Monte Artemisio was one obstacle that stood in the path of the 36th "Texas" Division's advance on Rome. The 11th Engineer Battalion was given the task to build a road over the mountain and clear a path for the vanguard of the 5th Army. Marion's note: this should say 111th
Date: May 30, 1944
Walker= Gen Walker, CG of 36th Infantry Division
B Company = Company B, 111th Engineer Battalion
Quoted directly from Source: The Texas Army, A History of the 36th Division in the Italian Campaign, by R. L. Wagner, State House Press, 1991.
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One of the most extraordinary combat engineering feats of World War II was the building of the 22-mile long road up and over M. Artemisio and through the Alban Hills by the 111th Engineer Battalion. Walker viewed the road as vital to the supply of the two forward regiments of the 36th and above all—should the enemy counter-attack and deny American use of the Nemi-Velletri highway—as an artery through which to move tanks and TDs to stop any enemy armored thrust.
Engineering authorities at Corps and Army were skeptical whether the road could be built, but Walker had received the division engineer’s assurance on the 28th that it was feasible; and he proceeded on that basis to issue a verbal order that the trail be constructed. The CO of the 111th Engineers accordingly gave the main job to B Company, commanded by Captain Orvil W. Crisman of Wortham, Texas, and preparations were underway on May 30 to begin work. Stovall, the division engineer, had stuck his neck a long way out when he gave assurance to General Walker about the practicability of a road over the 3,100-foot mountain. He had reconnoitered the area and satisfied himself—almost—that the earth there was volcanic in origin and therefore amenable to treatment by bulldozers. If it turned out to be some recalcitrant substance such as granite the mission would be seriously compromised. As he confided many years later:
“My extreme worry was the thick ledge of “cap rock†nearly 100 feet high. I had flown as near the area as the “driver†would take me and had examined the rock at the base that had rolled down the side. . . . All indications were that the rock was volcanic residue. The night of May 30 was nearly sleepless for me but I did feel some better after I got to the ledge and found it to be volcanic rock early in the morning of [May] 31.â€
The road itself followed roughly the trace of the 142nd Infantry. In the vicinity of M. Artemisio there were a number of trails already present, and the engineers made it their business, where possible, to improve those already existing rather than hacking out new ones. Company B minus one platoon, started work with their R-4 and D-7 Angle Dozers early on the morning of May 31* and widened the initial passage to allow forward movement of 2-1/2-ton trucks and tanks. Company B was followed closely by elements of a battalion of the attached 39th Engineer Combat Regiment who improved and marked the road. Before nightfall a total of ten Angle Dozers were at work on the road. Very little pick and shovel activity was required as heavy equipment did most of the work; the only delays were caused by snipers—all along the route. Flank guards had to be posted to protect the Dozer operators, who could not hear the sniper fire over the noise of their machines.
{* The division records say June 1 but the author has satisfied himself in conversation with Oran Stovall that this date is in error. Interview May 9, 1968, Austin, Texas. }
After the road reached the crest of M. Artemisio the 143rd Infantry told the commander of B Company that they were attacking down the other side of Artemisio and would continue northwest toward Rocca di Papa. This attack got underway about 9:30 on the morning of June 2 and Colonel Adams’ regiment needed the road continued forward in order to allow anti-tank weapons and tanks to support the attack. A route was carefully selected so that traffic could move easily over the one-way roads. When the road was completed the anti-tank company and cannon company of the 143rd were the first to use it. The Dozers continued to follow closely behind the 143rd Infantry over M. Pennolo, M. Sarapullero, Colle Tano, M. Ara and on to the highway near Rocca Di Papa.
