D>, 2 vols. (Paris, 1950); as well as de Gaulle's memoirs.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = On SOE see M. R. D. Foot,
<MI>SOE: An Outline History of the
Special Operations Executive<D> (London, 1984), and for operations in
France, the same author's authoritative <MI>SOE in France<D>
(London, 1966); Marcel Ruby, <MI>F Section SOE: The Buckmaster Networks <D>(London,
1988).
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = A. L. Funk, "Churchill,
Eisenhower, and the French Resistance,"
<MI>Military Affairs<D> (Feb., 1981), 31<196>33; David
Stafford, <MI>Britain and European Resistance, 1940<196>1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive,
with Documents<D> (London, 1980), 150<196>52.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Forrest Pogue, <MI>The
Supreme Command<D> (Washington D.C., 1954), 152<196>54; Foot,
<MI>SOE in France<D>, 31<196>32,236; PRO, WO 204/1834; NARA,
RG 226, E 168, Box 81. For SHAEF plan of
March 17, 44, <MI>The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower<D>, A. D.
Chandler and S. E. Ambrose (eds.), <MI>The War Years<D>, III
(Baltimore, 1970), 1771. For SOE policy,
see Chiefs of Staff directive, March 20, 1943 (PRO, CAB 80/68) published as
Document 7 in Stafford, <MI>Britain and European Resistance<D>,
248<196>57; Foot, <MI>SOE in France<D>, 233<196>35.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = "L'Etat Major des Forces
Franá‡áaises de l'Intá,árieur," in <MI>Les rá,áseaux ACTION de
la France Combattante<D> (Paris, 1986), 259<196>70; <MI>The
French Forces of the Interior<D> (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.),
cited hereafter as <MI>FFI History<D>; communications to author of
Paul van der Stricht and Henri Ziegler.
An ardent flier, Colonel Ziegler later became head of Air France.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Funk, <MI>Charles de
Gaulle<D>, 233<196>76; Julian G. Hurstfield,
<MI>America<D> <MI>and the French Nation,
1939<196>1945<D> (Chapel Hill and London, 1986), 207<196>19;
Foot, <MI>SOE in France<D>, 360<196>64, 385,435; Pogue,
<MI>Supreme Command<D>, 236<196>37; PRO, WO 219/2330.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 2: THE RESISTANCE IN SOUTHEASTERN FRANCE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = For books in English on the French
Resistance, see Henri Michel, <MI>The Shadow War<D> (London, 1972),
David Schoenbrun, <MI>Soldiers of the Night<D> (New York, 1980),
Henri Frenay, <MI>The Night Will End<D> (New York, 1975), Martin
Blumenson, <MI>The Vildá,á Affair<D> (Boston, 1977), Robert Aron,
<MI>France Reborn<D> (New York, 1964), John Sweets, <MI>The
Politics of Resistance in France<D> (DeKalb, Ill., 1976), Frida Knight,
<MI>The French Resistance<D> (London, 1975), and H. R. Kedward,
<MI>Resistance in Vichy France<D> (New York, 1978). In French, the standard works are Henri
Michel, <MI>Histoire de la Rá,ásistance<D> (Paris, 1950), Henri
Noguá_áres, <MI>Histoire de la Rá,ásistance<D>, 5 vols. (Paris,
1974<196>81).
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Lucien Micoud, <MI>Nous
á,átions 150 maquisards<D> (Valence, 1982), 197<196>201. (A U.S. atlas reveals neither a town nor
county called "Madison" in Pennsylvania.)
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = The Drá“áme Resistance is
well documented: In 1989 appeared Jean Abonnenc's <MI>Pour l'amour de la
France: Drá“áme-Vercors 1940<196>1944<D>, published in
Valence by the "Fá,ádá,áration des unitá,ás combattantes de la
Rá,ásistance et des F.F.I. de la Drá“áme." Besides the Micoud book cited above, there
are other memoirs: General de Lassus Saint-Geniá_ás (Drá“áme FFI chief)
and Pierre de Saint-Prix (Resistance prefect) collaborated on <MI>Combats
pour le Vercors et pour la libertá,á<D> (2d ed., Valence, 1984), Cdt. P.
Pons, <MI>De la Rá,ásistance á…á la libá,áration<D> (Romans,
1962), Rená,á Ladet, <MI>Ils ont refusá,á de subir: La Rá,ásistance en Drá“áme<D>
(Crest, 1987). Additional material is
available in the 72 AJ 39 files, <MI>Archives Nationales<D>, Paris.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Pá_áre Richard Duchamblo,
<MI>Maquisards et Gestapo<D>, Cahier 16 (Gap, 1949), 3,
25<196>32. The writer has interviewed
Henry McIntosh (of Jedburgh team CHLOROFORM), General de Lassus, and Francis
Cammaerts, all of whom knew L'HERMINE.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = De Lassus, <MI>Combats pour
le Vercors<D>, 27<196>28. In
the appendix of <MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>, there is a Table
of Organization for FFI units as of Aug. 20, 1944, with commentary on changes
in previous months. The northern sector
had three battalions, comprising five or six companies each; in the center,
under Captain Benezech (ANTOINE), were eleven companies, and in the south,
dominated by the FTP, were some twelve companies. Of special interest to this study is the 4th
AS Battalion, under Captain Bernard, whose five companies fought with the
Americans in the Battle of Montá,álmar.
For more details, see the section "Resumá,á-Unitá,ás militaires de
la Rá,ásistance en Drá“áme," in Ladet, <MI>Ils ont refusá,á de
subir<D>, 352<196>74.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Charles de Gaulle, <MI>War
Memoirs<D> (1 vol. ed., New York, 1967), 618. Between June 1943 and May 1944, the French
Resistance sabotaged 1822 locomotives.
After the Normandy landings, during June, July, and August, 658 sabotage
operations were executed and 820 locomotives were damaged (<MI>FFI
History<D>, 1352). Annex F of the
<MI>FFI History<D> (1352<196>81) lists specific acts of
sabotage by region. Sabotage data is
found in PRO: WO 204/1965, 2348; also in
"OSS Aid to the French Resistance,
Operations in southern France, SO-RF Section Missions: Sabotage," NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 741. The French "Comitá,á d'Histoire de la
deuxiá_áme guerre mondiale," and the Institut d'Histoire du Temps
Prá,ásent, Paris, have published many departmental maps showing sabotage.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Pour l'amour de la
France<D>, 142. Details on
sabotage, 132<196>56. See
also: "Coupures et attentats sur
les voies ferrá,áes sur le territoire du dá,ápartement de la
Drá“áme," <MI>Archives Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 39.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Report of the Supreme Commander to
the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe (Washington, D.C.,
1946), 53.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Operation UNION I Report, SO-RF
Missions (NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 741);
<MI>Archives Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 545; Edward Hymoff, <MI>The
OSS in World War II<D>, rev. ed. (New York, 1986), 246<196>49
(Anecdotes about Ortiz); de Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le Vercors<D>,
26<196>27.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Material on Cammaerts comes from
many interviews and considerable correspondence over several years. Mr. Cammaerts has read and commented on the
sections relating to his activities.
Cammaerts is featured in several journalistic accounts, notably E. H.
Cookridge, <MI>They Came from the Sky<D> (New York, 1967),
73<196>151, and Madeleine Masson, <MI>Christine<D> (London,
1975). Cookridge's account, while
readable and detailed, owes much of its color to a fanciful imagination. Accurate information can be found in Foot's
<MI>SOE in France<D>, 81<196>82, 253<196>56,
392<196>94, 412, and in Cammaert's own account (in French) of his activities
in the Drá“áme (<MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>,
80<196>86). Official accounts: SOE
Archives, London; <MI>Archives nationales<D>, Paris, 72 AJ 39, 85;
War Diary in <MI>Covert Warfare<D>, Vol. 5 (New York, 1989);
NARA: RG 226, E 190, Boxes 132, 139.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Pons, <MI>De la Rá,ásistance
á…á la libá,áration<D>, 23<196>31. Interview and correspondence of author with
Pierre Raynaud.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Cookridge, <MI>They Came
from the Sky<D>, 96<196>97; for Cammaerts' contacts in Basses
Alpes: Jean Garcin, <MI>De
l'armistice á…á la Libá,áration dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>
(Digne, 1983), 126<196>27.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 238; Richard Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards et
Gestapo<D>, Cahier No. 7 (Gap, 1947).
Richard Duchamblo, <MI>Histoires de notre ville<D> (Gap,
1991), 7<196>16. As Moreaud was an
engineer employed by the electric utility company <MI>Energie
Alpine<D>, he knew the vulnerable points of transmission lines.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Cammaerts to the author.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = JOCKEY Report, <MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 39.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Foot, <MI>SOE in
France<D>, 82; see also JOCKEY report, July 1944: "Among last deliveries from Algiers
results appalling both in Vercors and south Drá“áme. Half material broken or useless."
(NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 132, Folder
710). Ray Wooler, who supervised
parachute packing for MASSINGHAM, explained the situation thus: "The trouble was not careless packing by
the Spanish Republicans we used in this work, but the fact that we had to use
parachutes made in Egypt of Egyptian cotton for lack of parachute silk in the
Middle East. These parachutes were far
more prone to failure than the silk ones, but they were all we had and it was
that or nothing, until silk became available in the required quantities from US
sources." (Information provided the
writer by Sir Brooks Richards.)
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Excerpts from "Special
Operations Executive Directive for 1943," Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of
March 20, 1943, in David Stafford, <MI>Britain and European Resistance,
1940<196>1945<D> (London, 1980), 250<196>51.
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = On the CDLs, see Hilary Footit and
John Simmonds, <MI>France 1943<196>1945<D> (New York, 1988),
363<196>69.
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = De Gaulle,
<MI>Memoirs<D>, 491<196>94, 591; Charles-Louis Foulon,
<MI>Le pouvoir en province á…á la libá,áration<D> (Paris,
1975), 277; <MI>Les rá,áseaux ACTION de la France Combattante<D>,
published for the "Amicale" by France Empire (Paris, 1986),
98<196>102.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = Dossier Zeller, 72 AJ 66
(<MI>Archives Nationales<D>); see also 72 AJ 449. Interview of author with General Zeller, Mar.
21, 1969. COMAC (the military Committee
of Action within the CNR) approved Zeller's appointment at the request of
Fourcaud, head of the UNION mission; the appointment was confirmed by General
Revers, head of the ORA.
@NUMBER = 21.
@NUMBER2 = De Gaulle,
<MI>Memoirs<D>, 489<196>91, 632<196>33; for detailed
material on the CNR, see Rená,á Hostache, <MI>Le Conseil National de la
Rá,ásistance<D> (Paris, 1958).
@NUMBER = 22.
@NUMBER2 = Foulon, <MI>Pouvoir en
province<D>, 116, 122<196>31, 232<196>36, 280.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 3: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
@HEAD1 = IN
SOUTHEASTERN FRANCE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Douglas Dodds-Parker,
<MI>Setting Europe Ablaze<D> (London, 1983), 117.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Anthony Cave Brown, <MI>The
Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan<D> (New York, 1982), 297<196>340;
Thomas F. Troy, <MI>Donovan and the CIA<D> (Frederick, Md., 1981),
162<196>208; R. Harris Smith, <MI>OSS: The Secret History of
America's First Central Intelligence Agency<D> (Berkeley, California,
1972), 69<196>72; Bradley F. Smith, <MI>The Shadow
Warriors<D> (New York, 1983), 178<196>80, 227<196>28; W. F.
Craven and J. L. Cate, <MI>The Army Air Forces in World War II
<D>(Chicago, 1951), 499<196>506; Fabrizio Calvi,
<MI>OSS: La guerre secrá_áte en
France<D> (Paris, 1990), 85<196>95, 139<196>79; Max Corvo,
<MI>The O.S.S. in Italy<D> (Westport, Conn., 1990),
41<196>82; <MI>The War Report of the OSS<D>, edited by Kermit
Roosevelt (New York, 1976).
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = OSS Historical File (NARA: RG 226, E 99, Box 30, Folder 144). By the
beginning of 1944, SOE supported de Gaulle rather than Giraud; SOE's final
operation with a Giraudist agent was Lt. Marcel Sobra's HERCULE mission,
Jan.<196>May 1944. OSS continued
to maintain contacts with Giraudist services for a longer time.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Jacques Soustelle,
<MI>Envers et contre tout<D>, II, <MI>D'Alger á…á Paris<D>
(Paris, 1950), 285<196>96, 323<196>28, 351<196>52,
388<196>91; Noguá_áres, <MI>Histoire de la Rá,ásistance<D>,
V, 354<196>55.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Communication of General Constans
to author, Feb. 15, 1985. Communication
of Sir Brooks Richards to author, July 7, 1988.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Report on SPOC dated July 12, 1944
(NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 132). SPOC was subordinated to General Wilson's
Supreme Mediterranean Command and, thus, came administratively under AFHQ: Lt. Gen. Sir James A. H. Gammell (British),
chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Lowell Rooks (U.S.), deputy chief of staff. More closely associated with SPOC, for policy
and administration, were the officers heading the AFHQ Special Operations Section
in G-3: Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce (U.S.) and
Brig. Gen. B. F. Coffey (U.S).
