Hello all my name is Kyle Thomas and I am fairly new to this forum. I was wondering if there is any one out there who could help me find more information on my Uncle Harold G. Parnell. He was killed in action in Tunisia on April, 15 1943. I am having a hard time finding any information on the Mediterranean Theater in North Africa. I have gotten some information from Roque Riojas whom I met researching information on my uncle. I also read in this forum that Dogdaddy has done extensive research on the Mediterranean Theater. If any one could set me in the right direction it would be greatly appreciated.
Thank you for any help.
Kyle Thomas
thomas-kdja@t-online.de
I know this original post is dated; I am responding anyway in hopes that it will reach you. My name is Craig Johnson and I have been involved with researching the story of the men who served in the 34th Division half my life. Part of that has been assembling the listings of wartime death casualties and the related details about those men. I do know about Parnell's death (I believe I have a snap shot of Parnell also, but will have to scan it if you are interested). I will paste a portion of my document "History and Death Casualty Biographies: 135th Infantry (1942-1945)". It talks about the 2nd Fondouk. You will notice it might be a little opinionated and not favorable toward the British command. I thought the circumstances of those days surrounding his death should be known. It may not give us that "warm-fuzzy". It might; however, show us that mistakes were made, and a flawed plan was allowed to be used. As a warning, the narrative is pretty long.
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Second Battle of Fondouk
April 7 - 15, 1943
Led by Col. Robert Ward
April 7, 1943
In conjunction with an attack being made by the 133rd Infantry, the 135th Infantry would launch its second offensive against Fondouk. The initial objective was to take the steep, rocky slopes of Djebel el Aouareb (the high ground overlooking the Fondouk Gap from the south). Once the high ground was taken and the pass secured, the British would go through the Fondouk Pass, proceed to Kairouan and continue to the Meditteranean Sea and cut off the German Army to the south.
This plan for this second attack against Fondouk was also devised by the British Army (Lieutenant General John Crocker). The northern boundary for the 34th Division would be the southern bank of the Marguellil creek. The attack would made easterward directly against the hill mass south of Fondouk el Aouareb. In effect, it would be a frontal attack across the steep, rocky slopes of Djebel el Aouareb.
The 135th Infantry would advance along the northern (left) flank with the 3rd Battalion leading the attack. The 1st Battalion would be in reserve on the left flank, provding protective fire against Djebel ain el Rhorab (Hill 209). The 133rd Infantry's 3rd Battalion would attack along the southern (right) flank. The British would make an attack from the vicinity of Pichon and work their way toward Djebel Ain al Rhorab, in hopes of preventing the enemy on that hill from bringing deadly enfilading fire to bear upon the attacking 34th Division troops. Djebel Rhorab was about (500) yards northeast of where the 135th Infantry's troops would advance. General Ryder voiced his concern over Rhorab to General Crocker. Crocker dismissed Ryder's concerns by stating that Rhorab would be lightly held and should not be a concern to him. Although a flawed plan, Ryder was ordered to carry it out. Knowing that fire from Rhorab could devastate the operation, Ryder requested that he could move up his attack from (05:30) hours to (03:00) hours. This might give his troops enough time to move under the cover of darknes to slip past the watchful eyes on Djebel Rhorab undetected and be on the objective before dawn.
April 8, 1943
After nightfall on April 7, 1943, the 135th Infantry moved into an assembly area due west of the Fondouk Pass. This assembly area would be about one thousand yards from the line of departure designated for the attack. The men laced toilet paper through the helmet nets on the back of their helmets so that the men could see and follow the man in front on them. The 135th Infantry would attack in a column of battalions. The 3rd Battalion would be in the lead, the 2nd Battalion would follow and the 1st Battalion would be in a reserve position on the desert plain below Djebel Trozza. A huge aerial bombing of the German positions was planned to occur before the attack. An aerial bombing attack was needed in this attack as it would be able to destroy German positions on the reverse slopes of Djebel el Aouareb that an artillery barrage couldn't. After the bombing attack, an artillery barrage would follow. After the artillery barrage had completed, then the assault troops would attack.
Just before midnight, the 34th Division was informed that the scheduled aerial bombardment had been cancelled. During the move up, the 3rd Battalion units had ventured completely off course and gotten lost. The 3rd Battalion units (Company "I", Company "L", and part of Company "M") arrived at their assembly area at (01:50) hours and made contact with the 133rd Infantry. At (03:10) hours, Company "K" and the rest of Company "M" arrived at the assembly area. The assault units moved up to their line of departure at the foot of the mountain. At (05:10) hours, Colonel Ward ordered the attack to jump off. Company "L" was on the left flank, Company "K" was on the right flank and Company "I" followed in reserve. From Company "M", one of the machine gun platoons along with the 3rd (mortar) Platoon provided fire support to the assault companies. With the 3rd Battalion getting lost, the jump-off time for the attack was pushed back to the original H-hour. Much precious time of movement under the cover of darkness was lost.
