Merely the flowers on the battlefield is what I refered to. I read the General's speachto West Point and to Congress. Very very touching. Question? Was Gen. relieved of
command by Harry Truman? If he was, what a hell of a way to end 52 years of
military service. The-AINT READY YET was just a little humor. Rocky
Roger, I recognize humor when see it. . . 
This discussion on MacArthur was straying a bit from poetry and so I migrated over to the WWII sandbox.
As for MacArthur, his problem is that he had a high opinion of himself, not entirely undeserved, and it got him into trouble. In my last class I took, Historical Research Methods, We read from a text that compared two opposing views on different issues. One issue was the Truman - MacArthur controversy. Here was my post. It was written for a master’s class so don’t attempt to read it while operating heavy machinery or the coma you fall into may cause accidents!! It may be hard to follow in parts because you, dear readers, have not had the benefit of reading the articles mentioned.
Posted by Todd O'Brien Sun Sep 30 22:55:04 2007.
Message: “In Defense of MacArthur: Miscommunications and Mistreatment,†D. Clayton James attempts to clarify some of the reasons for Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur during the Korean War. He claims that much of what is commonly understood about the conflict is an oversimplification of the facts. Many of the arguments of the General “need not have been dismissed so lightly†(391.)
He writes that the Truman – MacArthur controversy not over the General’s desire to expand the war. MacArthur, although an aggressive advocate of complete victory, did not wish to bring the Soviets in on the side of China and North Korea. During the early stages of his handling of the war there was not much conflict with the senior military advisors or the President. It was only later when orders became more often bent to suit what felt was tactically or operational expedient and insubordination was pushed further and further from acceptable that a problem got to epic proportions. Encouraging MacArthur was the lackluster response for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). By not countermanding orders which were in direct violation of orders given, MacArthur was given tacit approval. At first, they were more concerned about the perceived gaff than of the political implications of his actions. MacArthur also had a habit of putting the situation in dire terms which made the JCS less likely to react.
As the situation began to deteriorate in Korea the space between MacArthur’s intentions and those of Washington became wider. Where Truman had no intensions of liberating the North Koreans, MacArthur’s vision was complete victory. But it was the speaking his mind in direct contravention of presidential orders that finally pushed Truman to sack the general.
The violation of the December 1950 orders for all diplomats and military personnel to cease speaking out on policy was not the first of MacArthur’s pushing the limits. There were a long string of actions which either pushed the sensible boundaries of legality or down-right violated them. There were many instances where the General went against administration policy and even attempted to cinch the 1944 nomination for president. All of this was to come out during the senate hearings concerning the relief of the far-east chief. What it came down to is the damage that MacArthur did to the political aims of the United States. MacArthur was pulling the country into a situation, one that was rapidly deteriorating, that the administration did not want. The senior military advisors agreed with Truman. When MacArthur stated in his senate hearing that he maintained a close relationship with the JCS he showed how out of touch he was with the leadership in the states.
On the other side of the controversy, Roy K. Flint writes, “In Defense of Truman: MacArthur Had a Limited Vision as a Theater Commander.†MacArthur had seen his share of defeat in World War II, but had come back each time to regain what he had lost. The situation in Korea, Flint writes, was much different. North Korea had two major communist countries that could possibly enter the war on their side; something the Japanese never had. Whereas MacArthur sought nothing short of victory, the JCS and administration had other goals. Aside from blemishing his reputation in the twilight of his long career, a “tie†was simply bad policy in his eyes. The defeat by the Chinese, however, left him very defensive. He freely criticized what he considered to be bad policy to the press even after the December 6th gag order placed on military and diplomats by the president.
In the end the general’s goals did not match those of the president. The problems caused by this hurt the war effort in the end. Either he should have received the necessary personnel and equipment to do the job as he envisioned it, or he should have been reigned in or relieved sooner. The relief was not met with enthusiasm by the American populace. By the end of the hearings, however, people began to side with Truman.
At the dawn of the atomic age, the senior military and administration felt it too important for generals to be acting so freely in a situation that could have lead to an expanded conflict. The WWII model of devolved command and control did not fit, and neither did the attitude of MacArthur.
It is hard to say who is more at fault for the misfortunes of Korean War. MacArthur made serious miscalculations and flaunted the breaking of policy laid out by the administration, but the Truman administration did nothing about it until it was too late. I found the Flint essay more convincing as it laid out the reason for MacArthur’s eventual relief as well as the thinking for it. The James essay seems to do the same but he was ostensibly defending MacArthur’s decisions. It seems that he does not seem to spend a lot of time discussing why MacArthur is justified in his actions.