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = In an earlier book, the current
writer referred to the fact that arms promised the Algerian insurgents never
arrived (<MI>The Politics of TORCH<D> [Lawrence, Kansas, 1974],
155). It is now known that Brooks
Richards was sent by SOE, and that failure to deliver them derived from a
confusion over signals ("Operation TORCH and its Political
Aftermath," special issue of <MI>Franco-British Studies<D>,
No. 7, Spring 1989, 38<196>45).
For details of Richard's role in Tunisia: Carleton Coon, <MI>A North African
Story, 1941<196>1942<D> (Ipswich, Mass., 1980); Henri Rosencher,
<MI>Le sel, la cendre, et la flamme<D> (Privately printed, 1985),
151<196>52, 163<196>99, 232<196>33. After SPOC closed, Richards remained for four
years at the Embassy in Paris. He
continued in the foreign service with various appointments. He served as minister to Bonn
(1969<196>71), ambassador to Saigon (1972<196>74), and ambassador
to Greece (1974<196>78). He was
deputy secretary in the Cabinet Office (1978<196>80) and subsequently
security coordinator in Northern Ireland.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = On Jedburghs: AFHQ History of Special Operations (PRO:
WO/2030 B); for southern France:
"Report on Jedburghs" by Maj. H. N. Marten (NARA: RG 226, E 154, Box 56, Folder 945). For popular accounts: S. Alsop and T. Branden, <MI>Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage<D>
(New York, 1946); E. H. Cookridge, <MI>They Came from the Sky<D>
(New York, 1967).
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = "Report on O.G.'s in southern
France," prepared by Maj. Alfred T. Cox, Sept. 20, 1944 (NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 741). For recollections of an OG commander operating
in France: Serge Obolensky,
<MI>One Man in His Time<D> (New York, 1958).
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Report on SPOC (see n. 6); Fernand
Rude, who was able to examine virtually all the messages sent by a single
operator from the Vercors, estimates that several hundred were sent in a 50-day
period ("Le dialogue Vercors-Alger," <MI>Revue d'histoire de la
deuxiá_áme guerre mondiale<D>, XLIX [Jan. 1963], 79<196>110). A summary of messages in 1944 from the field
to London shows: Jan.: 620; May: 1,674, July:
3,472 (<MI>Les rá,áseaux ACTION<D>, 235).
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Foot, <MI>SOE in
France<D>, Appendix C (Supply), 470<196>77; Craven and Cate,
<MI>Army Air Forces in World War II<D>, III, 496<196>506;
John Ehrman, <MI>History of the Second World War: Grand
Strategy<D>, V (London, 1956), 325<196>26; Forrest Pogue,
<MI>The Supreme Command<D>, 156; Maj. H.G. Warren,
<MI>Special Operations: AAF Aid to
European Resistance Movements<D> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Historical Office, 1947); Hugh
Verity, <MI>We Landed by Moonlight<D> (London, 1978), and the
corrected and augmented French edition:
<MI>Nous atterrissions de nuit<D> (Paris, 1989); PRO: WO 204/1959.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Marten Report; Cox Report. Officially the OGs trained for southern
France were Company "B," 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion,
under the overall command of Col. Russell Livermore. (Company "A" was
"Italian," and Company "C" "Balkans.") NARA:
RG 226, E 143, Box 11.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Constans' desk diary, entry of 22
May 1944, communicated to author by General Constans.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Since Cochet had served briefly as
director of the <MI>Services Spá,áciaux<D> (Oct.<196>Nov.
1943) and had been replaced by Soustelle, a basis of friction already existed
(Soustelle, <MI>Envers et contre tout<D>, II, 289<196>92, 321). The antagonism is confirmed in a letter from
Maj. S. L. McKinney to Colonel Haskell, July 11, 1944 (NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 139, Folder 838). Soustelle considered General Cochet
uncooperative and given to grandiose, unworkable staff organization.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = "Note du gá,áná,áral Constans
á…á l'attention de Monsieur Rude, 1962," in <MI>Grenoble et le
Vercors<D>, Pierre Bolle (ed.) (Lyon, 1985), 291<196>94.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Cave Brown, <MI>Last
Hero<D>, 503<196>05; B. Smith, <MI>Shadow Warriors<D>,
187, 248.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Report of OSS Activities with 7th
Army, Oct. 14, 1944 (NARA: RG 226, E 99,
Folder 145, Box 30).
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = Reports on 4-SFU (NARA: RG 226, E 158, Box 5, Folder 67);
Headquarters 7th Army report (PRO: WO
204/1962).
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = Report of OSS Activities, 17.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 4: IMPACT OF THE NORMANY LANDINGS
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Harry C. Butcher, <MI>My
Three Years with Eisenhower<D> (New York, 1946), 540<196>41; AFHQ
History of Special Operations, Sec. VII, Annex E (PRO: WO 204/2030 B).
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = The Vercors has become a symbol of
French Resistance and has been described in many books: Paul Dreyfus, <MI>Vercors, citadelle de
libertá,á <D>(Paris, 1969); Pierre Tanant, <MI>Vercors, haut-lieu
de France<D> (Paris, 1947); H. Noguá_áres, <MI>Histoire de la
Rá,ásistance<D>, vol. V; Pierre Bolle (ed.), <MI>Grenoble et le
Vercors<D> (Lyon, 1985); Gen. de Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le
Vercors et pour la libertá,á<D> (Valence, 1984). In English, a journalistic account is Michael
Pearson, <MI>Tears of Glory<D> (New York, 1978) and a chapter in
Robert Aron, <MI>France Reborn <D>(New York, 1964), 182<196>208.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Madeleine Baudoin,
<MI>Histoire des Groupes Francs (M.U.R.) des Bouches-du-Rhá“áne<D>
(Paris, 1962), 137, 144<196>45.
Rossi was arrested and executed in 1944, but Lá,ácuyer survived the war,
continued his military career, and wrote memoirs, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous du
torá,áador<D> (Toulon, 1987). He
summarizes his early Resistance activities (16<196>60) and discusses in
detail his relations with Rossi. He
found Rossi "sympathetic, intelligent, active, and energetic" and
emphasizes that his differences and reservations applied not to the man but to
the "system" (38). The author
interviewed General Lá,ácuyer in 1984.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = SOE Archives; Lá,ácuyer,
<MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>, 294<196>336. Several of Lá,ácuyer's lieutenants were
assigned to the mission. A Polish
physician, Dr. Henri Rosencher, also came in
with the mission and has described the boat voyage from Corsica to the
French coast, and the landing on May 25 in his memoirs, <MI>Le sel, la
cendre, et la flamme, 252<196>56.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous
du torá,áador<D>, 44.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration
dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 17<196>18; Lá,ácuyer,
<MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>, 44<196>48.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Journal de Marche de la
Rá,ásistance en Ubaye<D>, published by the Amicale des Maquisards et
Rá,ásistants, Secteur Ubaye (Digne, <MI>n.d.<D>), 8<196>11
(hereafter cited as <MI>Ubaye Journal de Marche<D>). Henri Bá,áraud, <MI>La seconde guerre
mondiale dans les Hautes-Alpes et l'Ubaye<D> (Gap, 1990),
103<196>06; Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>,
47<196>48, 55<196>56, 296<196>97; Garcin,
<MI>Libá,áration dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>,
289<196>329. The Ubaye actions are
based on these works, together with SOE records and interview of Cammaerts and
Lá,ácuyer.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 322<196>23.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = The FFI command's radio operator
transmitting to Algiers was Lt. Robert Bennes (BOB), and to London Sous-Lt.
Argentin (TITIN). Cammaerts' JOCKEY
circuit was served by Auguste Floiras (ALBERT) and by Lieutenant Sereni
(ANTOINE). The transmissions to Algiers
went to SPOC, and the ones involving the French went to Colonel Constans, who
would reply when the concerns were essentially French. Rude, "Le dialogue Vercors-Alger,"
<MI>Revue d'histoire de la deuxiá_áme guerre mondiale<D>, XLIX
(Jan., 1963), 79<196>110.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Craven and Cate, <MI>Army
Air Forces<D>, III, 503<196>04; Marcel Vigneras, <MI>Rearming
the French<D> (Washington, D. C., 1957), 301<196>03; FRUS, 1944,
III, 692<196>93; Cave Brown, <MI>Last Hero<D>,
561<196>62; PRO: WO 204/1164;
interview of author with Joseph Haskell.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = JUSTINE, VEGANINE, CHLOROFORM
Reports; Pecquet report on EUCALYPTUS (NARA:
RG 226, E 190, Box 740).
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = JOCKEY Report, in <MI>War
Diary, OSS London<D>, III, 460<196>61 (NARA: Microfilm M 1623, Roll 6).
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration
dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 340<196>45.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards et
Gestapo<D>, 7th Cahier, 18th Cahier.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Cammaerts to author.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Christine's adventurous life has
been recounted in detail by the British writer Madeleine Masson: <MI>Christine: A Search for Christine Granville<D>
(London, 1975). For her arrival in
France as Cammaert's assistant, see pages 151<196>52, 159<196>60,
179<196>87. After the war, she
settled in London, worked for a while as a steamship stewardess, and in 1952
was murdered by a jealous would-be lover.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Craven and Cate, <MI>Army
Air Forces<D>, III, 503<196>04; Gilles Lá,ávy, <MI>14 Juillet
1944: L'Opá,áration
"Cadillac"<D> (St.-Leonard, France, 1989); Dreyfus, <MI>Vercors<D>,
169.
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = JUSTINE Report.
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = Dreyfus,
<MI>Vercors<D>, 262.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = Wilt, <MI>French Riviera
Campaign<D>, 43.
@NUMBER2 =
@NUMBER2 =
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 5: PREPARATIONS FOR ANVIL/DRAGOON
@NUMBER =
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = On ANVIL planning: U.S. Seventh Army, <MI>Report of
Operations<D>, I, 1<196>70; Wilt, <MI>French Riviera
Campaign<D>, 46<196>80; L. K. Truscott, <MI>Command
Missions<D> (New York, 1954), 381<196>409.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Cochet's "Southern Zone of
Operations" was defined as R-2 and R-3 plus Ardá_áche, Drá“áme,
Tarn, Haute-Garonne, Ariá_áge, and part of Isá_áre. It comprised only a part of the area covered by
Bourgá_ás-Maunoury, military delegate for Southern France (<MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 237).
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = On Cochet and the Allied
Command: NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 139, Folder 834; RG 226, E
110, Box 2, Folder 23; PRO: WO 204/1164,
1959, 1961, 5653, 5739; <MI>Archives Nationales<D>: Cochet papers (72 AJ 441<196>49).
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = PRO: WO 204/1494.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 1959, 1449.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 446.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = PRO: WO 204/5653.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = NARA: RG 226, E 99, Box 34; E 190, Box 139;
PRO: WO 204/1959; AFHQ History of
Special Operations, WO 204/2030 B.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = On July 26, Seventh Army sent SPOC
a revised list of targets, and a modified plan was developed by SPOC on August
1, further modified later by General Cochet regarding use of the Route Napoleon
(NARA: RG 407, E 427, Box 2641).
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Lawrence Wylie's well-known study,
<MI>Village in the Vaucluse<D> (New York, 1964), describes life in
Peyrane (Roussillon) about 30 miles from landing zone Spitfire. While nearby towns saw atrocities and German
reprisals, "at Peyrane nothing of the kind occurred. No one was arrested. No one was killed."
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Noguá_áres, <MI>Histoire de
la Rá,ásistance<D>, V, 111, 327<196>28. The men were betrayed by a French agent,
generally identified as Seignon de Poissel (code named NOEL), who was directed
by the notorious Gestapo (properly Section IV of the
<MI>Sicherheitspolizei<D>) agent Ernest Dunker (Delage). See Lucien Gaillard, <MI>Marseille sous
l'occupation<D> (Rennes, 1982) 56<196>61; Pierre Roumel, "La
veritá,á sur le massacre de Signes," <MI>Marseille-Magazine<D>
(July, 1957); Jean Vial, <MI>Souvenirs d' un Rá,ásistant
<D>(Aix-en-Provence, 1976), 212<196>21; Baudoin, <MI>Groupes
francs des Bouches-du-Rhá“áne<D>, 59<196>60,
131<196>33, 146, 254<196>55.