On M. Pennolo the R-4 Dozer was knocked out by artillery, injuring an officer and three men. The original D-7 operator, who had led all the way, finished the remainder of the road alone. As the historian of the 111th Engineers pointed out, “The remaining D-7 bulldozer continued the work. In fact the operator of this equipment followed the Infantry almost to the outskirts of Rome.â€
The bulldozer operator in question was an irrepressible young corporal, John Bob Parks of Spencer, Louisiana. Many years later at the behest of his former battalion commander, he wrote down his impressions of those days leading to the capture of Rome. His induction into the job came when his superior officer, the CO of B Company, told him, in essence:
""Do you see that little hill up there, we are going to cut a road up and over it to carry tanks; I have selected you as No. 1 dozerman for the job, dont [sic] spare the horses because we have a dozen more to take your place.†From that location I started filling ditches, pushing rocks and trees out of the way; at any time I got it smooth enough to climb over, I moved forward to the next. . . [obstacle] and other equipment finished the job. At first the job offered few difficulties; but as we started climbing, the job demanded my full attention and I lost track of time and everything else except that damn white tracing tape that was always in front of me.â€
As the slopes of the mountain became steeper, rocks and dirt started to give way under Parks’ machine with a loss of traction, thereby slowing him and making his work harder. Forest growth was becoming more dense and had to be removed by demolition crews or by men using saws and axes. Parks tried to make every traverse as long and straight as possible before turning back because each hairpin turn had to be wide enough to allow the awkward tanks to move around without losing a track. As he described it:
“Working parallel to the slope and moving up as we could and switching back in the opposite direction, we moved up sometime only a few feet above the last cut, but up, up, up, all the time. We worked like hell till sometime after dark when the Colonel [stovall] told Lieut. [Earl P.] Powers to stop us because he was afraid we would do more damage to the men and equipment than we could do good in the dark. The enemy had gotten real nasty and had closed in in the darkness. "
The next morning (June 1) the Dozers were held up by German counter-attacks but with help from the 143rd Infantry and a few men, probably from the First Special Service Force, the enemy was cleared out and the engineers continued forward. About this time, Parks ran out of gas but was soon re-supplied by another engineer and after a short delay rumbled ahead once again. In the meantime the B Company CO had reappeared, urging his men on. As John Bob phrased it:
“Capt. Crisman reminded me again that I was holding up the whole damn Fifth Army. One of my fingers had been busted earlier and was hurting something awful but I was afraid to tell anybody for fear that I would be replaced; this was one job that I was going to finish. We finally got to the top [and] though I had been fully aware that we had done some climbing, I was not prepared for the view from the top. I could hardly see the place we had started from the morning before. Anzio and the sea was . . . [visible] in the far distance. I had little time to view the landscape however, because we still had the road to build to the bottom. . . . We got some long range heavy artillery later in the day. I was used to 88’s and other incoming fire and to our own tanks and tank destroyers that had been firing over us. I did not know at first that we were their target. Not that it would have mattered a whole lot, because Sgt. Alex Griffin told me we had to get to the bottom before dark and that the Krauts were lousy shots. Naturally the descent was much easier [because] we were pushing downhill. . . . We reached the bottom and a second class road well before dark and I watched some armored units pass us and disappear in to the valley. We had finished the road that could not be built. As I think of it now, I honestly [don’t] think it could have been done by any other engineer unit in the Army.â€
After finishing the road Parks and the other men of his unit spent an Uneventful night. The next day, June 2, they continued with normal engineering work and also came under a good deal of enemy artillery fire. Though Parks had no idea where he was, he had in fact progressed rather close to Rome and quite near Highway 7. His bulldozer had taken a great deal of punishment, and Parks took a short time out for repairs before dark. He was dog tired and his hand throbbed with pain, but Parks was up before daylight the next morning and soon ran on to a paved highway over which all sorts of vehicles were moving.
“It was not long before trucks, tanks and other traffic nearly ran me in to the ditch. Some so and so yelled at me to get that rattleing [sic] wreck off the highway, [because] we were holding up the war. I had no idea where I was but I was out of orders and I had heard “all roads lead to Rome.†So, I took my place in the parade to catch my company that I knew were up front somewhere and might need me. I got nearly to the walls of the city and decided it would be good to drive the first bulldozer into town, but I got stopped on that idea. The Colonel stopped me and asked where I thought I was going, and when I told him he told me to take cover behind some buildings or I would be the first dead dozer operator in Rome.â€
The 111th Engineers with the likes of John Bob Parks and his mates had accomplished a notable feat which gave General Walker and, in turn, Fifth Army the assurance that the successful forward thrust of the Allied movement against Rome could be sustained, even if a massive German counter-attack developed.**
**Footnote:
A description of the 36th Division’s operation against Velletri was requested by and prepared for the commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, Army War College at Washington, D. C. “The Capture of Velletri & the Colle Laziale—36th Inf Div 29 May-4 June 44â€; see also article by Robert L. Wagner, “High Road to Rome,†Texas Parade Magazine, August 1968.
On 4 June, the 5th Army entered Rome.