The units were to advance until they reached a predesignated line about (1,500) yards from the base of Djebel el Aouareb. At this point, the 3rd Battalion would make final preparations for the assault. The 3rd Battalion had veered too far to the north and contact was lost with the 133rd Infantry. It was (06:35) hours before the assault units reached this line. Upon reaching this line, a special flare signal was fired (green and white star cluster) was to be fired by the 3rd Battalion Commander (Major Garnet Hall). This was the signal to commence with the preparatory artillery barrage on the objective. Some of the shells fell short and caused casualties in Company "K". The Germans opened fire upon the 3rd Battalion troops with mortar and machine guns at about this time also. It was almost dawn when the artillery barrage was lifted.
To plug the gap between the 3rd Battalion - 135th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion - 133rd Infantry, the Commanding Officer for the 1st Battalion - 135th Infantry (Lt. Col. Robert P. Miller) was ordered to rush his battalion across the desert flats as the sun was rising behind the enemy positions. It is believed that Company “C” and Company “B” would lead the attack and Company “A” would follow in reserve. To support the advance, an American artillery barrage began at (06:00) hours. The barrage lasted fifteen minutes and was followed by a smoke screen. It was broad daylight when the 1st Battalion was seen moving from the assembly area to the line of departure. At about (07:00) hours, the 1st Battalion begins to receive fire. Heavy mortar fire was brought to bear upon the 1st Battalion from Djebel Rhorab. The British were supposed to attack this hill and prevent it from being used to fire upon the assault units. It is believed that Lt. Richardson of Company “C” was killed by artillery fire during this advance. It is thought that Company “B” and Company “A” flanked around the impact area and continued to move forward.
At this point it was decided to reinstate the aerial bombardment. At (07:30) hours the troops received orders to halt. The aerial bombing was scheduled again for between (08:00 - 08:30) hours. The bombers never showed and the attack was postponed. The troops waited, while being pelted with fire from Djebel Rhorab to the north (left flank) and from Djebel el Aouareb to their front. By (09:30) hours, it was evident that the bombers were a no-show and the aerial attack was cancelled. The artillery barrage resumed with smoke and high-explosive shells agains the German positions.
Afterwards the assault companies resumed their advance. After the countless delays, the Germans had the range of the assault troops zeroed in and began to shell them in earnest. The enemy fire (artillery and mortar) became increasingly thick. In spots, the fire and explosions were so heavy that the resulting dust and flying shrapnel resembled a smoke screen. The 1st Battalion became pinned down at (11:20) hours and and it attempted to dig in. By (11:40) hours, the advance had completely bogged down. The men scratched at the deserte soil with their bayonets and entrenching tools and frantic attempts to avoid the shrapnel and automatic fire clipping the air above their heads.
By late in the afternoon, the British attack from Pichon was still over a mile away from Djebel Rhorab. The 1st Battalion begins to slowly move forward again at (15:30) hours and becomes pinned down frequently. Tanks came up on a couple of occasions and shell the German positions in the hills to the left. Company “B” led the 1st Battalion and suffered heavy casualties on this day. At dusk, the 1st Battalion reached German wire entanglements and is pinned down again. By (21:00) hours, the 1st Battalion takes up positions for the night.
At (17:45) hours, a company from the 751st Tank Battalion was committed to the renewed attack being made by Company "K" and Company "L". It too was an exercise in mass confusion and also ended in failure. It is believed that the tanks made considerable progress and some troops did reach the base of the hills. Because of the heavy fire coming from the left rear, the troops could not move up with the tanks so that the tanks could hold their newly-gained ground. This heavy fire forced the tanks and troops to fall back. In some case, when tanks would come up to lead the next attack, the infantry would not follow.
At about that same time, tanks from the British 26th Armoured Brigade came into the area of the 3rd Battalion - 135th Infantry and parked among the troops and their foxholes. This added to the confusion among the troops, and left them wondering which tanks they were supposed to follow. This also increased the enemy fire directed toward their positions. In some cases, the British tanks ran over occupied foxholes, causing the walls of the foxholes to collapse in on the occupant and burrying him alive. In some cases, when tanks would arrive to make another attack, they became engulfed in flames within minutes. Further attempts to move forward that day also failed. A night attack at (19:00) hours by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions also failed.
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Company "D" Deaths, 08-Apr-1943
Fatt, Hyman
Mc Culloh, Edwin F.
Nussbaum, Francis J. - Died of Wounds 21-Apr-1943
Parnell, Harold G. - Died of Wounds 16-Apr-1943
PARNELL, HAROLD G. "SUNNY" - Sergeant - Company "D" - 1st Platoon (.50 Caliber Machine Guns) - Section Sergeant (Stillwater, Minnesota): Harold Parnell was originally with the Minnesota National Guard. Parnell was seriously wounded in the neck by mortar shrapnel while he was trying to cross the flat, open terrain at the Fondouk Pass on April 8, 1943. Platoon Sergeant Lester Rydeen told the medics that Parnell was wounded and where he was located. The medics could not get to him and evacuate him until nightfall. Parnell was evacuated to the hospital, where he was able to hold on until he died on April 16, 1943.
Parnell is buried at the American cemetery near Carthage, Tunisia in Plot © - Row (7) - Grave (1).