On the American OSS agent, d'Errecalde:
NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 128,
Folder 684.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Unlike some delegates, Burdet had
no deputy, although his courier, Marguerite Petitjean (BINETTE) was extremely
capable<197>"a sort of sub-chief of mission" according to
Lá,ácuyer (<MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>, 39. See also Margaret Rossiter, <MI>Women
in the Resistance<D> [New York, 1985], 171). Although disappointed at his dismissal,
Burdet had no alternative but to withdraw from active participation in the
Resistance. He later became manager of
the Stafford Hotel in London. For
details on the financing of Burdet's mission, see Baudoin, <MI>Groupes
francs des Bouches-du-Rhá“áne<D>, 60, 264<196>66.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Remainder of section
"Arrangements in R-2" based on Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous du
torá,áador<D>, 64<196>67; Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration dans les
Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 345 (on Bonnaire, 30, 40, 71, 90, 172);
interviews of Lá,ácuyer, Garcin, Cammaerts.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Communication of General Constans
to author.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh GRAHAM Report.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Details of Zeller's mission
from: General Zeller, "Rapport sur
ses missions á…á Alger et á…á Naples" (<MI>Archives Nationales<D>,
72 AJ 66, 44).
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Sir Brooks Richards confirms this
conversation (communication to author).
He believes that Zeller, unfamiliar with British naval insignia,
confused "Lt. Commander" with "Captain."
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = This section based on Truscott,
<MI>Command Missions<D>, 401<196>08; Gen. Frederic B. Butler,
"Task Force Butler," <MI>Armored Cavalry Journal<D>
(Jan.<196>Feb., 1948), 13<196>14; Report of Task Force Butler,
Sept. 6, 1944 (NARA: RG 407, E 427, Box 3825).
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 58.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = NARA: RG 407, E 427, Box 2641.
@NUMBER = 21.
@NUMBER2 = PRO: WO 204/1959.
@NUMBER2 =
@NUMBER2 =
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 6: EVE OF THE LANDINGS
@NUMBER =
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Report on Jedburghs-zone sud,
Avignon, Oct. 6, 1944 (NARA: RG 226, E
154, Box 56, Folder 945); Major A.T. Cox, Report on OGs, Grenoble, Sept. 20,
1944 (NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 741).
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = AFHQ History of Special Operations,
Annex E (PRO: WO 204/2030B); WO
204/1958; WO 219/2370; Wilson to de Gaulle, Aug. 4, 1944 (WO 204/1959); SPOC
Body Operations for July and August 1944 (NARA:
RG 226, E 97, Box 45); Canfield to Haskell, July 28, 1944:
@INDENTED = Critical morale situation here
regarding 10 Jedburghs. . . . Absolutely essential that first class US
briefing officer . . . come immediately to assist CHAMPION, bringing briefs and
radio equipment and above all clear cut decision as to LONDON's intentions for
use of Jedburghs. Recommend strongly
that SPOC be authorized to employ these teams in AFHQ Zone in support ANVIL
unless LONDON already has definite plan for their early dispatch.
@NUMBER-LEFT = (NARA, RG 226, E 190, Box 139,
Folder 832.) On Jedburgh effectiveness,
Baker to Davis, Nov. 15, 1944 (NARA, RG 226, E 190, Box 135, Folder 757.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = On national differences, note that
the Allied Command emphasized that "SPOC's directive is the support of
ANVIL." Yet Colonel Constans (in a
note to the historian F. Rude) asserted:
"The primordial mission of SPOC was and remained <MI>aid to
the Resistance<D>" (Bolle [ed.], <MI>Grenoble et le
Vercors<D>, 293).
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = SOE Archives; Jedburgh PACKARD
report; correspondence with Colonel Bank.
ISOTROPE included Cdt. Jean Albert Baldensperger, with British
representative Maj. Denys Hamson (ETOLE), French Capt. Georges Pezant (ROCHET),
and, as wireless operator, QM Louis Berthou (PELICAN), dropped June 8/9, 1944,
and joined on June 28/29 by New Zealand Maj. William Jordan (PINTADE) and
French wireless operator Sous-Lt. Pierre Fournier (PERDRIX). Jordan, who broke a leg on landing, has
written memoirs, <MI>Conquest without Victory<D> (London: 1969), which provide extensive details of the
mission (pp. 215<196>55). Aaron Bank, leader of Jedburgh PACKARD, has
published memoirs: <MI>From OSS to
Green Berets<D> (Novato, Calif.: 1986).
Written without records, Bank's account is a vivid story of Jedburgh
operation but not accurate on details.
The official report names his two French team members as Capt. C.
Boineau and Lieutenant Montfort, but Bank refers to them as Henri Denis and
Jean. His principal FFI contact he calls
Raymond, perhaps Michel Bruguier (AUDIBERT), leader of the <MI>Corps
Franc de la Libá,áration<D> in the Gard, or Commandant Magnat (BOMBYX),
FFI chief of staff, Gard. Both are
mentioned in his official report, but Raymond is not mentioned.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = OG Ruth report; Oxent Miesseroff,
<MI>Le charme discret des maquis de Barrá_áme<D>, (Paris, 1978),
81. Interview of author with Mills
Brandes.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = OG ALICE report.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = De Lassus, <MI>Combats pour
le Vercors<D>, 86<196>87.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = OG ALICE report. The official Drá“áme history states 280
dead, 200 wounded, 480 buildings destroyed, but the strategic bridge untouched
(<MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>, 383<196>87).
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Interview of author with Havard
Gunn.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = "Plan for the Use of
Resistance in Support of Operation ANVIL," July 15, 1944, p. 15 (PRO: WO 204/1959).
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Activities of Cammaerts,
Christine, Hamilton, etc., based on reports in SOE Archives; O'Regan papers, in
Liddell Hart collection, King's College, London. Christine's biographer, Madeleine Masson,
seems to have confused the trip to Italy with a later expedition to Larche
(<MI>Christine<D>, 200). On
Italian partisans, see Charles F. Delzell, <MI>Mussolini's
Enemies<D> (Princeton, 1961), 379<196>81, 419<196>22. On the Alpine campaign, see Henri Bá,áraud,
<MI>La seconde guerre mondiale dans les Hautes-Alpes<D> (Gap,
1990), 116<196>200.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = SOE Archives.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid. Jed NOVOCAINE Report; interview with John
Roper; Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration dans les Alpes de
Haute-Provence<D>, 147, 387<196>88.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid. 217<196>22; PRO: WO 204/1502, 1958, 2293; Baudoin,
<MI>Groupes Francs du Bouches-du-Rhá“áne<D>,
252<196>53; Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>,
44<196>45; Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards et Gestapo<D>, 7th
Cahier, p. 20.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., p. 26.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Jed NOVOCAINE Report; Roper report
(SOE Archives).
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = Halsey Report; Gunn Report (SOE
Archives); Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>,
68<196>69, 253<196>54; Fournier Report (Digne Archives). Cammaerts' reports to SPOC, July 13, 17, Aug.
5 (NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 140, Folder
844); On July 27, Cammaerts reported "Christine intends to see Poles at
Gap" (SOE Archives); note of A. Vincent-Beaume (<MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 39).
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = Jed GRAHAM Report.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = Information to writer from General
Constans, including photocopy of orders in French signed by de Gaulle. This order expanded R-2 to the north to
include most of the Drá“áme department and all of the Vercors.
@NUMBER = 21.
@NUMBER2 = Hugh Verity, <MI>We Landed
by Moonlight<D> (London, 1978), 188.
Report of Roger Vencell, Widmer's radio operator, Sept. 25, 1944 (NARA,
RG 226, E 110, Box 4, Folder 77).
@NUMBER = 22.
@NUMBER2 = Although de Gaulle himself named
Constans as FFI chief, inside France the National Council of the Resistance,
which frequently contested de Gaulle's authority, opposed the appointment and
requested Cochet to recall Constans.
Constans never received any countermanding order. Noguá_áres, <MI>Rá,ásistance<D>,
V, 435; Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, <MI>La Libá,áration: les archives du COMAC<D> (Paris, 1964),
233; correspondence with General Constans.
@NUMBER = 23.
@NUMBER2 = Xan Fielding, <MI>Hide and
Seek<D> (London, 1954), 234.
@NUMBER = 24.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 236<196>37. Fielding may have described a stop at
Manosque (or Forcalquier) where Cammaerts met Widmer. OG NANCY Report; communication of Cammaerts.
@NUMBER = 25.
@NUMBER2 = When Constans learned that
Há,áraud had wished Moreaud to succeed him, he gave Robert Bidault, from Gap, a
blank order to be filled in with the approval of the Hautes-Alpes leaders
(Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards et Gestapo<D>, 7th Cahier,
22<196>24; Roper Report and interview with John Roper).
@NUMBER = 26.
@NUMBER2 = Christine never spoke very much
about her role in bringing about Cammaerts' release, but she did write a report
and her biographer has pieced together most of the relevant information
(Masson, <MI>Christine<D>, 201<196>09). Fielding provides a detailed account of the
imprisonment in his memoirs (<MI>Hide and Seek<D>,
237<196>51), alluding frequently to his fear and guilt that he, lacking
the <MI>savoir-faire<D> of his colleagues, had brought them into
the predicament. Cookridge
(<MI>They Came from the Sky<D>, 133<196>48), having
interviewed Cammaerts, gives a long and dramatic account, liberally peppered by
a fertile imagination. Garcin,
<MI>Libá,áration dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>,
400<196>402, as a resident of Digne and a meticulous chronicler, adds
some details from the French side. One
of Lá,ácuyer's lieutenants, Tilly, provided safe-conduct for Schenk and Waem
(Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>, 234). Their later fate is mentioned by Douglas
Dodds-Parker (<MI>Setting Europe Ablaze<D>, 168<196>69). The writer's discussions with Cammaerts have
not evoked information that significantly expands on what has been published.
@NUMBER2 =
@NUMBER2 =
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 7: THE LANDINGS
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>La Rá,ásistance dans le
Var, 1940-1944<D> (Victor Masson [ed.] for the Association des Mouvements
Unis de la Rá,ásistance et des Maquis du Var, Draguignan, 1983),
13<196>73.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 200 B; Eric Sevareid, <MI>Not So Wild a
Dream<D> (New York, 1978), 435.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Rá,ásistance dans le
Var<D>, 96. This figure must be
related to the fact that SPOC averaged 19 sorties a night in R-1 and R-2
(NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 132).
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = For details of the airborne
operation, see Gerard M. Devlin, <MI>Paratrooper!<D> (New York, 1979), 439<196>57; William
B. Breuer, <MI>Operation Dragoon<D> (Novato, California, 1987),
129<196>63; Charles La Chaussee, <MI>Northwest for France<D>
(unpublished manuscript, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania); PRO WO 204/1818 and 1645.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = NARA: RG 226, E 190, Box 133, Folder 723. The activities of Jones (who later became
president of the Veterans of OSS) are described, not with complete accuracy, in
R. H. Adleman and G. Walton, <MI>The Champagne Campaign<D> (Boston,
1969). Inaccuracies have been here
corrected by conversations with Mr. Jones and by materials he has provided the
writer.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Allain Report, "Rapport de
mission particuliá_áre de l'á,áquipe LOUGRE," Oct. 30, 1944 (Service historique de la
Marine, Vincennes, courtesy of Admiral Chastel and Sir Brooks Richards).
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Geoffrey Jones, "The
Liberation of the French Riviera," May 1980 (8-page unpublished account,
courtesy of Mr. Jones); Jones' report on mission RABELAIS (NARA: RG 226, E 110, Box 3, Folder 49).
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = According to a "Rapport du
Capitaine Bialque concernant le comportement de la Commune de FAYENCE"
(Archives Nationales, 72 AJ 199), there was an AS group in Fayence organized by
Adjutant-Chief Pignault, which included among others, M. Farraut,
<MI>garde-champáˆátre<D>, who saved Pignault's life when he
was being sought by the Gestapo.
Referring to the day of the Allied landings, the report says:
@INDENTED = A 8 heures des F.F.I. et F.T.P.F.
ainsi que ceux de la S.A.P. passá_árent á…á l'attaque, en ceinturant le
poste d'observation fortifiá,á de la ROCHE, occupá,á depuis plusieurs mois par
les Allemands qui ripostá,á [<MI>sic<D>] avec leurs armes
automatiques. . . . Cette premiá_áre
attaque de nos forces (rá,ásistance) n'eut qu'un sensible rá,ásultat, mais il y
eut, há,álas, des blessá,ás.
