Not sure if anyone is interested in reading more homework or not, but this is my first post for my on-line class (the Pacific War.) It is a lot of reading, I admit.

The topic was this: Clemenceau remarked that war was too complicated an endeavor to be left to the generals alone. Can the same be said about diplomats and trade representatives? Bismarck insisted that in order to achieve a lasting peace, settlements should not fill the vanquished with a burning desire to avenge its defeat.

Using Costello's introductory chapters (1-6), as well as other material you have read or studied, why is it so difficult for diplomats and/or trade representatives to achieve lasting and peaceful settlements?

My response:

Message: The question posed for the discussion board can be answered several ways. "Why is it difficult for the representatives of nations to achieve a lasting peace?" could be answered solely with no particular nations in mind. When discussing the decades leading to the Pacific War, the realities of the situation make a cookie-cutter solution impossible. In today’s day and age, there are relatively few countries who are as forceful in their foreign relations as the main belligerents in WWII were.

The Japanese were especially forceful in their dealings with other Asian countries; most notably China. The Japanese feelings toward the non-Asian tradesmen were not good in the first place due in part to anti-Japanese and Asian policies and journalism during the first decade of the twentieth century (27). During the mid thirties, however, they began to resent the presence of Europeans in a market they saw as their own and they began more aggressive expansion into Manchuria and other parts of China. The English and American response to this was motivated by two factors: first, they did not want to be forced out of what was seen as a burgeoning market, and second, they felt an obligation to the Chinese to help protect them. This was especially true in the case of the Americans. Roosevelt choose to "uphold the sanctity of international treaties" and had the "deepest sympathy" for China (47). At the same time, investments in China were not near as sizable as the English ones; limiting the reason for a increasingly antagonistic relationship with Japanese (48).

The Japanese, for their part, were growing more and more nationalistic and militaristic all the time. The USS Panay was sunk by Japanese warplanes, angering the United States. The Rape of Nanking, which was to shock the Chinese Nationalists into surrender, only strengthened the resolve of the Chinese and disgusted the rest of the world. Cabinets were also frequently dissolved or subject to assassination. This meant there was a constantly shift in policy and that only cabinets that pleased the nationalists and militarists stayed in power. It also led to the military having no fear of the civil authorities as evidenced by the July 29, 1939 attack into Russia (60). An attack that had been expressly forbidden.

The English and Americans vowed to stop this expansion. The only problem was that there was no threat to back up the big talk. The Joint Board held in 1939 came to the conclusion that the US should withdraw from its base in the Philippines in order to protect Hawaii and the US West Coast (63). As a result of this perceivable weakness, the Japanese continued to push for trade rights and take over more Asian territory. To counter this, the US threatened one of the few things it could threaten Japan with: oil. When the incoming supply of oil dried up, the militarists set a deadline for war to begin before their planes, tanks, and ships would stop. Time ran out and war began.

One constant in the world is the use of force. A gun is a morally neutral device. Bad in the hands of one who would do ill with it, good in the hands of someone who would stop the evil. On a larger scale, there will always be nations led by people that are intent on using force against other nations who are not as strong. The only thing they understand is force and the arithmetic one does to gage chances of victory. The Japanese saw only weakness in the American/English threat that was posed to them. The same was true of Saddam Hussein. In the case of Iraq, even after a crushing defeat in the Gulf War, he remained defiant after UN resolution after resolution was shown to be meaningless. With no force behind them to back them up, they, too, were "scrapes of paper." Only the overwhelming force that was eventually brought to bear on both countries brought an end of the conflict.

Homework welcome here! After all, I used to teach school.

Unfortunately one of the main reasons it's so difficult for diplomats and/or trade representatives to achieve lasting and peaceful settlements, is because there IS NO appeasing the aggressive behavior of some nations. It's plain and simple as that. Diplomats no matter how skilled, governments no matter how committed, have little effect to stop an enemy who is resolved to have his way.

Using the Pacific in the 30's, is a perfect example of this. I have to smirk when I read the words of those who say, well if we would have stopped the embargo on oil, the Japanese would have dropped their aggressive stance. Bologna! The Japanese already had their plans to take over vast amounts of land in China and elsewhere. The oil embargo wasn't put in place until mid July of 1941, and was our final attempt to put a stop to their military threat.

Yes, Japan used this as an excuse to attack the US, but Japan's economy was falling apart for the last several years. This was due to the crash in 1929 and it's world-wide spead, but also due to internal affairs in Japan. The Minsei Party government (July 1929-April 1931, with prime minister Osachi Hamaguchi, finance minister Junnosuke Inoue, and foreign minister Kijuro Shidehara) deliberately adopted a deflationary policy in order to eliminate weak banks and firms and to prepare the nation for the return to the prewar gold parity (fixed exchange rate with real appreciation). The policy of deflation and return to gold was strongly advocated and implemented by finance minister Inoue.

Considering the stance of their military and their weakening economy, no amount of diplomacy would have stopped Japan. Her mind was set and her will was indomitable.

Quite correct that only overwhelming force would cause Japan to capitulate.

Barbarism was encouraged. They were already taking Chinese civilians & using them for bayonet practice and using healthy Chinese as surgical guinea pigs for inexperienced military doctors. They were inculcated in brutality and taught to believe they were a favored race (believing that the Emperor was actually a living god) and that everyone else was sub-human. This mindset made their culture increasingly barbarous and impenetrable to rational thought or humane appeal. Their belief in their own superiority & all other people's inferiority made it impossible to halt their aggression diplomatically. Two A-Bombs and Stalin's Red Army

poised against them was what it took to force surrender.

The parallels with today's Militant Islam should be obvious.

m2

MAN O MAN !! ALL THE ABOVE IS TOO DEEP FOR THIS OLD DOGFACE,

I guess I was just one of the guinea pigs. Rocky

And will they ever stop...... coming out of the bleeding jungle..?

The parallels with today's Militant Islam should be obvious.

 

m2

This is a very important point and one which many don't understand. We constantly hear people naively exclaim, "Why don't we just sit down and TALK with the terrorists? Has anyone tried talking with them?"

Does that not boggle your mind? The people spouting these questions were the very same human beings who inquiring why we weren't trying harder to find diplomatic solutions in regards to Hitler and the Emperor of Japan!! The same people who accused FDR of being a war monger because HE failed to keep the peace!!

The trouble is these same people regardless of decade, have no concept of a truly evil mind. They see everything in b&w. They are living in the very small confines of their own visionless gray-matter. If they can't imagine it, then it can't be possible.