@NUMBER-LEFT = Queried in 1989 about the
radar, the Cercle d'Etudes et de Recherches sur l'histoire de Fayence obtained
the testimony of M. Farraut, who stated:
@INDENTED = Le radar allemand á,átait placá,á
á…á la Roque, sur l'emplacement des anciens reservoirs d'eau de
Fayence. Le radar a á,átá,á dá,átruit
par des explosifs introduits sous le poste allemand par des rá,ásistants qui y
á,átaient parvenus en remontant depuis l'aval des reservoirs par les conduites
d'alimentation d'eau.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh SCEPTRE Report.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Jacques Robichon, in <MI>Le
dá,ábarquement en Provence<D> (Paris, 1962), identifies the gendarmes
(179<196>80). See also Adleman and
Walton, <MI>Champagne Campaign<D>, 131<196>33; Edward Hymoff,
<MI>The OSS in World War II<D> (rev. ed., New York, 1972),
344<196>57.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Devlin,
<MI>Paratrooper!<D>, 449; Robichon, <MI>Dá,ábarquement en
Provence<D>, 261<196>65; <MI>Rá,ásistance dans le
Var<D>, 137<196>39; U.S. Seventh Army
<MI>Operations<D>, I, 114, 123, 149; Breuer,
<MI>Dragoon<D>, 152<196>158; Patch Diary, Aug. 17, 1944
(Center of Military History, Washington, D. C.).
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh SCEPTRE Report;
<MI>Paratroopers' Odyssey: A
History of the 517th Parachute Combat Team<D>, Clark L. Archer (ed.),
(Hudson, Florida, 1985), 62<196>63, 69<196>71.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Allain and Jones Reports (see
notes 6 and 7); Report of O.S.S. Activities with Seventh Army (SI unit), Oct.
14, 1944 (NARA: RG 226, E 99, Folder
145, Box 30), 6<196>7; Report of Dyas, part of OG RUTH report. Another member of the SI team, Marine Lt.
Walter W. Taylor, did not long survive the landings. Assigned to the 36th Division, he and a
French agent attempted to obtain information in Grasse, but ran into a nearby
German road-block. The agent was killed
and Taylor taken prisoner. He ended up
in the same POW camp where Ortiz (UNION II) was interned. Both he and Ortiz survived the war. (Hymoff, <MI>OSS in World War
II<D> [rev. ed.], 314<196>16; Frank and Shaw, <MI>Marine
Corps in World War II<D>, 748.)
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Actions of the First Airborne Task
Force, in NARA: 99/06 (FABTF) 0.3; in
PRO: WO 204/1625, 1645, 1818.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Rá,ásistance dans le
Var<D>, 137.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 43; Jean-Marie Guillon,
"La libá,áration du Var:
Rá,ásistance et nouveaux pouvoirs," <MI>Les Cahiers de
l'IHTP<D> (No. 15, June 1990), 15<196>16. Guillon's article represents part of a
doctoral thesis, <MI>La Rá,ásistance dans le Var: Essaie d'histoire politique<D>
(Aix-en-Provence, 1989). On Henri Michel's career, see A. L. Funk,
"Henri Michel, 1907<196>1986," <MI>Military
Affairs<D> (Jan. 1987), 14<196>26.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Patch Diary, Aug. 17, 18, 1944.
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = Gunn report (SOE Archives);
correspondence and interview with Mr. Havard Gunn; Lá,ácuyer,
<MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>, 68<196>73;
132<196>33 (account of Lieutenant Gautier); J.-L. Panicacci, "Le
Comitá,á dá,ápartemental de Libá,áration dans les Alpes-Maritimes,
1944<196>1947," <MI>Revue d'histoire de la deuxiá_áme guerre
mondiale<D> (July 1982), 77<196>84; Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration
dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 408<196>10.
@NUMBER2 =
@NUMBER2 =
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 8: TASK FORCE BUTLER
@HEAD1 = AND
THE LIBERATION OF DIGNE
@NUMBER =
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Truscott, <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 413<196>20; Wilt, <MI>French Riviera
Campaign<D>, 81<196>87.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Task Force Butler: NARA:
RG 407, E 427, Box 3825; Frederic B. Butler, "Task Force
Butler," <MI>Armored Cavalry Journal<D> (Jan.<196>Feb. 1948),
13<196>14. 117th Cavalry History
of Operations: NARA: RG 407, CAVS-117-0.7, Boxes 18282 to 18292. The writer has interviewed Colonel Hodge and
Col. Harold J. Samsel (Operations officer in 1944) and received from them
supplementary documentation: Colonel
Hodge's typed unpublished memoirs; reports of operations; articles by Colonel
Samsel ("Shades of Jeb Stuart," "Knights of the Yellow
Cord"); and a volume edited by Colonel Samsel: <MI>The Battle of Montrevel<D>,
brought out in 1986 for members of the 117th Cavalry Association.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = On the Enigma coding machine and
the operation at Bletchley, see Peter Calvocoressi, <MI>Top Secret
Ultra<D> (London, 1980); on the situation in southern France, Ralph
Bennett, <MI>Ultra in the West<D> (New York, 1980),
158<196>160; Thomas Parrish, <MI>The Ultra Americans<D> (New
York, 1986), 180, 257<196>58; Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., "Protecting
the Ultimate Advantage" (interview of Donald Bussey), <MI>Military
History<D> (June, 1985), 42<196>47.
In France, Truscott did not receive ULTRA messages but, since he had had
access to them in Italy, he knew about this source of intelligence.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Message of Aug. 17, 1944 (XL
6753), message of Aug. 18, 1944 (XL 6919), PRO:
DEFE 3/121. F. H. Hinsley, et
al., <MI>British Intelligence in the Second World War<D>, Vol. 3,
Pt. II (New York, 1988), 274, 334.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>Premiá_áre
Armá,áe Franá‡áaise<D>, 130, 135<196>37.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Adleman and Walton,
<MI>Champagne Campaign<D>, 165<196>67. Devers saw Patch at various times on Aug. 18
and 19, but Patch's Diary only records that Devers "offered General Patch
all available aid in pushing the advance."
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Patch Field Order in Seventh U.S.
Army <MI>Operations<D>, III, Appendix. Bussey's memorandum to Colonel [Telford]
Taylor, "Ultra and the Seventh Army," May 12, 1945 (NARA: RG 457, SRH-022). Published in French in <MI>Revue
d'histoire de la deuxiá_áme guerre mondiale<D> (Jan., 1984),
59<196>63.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = "Task Force Butler,"
<MI>Armored Cavalry Journal<D> (Jan.<196>Feb., 1948), 13;
<MI>The Complete Official History of the 59th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion<D>, compiled by Charles G. Castor (Decorah, IA: 1990), 107<196>14.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Colonel Hodge to author.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = 117th Cavalry History of
Operations. Interview of author with
Colonel Piddington.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration
dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 412, reproduces NOEL's handwritten
order.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid. Interview of author with Justin Boeuf.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Armored Cavalry Journal
<D>(Jan.<196>Feb. 1948), 17.
Butler refers to Lt. Brandes as a Captain. Brandes told the writer he wore captain's
insignia, under instructions, in anticipation of an already authorized
promotion.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = OG RUTH Report.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Material on SSS from OSS Report
(NARA: RG 226, E 99, Folder 145). On 4-SFU:
NARA: RG 226, E 158, Boxes 2-5; E
190, Box 129, Folder 696; Box 139, Folders 838-39; PRO: WO 204/1962.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = NARA: RG 226, E 99, Folder 145, Box 30.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Garcin, <MI>Alpes de
Haute-Provence<D>, 414.
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = Testimony of Gen. Jean Fournier,
Jan. 15, 1987, provided to writer by Guy Reymond, Communal Archives,
Digne. Fournier was accompanied by
Sous-Lieutenant Cheylus from Lá,ácuyer's staff (Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Torá,áador<D>,
354).
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = Schuberth to General Huhnermann,
Aug. 18, 1944, Task Force Butler records (NARA, RG 407, 206-TF-0.7, Box
3825). Interviewed by author, Colonel
Hodge spoke contemptuously of Schuberth, hurried out of the hotel in his
underclothes.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = Details on liberation of Digne in
Garcin, <MI>Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 414<196>23; newspaper
accounts in Communal Archives, Digne; comments to writer of Padraig O'Dea and
William Magee (members of Troop B, 117th Cavalry); "Interrogation and
papers of General Schuberth," Task Force Butler records (NARA, RG 407,
206-TF-07 Box 3825); 117th Cavalry message log (NARA, RG 94, CAVS 117-07, Box
18l291); Louis Gazagnaire, <MI>Le peuple há,áros de la
Rá,ásistance<D> (Paris, 1971), 206<196>20; Guy Reymond,
<MI>Histoire de la libá,áration de Digne<D> (in press).
@NUMBER = 21.
@NUMBER2 = "Compte rendu sur les
circonstances de la libá,áration de Cháƒáteau-Arnoux," written by
Jean Rey, former mayor, Sept. 15, 1944 (Communal Archives, Digne);
communication of Piddington to writer.
Thomas Piddington visited Cháƒáteau-Arnoux in June, 1984, where he
met the gendarme, Max Bossert, who had guided him 40 years earlier. The writer interviewed them both at that
time.
@NUMBER = 22.
@NUMBER2 = Comments of James Gentle (on tape,
in possession of Digne archivist Guy Reymond).
@NUMBER = 23.
@NUMBER2 = Butler, "Task Force
Butler," <MI>Armored Cavalry Journal<D> (Jan.<196>Feb.
1948), 15.
@NUMBER = 24.
@NUMBER2 = 117th Cavalry History, August 19,
1944 (NARA: RG 94, CAVS 117-0.7, Box
18283).
@NUMBER =
@NUMBER =
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 9: LIBERATION OF GAP AND GRENOBLE
@NUMBER =
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Most of the information on the
French side regarding Gap comes from Richard Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards et
Gestapo<D>, published in Gap between 1945 and 1951 in nineteen
"cahiers" of about fifty pages each.
Abbá,á Duchamblo published a collection of his writings as
<MI>Histoires de notre ville<D> (Gap: 1991), of which pp.
7<196>26 relate to World War II.
The writer had the pleasure of meeting Pá_áre Duchamblo and his
publisher, M. Guiboud Ribaud, in Gap, Sept., 1984. See also Henri Bá,áraud, <MI>La seconde
guerre mondiale dans les Hautes-Alpes et l'Ubaye<D> (Gap, 1990),
117<196>20. Information about
L'HERMINE is in part derived from interviews with Dr. Henry McIntosh (of
Jedburgh Team CHLOROFORM).
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh CHLOROFORM Report;
Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards<D>, Cahier 16, p. 8; Jedburgh NOVOCAINE
Report.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = The meeting took place at
St.-Etienne-en-Dá,ávoluy, in the mountains (a winter ski resort) between Gap
and the Col de la Croix Haute, and included L'HERMINE, Colonel Daviron (the ORA
head), Pelletier (inter-allied mission), Commandant Terrason-Duvernon (regular
<MI>Chasseurs Alpins<D> officer), Martin and McIntosh (Jedburgh
CHLOROFORM); and local FFI chiefs Tortal, Genty, Woussen, and Cá,áard, but not
Moreaud or Bertrand, who were delayed.
Duchamblo describes these activities in great detail in
<MI>Maquisards<D>, Cahier 16, pp. 17<196>20. Captain Hermann was acting commander of the
555 Feldkommandantur, attached to General Pflaum's 157th Reserve Division
(Interrogation Report, No. 2, 21 Aug. 1944, Task Force Butler Journal).
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Butler, "Task Force
Butler," <MI>Armored Cavalry Journal<D> (Mar.<196>Apr.
1948), 32-33; Task Force Butler Report; Jedburgh CHLOROFORM Report; 117th
Cavalry History; Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards<D>, Cahier 16, p. 21, Cahier 15, pp. 28<196>30.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Butler, "Task Force
Butler," 33 (Butler misspells Constans' code name "Saint
Savour"); Leger 4-SFU Report (NARA:
RG 226, E 99, Box 30, Folder 145); correspondence of writer with General
Constans; Butler to Truscott, 0015, Aug. 21, 1944 (Task Force Butler Journal).
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Cammaerts to writer, Dec. 9,
1983. For a colorful account of this
incident, Cookridge, <MI>They Came from the Sky<D>,
149<196>50.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Thomas C. Piddington, "Town
of Gap, France: Operation during World War II," typed unpublished
manuscript in possession of the writer.
Duchamblo devotes Cahiers 16 to 19 of <MI>Maquisards<D> to
the liberation of Gap. He interviewed
many of the people involved. Coverage of
the Gap<196>Col Bayard operations is from these sources, together with
interviews of Piddington and of Etienne Moreaud. A war correspondent, Newbold
Noyes, Jr., was at Gap and wrote an account for the Washington
<MI>Star<D>, Aug. 26, 1944.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = The Gestapo agent, Willi Schmidt,
his deputy, Hans Stahl, and a French traitor, Andrá,á Vallet, were executed at
the Caserne Desmichels on Aug. 21, 1944. Duchamblo asserts that Stahl may have
been a double agent (Cahier 19, pp. 19<196>20). The captured Germans included members of the
157th Reserve GR <MI>Restverband<D>, as well as customs officers,
border police, and medical units.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Cammaerts to the writer.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Some Poles, under a Lieutenant
Buisky, had already joined the Maquis, and others continually tried to desert
(Duchamblo, Cahier 17, p. 8; Cahier 18, pp. 3<196>11; Cahier 19, p. 20).
Both Piddington and Cammaerts agree on their efforts to employ the Poles:
Cammaerts has a vivid memory of Christine addressing Polish prisoners who tore
off their <MI>Wehrmacht<D> uniforms in their enthusiasm to join the
Allies. Cammaerts and Christine drove to
Aspres to try to obtain Butler's authorization, but he refused to see them.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = By error, Major Gentle, whose
mini-task force had completed the liberation of Digne, also showed up in
Gap. Ordered to report to a bivouac area
near Aspres, he had made a wrong turn and was in Gap when General Butler
arrived. Butler temporarily relieved him
of his command (Gentle to writer, Sept. 19, 1984, including Gentle's report to
Colonel Adams, Aug. 23, 1944).
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Report of McNeill Force, Appendix,
Task Force Butler Journal; 117 Cavalry History; Jedburgh CHLOROFORM Report;
"Combats de St. Firmin-Chauffayer," Duchamblo,
<MI>Maquisards<D>, Cahier 19, pp. 20<196>25.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = G-2 History, Seventh Army
Operations in Europe, Aug. 15<196>31, 1944 (U.S. Army Military History
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania), 5 (Aug. 20, 21, 1944); Truscott,
<MI>Command Missions<D>, 415<196>26.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Dahlquist left to Adams the
deployment of his two battalions (Vincent M. Lockart, <MI>T-Patch to
Victory<D> [Canyon, Tex., 1981] 22<196>23). Adams considered that the "movement required
me to make one of the most difficult tactical decisions of my career."
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = "OKW War Diary,"
<MI>World War II Military Studies<D> (New York, Garland, 1979), X,
102-06; G-2 History, Seventh Army; Foreign Military Studies, Pflaum (NARA: A
946); Col. J. Defrasne, "L'occupation allemande dans le sud-est de la
France" (mimeographed), Service historique de l'Armá,áe, Vin- cennes,
France, 6.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = XL 6919, 7246, 1793 (PRO: DEFE 3/122); Ralph Bennett, <MI>Ultra
in the West<D> (New York, 1980), 159<196>60; Charles von Luttichau,
"German Operations in Southern France," MS R-99, R-111 (Center of
Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C).
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Lanvin (Andrá,á Lespiau),
<MI>Libertá,á provisoire<D> (Grenoble, 1973), 209<196>17;
Paul and Suzanne Silvestre, <MI>Chronique des maquis de
l'Isá_áre<D> (Grenoble, 1978), 294<196>98.
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = Col. J. Defrasne,
"L'occupation allemande dans le sud-est de la France,"
30<196>35; Le Ray, Preface to Silvestre, <MI>Chronique des Maquis
de l'Isá_áre<D>, 21<196>22; comments of General Le Ray in
<MI>Grenoble et le Vercors<D>, Pierre Bolle (ed.) (Lyon, 1985),
113<196>14, 127<196>28; Jean-Pierre Bernier, <MI>Maquis
Rhá“áne-Alpes<D> (Paris, 1987), 90<196>93,
101<196>03. On the Drá“áme
contingents, <MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>, 404<196>06;
"Aperá‡áu sur les conditions de la progression alliá,áe du 18 au 21
aá“áut 1944 entre Aspres-sur-Buech et Grenoble et sur le rá“ále
jouá,á par les forces FFI des secteurs de l'Isá_áre," a six-page
typewritten account given the author by General Le Ray in 1984.
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = Silvestre, <MI>Maquis de
l'Isá_áre<D>, 325<196>31, covers these events in minute
detail. Pierre Flaureau, "Le
Comitá,á de Libá,áration de l'Isá_áre," in <MI>Grenoble et le
Vercors<D>, 83<196>96.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = 143rd Infantry Journal, NARA, 336,
INF (143)-0.3.
@NUMBER = 21.
@NUMBER2 = "Grenoble French Applaud
Newsman as Liberator," by Edd Johnson, Chicago <MI>Sun<D>,
Aug. 25, 1944.
@NUMBER = 22.
@NUMBER2 = Lanvin, <MI>Libertá,á
provisoire<D>, 234<196>35.
@NUMBER = 23.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 236<196>38,
383<196>84; 143rd Infantry Journal.
@NUMBER = 24.
@NUMBER2 = Interview of General Adams, May 5,
1975 (Oral History Program, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania).
@NUMBER = 25.
@NUMBER2 = Meyer Papers, Archives of 45th
Division Museum, Oklahoma City, Okla.
@NUMBER = 26.
@NUMBER2 = Meyer Papers; interview with Col.
Harlos Hatter.
@NUMBER = 27.
@NUMBER2 = Johnson is mentioned by name in
Silvestre, <MI>Maquis de l'Isá_áre<D>, 331, and in Bernier,
<MI>Maquis Rhá“áne-Alpes<D>, 103. Clearly, Johnson loved France and the French
reciprocated. At age 48, he was older
than most battalion commanders; he had served in World War I and then, after
the Armistice, had remained for a year in France, a sojourn that gained him
language resources that permitted direct communication with Resistance
leaders. In 1951, the French government
made him <MI>chevalier<D> of the Legion of Honor, praising him for
his "devout and loyal remembrance of France, his second country," for
his decisive part in liberating Grenoble, for his energetic and daring entry
into action at Bourgoin<197>"great friend of France, he has been for
the population of the Isá_áre Department a veritable symbol." After the war, Johnson returned many times to
Grenoble, where a plaque commemorates his and his colleagues' accomplishments. He died in 1985. Citations, newspaper clippings, and text of
memorial service have been provided the author by Mrs. Virginia Johnson and Mr.
Dion Johnson.
@NUMBER = 28.
@NUMBER2 = Paray (Pecquet) report, part of
EUCALYPTUS Mission report (NARA: RG 226,
E 190, Box 740; also RG 226, E 168, Box 1030); interview with Andrá,á Pecquet
(June 9, 1988) and correspondence. The
S-2 log of the 179th RCT shows Paray logged in at 1217, 23 Aug. 1944.
@NUMBER = 29.
@NUMBER2 = Interview with General Davison; on
"Le Barbier," see Silvestre, <MI>Maquis de l'Isá_áre<D>,
167<196>68, 205, 246, 313, 330.
@NUMBER = 30.
@NUMBER2 = 179th Infantry, S-2 Journal, Aug.
23, 24, 1944; Warren Munsell, <MI>The Story of a Regiment: A History of the 179th Regimental Combat
Team<D>, 75; Report of Henri Zeller (<MI>Archives Nationales<D>,
72 AJ 66); Huet radio speech, April 20, 1954 (part of Zeller commentary); 45th
Div. Archives; Capitaine Poitau, "Guá,árilla en montagne,"
<MI>Revue d'histoire de la dexuiá_áme guerre mondiale<D>, XLIX
(Jan. 1963), 36<196>37 (as STEPHANE, Etienne Poitau headed one of the
principal guerrilla groups in Isá_áre); Silvestre, <MI>Maquis de
l'Isá_áre<D>, 333. The German unit
that surrendered was the 7th Engineer Battalion of the 157th Division. It was trying to move south of Grenoble to
set up a road-block (G-2 Periodic Report, 45th Division, Aug. 26, 1944).
@HEAD1-NP = CHAPTER 10: THE 3RD DIVISION TO THE
RH<210>NE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Já”árg Staiger,
<MI>Rá_áckzug durchs Rhá“ánetal<D> (Neckargemá_ánd, 1965),
41<196>57; Truscott, <MI>Command Missions<D>,
421<196>23; Seventh U.S. Army <MI>Operations<D>, I,
172<196>74; Seventh U.S. Army G-2 History, Part I (Aug. 15<196>31,
1944), U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Penn.; Charles von
Luttichau, "German Operations in Southern France and Alsace," Chapter
13, MS R-111, Center of Military History.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh CINNAMON Report. Activities of CINNAMON and the Var Resistance
based on "Compte rendu des opá,árations du FFI du Var," 72 AJ 200
(<MI>Archives Nationales<D>); Masson, <MI>Rá,ásistance dans
le Var<D>, 70<196>93, 133<196>35. American actions based on Seventh U.S. Army
<MI>Operations<D>, 174<196>76; regimental journals.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Gouzy to HQ, 179th regiment, 0950,
8/20/44, recorded in 179th Regiment S-2 journal, 1330, Aug. 20, 1944.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Vaucluse actions largely based on
Claude Arnoux, <MI>Maquis Ventoux<D> (Avignon, 1974). This study benefits from extensive use of
German sources.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = SOE Archives: "The Vaucluse Mission"; Antoine
Benoit, "Le Groupe Franc de Saint-Christol," <MI>Proceedings of
the Colloque international d'histoire militaire<D> (Montpellier, 1974),
473<196>80.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = John Goldsmith,
<MI>Accidental Agent<D> (New York, 1971). His mission is described in pages
134<196>78, but his account, filled with exaggerations and errors, must
be read with care.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Arnoux, <MI>Maquis
Ventoux<D>, 174<196>79, 190<196>98; <MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 39; SOE Archives; "Rapport sur l'activitá,á . .
. ORA en Vaucluse," Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Arnoux, <MI>Maquis
Ventoux<D>, 194<196>99; Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration dans les
Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 406.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = CITROEN and MONOCLE Reports. De Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le
Vercors<D>, 85<196>87.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh GRAHAM Report; SOE
Records; Garcin, <MI>Alpes de Haute- Provence<D>, 402, 408, 421,
photograph on p. 148 (figure in kilts is Crosby, not Gunn).
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh CITROEN Report; Arnoux,
<MI>Maquis Ventoux<D>, 189; "Rapport sur l'activitá,á . . .
ORA en Vaucluse" (Hoover Institution); Dainville, <MI>ORA<D>,
293; Antoine Benoit, "Le Groupe Franc de Saint-Christol"; interview
of writer with Louis Malarte.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = 157th Infantry Regiment, Summary
of Operations, August 1944 (NARA); 45th Division Situation Reports.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Staiger,
<MI>Rá_áckzug<D>, 57<196>61 (map, p. 63).
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Arnoux, <MI>Maquis
Ventoux<D>, 203<196>06.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Truscott, <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 424<196>26.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Staiger,
<MI>Rá_áckzug<D>, 62; Von Luttuchau, "German Operations,"
Chapter 13, 4<196>6.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Jedburgh CITROEN Report. Claude Arnoux admits there were Gaullist-FTP
differences, but adds: "let us not forget that the Vaucluse was one of
those rare departments where a unity of command was realized"
(<MI>Maquis Ventoux<D>, 220).
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 11: TASK FORCE BUTLER TO THE RH<210>NE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = The official Drá“áme
history, <MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>, describes the bombings
in detail and summarizes French casualties:
550 killed, 713 wounded, 1,221 buildings destroyed (382<196>89). The unhit railway bridge had been rendered
unusable by the Resistance two months earlier (OG ALICE Report); the rails had
been removed.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Destruction of the
Loriol<196>Livron bridge is celebrated in the Drá“áme Department as
one of the most daring acts of the FFI, and is well documented. Henri Faure has produced a mimeographed account,
"Compte rendu de l'opá,áration `Pont de Livron' (nuit du 16 au 17
aá“áut 1944), á,átabli á…á la suite d'une Rá,áunion, en 1970, des
17 survivants." See also
<MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>, 378<196>82; de Lassus,
<MI>Combats pour le Vercors<D>, 86; <MI>Les rá,áseaux ACTION
de la France Combattante<D>, 276<196>81.
@NUMBER2 = In his <MI>T-Patch to
Victory<D> (Canyon, Texas, 1981),
31<196>32, Vincent Lockhart recounts from the testimony of Charles Hodge
(commanding officer of the 117th Cavalry) that Hodge's squadron blew the bridge
when they reached the area on August 21.
Although until his death General Hodge insisted that his version was
correct, there is no question but that the bridge had been blown earlier. Under date of August 21, the official journal
of the 117th Squadron reads: "When
reaching Crest, Troop `C' arrived at Livron and found that the bridge south of
there had been blown." Colonel
Lockhart agrees that Hodge was in error when he described the bridge
blowing. It is possible that Hodge
confused the incident with another: the
bridge over the Roubion at Charols was blown by the 36th Division on 25
August. As Hodge's CP was only three
miles from Charols at that time, he could have witnessed the destruction of a
smaller bridge over a smaller river.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Butler, "Task Force
Butler," <MI>Armored Cavalry Journal<D> (Mar.-Apr., 1948),
34. On 17 August, Jean Abonnenc, of the
Drá“áme Secret Army, had sent a messenger to the Americans, pointing out
that the road was free of Germans (de Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le
Vercors<D>, 127). On August 21,
Butler conferred with Constans (SAINT SAUVEUR), who assured him the FFI
controlled areas leading to the Rhá“áne (VI Corps War Room Journal, NARA:
RG 407, E 427, Box 3605).
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Paul Pons, <MI>De la
Rá,ásistance á…á la Libá,áration<D> (Romans, 1964),
214<196>16, 232; interview of author with Father Lucien Fraisse.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Bernard's FFI 4th Battalion
included the 7th Company (BONFILS), the 8th Company (RIGAUD), the 13th Company
(DIDIO), the 14th Company (APOSTAL), and the 17th Company (VERNIER [VALLIERE])
into which had been incorporated CAILLET's 9th Company. The battalion also included Lt. RIVE's
<MI>Corps franc<D>. Rená,á
Ladet, <MI>Ils ont refusá,á de subir:
La Rá,ásistance en Drá“áme<D> (Portes-lá_ás-Valence, 1987),
364; 117th Cavalry History of Operations (NARA:
RG 407, CAVS-117. O.1, Box 18284); Lockhart, <MI>T-Patch to
Victory<D>, 33; Drá“áme 4th Battalion report, Drá“áme A No. 2
V, <MI>Archives National<D>, 72 AJ 120<196>21.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Account of the Montá,álimar
battle, if not otherwise indicated, based on reports of VI Corps; 36th and 45th
Divisions; Task Force Butler; General Truscott's memoirs (<MI>Command
Missions<D>); U.S. Seventh Army <MI>Operations<D>, Vol. I;
Lockhart, <MI>T-Patch to Victory<D>; Wilt, <MI>French Riviera Campaign. For French participation: the Drá“áme history: Pour l'amour de la France<D>,
419<196>65; Pons, <MI>De la Rá,ásistance á…á la
Libá,áration<D>; Ladet, <MI>Ils ont refusá,á de subir<D>; de
Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le Vercors<D>; Lucien Micoud,
<MI>Nous á,átions 150 maquisards<D> (Valence, 1982); <MI>Archives
Nationales<D>: 72 AJ
120<196>21. For German
actions: OKW War Diary in
<MI>World War II German Military Studies<D> (New York, Garland,
1979), X, 106<196>08; Charles von Luttichau, "German Operations in
Southern France" (MS # R-111, Center of Military History); Army Group G
War Diary (English translation, NARA: RG
242); Já”árg Staiger, <MI>Rá_áckszug durchs Rhá“ánethal<D>. Author interviews with General de Lassus,
Albert Fiá,á.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Abbá,á Vignon, "Evá,ánements
á…á St.-Vallier-sur-Rhá“áne," <MI>Le Semeur<D>
(Nos. 61<196>64, Sept. 1944<196>Jan. 1945).
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Pons, <MI>De la
Rá,ásistance<D>, 219<196>20; Micoud, <MI>150
maquisards<D>, 163<196>65.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Pons, <MI>De la
Rá,ásistance<D>, 223. For an
illuminating account of how the Americans appeared to the French, see Henri
Audra's reaction quoted in <MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>,
398<196>401.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Pons, <MI>De la
Rá,ásistance<D>, 224<196>29; de Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le
Vercors<D>, 90<196>92. Bulletin
No. 13 (Jan. 1991) of the <MI>Amicale Pons<D> (<MI>10 á_áme
compagnie, Rá,áseau Buckmaster-Roger<D>) includes several eye-witness
accounts of the Fiancey action.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Butler to Dahlquist, 1100, Aug.
22, 1944 (Task Force Butler Records).
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Lockhart, <MI>T-Patch for
Victory<D>, 32.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Interview of Col. Piddington by
author. One of Piddington's platoon
leaders, Lt. Kenneth J. Cronin, recalls hearing that a German command car was
coming down from the north. His
reaction: "I couldn't figure out
how it approached from that direction since some of our people were supposed to
be in Puy" ("Montelimar to Montrevel," by Maj. K. J. Cronin, in
Col. Harold J. Samsel [ed.], <MI>The Battle of Montrevel
<D>[privately printed for the 117th Cavalry Association, 1986], Chap.
IV). Just south of Puy-St.-Martin, Capt.
Dominique Hepp, the paratrooper whom de Lassus had appointed deputy commander
for south Drá“áme, accompanied an American patrol that was captured. When the Germans were fired on by an American
tank destroyer, Hepp and a companion escaped, but the Americans remained,
relying on their Geneva Convention status.
Their bodies were recovered next day (testimony of Hepp, in
<MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>, 425). See also de Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le
Vercors<D>, 91, 124<196>25.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = 4th Battalion report
(<MI>Archives Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 120-21).
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Truscott, <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 425; Truscott Diary (Marshall Library, Lexington, Virg.).
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Lockhart, <MI>T-Patch to
Victory<D>, 63<196>68.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 12: MONTá_áLIMAR TO VALENCE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = De Lassus, <MI>Combats pour
le Vercors<D>, 94.
@NUMBER = 2,
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 95.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = American side of the attack on
Valence from 143rd Regiment records and diary (NARA: RG 407, E 427, Boxes 9997 and 1857);
interview of author with General Adams.
French side from memoirs of de Lassus, Pons, and Micoud, cited above;
records of 5th Co. FFI (Sabatier), <MI>Archives Nationales<D>, 72
AJ 121; <MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>, 436<196>45.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Pons, <MI>De la
Rá,ásistance<D>, 233.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = NOIR Report (NARA: RG 226, E 154,
Box 56), 22. This 22-page report is much
more detailed than the VEGANINE Jedburgh report and provides in great detail
NOIR's reactions to local conditions. On
German reactions, Foreign Military Studies:
NARA, A 868 (Blaskowitz), A 881 (Drews).
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = OG ALICE report.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Weiss account in Lockhart,
<MI>T-Patch to Victory<D>, 74<196>91.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = De Lassus, <MI>Combats pour
le Vercors<D>, 97. De Lassus
believed that Adams needed Patch's approval but agrees that Dahlquist, not
Patch, made the decision.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = A copy of Wiese's Operation Order
of August 24 is located in the Drá“áme archives and has been published,
in French, in <MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>,
409<196>11. See also von Luttichau,
"German Operations in Southern France," in Center of Military
History; Dahlquist's letter to his wife in U.S. Army Military History Archives,
Carlisle Barracks, Penn., and also cited by Wilt, <MI>French Riviera
Campaign<D>, 141. Hinsley,
<MI>British Intelligence<D>, Vol. 3, Pt. II, 276.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Truscott, <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 431. If a tough,
experienced officer like Truscott was willing to keep Dahlquist in charge of
the largest battle in the southern France campaign, it is difficult to accept
the evaluation of the journalist Eric Sevareid, who met Dahlquist about this
time, that the general "was obviously a man who was losing his nerve"
(<MI>Not So Wild a Dream<D> [New York, 1978], 444). It is true that Dahlquist, having been
dressed down several times by Truscott, had some personal misgivings about his
actions. Three days after his meeting
with the VI Corps commander, he wrote his wife, "I have a very classic
military role and a great opportunity. I
feel I fumbled it badly and should have done a great deal better." Perhaps he could have acted with more vigor,
but General Dahlquist, according to those who knew him, was a courageous man,
always in the front lines, and dedicated to his professional obligations. It is not likely that any commander,
regardless of his brilliance, could have overcome the logistic problems and
brought more firepower to the Rhá“áne.
For a detailed analysis of the Sevareid comment, see Lockhart,
<MI>T-Patch to Victory<D>, 43<196>44.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Pour l'amour de la
France<D>, 427<196>28; de Lassus, <MI>Combats pour le
Vercors<D>, 126<196>27.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Von Luttichau, "German
Operations in Southern France," 28<196>31. Although the 11th Panzer
had lost many tanks, it had suffered only 747 casualties out of 14,000
men. The division obtained replacement
tanks from Germany. See also Staiger,
<MI>Rá_áckszug durchs Rhá“ánetal<D>, 90<196>98.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Pons, <MI>De la
Rá,ásistance<D>, 249<196>63; <MI>Pour l'amour de la France<D>,
455<196>60; Micoud, <MI>Nous á,átions 150 maquisards<D>,
177<196>89.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Combats pour le
Vercors<D>, 106.
@NUMBER2 =
@NUMBER2 =
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 13: EAST: THE DAUPHINá_á ALPS
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Truscott, <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 391<196>94.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = "Report of O.S.S. Activities
with 7th Army, 14 Oct. 44" (NARA:
RG 226, E 99, Box 30, Folder 145, p. 14).
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Report of Jed EPHEDRINE.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Officially, PROGRESSION was a
continuation of the UNION mission and is sometimes referred to as UNION
III. The five Frenchmen were Lt.
Fournier, Lt. Flicourt (MARABOUT), radio operator, and instructors: Sous-Lt. Hook (EGRAPPOIR), Lt. Carriá_áre,
and Lt. Appui. (SOE Archives;
<MI>Archives Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 545.)
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Report of OG NANCY.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Journal de Marche...en
Ubaye<D>, 34; Bá,áraud, <MI>La seconde guerre mondiale dans les
Hautes-Alpes<D>, 120<196>25.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = John Halsey report (SOE Archives).
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Based on Halsey's report;
<MI>Journal de Marche...en Ubaye<D>, 35<196>36; Garcin,
<MI>Libá,áration dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 410, 413, 419
(n. 121). In his report, Halsey mentions
that Christine was present. Because
Christine had been occupied with Cammaert's release on Aug. 17, and accompanied
him to see Butler on the 20th, she would have had a full schedule if she went
to Larche and back. Cammaerts'
recollection:
@INDENTED = When I saw Christine after
getting out of prison, she had already been to Larche. I don't think she went to Larche on 18/19
though that would have been possible since our base was Seyne-les-Alpes and she
wasn't with me on those two days. On the
motor bike Seyne<196>Larche is only
a couple of hours.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = The following account based on
Roper's report (SOE Archives) and interview with Roper, Mar. 3, 1988.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Report of OG NANCY.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Actions of 142nd RCT throughout
from S-3 Journal, NARA. Jedburgh and OG
actions from their reports; BLOs, SOE Archives.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 427.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = The FFI units were led by Frison,
Nortier, Ambrosi (district chief), and Sallot des Noyers, later joined by
Begoud and Cá,áard. The groups came
under the overall command of Daviron (for East Alps) and L'HERMINE (for Central
Alps). Records under A III
(Hautes-Alpes) and "Journal de Marche du Cie AMBROSI," A II 6
(Hautes-Alpes), in <MI>Archives Nationales<D>.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = Purvis and Roper reports, SOE
Archives. Interview with John
Roper. Aerial reconnaissance did not
reveal enemy columns at Larche (VI Corps War Room Journal, Aug. 23, 1944).
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Halsey Report, SOE Archives.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = XL 7493 (Aug. 22, 1944), XL 7584
(Aug. 23, 1944) (PRO: DEFE 3/122).
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 429<196>30.
While he acknowledges the help of Resistance units, Truscott says little
about them. Among his papers is a
nine-page, single-spaced G-2 summary, "The Maquis of France," dated
July 28, 1944 (Truscott Papers, Box 13, Marshall Library, Lexington, VA). One wonders if he had read it.
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = Halsey Report, SOE Archives.
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = Actions in the Larche area based
on Cronin communication in Col. Harold J. Samsel, <MI>The Battle of
Montrevel<D> (privately printed, 1986).
Cronin recalled Halsey as "Jack Darcy," but from the context,
it is clear that he refers to Halsey.
Also: 117th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron reports and journal (NARA: RG 407, Box 3825); interviews with Col.
Thomas Piddington; Report of Jedburgh CHLOROFORM (McIntosh, Martin); interviews
with Henry McIntosh and Jacques Martin; Halsey report; <MI>Journal de
Marche...en Ubaye<D>, 37<196>52; Bá,áraud, <MI>La seconde
guerre mondiale dans les Hautes-Alpes<D>, 123<196>27.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = Garcin, <MI>Libá,áration
dans les Alpes de Haute-Provence<D>, 426<196>27.
@NUMBER = 21.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Journal de Marche...en
Ubaye<D>, 53<196>78. It was
not until Aug. 30 that the ABTF journal reported "Advance echelon of 550th
CT closed on Barcelonnette and established base of operations there," five
days after Patch had ordered Frederick to assume responsibility for the Larche
pass.
@NUMBER = 22.
@NUMBER2 = Unit Journal, Provisional Flank
Protective Force (NARA: RG 206,
PFPF-07). See also U.S. Seventh Army
<MI>Operations<D>, I, 241<196>48.
@NUMBER = 23.
@NUMBER2 = Interview of author with Colonel
Piddington, who has read this section.
@NUMBER = 24.
@NUMBER2 = The Cá,áard company, under the
general orders of Captain Frison, took up positions at the Fort des
Táˆátes on Aug. 29 (Duchamblo, <MI>Maquisards et Gestapo<D>,
Cahier 15, 30<196>31). Cá,áard had
guided units of Task Force Butler to Col de la Croix Haute a week earlier.
@NUMBER = 25.
@NUMBER2 = "Evá,ánements que se sont
dá,ároulá,ás á…á Brianá‡áon (<MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ Hautes Alpes [A II 3]); Bá,áraud, <MI>La
seconde guerre mondiale dans les Hautes-Alpes<D>, 123<196>27.
@NUMBER = 26.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid.; Jedburgh NOVOCAINE report;
Purvis and Roper reports (SOE Archives).
Patch knew through ULTRA as early as August 22 that the 90th Panzer
Grenadier Division was being ordered to the Franco-Italian frontier (Hinsley,
<MI>British Intelligence<D>, Vol. III, Pt. 2, 334).
@NUMBER = 27.
@NUMBER2 = Colonel Bonjour commanded the RSAR
(<MI>Rá,ágiment de Spahis Algá,áriens de Reconnaissance<D>) of the
3rd Algerian Infantry Division. In the
latter days of August, his regiment, of about 6000 men, had swung behind the
U.S. 45th Division and had occupied Aix-les-Bains and areas to the northeast of
Albertville, the northern limit of Bibo's responsibility (De Lattre,
<MI>French First Army<D>, 131).
@NUMBER = 28.
@NUMBER2 = For Troop A, this would mean one
long drive. On September 1, VI Corps had
ordered the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron to patrol in the area of Meximieux,
where the 179th Infantry was holding off attacks of the 11th Panzer. Meximieux is about 250 miles from
Brianá‡áon, and the roads are in many places curving and steep. Throughout the 2nd, Piddington's troop drove
through the rain to rejoin the squadron, which had been ordered to seize and
hold Montrevel, northwest of Bourg-en-Bresse, another 40 miles beyond
Meximieux. On September 3, Piddington
and part of Troop A joined Troop B in a day-long fruitless attempt to keep
Montrevel from being occupied by elements of the 11th Panzer. Piddington was captured and spent the rest of
the war in German prison camps. See A.
L. Funk, "Mandate for Surrender," <MI>World War II<D>
(Mar. 1990), 27<196>33.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 14: EAST: CANNES AND NICE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = PRO: DEFE 3/122:
XL 7198, 1320 Aug. 20, 1944; XL 7246, 2202 Aug. 20, 1944.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Robert D. Burhans, <MI>The
First Special Service Force: A War
History of the North Americans, 1942<196>1944<D> (Washington, D.C.,
1947); Patch Field Order No. 2, Aug. 19, 1944.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = First Airborne Task Force, Summary
of Operations (NARA: 99/06-(FABTF)-0.3,
Box 1746) (hereafter cited as FABTF Operations); S-3 Journal, 141st Infantry;
Masson, <MI>Rá,ásistance dans le Var<D>, 141.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Jones report (NARA: RG 226, E 110, Box 3, Folder 49).
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous
du torá,áador<D>, 73<196>74, 132<196>33.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 235. The HOCHCORN Battalion is one of the few FFI
units identified by name in American records (see Burhans, <MI>Special
Services Force<D>, 282). The group
is referred to by various spellings:
Hochcorn, Hochscorn, Hochgorn.
Perhaps it is the Norman name "Hauchecorne."
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Gunn report (SOE Archives);
Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>, 70.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = The first patrols of the 550th
went north on Aug. 26, but not until the 28th was a Combat Team organized. The first elements, badly informed on road
conditions, detoured by way of Digne, and reached Barcelonnette late on Aug.
29. Not until the 31st did the battalion
take up positions (FABTF Operations; <MI>Journal de Marche de la
Rá,ásistance en Ubaye<D>, 51<196>55).
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous
du torá,áador<D>, 71.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = FABTF Operations; Burhans,
<MI>Special Service Force<D>, 273<196>76;
<MI>Paratroopers' Odyssey: A
History of the 517th Parachute Combat Team<D>, 72<196>73; Jones
report.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = FABTF Operations;
<MI>Archives Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 97; Adleman and Walton,
<MI>Champagne Campaign<D>, 170<196>72; Peter Leslie,
<MI>The Liberation of the Riviera:
The Resistance of the Nazis in the South of France and the Story of its
Heroic Leader, Ange-Marie Miniconi<D> (New York, 1980),
200<196>43. While Leslie's volume
is an excellent, detailed, journalistic account of the FTP in Cannes, its title
makes claims hardly substantiated by its contents: a study of a local Resistance leader who
commanded three companies, about 650 people.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Gunn report (SOE Archives).
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous
du torá,áador<D>, 133<196>34.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = OG RUTH report;
<MI>Paratroopers' Odyssey<D>, 72<196>73.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Jones to author. For a colorful but inaccurate account of this
incident, see Adleman and Walton, <MI>Champagne Campaign<D>,
154<196>60. The authors
erroneously refer to the 148th Division order as applying to the entire German
Nineteenth Army. (For text, see
NARA: US Seventh Army, 107-2.9 "Captured documents.")
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = J. L. Panicacci, "Le Comitá,á
Dá,ápartemental de Libá,áration dans les Alpes-Maritimes, "<MI>Revue
d'histoire de la deuxiá_áme guerre mondiale<D>, July, 1982,
78<196>90; Joseph Girard, "Organisation et les opá,árations
á…á caractá_áre militaire des Forces Franá‡áaises de l'Intá,árieur
dans les Alpes-Maritimes," <MI>Revue<D> <MI>d'histoire
de la deuxiá_áme guerre mondiale<D> (Jan. 1972), 73<196>94.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Burhans, <MI>Special Service
Force<D>, 282; comments of Pierre Gautier (MALHERBE) in Lá,ácuyer,
<MI>Má,áfiez-vous du torá,áador<D>, 134<196>35.
@NUMBER = 18.
@NUMBER2 = FABTF G-2 Reports and Journal,
Annex #2, SSS Subsection, Administrative Report, Oct. 1, 1944 (NARA: RG 407, 99/06 [FABTF]-0.3; 4-SFU order to CG
ABTF, Sept. 3, 1944); Gunn report, Halsey report (SOE Archives); interview of
author with Havard Gunn. With the
closing of Gunn's section, efforts to equip the FFI in southern France no
longer were supervised by SPOC, 4-SFU, or inter-allied missions, but devolved
on General Devers, commanding Sixth Army Group (Vigneras, <MI>Rearming
the French<D>, 324<196>25).
@NUMBER = 19.
@NUMBER2 = Jones, "The Liberation of the
French Riviera" (8-page typed summary written in 1980, copy provided
author by Geoffrey Jones); correspondence, Jones to author, Sept. 14, 1982; SSS
Administrative Report, Oct. 1, 1944 (see previous note) and Oct. 22, 1944;
interview of author with Emile Adá_ás, interpreter with mission MICHEL.
@NUMBER = 20.
@NUMBER2 = Chief of staff ABTF to CG, Seventh
Army, Sept. 27, 1944 (NARA: RG 407,
99/06 [FABTF]-0.3); Commendation of CG, Forty-fourth A.A.A. Brigade, Mar. 14,
1945 (NARA: RG 226, E 110, Box 3, Folder
49).
@NUMBER = 21.
@NUMBER2 = Lá,ácuyer, <MI>Má,áfiez-vous
du torá,áador<D>, 78<196>81; Jean Delmas, "L'amalgame: Forces Franá‡áaises de l'Intá,árieur,
lá_áre Armá,áe," in <MI>Les armá,áes franá‡áaises pendant la
seconde guerre mondiale<D> (Paris, 1986), 415<196>25.
@HEAD1-NP = CHAPTER 15: WEST:
TOULON AND MARSEILLE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = GARDENER Circuit (SOE Archives);
Foot, <MI>SOE in France<D>, 215, 379. On Má,áker, Madeleine
Baudoin, <MI>Histoire des Groupes Francs (M.U.R.) des Bouches du
Rhá“áne<D> (Paris, 1962), 7, 161, 173<196>77. Interview with Francis Cammaerts.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Antiscorch operations based on
records from the <MI>Service historique de la Marine<D>
(Cháƒáteau de Vincennes, Paris): "Rapport de mission particuliá_áre
de l'á,áquipe LOUGRE, Oct. 30, 1944;" "Compte rendu de la mission
SAMPAN, Sept. 10, 1944;" "Rapport particulier de la mission GEDEON,
Oct. 30, 1944;" "Rapport particulier de la mission CAIQUE, Sept. 10,
1944;" "Rapport de mission [SCHOONER], Sept. 27, 1944." Also interview with Lt. Cmdr. Brooks Richards
of the SPOC French desk, and letter of Aug. 8, 1989.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Victor Masson, <MI>La
Rá,ásistance dans le Var<D> (Hyá_áres, 1983), 93<196>95.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = In his memoirs (<MI>French
First Army<D>, 74<196>75) de Lattre gives the impression that he
had to persuade Patch for authorization to attack earlier than planned:
"It was <MI>after midday<D> [August 19] when, by sheer
insistence, I succeeded in overcoming the opposition of the cautious. General Patch gave me a free hand." It is worth noting that Patch's Field Order
No. 2, issued <MI>at noon<D>, August 19, ordered the French II
Corps to "capture and secure TOULON without delay." Truscott, in his memoirs (<MI>Command
Missions<D>, 241) writes:
"Patch was concerned about de Lattre's delay in beginning the
attack on Toulon. . . . Patch was urging
de Lattre to begin operations but de Lattre insisted . . . on the full-scale
attack he had planned."
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 74. In the French ed.
(<MI>Histoire de la premiá_áre Armá,áe franá‡áaise<D>,
105<196>06) de Lattre provides a graceful acknowledgement of FFI
value. This is omitted in the English
version.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 76.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Although they withdrew on August
20, the Germans had already begun sabotage operations in Sá_áte. The SCHOONER team, headed by engineer
Kervarec, had blocked a swing bridge (by removing a machinery part), preventing
a vessel from being used as a block ship.
They also sunk, so that it could be refloated, a massive 135-ton
floating crane that was later used to move concrete blocks in the channel. Kervarec's report on the Sá_áte installations
right after the Germans left points out that some damage resulted from an
Allied air strike on June 25. Allain
(with Lt. W.H. Woolverton of 4-SFU) visited Sá_áte on August 30 and
reported: "Docks fair
condition. Railway operating. Harbor can be used soon as mines
cleared. Counter scorch team did superb
job" (4-SFU sitcom, Sept. 1, 1944, NARA:
RG 226, E 190, Box 132).
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Baudoin (<MI>Groupes Francs
du Bouches du Rhá“áne<D>, 159<196>210) analyzes these
differences in great detail.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = For details regarding the
liberation of Marseille, see (in English) de Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 99<196>115; Robert Aron, <MI>France Reborn<D>
(New York, 1964); US Seventh Army <MI>Operations<D>, I,
162<196>69; (in French) Noguá_áres, <MI>Histoire de la
Rá,ásistance<D>, V, 441<196>53; Lucien Gaillard,
<MI>Marseille sous l'occupation<D> (Rennes, 1982),
94<196>119.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 115; Marcel Vigneras, <MI>Rearming the French<D>,
324<196>35; Roland C. Ruppenthal, <MI>Logistical Support of the
Armies<D> (Washington, D.C., 1953), II, 116<196>24.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 114.
@NUMBER2 =
@NUMBER2 =
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 16: WEST: ACROSS THE
RH<210>NE<197>THE ARD<201>CHE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Cammaerts had a few contacts in
the Ardá_áche, and Tony Brooks's PIMENTO, concentrating on railways and
Rhá“áne bridges, was familiar with the area.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Ducros, <MI>Montagnes
ardá,áchoises<D>, III, 200<196>01, 391. The agents were Pierre Casanova, Henri Rozan,
and Marcel-Jean Michel.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 68<196>69,
90<196>91. Vaucheret was caught in
a poplar tree, one member had the misfortune to land in a ditch of liquid
manure, while Chassá,á was greeted by a little girl: <MI>"cher officier, tombá,á du
ciel"<D> (Dear officer, fallen from heaven).
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 183<196>96.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = The following account is based on
reports of Jedburgh WILLYS, OGs LOUISE and BETSY, and Ducros,
<MI>Montagnes ardá,áchoises<D>, III, 211<196>12,
270<196>307.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = OG HELEN Report; Report on OGs,
Sept. 20, 1944, by Maj. Alfred T. Cox (NARA:
RG 226, E 146, Box 230).
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = On the retreat of Germans from
southwest France, a topic that lies outside the scope of the present study, see
David Wingeate Pike, "Les forces allemandes dans le sud-ouest de la
France," <MI>Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains<D>,
152 (Oct. 1988), 3<196>24; Noguá_áres, <MI>Rá,ásistance<D>,
V, 716<196>36; Robert Aron, <MI>Libá,áration<D>,
548<196>72.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Ducros, <MI>Montagnes
ardá,áchoises<D>, III, 332<196>35; Escudier papers in possession of
author.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Pike, <MI>Guerres
mondiales<D> (Oct. 1988), 6; Jedburgh PACKARD Report; OG LOUISE Report;
Staiger, <MI>Rá_áckzug durchs Rhá“ánetal<D>,
50<196>52. ULTRA had information on
August 26 that the Field Corps was going to Lyon (Hinsley, <MI>British
Intelligence<D>, III, Pt. 2, 273<196>77).
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Ducros, <MI>Montagnes
ardá,áchoises<D>, III, 340<196>44.
Ducros identifies over twenty skirmishes between August 22 and 25.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 345<196>47; OG LOUISE
Report; Escudier papers.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = OG LEHIGH Report. Interview with Dr. John Hamblet (Sept. 6,
1991).
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Nurk, born in 1904 in Esthonia of
Russian parents, formerly a white hunter in East Africa, was parachuted into
the Ardá_áche on August 25 (SOE Archives).
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = OG LEHIGH Report; Ducros,
<MI>Montagnes ardá,áchoises<D>, III, 390.
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = Ducros (ibid., 395<196>98)
enumerates FTP 3rd and 5th Battalions, FTP Companies 7103, 7107, 7108, 7110,
7111, 7116, 7118, 7124, the <MI>Groupe Franc<D> Dury, AS companies
6, 7 (Maleval), 23 (Anselin), 51, 52 (Escudier), 53, 54 (Rouyer), and others. Escudier took as prisoners a group of
"Mongols" (<MI>Turkmá_ánes<D>) who had captured peasants
as hostages. Altogether 1,750, of which
the majority belonged to the SS Legion of Azerbaijan, assembled at Privas. The FFI picked up four 77-mm. guns; twelve
guns of 37- to 47-mm.; thirty 20-mm., fifteen heavy machine guns, dozens of
mortars (some 105-mm.), 380 vehicles, and 600 horses.
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid., 399<196>400; reports
of LOUISE, LAFAYETTE.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Escudier to author.
CHAP 17 NOTES NOT RELEVANT AS THEY APPLY TO
ANOTHER VERSION.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 17: NORTH OF GRENOBLE
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = On the heroic women of the Arcelin
family, see Margaret Rossiter, <MI>Women in the Resistance<D> (New
York, 1985), 85, 177. Situation in
Savoie, <MI>Archives Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 86, 72 AJ 545; Foot,
<MI>SOE in France<D>, 357<196>58, 403; Bernier,
<MI>Maquis Rhá“áne-Alpes<D>, 111<196>15.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = ON UNION II, <MI>Archives
Nationales<D>, 72 AJ 86; B. M. Frank and H. I. Shaw, <MI>History of
U. S. Marine Corps Operations<D>, V (Washington, D.C., 1968), 747. The five
sergeants were John P. Bodner, Frederick J. Brunner, Jack Risler, Robert
E. La Salle (injured on landing), and Charles R. Perry (killed on landing).
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = PROGRESSION information from SOE
Archives; EPHEDRINE Report; Hymoff, <MI>OSS in World War II
<D>(rev. ed.), 312<196>14.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = 180th Regiment Journal (NARA).
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = PROGRESSION Report; Bernier,
<MI>Maquis Rhá“áne-Alpes<D>, 114.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 130<196>32.
EPHEDRINE reported to 4-SFU in Grenoble on Sept. 8, 1944. PROGRESSION continued to work with the FFI
until the French 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division arrived and requested further
orders from London. Receiving no
instructions, the mission left the Savoie on Oct. 2, 1944, and proceeded to
England via Lyon and Paris.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Silvestre, <MI>Maquis de
l'Isá_áre<D>, 339<196>41; Marcel Ruby, <MI>La Rá,ásistance
á…á Lyon<D> (Lyon 1979), II, 803<196>05; Alban Vistel,
<MI>La nuit sans ombre<D> (Paris, 1970), 501<196>11. General Eagles phoned Truscott on Aug.
26: "I have Meyer at Grenoble and
he is in a huddle with the head of the Maquis . . . . I have been asking the
Maquis for the last two days to cut all those roads that cross the
Grenoble-Lyon road so that the Boche can't get out. Meyer will work them over again on that"
(VI Corps War Room Journal). A grateful
French government later awarded Colonel Johnson the Legion of Honor. The citation (with slight errors of dates)
reads in part:
@INDENTED = At the request of the French
Forces of the Interior his battalion moved to BOURGOIN the 24th of August at
the farthest point of the Allied advance.
The city had been liberated the day before and his energetic and daring
entry into action permitted the conquered ground to be held. The moral and material assistance given to
the troops of Commandant CHABERT [Rená,á Bousquet] permitted the intensive
guerrilla action which terminated in the taking of Lyon the 2nd of
September. (Citation courtesy of the
Johnson family.)
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Justin Greene of OSS and Colonel
Cusenier, FFI, had accompanied Colonel Adams to Grenoble. Alban Vistel states that on Aug. 25 Descour
reported to him that the evening before he had made contact with the general
commanding the 5th [<MI>sic<D>] American division (<MI>La
nuit sans ombre<D>, 509). This
presumably refers to the 45th division.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Pecquet (Paray) to author;
Truscott diary (George Marshall Library and Archives, Lexington, Virginia).
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = For details and documentation on
what liberation meant politically to the French, see Hillary Footit and John
Simmonds, <MI>France 1943<196>1945<D> (New York, 1988),
especially 40<196>57; John Sweets, <MI>The Politics of Resistance
in<D> <MI>France, 1940<196>1944<D>,
196<196>210. The French side of
Lyon's liberation is covered in detail in Fernand Rude, <MI>Libá,áration
de Lyon et de sa rá,ágion<D> (Paris, 1974); Marcel Ruby, <MI>La
Rá,ásistance á…á Lyon<D>, 2 vols. (Lyon, 1979); Henri Noguá_áres,
<MI>Histoire de la Rá,ásistance<D>, V, 631<196>93.
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = For reprisals carried out by the
Germans in the Lyon area, see Robert Aron, <MI>Libá,áration<D>,
526<196>32; Ted Morgan, <MI>An Uncertain Hour: The French, the Germans, the Jews, the Klaus
Barbie Trial, and the City of Lyon, 1940<196>1945<D> (New York,
1990), 251<196>322; Hinsley, <MI>British Intelligence<D>,
III, Pt. 2, 375<196>76.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = The French clandestine command
structure, on paper, was complicated but did not always function according to
the organization plan. In the Lyon area,
three men dominated the hierarchy: Yves
Farge, regional commissioner of the Republic, Jacques Maillet, delegate of the
[provisional] French government, and Bourgá_ás-Maunoury, FFI chief for the
Southern Zone. Bourgá_ás worked closely
with Marcel Degliame, a Communist, who was not only FFI inspector general for
the Southern Zone, but also a member of the Directing Committee for the MLN
(<MI>Mouvement de Libá,áration Nationale<D>), formerly the
MUR. These men operated from clandestine
headquarters in Lyon, or from a command post at St.-Laurent-de-Chamousset in
the hilly country twenty-five miles west of the city. There they maintained contact with London
(General Koenig's FFI headquarters) and with the National Resistance Council in
Paris. The R-1 military delegate, Paul
Leistenschneider (CARRE), maintained liaison with Alban Vistel, the Regional
FFI chief.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = Vistel, <MI>Nuit sans
ombre<D>, 511<196>18.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NUMBER2 = SSS Report, 25; Report of Justin
Greene (NARA, RG 226, E158, Box 6, Folder 75).
@NUMBER = 15.
@NUMBER2 = U.S. Seventh Army,
<MI>Report of Operations<D>, I, 254. In a telephone conversation at 0930, Aug. 28,
Patch told Truscott: "Don't put any
of your troops anywhere within the city of Lyon" (NARA: RG 407, E 427, Box 3605).
@NUMBER = 16.
@NUMBER2 = Truscott, <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 434.
@NUMBER = 17.
@NUMBER2 = Charles von Luttichau,
"German Operations in Southern France" (MS R-112, U.S. Army Center of
Military History, Washington, D.C.), Chap. XIV, 19<196>22; Staiger,
<MI>Rá_áckszug durchs Rhá“ánetal<D>, 98<196>100.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 18: END OF DRAGOON: MEXIMIEUX AND LYON
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Fol and Rudiqoz, <MI>La
bataille de Meximieux<D>, 28.
Operations at Meximieux and the Ain, unless otherwise noted, are based
on reports of the 45th Division, 179th and 180th Regiments (NARA), and Warren
P. Munsell, Jr., <MI>The<D> <MI>Story of a Regiment: A History of the 179th Regimental Combat
Team<D>, Part 5. The book of Fol
and Rudigoz, cited above, is an extremely detailed account, based on
testimonies by witnesses enhanced by careful research. The present writer used materials at the 45th
Division Museum and Archives in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and interviewed Col.
Harlos Hatter, in 1944 179th RCT Supply Officer. At the Museum are the papers of Col. Harold
Meyer, CO of the 179th, among which are
included a long account of the action at Meximieux written several months later
while Meyer was hospitalized. The
account of Gen. Michael Davison, in 1944 CO of the 1st Battalion, had been
recorded in an official U.S. Army interview deposited in the archives of the
Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The writer has also corresponded with and
interviewed General Davison. Both
Davison and Meyer have read this section.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = Seen by the writer at Pá,árouges
in 1982.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Staiger, <MI>Rá_áckzug
durchs Rhá“ánetal<D>, 98<196>99.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = Luttichau, "German Operations
in Southern France," Chapt. XIV, 22.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = H. Romans-Petit, <MI>Les
obstiná,ás<D> (Lille, 1945), 253<196>54.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = Noguá_áres,
<MI>Rá,ásistance<D>, V, 696<196>93.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = 142nd Regiment, S-3 journal
(NARA). Anthony Brooks, interview and
correspondence.
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Ibid.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 124<196>26; Ducros, <MI>Montagnes
ardá,áchoises<D>, III, 400<196>06.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = Sheeline Report (NARA, RG 226, E
190, Box 128).
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = Following details based on OG and
Jedburgh reports in NARA.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = Weiss's account of his work with
the Resistance has been printed in Lockhart, <MI>T-Patch to
Victory<D>, 83<196>91. See
also Ducros, <MI>Montagnes ardá,áchoises<D>, III, 351<196>52,
385<196>86.
@NUMBER = 13.
@NUMBER2 = De Lattre, <MI>French First
Army<D>, 127<196>28; OG LEHIGH Report. For details of an American patrol into Lyon,
see <MI>MacGibbon's Mule Barn<D> (Portland, Oregon, privately printed,
1976), 18<196>21.
@NUMBER = 14.
@NOHYPHEN = Dahlquist Papers, Military
Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
@HEAD1 = CHAPTER 19: CONCLUSION
@NUMBER = 1.
@NUMBER2 = Bill Harr, <MI>Combat
Boots<D> (New York, 1953), 20<196>21.
@NUMBER = 2.
@NUMBER2 = 180th Infantry, Operations Report,
August 1944, 241, 243.
@NUMBER = 3.
@NUMBER2 = Report of Capt. Dewey Mann, 142nd
Infantry, August 1944.
@NUMBER = 4.
@NUMBER2 = 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron, History, Entry for Aug. 26, 1944.
@NUMBER = 5.
@NUMBER2 = "Task Force Butler,"
<MI>Armored Cavalry Journal<D> (Jan.<196>Feb., 1948), 15.
@NUMBER = 6.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Command
Missions<D>, 420.
@NUMBER = 7.
@NUMBER2 = Appendix C, Foot, <MI>SOE in
France<D>. See also
<MI>Special Operations: AAF Aid to
the Resistance Movements, 1943<196>1945<D>, 66<196>75. (I am assuming that roughly one-third of the
supplies went to southern France.)
@NUMBER = 8.
@NUMBER2 = Ernest Borrely, in <MI>Le
Provená‡áal<D>, Sept. 16, 1944.
@NUMBER = 9.
@NUMBER2 = Bill Mauldin, <MI>Up
Front<D> (New York, 1945), 204.
@NUMBER = 10.
@NUMBER2 = <MI>Special Operations: AAF Aid<D>, 231 (Appendix 15).
@NUMBER = 11.
@NUMBER2 = On the occasion of de Gaulle's
visit to Washington in July 1944, Donovan presented what his biographer calls
the "longest report of his career so far," a memorandum on
"Performance and Potential of the French Resistance," which argued
strongly for more support (Cave Brown, <MI>The Last Hero<D>,
361<196>64). A similar argument,
at the same time, was made by General Caffey to General Noce (Asst. Chief of
Staff, G-3, Special Operations, AFHQ) June 30, 1944 (PRO, WO 204/1164). All these arguments came too late to have any
significant impact.
@NUMBER = 12.
@NUMBER2 = In early OVERLORD planning by
COSSAC, the point was made that "assistance of the [Resistance] groups . .
. should be treated as a bonus rather than an essential part of the plan"
(cited in Ehrmann, <MI>Grand Strategy<D>, V, 324<196>25).